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by 
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Professor Allan Rosenbaum, Major Professor 
 
The purpose of this research is to examine the factors that have influenced political 
decentralization in Paraguay and Colombia and how the new intergovernmental relations 
that result in political, fiscal and policy decentralization impact local governments and their 
capacity to deliver public services. The research, building on institutional theory, places 
particular emphasis on trying to explain and understand how intergovernmental relations 
shape the decentralization—and effectiveness—of public service delivery to local and 
regional governments, particularly in the areas of health and education. 
The research method is principally a path-dependent within-cases analysis. The 
analysis traces how the processes of decentralization evolved from 1990 to 2010. Special 
attention is given to critical junctures, or special political or social circumstances, that have 
significantly changed the process of decentralization. Data was collected mainly through 
reviews of documents, journals and newspapers, and most significantly through elite 
interviews “tailored to the purposes of the study” (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002). Leaders 
	 viii 
of political parties, unions, non-governmental-organizations and civic movements were 
interviewed in both countries. 
The research shows that political parties play a very important role, not only in 
the design and implementation of decentralization of public service delivery, but also in 
sustaining and furthering the process. The analysis is based on the assumption that 
increased decentralization of health and education to local and regional levels should 
positively impact basic health and education indicators. If decentralization, as argued, 
helps governments to be more responsive to local needs, and if more health and education 
programs are decentralized to the local and regional level in response to the demands of 
many communities, it is predicted that health and education indicators would improve, as 
people would have easier access to these services. 
Analysis of health and education indicators in the form of infant mortality rates 
(deaths of children under one year old, live births) and school enrollment show mixed 
results for both Colombia and Paraguay.  
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CHAPTER I  
  
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
Introduction 	
Twenty years ago, as a young graduate student in Washington, DC, I was 
introduced to the concept of decentralization by a former colleague who was then working 
at the World Bank. Decentralization, with its devolution of power and authority to regional 
and local governments seemed to me, unrealistic. No central government would devolve 
(any) authority to lower levels of government unless forced by compelling reasons.  
A few months later, as a recently hired Program Coordinator for a large US Agency 
for International Development (USAID) program aimed at strengthening local 
governments and democratic institutions in South America, I found myself again exposed 
not only to the concept of decentralization, but to actually assisting governments in Chile 
and Paraguay implement it.  
A few weeks later, the implication of what decentralization reforms really entailed 
came to light at a meeting with local government officials in the regional capital of 
Concepcion in the Department of Concepcion, Paraguay, a locality about 415 Km or 5 ½ 
hours away from the capital city of Asuncion. At the local health clinic, some broken 
windows caught our attention. When I asked why they had not been repaired, I was told 
that the Health Ministry in Asuncion had yet to send the funds for that particular repair. 
The realization that administrative and fiscal decentralization could allow these local 
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authorities to make their own decisions, and not depend on authorizations and funding from 
distant bureaucrats in the city of Asuncion, made me realize the importance of these 
reforms.  
 In the mid-1990s, Paraguay’s decentralization supporters relied heavily on 
Colombia’s experience with decentralization and to some extent modeled their reforms on 
that country’s successful reforms and initiatives. With time, and through work with 
municipal associations around the Hemisphere, it became clear that political, 
administrative, and fiscal decentralization was key to strengthening local governments and 
to delivering better services, especially education and health, to local communities. 
However, lingering questions motivated me to seek a better understanding of the context 
in which unitary systems (such as Colombia and Paraguay) decentralize and, likewise, 
under what conditions might they recentralize.  
Thus, the present research aims to examine, first, the factors that have influenced 
political decentralization in these two countries, and how the new intergovernmental 
relations that result as a consequence of political, fiscal and policy decentralization impact 
local governments and their capacity to deliver public services. This research puts 
particular emphasis on understanding how intergovernmental relations shape the 
decentralization—and effectiveness—of public service delivery (particularly in the areas 
of health and education) to local and regional governments.   
Building on institutional theory (Frederickson & Smith, 2003), and previous 
academic research, the present study seeks to answer the research question of how 
intergovernmental relations shape and modify political and other decentralization 
processes in countries with unitary forms of government and how those processes inform 
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and define the implementation of decentralized public service delivery in the areas of health 
and education at the local and regional level. Other key objectives include explaining and 
analyzing how differences in the implementation of health and education decentralization 
have impacted the delivery of those services at the local level.  
The proposed research is firmly based on—and supports the importance of—a 
political-economic analysis, with the belief that knowledge of the policy context greatly 
contributes to the understanding of very complex policymaking processes. Context 
specificity matters, though opponents of a political-economic analysis often argue that such 
a focus neglects, or fails to examine, the marginal improvements feasible even in very 
complex and difficult policy environments (Corduneanu-Huci et al., 2013). The present 
research offers an analysis of both the “larger picture” of the institutions and stakeholders 
involved in the public service decentralization process, as well as the particular impact of 
such reforms on more basic indicators, in an attempt to examine those marginal 
improvements that indeed were made in both Colombia and Paraguay. 
 
Significance of the Study 	
This research aims to uncover better understanding of why countries with a unitary 
form of government, such as Colombia and Paraguay, engage in political decentralization, 
and how such processes influence the shape and effectiveness of public service delivery 
with particular emphasis on health and education. The proposed research utilizes a 
qualitative-descriptive and comparative approach based on institutional theory and 
previous academic research.  
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The findings of the research—through an examination of how timing and socio-
political determinants played a role in changing the balance of power, and an examination 
of the subnational level policies that were promoted and implemented—could prove useful 
for policy-makers both in Latin America and other regions of the world, who are initiating, 
or at different stages of decentralization processes. Findings will also be valuable to 
international donor and multilateral organizations who have spent hundreds of millions of 
dollars promoting and supporting decentralization—often in an uncoordinated manner and 
without a full understanding of the socio-political circumstances that could be influencing 
how such initiatives can or cannot be implemented.  
 
Background  	
In Latin American countries, political constitutions are a reflection of each 
country’s history, culture, and political evolution since the Independence movements of 
the early XIX century. As such, the countries in the region are diverse and unique and 
provide specific characteristics that have shaped their respective political institutions. Most 
assuredly, the quality of governance is influenced by the kind and quality of government 
present in a particular country or society. Gerring, Thacker, and Moreno (2005), with their 
centripetal theory of democratic governance, posit that for the proponents of centralist 
theory, good governance is the result of political institutions that are controlled by a central 
authority. On the other hand, decentralization theory argues that the diffusion of power 
among many independent bodies is most likely to lead to good government.  
These two visions of what brings about good governance resurfaced strongly with 
the return to democracy in the region in the 1980s. In fact, in many parts of the world, the 
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late 1980s and early 1990s saw the promotion of decentralization as a dominant issue in 
the agenda of many national governments, regional leaders, and development agencies. 
Decentralization was seen as key to reestablishing the democratic credentials of the State 
in formerly authoritarian regimes and as a way to make governments more responsive, 
closer to the people, and transparent. Many also proposed decentralization as the best way 
to promote better governance, reduce inequalities and strengthen economic development. 
Decentralization was viewed as key to improving the quality of governance by making 
governments more accountable.  
A key reason for decentralization in Latin America was most likely the result of the 
political evolution of the 1980s and 1990s, in which central governments, often highly 
authoritarian, had lost credibility. Civil society and emerging political groups started to 
demand more participation after decades of dictatorial governments. Seemingly, the 
collapse of centrally controlled economies had made central governments obsolete. Thus, 
the international community was ready to support decentralization as a means to 
democratization. However, in the end, decentralization—when successfully 
implemented—is inevitably a locally driven political process and “in seeking explanations 
for the popularity of decentralization, we must therefore look mainly at the thinking of 
leaders within the governments of developing countries” (Manor, 1999).  
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Decentralization 	
Decentralization is defined in this research as the transfer of political, 
administrative and fiscal responsibilities and authority to subnational (regional or local) 
levels of government (Falleti, 2005).   
The central concern of the proposed research rests mainly on better understanding 
the role of political actors and their interactions in the defining and implementing of 
decentralization processes (in particular for the provision of public services). As a 
consequence, special attention is given to the underlying political relationships driving this 
process (Gomez, 60). The principal theoretical framework is based on institutional theory: 
“an institutional approach is one that emphasizes the role of institutions and 
institutionalization in the understanding of human actions within an organization, social 
order, or society” (March & Olsen_B; 1998).  
The present research is based on a comparative institutionalist approach in which 
the objective is to explain how specific institutions shape outcomes (Grindle, 2000). As 
such, the research focuses on the historical context, the dynamics and actions of the groups 
involved, and the interactions that might generate cooperation and conflict around areas of 
policy reforms. 
Institutions are characterized by “the sets of working rules that are used to 
determine who is eligible to make decisions in some arena, what actions are allowed or 
constrained, what aggregation rules will be used, what procedures must be followed, what 
information must or must not be provided, and what payoffs will be assigned on individuals 
dependent on their actions” (Ostrom, 1990; page 51). 
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Institutions shape the rules of the game. Examining the institutions involved, and 
the rules and constraints that define incentives for decentralization, helps explain the 
behavior of stakeholders in the process of public service delivery decentralization. The role 
of political and economic actors can be better understood, and their likeliness to change 
can be better explained, by examining the origins and the internal mechanisms of the 
institutions with which interact (Corduneanu-Huci et al., 2013). 
Institutional theory emphasizes the significance of institutional structures in 
affecting the course of reform (March & Olsen, 1989); thus, special importance is given to 
examining constitutions and legal frameworks. The interrelationship of political 
institutions also affects the distribution of power—even though context and motives also 
matter. Thus, political institutions (and their inter-relationships) are able to influence the 
process of decentralization. Therefore, the need to concentrate on bargaining relationships 
between executives, political parties, and subnational governments as underlying factors 
controlling the reform process is of fundamental importance (Gomez, 58). March and 
Olsen’s logic of expected consequences—based on the premise that actors are rational and 
act in pursuit of their best interests; and logic of appropriateness (with its emphasis on 
rules, identities, and institutions)—facilitates the understanding of the political bargaining 
processes that characterize processes of decentralization. As they note, “political actors 
are constituted both by their interests, by which they evaluate their expected consequences, 
and by the rules embedded in their identities and political institutions.” (March & Olsen_B, 
1998).  
According to institutional theories, political democracy depends not only on 
economic & social conditions but also on the design of political institutions 
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(rules/procedures/roles/strategies become important) (March & Olsen, 1989). 
Decentralization is then the result of the interaction of numerous political institutions 
including legislative bodies, political parties, subnational levels of government, executive 
office holders and their deputies, and civil society actors among others.   
At the heart of most decentralization reforms is a basic struggle for power and 
control. Inevitably, this creates conflict and tension.  Examining how conflict and 
compromise is achieved by the different political actors contributes to the understanding 
of decentralization processes (Lyne, 2006).  
Several factors have been posited to account for many of the differences in 
decentralization outcomes observed in Latin America, including the following: 
1) The motivation of key actors is a fundamental element in defining how and when 
decentralization will occur and to what extent it will be implemented (basically, the degree 
of political will);  
2) The institutional arrangements (legal framework) put in place that define and 
often have limited the capacity and autonomy of local governments in performing their 
new roles. Institutional arrangements will determine the degree to which political power 
and authority is transferred from central government to subnational levels; the 
administrative assignment of specific functions; the roles for each level of government; 
and the capacity to generate, collect, and administer one’s own revenue. 
3) Finally, important “state-society relations” also influence the outcome of 
decentralization initiatives. History, cultural values, and traditions (including variations 
within a country) play a key role in influencing the outcome of decentralization processes, 
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helping to explain how regions and localities within the same country might expect 
different results from the decentralization process (Tulchin & Selee, 2004).  
 The struggle for power and control is evident in the decentralization process of the 
two countries analyzed here. In both Paraguay and Colombia, in the early 1990s, significant 
political changes occurred that helped place the issue of decentralization at the forefront of 
the political agenda. Impetus for these political reforms resulted from: the international 
movement toward increased democratization, especially in the Latin American context—
in conjunction with years of the State’s failure in the provision of services, and buttressed 
by support from multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, and cooperation agencies like the US Agency for International 
Development. But, as we shall see, over time, the implementation of these reforms began 
to stall. The present research also aims to analyze the reasons and factors for this 
development. 
 
Case Selection: Paraguay 	
A high degree of government centralization and authoritarianism characterized 
Paraguay’s history for most of the XX century. Beginning in 1952, one person (Alfredo 
Stroessner) and one political party (Partido Colorado) controlled the country for 37 years. 
Together they controlled almost all aspects of life in Paraguay. This led to the establishment 
of a culture of clientelism, corruption, and mismanagement that has been difficult to 
overturn. 
The dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner ended in 1989, and the decentralization 
process began soon after with the 1991 election of mayors by popular vote for the first time 
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in the country’s history. Political decentralization was further encouraged through the 
pressure brought by regional leaders during the constitutional assembly, which was elected 
to draft a new constitution for the country. As a result, the 1992 Constitution established 
Paraguay, somewhat ambiguously, as a unitary, decentralized state.  
The Constitution also recognized the role of Departments (equivalent to states or 
provinces) and municipalities and it introduced the figure of the Departmental Governor 
and Departmental Council (legislative body) to be directly elected by popular vote. In the 
Constitution, responsibilities and sources of revenues for Departments are only vaguely 
mentioned, leaving Congress to further define them by enacting necessary legal 
framework. Competencies and revenue sources for municipal governments also are only 
vaguely addressed by the new Constitution.  
In practice, the Congress has been very slow to enact the necessary legal framework 
and central government agencies have been reluctant to implement the few initiatives that 
have been approved.  The central government continues to control and monopolize revenue 
sources and to have great powers of intervention in subregional governments. Congress 
has introduced little legislation to change this situation. 
One of the earliest and most significant attempts at decentralization in Paraguay 
was initiated by the administration of President Juan Carlos Wasmosy (1993-1998) in the 
areas of health services and, to a lesser degree, education.  After nearly 15 years of health 
and education decentralization, what is the situation in Paraguay? Has decentralization 
really improved the conditions of those municipalities that have been part of the 
decentralization process? What do key health and education indicators suggest? 
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How have the relationships between the executive, congress and subnational 
leaders impacted the decentralization process? What roles were played by political parties 
(especially the dominant Colorado Party) and other socio-political actors in shaping 
decentralization? If decentralization has stalled, what has changed the path toward effective 
political, fiscal and administrative decentralization? 
The answers to these questions are unclear because very little research has been 
conducted on these issues. In fact, among scholars analyzing decentralization processes in 
Latin America, Paraguay’s decentralization has received the least attention. The present 
study aims to provide needed insight into Paraguay’s decentralization process.  
 
Case Selection: Colombia 	
Colombia experienced a rapid, significant, and consistent decentralization process 
in the 1980s and 1990s, but subsequently experienced a considerable slowdown in the last 
decade. The country has three levels of government: national, regional (Departments), and 
municipal. Each Department is headed by a governor and a legislative assembly; 
municipalities are led by a mayor and a municipal council. All of these officials are directly 
elected by the people.  
Contrary to other countries where political and administrative decentralization 
came first, Colombia’s decentralization started with fiscal issues. With the constitutional 
reform of 1968, a mechanism to transfer funds to Departments to be spent on health and 
education was implemented. In the 1980s, the concepts of administrative decentralization 
and deconcentration were added to the debate on decentralization. In 1986, political 
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decentralization of the country was strengthened with the direct election of mayors by 
popular vote.  
Simultaneously, a program to reform municipalities was also initiated. 
Municipalities regained responsibilities over water provision, environmental health, the 
building and maintenance of schools, hospitals and roads, housing, urban transportation 
and cadasters (property tax rolls). Health and education responsibilities were progressively 
transferred to municipalities and Departments, along with the funds to support them. But 
this resource and administrative transfer often occurred without needed technical and 
human resources.   
In the early 1990s, Colombia experienced one of the most difficult periods in its 
history. Political and social instability, the product of years of armed conflict, drug-
smuggling and related political and social violence, were significantly undermining 
Colombia’s institutions. Recognizing the need to address the increasing fragility of the 
State, the government of President Virgilio Barco called for the election of a Constitutional 
Assembly in late 1990. In it, the traditional political parties did not have a clear mandate 
and a plurality of movements were represented (including former guerrillas). Much of the 
debate centered partly on the merits of a federal versus a centralist state. In the end, the 
1991 Constitution established Colombia as a unitary, decentralized and participatory state. 
The 1991 Constitution redefined the roles and functions of Departments and municipalities 
and established a completely new fund transfer system that was implemented by law in 
1993 (Acosta, 2003). Health and education decentralization began at this time.  
Continuing political violence, combined with apparent fiscal imbalances created by 
excessive subnational expenditures and growing indebtedness, seems to have contributed 
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to a decline in the promotion of fiscal, political, and administrative decentralization by the 
central government. The governments of former Presidents Samper and Pastrana, and 
especially President Uribe, seemingly halted the process of decentralization. Thus, the 
country had been viewed as a model for decentralization by other countries in the region 
(in fact, when Paraguay began its decentralization process, it looked to Colombia’s 
government officials for guidance), appeared to no longer be at the forefront of 
decentralization. If this is the case, where do health and education decentralization stand 
after more than 20 years of experience? Have indicators in those areas improved? Are 
Colombians receiving better health and education services, and if so, what is the 
consequence? Can Colombia still be a model for other unitary countries starting the process 
of public service delivery decentralization? 
 
Research questions 	
As noted above, many factors are involved in the promotion of decentralization 
processes, and in the design and implementation of decentralized public service delivery 
policies. The kind of intergovernmental relations that both produce decentralization 
initiatives and, subsequently, result from these processes will influence the policies that 
can be implemented at subnational levels of government. The more subnational 
governments control the process, or exert influence on it, the more likely that the 
decentralization of public services (such as health and education) will not be just 
administrative deconcentration but will include fiscal decentralization and some degree of 
policymaking autonomy as part of its implementation.  
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In a country like Paraguay, where the initiative for political decentralization was 
strongly influenced by representatives from subnational levels of government, what type 
of decentralization in health and education has resulted? Have these policies been more or 
less effective?  In a country like Colombia, where subnational political leaders were 
actually quite successful in implementing the decentralization of public services (Falleti, 
2005), what has happened to slow down the process? In either country, have health and 
education indicators improved due to decentralization?  
A first proposed hypothesis (H1) posits that if national, regional, and local political 
leaders participate and collaborate in the promotion of political, fiscal, and administrative 
decentralization, there is a greater probability for the passage, approval, and 
implementation of public service decentralization laws.  
A second hypothesis (H2) posits that once public service delivery decentralization 
has been enacted, the higher the degree of collaboration between national, regional, and 
local levels of government, stakeholders (in essence the type of intergovernmental relations 
established) and citizens (other socio-political actors), the greater the probability of its 
success and effectiveness. 
In the absence of progress with decentralization in the last decade, a third 
hypothesis (H3) posits that in the case of Paraguay, even though the process of 
decentralization was started by subnational authorities, the presence of one dominant and 
clientelistic political party has slowed political, fiscal, and administrative 
decentralization; thus shifting the balance of power back to the national government. 
In the case of Colombia, a fourth hypothesis (H4) posits that even in the presence 
of multiple regional and local political movements, as power is centralized in the executive 
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branch, the slowing of decentralization is more likely; thus shifting the balance of power 
in favor of the national government. 
 
Variables 	
For the purpose of the present research, the success and effectiveness of health and 
education decentralization processes is the dependent variable.  It is measured by the 
number of health and education policy/programs that were decentralized to regional and 
local levels, as well as by how basic performance indicators (such as infant mortality rate 
and school enrollment) have been affected.   
Independent variables considered include: 
● Institutionalization of the decentralization process. This is measured in terms of the 
presence or absence of a clear regulatory framework defining the administrative, 
fiscal, and political responsibilities of each level of government, the ability of the 
central government to override decisions and policies taken by lower levels of 
government; and the extent of implementation of relevant regulations and policies 
at each government level.  
● Role of political parties and politically active social movements. This is measured 
in terms of the presence or absence of political agreements in favor of 
decentralization; support in national, regional and local legislative bodies for 
decentralization legislation by the different parties/groups; coalition building 
strategies in support of the decentralization process; voting records; and/or public 
declarations.  
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● Involvement of other socio-political actors. This variable is measured by the 
presence or absence of an active media, student movements, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and union movements and their ability to influence the 
process through the established political parties or through demonstrations and 
activism. The role of international organizations and national and international 
financial institutions in influencing the process is also considered.  
● Control variables such as national education and poverty levels and other relevant 
indicators are also taken into account.  
 
Decentralization is operationalized by four dimensions: the share of revenue 
collection and revenue expenditure of subnational governments; their policy making 
authority; how officers are selected (elected or appointed); and, how their regional interests 
are represented in the national legislatures (Falleti, 2005, p 333). This is very important 
when analyzing decentralization processes in Latin America, and especially in the cases of 
Paraguay and Colombia, because the way in which intergovernmental relations are 
established, and how interactions happen, often affects the type of policies that can be 
implemented. 
 
Methods, Data Collection, and Sample 	
The research method is principally a path-dependent within-cases analysis. The 
analysis traces how the processes of decentralization evolved from 1990 to 2010. Special 
attention is given to critical junctures, or special political or social circumstances, that 
significantly changed or altered the process of decentralization. The research aims to 
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determine if the presence of certain contextual factors (or their absence) was necessary for 
decentralization to move ahead (to see if any causality could be established).  
This research required a close examination of each country’s history, present 
conditions, and culture to better understand the socio-political circumstances in which the 
decentralization processes occurred. Data was collected mainly through the reviewing of 
documents, journals and newspapers and, most significantly, through elite interviews 
“tailored to the purposes of the study” (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002). In this regard, 
interviews of national, regional, and local political leaders were very important. Leaders of 
political parties, unions, NGOs, and civic movements were interviewed in both countries. 
Over 25 interviews were conducted in Paraguay utilizing a semi-structured questionnaire. 
All interviewees requested that their comments not be audio-recorded. In Colombia, 15 
interviews were conducted, following the same format, and there too, interviewees 
preferred not to be audio-recorded. Interview notes were however taken. 
The interviewees included legislators representing all political parties in each 
country’s Congress, subnational legislators and elected local authorities 
(mayors/governors), former cabinet level officials in charge of decentralization policies 
and their implementation, and civil society representatives working on the promotion and 
implementation of health and education decentralization policies. Voting records on 
matters affecting decentralization were sought but in neither Colombia nor Paraguay were 
they available—only recently did both legislative bodies begin to record individual votes.  
A fundamental challenge in analyzing the information gathered through interviews 
is the accuracy of reconstructing how decisions were made and how things would have 
changed if decisions were different. To prevent such bias, as many of the actors involved 
	 18 
in the decentralization decision making process as possible were interviewed. Different 
historical interpretations are also taken into account.  
To measure the effectiveness of health and education decentralization, indicators 
such as student enrollment and coverage in the case of education decentralization, and 
infant mortality rates (deaths of children under one year of age, live births) for health 
decentralization are used for both countries. A comparison at the regional and municipal 
levels is done using these selected indicators, accounting for the specificities of each 
country’s service provision decentralization scheme and legal framework.  
In the case of Colombia’s health decentralization experience, municipalities and 
Departments that meet certain central-government-specified-criteria are then certified to 
provide health services. Thus, the present research compares Departments with the highest 
number of certified municipalities versus those with the fewest certified municipalities to 
see if there are significant differences in indicator outcomes (e.g., infant mortality rates). 
A total of five Departments are compared.  
Paraguay’s health decentralization places greater emphasis on citizen participation 
and on the creation of Local Health Councils (LHCs) to design and implement local health 
plans. To evaluate the same basic indicator, six Departments (three with the most LHCs 
and three with the fewest LHCs) are compared.  
Regarding education decentralization, the analysis of Colombia uses school 
enrollment and coverage as indicators of success, and it compares the performance of those 
indicators across Departments. The case of Paraguay is particularly difficult to assess, as 
so little progress has been made in implementing education decentralization.  
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The analysis of indicators is based on the assumption that increased health and 
education decentralization to local and regional levels should have a positive impact on 
basic health and education indicators. If decentralization, as argued, helps governments to 
be more responsive to local needs, and if more health and education programs are 
decentralized to the local and regional level in response to the demands of many 
communities, it is predicted that health and education indicators would improve as people 
would have easier access to these services. 
Access to adequate funding is important for the provision of health and education 
services, as local and regional control over those funds will presumably ensure that they 
are allocated effectively and reflect the most important needs of the respective 
communities. Lack of resources can seriously affect the ability of local and regional 
governments to provide the necessary services. Thus, the percentage of health and 
education expenditures spent at the local and regional level has also been included when 
the information has been available. Recognizing that many other socio-economic factors 
influence health and education indicators, control variables such as income, poverty rates, 
and inequality are also included in the analysis. Results generally show a positive 
correlation between intergovernmental cooperation and the enactment of decentralization 
policies. On the other hand, the impact of decentralization on the basic indicators 
mentioned is often mixed and difficult to establish. 
 In the following chapters, the extensive literature on Latin America’s 
decentralization processes (Chapter 2) is reviewed to contextualize the evolution of 
political decentralization in both Colombia and Paraguay, and how that evolution has 
	 20 
promoted (or hindered) decentralization of health and education policymaking and service 
delivery to the subregional and local levels of government.  
Chapter 3 offers a review of Colombia’s institutional framework, as well as a 
description and analysis of its decentralization process. The interplay of intergovernmental 
relations and how they have shaped the manner in which public services have been 
decentralized in terms of norms, structure, and procedures is then analyzed. Chapter 4 
applies the same analysis to Paraguay’s decentralization process.  
Chapter 5 tests hypotheses three and four regarding the perceived slowdown of both 
countries’ decentralization processes by analyzing the role of political parties in the 
approval of key decentralization legislation and how decentralization has impacted 
political parties and their ability to influence the process. In both cases, the hypotheses tend 
to be confirmed. The research also examines the importance of informal institutions such 
as clientelism and patronage (discussed in Chapter 5), and the role they play in cultivating 
personalized relations, intermediaries, administrative bureaucracies and organizations, 
which often hinder decentralization reforms. 
Subsequently, we will investigate the effectiveness of health and education 
decentralization in both countries (Chapters 6 through 9). An important element is the 
search for differences and similarities in both countries to uncover what factors could 
produce more effective results in terms of future health and education decentralization.  
Finally, the research brings together the analysis of both countries to provide 
answers to the research questions, and provide conclusions and recommendations for future 
policy development and research (Chapter 10).  
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It is hoped that this study contributes to scholarly writings that pay special attention 
to the socio-political context in which important political reforms occur, as well as to the 
research on the interaction between political institutions and social forces and their impact 
on public service delivery.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
DECENTRALIZATION: WHAT IS IT AND HOW DO WE MEASURE IT?  
OVERVIEW OF THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN LATIN AMERICA  
 
 
“Decentralization is a process that unfolds over time; more important, it is neither 
a linear process nor one that necessarily results in similar outcomes. 
Decentralization can mean progress toward improved governance and democracy 
as well as the erosion of local conditions of well-being” (Grindle, 2007, p. 10) 
 
 
Defining Decentralization 	
The meaning of decentralization varies widely, and the term has been used to 
describe government transformation and policy initiatives since the 1980s. In its early use 
from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, decentralization came to be associated with 
privatization and downsizing governments as dissatisfaction with government services 
increased (Rondinelli, Nellis, Cheema; 1984). By the mid-1980s and early 1990s, 
decentralization evolved into meaning not only the privatization of government enterprises, 
but also the transfer of government responsibilities to subnational levels of government 
(Rosales & Valencia Carmona, 2008; Wilson et al., 2008; Restrepo, 2006) 
In the present study decentralization is defined as the transfer of political, 
administrative, and fiscal responsibilities and authority to subnational (regional or local) 
levels of government (Falleti, 2005). Administrative decentralization gives subnational 
levels of government more responsibility in public policy delivery, including its planning, 
implementation, and (depending on the case) financing.  
Administrative decentralization can take different forms depending on how much 
authority, including fiscal responsibility, is actually transferred to the subnational levels 
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(Katorobo, 2004; Eaton, 2006). In administrative decentralization by deconcentration 
(Rondinelli et al., 1984; World Bank, 2007), the central government transfers 
administrative functions, roles, and responsibilities to its own agencies, present at the given 
subnational level. The decisions are still made at the central level but are implemented at 
the subnational level.  
In some instances, the national government delegates power and authority to semi-
autonomous agencies allowing them to control the day-to-day implementation of certain 
programs or policies (administrative decentralization by delegation). In this case 
government agencies are more or less independent, but the central government still controls 
and defines the policy aspects, and the agencies are accountable to the central government 
(Rondinelli et al., 1984; Manor, 1999; Katorobo, 2004; World Bank, 2007).  
Finally, administrative decentralization by devolution refers to cases in which the 
central government transfers not only the fiscal and administrative authority but also the 
political power for policymaking to subnational governments that are autonomous in the 
implementation of policies, and more importantly, who have control and autonomy over 
the use of their financial resources, as well as the capacity to raise resources (Rondinelli et 
al., 1984, World Bank, 2007).   
Of these three, only administrative decentralization by devolution can be 
considered as effective decentralization because the state would have reformed its 
administrative, fiscal, and political structure in favor of subnational levels of government; 
however, as long as local/regional authorities do not have autonomy over the decision 
making process and implementation of public policies including their own finances, 
effective decentralization has not taken place.  
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Decentralization, by its very nature, is a multidimensional and non-linear process 
(Montero & Samuels, 2004) that involves political, economic, administrative, and 
organizational factors that combine differently and vary across time and cultures. Being a 
process, and mainly a political one, decentralization is susceptible to reversal, requires 
implementation-time, and is not inevitable—the process is mainly a political choice.  
 
Measuring Decentralization 	
 Following the brief definition of decentralization above, and keeping in mind that 
it is a process with many different dimensions and implications, what are the difficulties 
that exist in measuring political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization? How does one 
quantify those three dimensions?  
 Given the diversity of legal frameworks and decentralization processes, certain 
baseline criteria are generally used to measure political or democratic decentralization such 
as direct popular elections of subnational authorities, the existence of recall provisions for 
elected officials, popular participation in subnational elections, and how competitive these 
elections are (Shah & Ivanyna, 2012). To these criteria, others add the ability (or 
inadequacy) of subnational governments to block financial or non-financial bills issued by 
the central government (Treisman, 2002).  
 Similarly, Kearney (1999) proposes nine dimensions that measure the level of 
decentralization in any given country, including the formal government structure of the 
country as established by the country’s constitution and the selection of regional 
executives. Other dimensions used by Kearney to measure decentralization are how local 
executives are elected, and the ability or inadequacy of central governments to override 
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decisions and policies determined at subnational levels of government. Revenue sharing 
and revenue raising capacity, as mentioned above, are also two important dimensions when 
trying to understand the level of decentralization. In terms of policy decentralization, it is 
important to examine the type of authority subnational governments have on issues of 
education, infrastructure, and policing at the local level.  
 Treisman (2012) measures level of decentralization using “conceptions of 
decentralization,” which are grouped into categories such as vertical decentralization or 
government structure, decision-making decentralization, appointment decentralization, 
electoral decentralization, fiscal decentralization, and personnel decentralization.  
 When considering how to measure administrative decentralization, three main 
criteria are proposed (Shah & Ivanyna, 2012): freedom to hire, fire, and set terms of 
reference for subnational employees; the freedom to contract out responsibilities and 
establish public-private partnerships; and the ability to pass by-laws or ordinances that 
would regulate local/subnational activities.  
 Based on these criteria, decentralization could be measured along the following 
lines: 
 
Table 1: How to Measure Decentralization 
Dimension What it means What it measures 
Government structure or 
Vertical decentralization  
Refers to the number of tiers 
in the country 
Measures political 
decentralization 
Decision-making 
decentralization 
Extent of authority to make 
decisions by subnational 
authorities1 
Measures political and 
policy decentralization 
																																																								1	This can vary greatly depending on each country’s legal framework from weak autonomy to subnational 
veto (Treisman, 2012).		
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Appointment decentralization  Subnational authorities can 
make appointments without 
approval from above 
Measures both political 
and administrative 
decentralization 
Electoral decentralization Subnational authorities are 
elected 
Measures political 
decentralization 
Fiscal decentralization Subnational governments’ 
share of tax revenue and 
expenditure 
Measures level of fiscal 
autonomy 
Personnel decentralization  Subnational authorities have 
autonomy in the 
administration of their 
employees.  
Measures 
administrative 
decentralization  
Source: Author, based on Treisman (2012)  
 
These dimensions offer a holistic view of the many areas that any decentralization 
process touches on and will be used in the present research to measure the level of 
decentralization of the case studies (Colombia and Paraguay). They are by no means 
exhaustive—as each dimension can have many sub-dimensions—but they provide a set of 
criteria from which further analysis can be made.  
 
Fiscal Decentralization 
  
Fiscal decentralization, with its concurrent need for fiscal responsibility, is a key 
component of any decentralization process (World Bank, 2007). It entails not only the 
capacity of subnational levels of government to have adequate revenues and decision-
making ability over expenditures, but also—and maybe more importantly—the authority 
to generate and collect their own revenues independently of the central government.  
It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of fiscal decentralization in countries that 
are diverse and complex, and that are transitioning from a very centralized tradition. No 
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uniform measurement can be established, as each country has a particular fiscal 
arrangement, resulting from country-specific political, economic, and geographic 
structures (Cetrangolo & Goldschmit, 2012); but researchers generally agree that fiscal 
decentralization occurs when subnational governments have the capacity to decide their 
own expenditures (budget), have control over taxes (to collect or create new ones), and 
have the capacity to collect fees for services (Gargarella & Arballo, 2012). This autonomy 
should also apply to how monetary transfers from the central government are used at the 
subnational level.  
In fact, a number of criteria of fiscal decentralization have been used to assess the 
level of fiscal decentralization (Katorobo, 2004), including: autonomy (subnational levels 
of government should independently set their expenditure priorities); revenue adequacy 
(having enough revenue to cover obligations); equity; predictability; resource allocation 
(central governments should not control resource allocation at the local/subnational level); 
simplicity (revenue sharing should be characterized as simple and transparent); incentives 
(for good management and efficiency); and safeguards for grantors (the central government 
has an acceptable monitoring role in how programs and policies are met, and transferred 
funds are used).   
The usual indicators that assess level of fiscal decentralization include subnational 
revenues as a percentage of GDP, subnational expenditures as a percentage of GDP, 
subnational revenues as a percentage of total government revenue, and subnational 
expenditures as a percentage of total government expenditure (Harbers, 2010).  
When assessing fiscal decentralization, it is important to examine the regulatory 
framework and what types of revenue sharing and revenue collection authority is granted 
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to subnational levels of government (including their capacity to create new source of 
revenues). When comparing expenditures at the local level, it is important to assess how 
much local governments rely on intergovernmental grants or transfers rather than on 
mobilizing and collecting their own revenues through independent taxes, fees, and 
borrowing (Rodden, 2004). Local governments must determine how revenue will be spent 
and to what degree they control this process. 
Fiscal decentralization can be measured by a range of local functions, the autonomy 
in rate and base setting for local financing of local expenditures, the level of responsibility 
and control over municipal and social services, autonomy in procurement as well as the 
ability to borrow both domestically and in foreign markets, and the ability to issue bonds 
(Shah & Ivanyna, 2012).  
For many countries, a central problem continues to be overreliance on central 
government transfers. Latin America, for example, is characterized by great asymmetries 
between expenditure devolution and revenue generation (Brosio & Jimenez, 2012). Lack 
of capacity at the local level and politically-motivated unwillingness to collect taxes (when 
authority is given) further complicate the implementation of fiscal decentralization 
reforms. As noted by the World Bank 2007 decentralization report:  
 
“In many developing countries local governments or administrative units possess 
the legal authority to impose taxes, but the tax base is so weak and the dependence 
on central government subsidies so ingrained that no attempt is made to exercise 
that authority” (World Bank, 2007; p. 3).  
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 Fiscal decentralization is a key issue in the discussion of decentralization. Only 
subnational governments that have both the authority and the ability to collect taxes and 
fees as well as create new ones, and that can decide on how those funds will be spent, will 
be truly accountable to their constituents and be able to improve governance and 
responsibility at the local and regional levels.  
 
Political and Fiscal Decentralization in Latin America—Overview2 	
Background on Latin America’s Decentralization Process 	
   
 “In most Latin American countries, since colonial independence, the shaping of 
intergovernmental relations has been a crucial component of the debate on the 
institutional structure of government and constitutional design. In the region, 
political reform and federalization/decentralization intersect in the political and 
intellectual debate with an intensity that, possibly, is not observable in other 
continents” (Brosio and Jimenez, 2012; p.1). 
 	
In Latin American countries, political constitutions are a reflection of each 
country’s history, culture, and political evolution since the independence movements of the 
XIX century. As such, they are diverse and unique and provide specific characteristics to 
the political institutions of each country. The struggle against the dominance of the colonial 
capital city versus the cities and regions of the interior also meant a struggle between 
federalism and unitarism in Latin America. In some countries like Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico and Venezuela this was resolved in favor of the cities and regions of the interior 
that wrestled power away from the center in a federal system, although in practice 
																																																								2	It is not the purpose of this section to analyze in depth the decentralization process of Latin America, but 
rather to offer an overview of the situation, placing our case studies in the context of the Hemisphere.  	
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centralization (especially in fiscal issues) continues to be a source of tension. In other 
countries, the issue was resolved in favor of the capital city and these countries were 
politically organized into unitary forms of government. Such is the case of Bolivia, 
Colombia, Chile, Paraguay, and all of Central America. 
There are contrasting views on how type of government influences quality of 
governance in a particular society. Gerring, Thacker, and Moreno (2005), with their 
centripetal theory of democratic governance, posit that for proponents of centralist theory, 
good governance is the product of political institutions that are controlled by a central 
authority. Decentralization theory argues that only the diffusion of power among many 
independent bodies can guarantee good governance (Saito, 2008; Gerring et al., 2005).   
This dual vision of good governance resurfaced strongly with the return to 
democracy in the region in the 1980s. In fact, in many parts of the world, the late 1980s 
and 1990s saw the promotion of decentralization as a central issue in the agenda of many 
national governments, regional leaders, and development agencies. Decentralization was 
seen as key to reestablishing the democratic credentials of the State in formerly 
authoritarian regimes, and as a way to make governments more responsive, transparent and 
closer to the people. Many reformers also proposed decentralization as the best way to 
promote better governance, reduce inequalities, and strengthen economic development.  
Although there were—and are—significant differences in how and why the process 
of decentralization was initiated, some basic principles were supported by promoters of 
decentralization: the diffusion of power, broader political participation, and limits on 
governmental action were key to ensuring good governance (Gerring et al., 2005; Saito, 
2008).  
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Questions have been raised regarding the endogeneity of decentralization, in 
particular the influence of multilateral organizations in promoting the principles of 
decentralization. However, even if some donor organizations in the 1980s promoted 
decentralization and worked with grassroots to ensure sustainability and move away from 
large scale centrally controlled projects, countries did not decentralize merely because of 
international organizations (Manor, 1999; O’Neill, 2005).  Bilateral and cooperation 
organizations “tended to support decentralized institutions once they were created rather 
than pressuring recipient governments to experiment anew with decentralization” (Manor, 
1999).  
The reasons for decentralization in Latin America were most likely the result of the 
political evolution of the 1980s and 1990s, in which central government had lost credibility 
and civil society as well as political groups began to demand greater participation. After 
decades of authoritarian governments, the collapse of centrally controlled economies had 
made the central governments in many cases obsolete, and the international community 
was ready to support democratization. In the end, decentralization is a political process and 
“in seeking explanations for the popularity of decentralization, we must therefore look 
mainly at the thinking of leaders within the governments of developing countries” (Manor, 
1999). As countries began the decentralization process, with some experiencing relative 
success in empowering citizens and increasing political representation of previously 
marginalized groups, and as subregional governments gained more preeminence in the 
political arena, many unitary countries followed the trend.  
The move toward decentralization in Latin America could also be explained by 
institutional isomorphism and its three mechanisms for change: coercive where formal and 
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informal organizational pressure and cultural expectations lead to change; mimetic where 
uncertainty leads organizations to model themselves after other organizations (countries 
that have successfully transitioned from centralized/authoritarian to 
decentralized/democratic system were powerful examples to follow), and; normative 
where change stems from professionalization (consultants and networks that were actively 
promoting decentralization—Washington Consensus is just one example of these kinds of 
networks and professionals (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
 For many left leaning intellectuals and politicians, the decentralization reforms of 
the last 20 years of the Twentieth century aimed to ensure access of international capital to 
important markets (Restrepo, 2006). The “strategic function” of territories is only 
important as long as international capital is guaranteed access to local markets. 
Nevertheless, by the mid-1980s and in the 1990s new territorial pressures surfaced as Latin 
American began its transition to democracy.  The need to strengthen local governments as 
a response to the political crisis became evident (Restrepo et al., 2006). Decentralization 
took on a new meaning, moving away from market-oriented policies toward an emphasis 
on local autonomy and local and regional governments to promote economic development, 
citizen participation, and the wellbeing of democracy in general (Rosales, 2012).  
Restrepo characterizes Latin America’s decentralization process as “centralist 
decentralization,” as it not being driven by local authorities and/or local demands, but 
imposed and dictated from the central government (2006). As central governments have 
defined the extent of subnational autonomy, and in many cases have established how 
resources will be transferred and spent, the argument goes that decentralization has not 
been locally motivated. This view though, is not shared by many. The argument does not 
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account for municipal associations, mayors, and governors from all over Latin America 
that have undoubtedly pressed for decentralization reforms. It ignores the fact that much of 
the legislation needed to implement decentralization has been decided and approved at the 
congressional level, where regional representation of political interests is important and 
quite vocal in many countries. Thus, it is interesting to see how regional politicians have 
supported decentralization once elected to the national legislatures or if they have changed 
their support.  
To the criticism that decentralization is part of a “neoliberal agenda,” Gordin (2003) 
argues that decentralization has not necessarily increased the power of market interests or 
private capital. Neoliberal reforms have introduced great transformations in 
intergovernmental relations as a result of many fiscal decentralization policies that are or 
were part of a neoliberal agenda. Tibeout, Musgrave, and Oates emphasize the importance 
of fiscal decentralization—with its concomitant transfer of administrative and political 
authority—to the strengthening of democracy (Gordin, 2003). 
Falleti (2005, 2010) offers a more nuanced interpretation of the origins of 
decentralization and the types and levels of autonomy that mayors and governors are able 
to obtain from central governments that is dependent on what level of government has 
leverage when decentralization processes are initiated. Falleti’s sequential theory of 
decentralization emphasizes the importance of analyzing the timing and order in which 
each type of decentralization (fiscal, political, administrative) occurs in any given country 
as key determinants of the intergovernmental balance of power that emerges in the 
decentralization process (Falleti, 2005). Falleti maintains that in order to “evaluate the 
consequences of decentralization…, we need to establish first when and how 
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decentralization policies increase or decrease the power of subnational officials”. The 
characteristics of the decentralization process will depend on the result of this interaction 
and it will condition further policies of decentralization affecting the balance of power in 
intergovernmental affairs.  
O’Neill (2005) offers an explanation based on political incentives and election 
cycles, where representatives of national political parties and central government would 
support decentralization if they see an electoral advantage in doing so. The importance of 
political incentives is also noted by Montero and Samuels (2004) who stress the relevance 
of political relationships between national and subnational politicians to understand 
decentralization; “because decentralization involves shifting power and resources 
vertically between branches of government, institutional and electoral explanations of 
decentralization should therefore focus on the way in which subnational politicians are 
linked to or claim leverage over national politicians and parties” (p.22).    
In summary, several factors account for differences in decentralization outcomes 
seen in Latin America, including the following: 
 1) The motivation of key actors is a fundamental element in defining how 
decentralization will occur and to what extent it will be implemented (basically the degree 
of political will);  
2) The institutional arrangements (legal framework put in place) that limit the 
capacity and autonomy of local governments in performing their new roles. Institutional 
arrangements will determine the transfer of political power and authority from central 
government to subnational levels; administrative assignment of specific functions; roles 
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for each level of government; and capacity to generate, collect, and administer own 
revenues. 
3) Finally, the importance of “state-society relations” also influences the outcome 
of decentralization. History, cultural values, and traditions (including variations within a 
country) play a key role in influencing the outcome of decentralization, helping to explain 
how regions and localities within the same country might expect different results from the 
decentralization process (Tulchin & Selee, 2004). 
 
Evolution of Decentralization in Latin America3 	
 As a whole, Latin America is a very diverse continent with over 570 million 
inhabitants who are highly urbanized (77.8% live in cities) and a region where significant 
social and economic inequalities4 remain.  
 The diversity can be observed by comparing the number of municipalities in a 
country like Brazil (over 5,000) to the country of Uruguay (only 19). Colombia, Peru, and 
Argentina have over 1,000 municipalities while Ecuador, Paraguay, El Salvador, and 
Honduras have over 200 municipalities. Population also varies greatly among all countries 
(Table 2), and nearly 90% of Latin America’s municipalities have less than 50,000 
inhabitants (Rosales & Valencia Carmona, 2012).  
 
Table 2: Number of subnational governments and population 
																																																								3	A modified version of this section was published in the summer issue of Hemisphere Magazine. Volume 
24. Summer 2015. http://lacc.fiu.edu  
 4	Decentralización y Democracia Local en América Latina. Informe Gold I		
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Source: Rosales and Valencia Carmona, 2008 
As noted above, Latin American countries vary in the extent and depth of their 
decentralization processes, but over the last 30+ years all countries have initiated or 
deepened political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization. In some instances, 
particularly in the case of Venezuela, some serious regressions have occurred5.  
Historically, highly centralized governments have characterized Latin America. 
There are only four federal countries: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. All others 
have unitary systems, though each has unique structures of regional and local governments 
																																																								5	The government of the late President Hugo Chavez, and the current administration of President Nicolas 
Maduro have, through laws and decrees, severely curtailed the political, administrative, and fiscal autonomy 
of regional and local governments.  
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and a specific degree of decentralization. In all countries, the national executive branch is 
preeminent and politics are very centralized (Rosales, 2012).  
 With the return to democracy in many Latin American countries in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, political decentralization seems to have occurred first. In the early 1980s, very 
few countries elected their local authorities by popular vote, and today mayors are directly 
and freely elected in all countries except Cuba.6 Administrative and fiscal decentralization 
followed with the necessary reforms to institutions and legal frameworks (Rosales, 2012).  
 In general, the larger countries of South America (i.e., Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, 
Chile, Colombia, and Ecuador) initiated important reforms and redistributed competencies 
and resources to subnational governments, not without controversy or great difficulty. 
Although Mexico initiated “new federalism” to open its political system, political and fiscal 
reform continue to favor state governments over local governments. Peru, under the 
government of former president Alberto Fujimori, experienced a slowdown in the 
decentralization process that subsequently re-emerged in the years after 2000. In Central 
American and Caribbean countries, decentralization has progressed more slowly, with 
Guatemala and Nicaragua emphasizing political decentralization, and Honduras and El 
Salvador emphasizing fiscal decentralization. Costa Rica, one of the most stable countries 
in Central America, introduced political decentralization with the direct election of mayors 
by popular vote only in 2002, while Panama has registered very little progress in this area 
(Rosales, 2012; Rosales and Valencia Carmona, 2008).  
																																																								
6 This assertion is always controversial, as it is commonly said that all countries but Cuba elect their local 
leaders. Cubans also vote for their local authorities but these candidates must belong to the Communist Party 
and are nominated—and previously approved—by the Cuban Communist party.  
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 In terms of administrative decentralization, there has been a clear trend to 
decentralize the provision of certain services (in particular health and education) to 
subnational levels of government with great variation in terms of the extent of these 
reforms, their financing, and the legal framework that regulates them.  
 Typically, local governments in Latin America provide basic services such as 
garbage collection, sewer and water, urban planning and zoning, parks and recreation, 
markets, transit, education and culture, environmental protection, and public safety, among 
others. Nevertheless, in Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, and Colombia, services such as primary 
health care, elementary and secondary education, and other social programs have been 
transferred to local and regional governments (Rosales, 2012). In Argentina, Brazil, and 
Mexico, the delivery of social programs, as well as health and education, is shared between 
the three levels of government; and in Central America, local governments have had great 
difficulty in providing basic services. Furthermore, fragmentation of policy 
implementation has characterized the decentralization process in Latin America over the 
last 20 years, where synchronization between assigning responsibilities, powers of tax 
collection, transfers from central governments, and implementation capacity has been 
lacking in many countries (Lora, 2007).  
 Fiscal decentralization across Latin America has progressed in varying degrees 
over the last 30 years, but has been characterized by great asymmetry between devolution 
of expenditure and devolution of taxing responsibilities (Brosio, 2012; Martinez-Vasquez, 
2011).  
  Between 1980 and 2009, the percentage of subnational governments’ expenditures 
as part of the total national expenditures increased from 11% to almost 19% (see Table 3), 
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with countries like Colombia (unitary) and Bolivia (also unitary) showing important 
increases, from 26% to 33%, and from 15% to 27%, respectively. After the years of 
centralization under former president Fujimori, Peru’s expenditures increased from 9% to 
34%. Among federal countries, Brazil showed the largest increase, from 32% to 55%, with 
Argentina and Mexico showing important increases as well. Central American countries, 
on the other hand, showed a decline in their participation in total governmental expenditure, 
with the exception of El Salvador where a very small increase occurred.  
Table 3: Percentage of the Expenditure of Subnational Governments in Total 
Governmental Expenditure – 1980 to 2009 
Brazil (1980) 32.4 Brazil (2008) 55.0 
Argentina (1980) 22.2 Argentina (2006) 50.8 
Mexico (1980) 22.0 Mexico (2007) 31.8 
Venezuela (1979) 2.4 Venezuela (2007) 8.0 
    
Colombia (1982) 26.3 Colombia (2006) 33.0 
Ecuador (1980) 18.3 Ecuador (2004) 22.1 
Bolivia 1986 14.8 Bolivia (2008) 27.0 
Peru (1990) 9.1 Peru (2007) 34.0 
Uruguay (1980) 8.6 Uruguay (2005) 13.2 
El Salvador (1978) 5.8 El Salvador (2007) 7.0 
Paraguay (1980) 5.5 Paraguay (2007) 6.5 
Guatemala (1980) 4.5 Guatemala (2009) 4.4 
Costa Rica (1980) 4.0 Costa Rica (2007) 3.7 
Chile (1980) 3.7 Chile (2007) 14.0 
Dominican Rep. 
(1980) 
3.5 Dominican Rep. 
(2006) 
5.3 
Panama (1980) 2.0 Panama (2005) 1.7 
    
Average Latin 
America 
11.6 Average Latin 
America  
18.9 
Source: Adapted from Rosales (2012, page 25), based on IMF, World Bank, IDB, and UCLG data.  
  
 Subnational governments, and in particular local governments, in most of Latin 
America have as their main sources of revenue: 
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- Locally collected taxes and fees (especially property taxes)  
- Transfers from the central government (conditional or unconditional) 
- Loans from different financial institutions or agencies (this option varies greatly 
by country) 
- Other revenue (royalties, grants, gifts, and donations)  
The most common tax that almost all countries in Latin America assign to local 
governments is the property tax, which is by far their largest source of revenue, though 
their ability to collect it varies greatly by region and by country. Other taxes and fees 
include car registrations, driver license fees, construction permits, and public markets, 
among others.  
 One measure of fiscal decentralization is the level of autonomy that subnational 
governments have in generating their own revenue. In Dickovick’s ideal types (2011) 
(based on measuring the fiscal aspects of decentralization: revenue, expenditure and 
contractual autonomy of the sub-national units), Latin American countries can be found 
between the Moderate type with large amounts of legally mandated transfers and major tax 
bases, but where transfers can be inconsistent (especially countries such as Brazil, 
Argentina, and Colombia), and the Low type with small amounts of legally mandated 
transfers, minor tax authority, and minimal transfers (most other countries).  
Adding to the lack of autonomy in revenue, many countries still have insufficient 
autonomy in expenditure: only six countries allow local governments to create new taxes, 
and in seven countries the regional or central government has veto power over local 
governments’ budgets (see Table 4). In many countries, there is a lack of local 
administrative capacity and profuse fragmentation (local governments that are too small), 
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lack of clear legal frameworks assigning expenditure responsibilities, confusion over 
revenue sharing (formulas are not clear, discussions over conditionality of the revenue 
sharing), irresponsible borrowing, and a concerning overreliance on transfers from the 
central government.  
Table 4: Local Governments Taxing Authority in Latin America 
Country Authority 
to 
introduce 
new taxes 
Authority 
to define 
taxes and 
fees levels 
within legal 
framework 
Authority 
to change 
basis of 
taxation 
Control or 
veto power 
of regional 
or central 
government 
over local 
budgets 
Responsible 
for 
Collecting 
Fees 
Responsible 
for 
Collecting 
Taxes 
Argentina Yes Yes Yes No Local Local 
Bolivia No No No Central Central/Regi
on 
Central 
Brazil Yes Yes Yes No Local Local 
Chile No Yes Yes No Local Central/Loc
al 
Colombia No Yes No No Local Central 
Costa Rica No No No Central Private 
Sector 
Private 
Sector 
Dominica
n Republic 
No No No No Central Central 
Ecuador Yes Yes No No Local Local 
El 
Salvador 
Yes Yes No No Local Local 
Guatemala No Yes No No Local Central/Loc
al 
Honduras No Yes No No Local Local 
Mexico No No No Regional Local Local 
Nicaragua No Yes Yes Central Local Local 
Panama No Yes No Central Local Central/Loc
al 
Paraguay No No No Central Local Central/Loc
al 
Peru No No No No Local Local 
Uruguay Yes Yes No Central Local Local 
Venezuela Yes Yes Yes No Local Local 
 Source: Adapted from Jorge Martinez-Vasquez in Informe Mundial GOLD 2, UCGL, 2011 
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As previously noted, Latin American subnational governments have come to rely 
heavily on transfers from the central government, which helps explain their revenue 
increases while their own tax resources that have remained stagnant (Gomez Sabaini and 
Jimenez, 2012). This overreliance on transfers makes subnational governments vulnerable 
to cuts due to macroeconomic fiscal and economic imbalances (e.g., the 2008 economic 
crisis triggered significant cuts in central government transfers) or political reasons. It also 
makes them vulnerable to conditionality imposed by central governments (Rezende & 
Veloso, 2012).   
 Some of the main flaws identified by Rezende and Veloso (2012) in the 
intergovernmental transfer system applied in Latin America include the lack of clear 
principles and objectives to organize such transfers, the multiplicity of transfer sources and 
criteria applied, rules that are neither clear nor stable, new and multiple conditionality on 
the use of such funds, and the absence of a system of “periodical revision of the transfer 
regime.” This overreliance also creates a disincentive for subnational governments to 
improve their own revenue collection capacity (Martinez-Vasquez, 2011), reducing their 
ability to negotiate with the central government. Some of these weaknesses must be 
addressed if subnational governments in Latin America intend to achieve autonomy of 
expenditure and revenue, both key factors in the delivery of public services.  
 
Final Perspectives on Latin America’s Decentralization  	
 After more than 30 years implementing political, fiscal, and administrative 
decentralization in the Hemisphere, the achievements are mixed, the difficulties and 
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challenges are many, and in some instances, there is a sense that in the XXI century 
decentralization is no longer a priority in many Latin American countries7. Presidentialism, 
and its tendency toward centralization, is too strong and difficult to overcome (Restrepo, 
2006).  
 Decentralization is not necessarily a perfect solution to a country’s development: it 
neither ensures better service delivery, nor is it the only factor influencing citizen 
participation. In fact, decentralization is not always efficient due to weak administrative or 
technical capacity at the local level. It can entail the loss of economies of scale or the 
capture of service delivery by local elites. It can also increase or create new tensions 
between local and regional governments and the central government over the control of 
scarce financial resources (World Bank Report, 2007; Rondinelli, et at 1984). 
 Nevertheless, achievements can be linked to the decentralization processes initiated 
in the last thirty years in Latin America, including the elections of subregional authorities, 
particularly local authorities, by popular vote. The legal framework for decentralization 
has encouraged important political reforms and increased citizen participation in most 
countries. Subnational governments have increased their share of expenditures and 
revenues and have more decision making authority as to how those funds can be spent. The 
transfer to subnational governments of policy making decision power and implementation 
has contributed considerably to increased capacity at the local level. Increased levels of 
citizen participation have contributed to innovations in social policy implementation, as 																																																								7	In fact, Dr. Daniel Cravacuore of the National University of Quilmes, Argentina posits in his recent research 
(2014) that without a stronger defense by local and regional governments of their autonomy and prerogatives, 
and without pushing for a more comprehensive agenda for decentralization, the relationship between central 
governments and subnational ones would revert to the pre-1990s situation with strong dominance of the 
central government.  
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well as to the inclusion of previously excluded social groups in the policy making process. 
Municipal associations in particular have been strengthened, and overall subnational levels 
of government have taken a more proactive role (Rosales, 2012). Their increased relevance 
can be seen in the number of subnational authorities that have become national leaders in 
their countries.  
 In conclusion, decentralization implies a profound change and readjustment of 
intergovernmental relations. The way these changes are shaped and implemented will 
affect governance and policymaking decisions and implementation. It is in this context of 
Latin American decentralization that we will examine how decentralization has impacted 
intergovernmental relations in the two case studies presented here—Colombia and 
Paraguay—and how intergovernmental relations has shaped policy decentralization in 
health care and education.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
COLOMBIA: INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND DECENTRALIZATION 
 
Introduction  	
Colombia, a country of 45 million inhabitants (2010)8, is characterized by its great 
cultural, geographical, and social diversity. Though its history has been marked by periods 
of conflict and violence since gaining independence from Spain, Colombia has 
simultaneously experienced remarkable economic and political stability by Latin American 
standards. Situated in the northern region of South America, it has been an example of 
decentralization, closely followed and studied by politicians, academics, and government 
practitioners.  
Until very recently, the country was notoriously dominated by two main political 
parties. Colombia has been fragmented by violence, but also has a very diverse and rich 
history; the country’s decentralization aimed to achieve stability and provide services to 
citizens that have been generally disenchanted with the political and economic system.  
As in many other countries, Colombia’s political institutions have been shaped by its 
particular history. This chapter will offer a brief review of the country’s history, the 
creation of its most important government institutions, and the decentralization reforms 
initiated in the mid-1980s, and deepened in the early 1990s.  
 
 	
																																																								8	http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/poblacion Banco Central de la Republica de Colombia	
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Historical Background  	
From Independence to 1886 	
 Colombia was part of the Spanish crown colonies in the New Kingdom of 
Granada—composed of modern-day Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Panama, and certain 
areas of Peru. The country declared independence from Spain in July of 1810, and Simon 
Bolivar ensured the end of Spanish dominance after the battle of Boyaca in 1819. The 
period after independence was characterized by internal conflicts that resulted in the 
dismemberment of the Kingdom in 1830, and the creation of modern day countries (with 
the exception of modern-day Panama, which was part of Colombia until 1903).  
 Civil strife and internal conflicts were also characteristics of the nascent country 
with deep regional differences that did not necessarily recognize the leadership of 
Bogota—the center of political and cultural life. The first Colombian constitution was 
enacted in 1821, establishing a very centralist organization but was otherwise 
conventionally liberal (Hudson, 2010). From 1849 to 1886, Colombia fluctuated between 
a liberal republic and a highly centralized, authoritarian government. The oscillation was a 
response to the political differences and impact of the two traditional political parties that 
were to dominate Colombia’s modern history: the Liberal Party, which tended to be 
progressive and urban-based; and the Conservative Party, which was more traditional, 
closely linked to the Catholic Church, and mostly rural-based.  
 In 1886, a new constitution was enacted that reversed the federalist trend 
established by the Liberal Party, and inaugurated 45 years of Conservative rule. The period 
was once again characterized by factionalism within political parties and political and 
economic instability (Hudson, 2010).  
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 This period of Colombian history saw a poor country with dramatic regional 
differences, managed from Bogota by political elites in a way that intensified those regional 
differences. Citizens did not feel they belonged to a nation, but rather an exclusive 
membership in one of two political parties (Hylton, 2006).  
 
From 1886 to the 1950s 	
 This period of Colombian history was marked by terrible civil wars, economic 
booms, political instability—including Colombia’s only coup d’état—the rise of armed 
guerrillas, narco-trafficking, paramilitaries, and overextended civil and military conflicts. 
As a result, Colombia has been a very fractured and polarized society where political 
competition has been a zero sum game expressed in various forms of violence. 
 Between 1880 and 1930, Colombian politics were dominated by the Conservative 
Party and the Catholic Church, and the government was very centralized. These factors 
strengthened clientelism rooted in the coffee export boom that began in the 1880s. This era 
also brought the commercial and banking elites of Antioquia Department to national 
prominence (Hylton, 2006).  
 In the 1890s, Colombia was dominated by a coffee economy; the country became 
a world exporter of coffee, and saw the consolidation of landed elites as the new political 
elites of the country. Between 1899 and 1902, in the civil war known as the War of a 
Thousand Days, the Liberal Party lost to the Conservative party. The war caused great 
economic losses and human casualties and precipitated Panama’s declaration of 
independence (Hudson, 2010), which was facilitated by the United States.  
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In 1886, a new centralist Constitution was enacted that gave the president the power 
to name governors; term-lengths for all political offices were extended; demonstrations 
against the government were forbidden; and heavy emphasis was placed on “order” 
(Hylton, 2006).  
 Between 1904 and 1930, Colombian politics were characterized by Conservative 
Party dominance, though power-sharing mechanisms were established with the Liberal 
Party to avoid more disruptions.  
 Divisions within the Conservative Party allowed the Liberals to reclaim the 
presidency. In 1930, the Liberal Party won the presidential election, inaugurating the period 
known as the “Liberal Pause” (Hylton, 2006), which lasted until 1946. During this time, 
the urban middle classes claimed a part of the riches generated by the economic boom, 
ushering a wave of mass mobilizations against the government. Liberals united around the 
charismatic figure of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, whose nationalism appealed to people of all 
economic classes and ethnic backgrounds. Special efforts were made to reform the 1886 
constitution to ensure the separation between State and Church, but the efforts were 
unsuccessful.  
The Liberal establishment resented Gaitan’s influence and locked him out of the 
presidency in 1946. He then decided to run as an independent, thus splitting the Liberal 
Party and allowing the Conservatives to win the election with Laureano Gomez, who was 
aligned with the most conservative wing of the party.  
In 1946, Gaitan was assassinated, ushering in one of the darkest periods of 
Colombian history, known as “La Violencia” (the Violence), which officially lasted from 
1946 to 1957.  
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 The death of Gaitan generated massive demonstrations in Bogota (then known as 
the Bogotazo), which were brutally put down by the Conservative government. Other 
major urban areas also experienced demonstrations and repression.  
Partisan conflict spread quickly in the coffee growing areas of the country. Liberal 
elites in this region, fearing Conservative revenge for actions that occurred during the War 
of a Thousand Days, organized armed resistance. Conservatives also reacted by arming 
their base. Bloodshed spread around the country and thousands were killed, many in rural 
areas. By the end of the conflict, an estimated 300,000 individuals—mostly men—had been 
killed, and 2 million had been forcibly displaced9.  
In 1951, Laureano Gomez momentarily stepped down due to health issues and, in 
1953, when he attempted to regain his post, the only military coup in Colombian history 
occurred. General Rojas Pinilla took over the government, increasing violence and 
repression against Liberal Party members. Partisan sectarianism increased significantly, 
and changing parties was seen as a treason to family and country. The roots of Colombian 
inequality (access to land) were not addressed nor solved by this conflict (Hylton, 2006; 
Hudson, 2010). Regional guerrilla movements emerged during this crucial time in 
Colombian history. 
 
 
 
																																																								9	There is little agreement and much controversy as to the total number of people who were killed during La 
Violencia, as some deaths were not recorded and occurred in rural areas. What is known is that most of the 
dead were poor peasants (Hylton, 2006; Hudson, 2010).		
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The National Front, 1957 – 1982 
 The horrors of La Violencia, and the terrible social and economic consequences it 
had on the country, were so great that the political elites of both parties realized that some 
compromise was needed to pacify the country. By 1957, Colombian political elites of both 
parties realized that Rojas Pinilla intended to remain in power, and they united to topple 
him. Thus, in 1958 a national agreement between the two parties was signed to diminish 
the violence and to establish a power sharing mechanism. The agreement called for both 
parties to share power equally, alternating the presidency, and parity of representation at 
all levels of government. Regional and local political power remained more important than 
central government authority in most places, as Liberals and Conservatives sought to 
maintain the economic well-being of the nation, and there were no major ideological 
differences between them.  
By 1961, the national government sponsored new agrarian reform laws without 
much success. The lack of progress and the continued dire situation of landless peasants, 
as well as serious urban poverty, fueled the surge of guerrilla movements10. In 1970 Misael 
Pastrana, a Conservative, was elected president (1970-1974) and sponsored public works 
and urban remodeling to generate employment and reform to deal with those problems.   
In 1974, Lopez Michelsen, a Liberal, was elected president (1974-1978). Urban 
discontent increased sharply and the guerrilla movement M-19 was formed. In general, the 
mid-1970s saw widespread protests around the country over public services delivery. In 
																																																								10	The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, known as the FARC, was created in 1964, along with the 
National Liberation Army or ELN. By 1967, the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) was also formed.		
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1977, the major trade unions organized the “paros civicos” or civic strikes to protest lack 
of services and opportunities, but these efforts were seriously repressed.  
Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala (1978-1982), a Liberal, allowed widespread suppression 
of the paros civicos and the guerrilla movements present in the country. Colombia was 
again experiencing a spiral of political violence, widespread crime, and civic protestations; 
it appeared as if governmental authorities had no control of the situation. As Hylton (2006) 
notes: 
“In the late 1970s and early 1980s intensified repression diminished state authority 
and created a climate in which the Left insurgencies thrived” (page 65). This in turn fueled 
the creation of death squads that eventually became regional paramilitary forces.  
 
 
Crisis Time, 1982 to 2010 
 
In 1982, Belisario Betancourt (1982-1986), a Conservative, was elected president. 
President Betancourt initiated a peace process with the insurgencies. A broad electoral left 
emerged and it was strongly resisted at the regional and local level. High levels of political 
violence, torture, and disappearances characterized this period of Colombian history. The 
power of the cocaine-exporting barons increased dramatically, and paramilitary forces took 
control of vast areas of the country. The guerrilla movements M-19, the EPL, and the 
FARC ended negotiations with the government. In 1984, the then Minister of Justice, 
Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, was killed by narco-traffickers. In 1985, M-19 seized the Palace of 
Justice, which was destroyed during the counterassault. Over 100 people were killed, 
including half of the members of the Supreme Court (Hudson, 2010). In 1989, the popular 
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Liberal candidate for President, Luis Carlos Galan, was assassinated, along with two other 
presidential candidates.  
During the 1990s, unemployment was high especially among young males, which 
facilitated the recruitment efforts of drug businesses, paramilitary organizations, and the 
left insurgency (Hylton, 2006). More and more people were being displaced by violence; 
smaller armed groups were disarmed and most of their members later killed. Political 
participation continued to erode. Insurgencies allied themselves in some instances with the 
drug barons and so did paramilitary groups (created to counter the violence of the leftist 
guerrillas). The violence was out of control in many parts of the country. Both insurgency 
and paramilitary groups took control over vast resources, populations, territories, and 
transport routes during this decade.   
It was in this context of violence and uncontrolled political chaos that Cesar 
Gaviria, a Liberal, was elected president (1990-1994). Realizing the seriousness of the 
situation, and trying to legitimize the political system, President Gaviria convened a 
Constitutional Assembly to produce a new and more democratic constitution as a possible 
solution to the spiral of violence engulfing the country.  
The new Constitution, approved in 1991, introduced important political, fiscal, and 
social reforms (recognition of indigenous peoples and their territories; streamlining the 
judiciary and limiting the authority of the executive; reforming how senators, 
representatives, mayors, and governors were to be elected; reaffirming fiscal and political 
decentralization; and, including participatory approaches to democracy, among other 
reforms).  
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But decentralization also opened a new opportunity for armed groups to enter into 
electoral competition (Hylton, 2006; Eaton, 2006). As Hylton (2006) notes: “Capitalizing 
on decentralization, the paramilitaries were now poised to contest insurgent power by 
taking over regional and local office through the Liberal Party, as Conservatives had done 
after 1946” (page 81).  
In 1993, the infamous Medellin cartel suffered a major blow when its leader, Pablo 
Escobar, was killed by the Colombian authorities. This event did not dislodge power from 
the drug barons, as Escobar’s death gave power to the Cali cartels that were, at least, more 
moderate in their attacks to judicial and political figures.  
In 1994, the Liberal Ernesto Samper was elected president (1994-1998), but his 
presidency was dogged from the beginning by allegations of drug money involvement in 
his political campaign (Hylton, 2006; Hudson 2010). At this time, the economic crisis of 
the country deepened and, for the first time, Colombia received an aid package from the 
International Monetary Fund. The War on Drugs became an essential component of US-
Colombia relations, and both insurgents (FARC and ELN) and paramilitary groups were 
linked to drug trafficking and common criminality. Their actions made many parts of the 
country extremely violent and caused massive displacements of poor and peasant families 
to urban areas. Paramilitary advances were exceptional, with the founding of the United 
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) in 1997 (Hudson, 2010).  
 When Andres Pastrana, a Conservative, was elected president (1998-2002), he 
sought to negotiate peace with the FARC. For that purpose, a Switzerland-sized 
“demilitarized zone” was created in the south. At the same time, the US and Colombian 
governments launched the Plan Colombia, a five year, $4 billion aid package—80% of 
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which was to be used by the Colombian military and police. In 2002, a peace agreement 
was also negotiated with paramilitary groups. Both negotiations failed and President 
Pastrana ordered the armed forces to recapture the area previously given to the FARC.  
In 2002, a former Liberal governor of Antioquia, Alvaro Uribe, who now promoted 
a very conservative agenda and was running as an independent, was elected president. The 
US-backed Plan Colombia was expanded. Peace agreements with no accountability were 
reached with paramilitary groups. Insurgencies continued to lose support from the general 
population (Hylton 2006; Hudson 2010) because of their often violent strategies.  
President Uribe embarked on an aggressive campaign against the guerrilla 
movements. In 2004, the Colombian Congress approved legislation that allowed for the re-
election of the President, handling President Uribe a major political victory. This was 
ratified by the Constitutional Court in 2005 (Hudson, 2010). That same year, a 
controversial law went into effect that gave almost complete amnesty to members of the 
paramilitary forces known as AUC.  
In 2006, President Uribe was overwhelmingly reelected with over 62% of the votes 
(Hudson, 2010). His 2006-2010 term was characterized by human rights abuse 
allegations11, increased military action against the FARC, and civil malaise over the 
economic situation of the country. In 2009, President Uribe faced defeat as his proposed 
referendum to allow for a second reelection was invalidated by the National Electoral 
Council. The FARC reaffirmed their armed struggle and rejected surrender. In 2010, the 
																																																								11	In 2008, the scandal over the “false positives” unraveled, revealing large-scale extrajudicial killings of 
poor young men to increase the alleged count of guerrilla members killed. By 2009, the UK had stopped 
bilateral military aid to Colombia due to human rights abuses allegations (Hudson, 2010).		
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Constitutional Court reaffirmed the unconstitutionality of Uribe’s second reelection 
ambitions, and his former Minister of Defense, Juan Manuel Santos, was elected president 
later that same year.  
 This brief review of Colombia’s modern history, suggests that to understand 
Colombian politics, it is necessary to understand the “multiple layers of previous conflicts 
and the accumulated weight of unresolved contradictions” (Hylton, 2006, page 7). The 
coexistence of democratic institutions and continued internal armed conflict are the central 
characteristics of Colombia’s political system (Table 5 below provides an overview of the 
country’s complex political history).  
Decentralization, in particular political decentralization, was seen by most political 
actors, parties, and the political establishment as a way of restoring legitimacy to a system 
that has been highly exclusionary, clientelistic, and unable to provide for the majority of 
its citizens.  
 
Table 5: Turning Points in Colombia’s Modern Political History 
Since Independence to 2010 
1811 – 1819 Independence movement against the Spanish crown 
1819 – 1830 Simon Bolivar won the battle of Boyaca and the Republic of Colombia 
was created. In 1830, a new Constitution was proclaimed. Ecuador and 
Venezuela seceded. Bolivar died. 
1832 - 1858 Republic of New Granada  
A new Constitution strengthening the central executive was enacted in 
1843.  
Slavery was ended in 1852. 
1853 a new more Liberal Constitution was enacted. 
1858 - 1861 Confederacion Granadina was established by the 1858 new 
Constitution that aimed to create a federal state. 
Church property was expropriated. 
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1863 Liberals enacted another more liberal Constitution that established a 
federal state and increased individual liberties. 
1886 Conservatives regained power and a new Constitution was enacted, 
ending federalism in favor of a highly centralized government. The 
Country was renamed Republic of Colombia, federalism ended and the 
Departments were created at the regional level 
1899 - 1902 War of the Thousand Days. 
1903 Panama, backed by the U.S., declared independence from Colombia. 
1904 - 1930 A period of political reconciliation and alternation between the Liberal 
and Conservative party ensued. 
1930 - 1945  A period of social reform, including attempts to agrarian reform under 
Lopez Pumarejo presidency. 
1946- 1958 La Violencia. After the assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, and the 
return of the Conservatives to the government, the country was 
engulfed in a civil war that caused thousands of deaths, mostly in rural 
areas. 
1958 - 1978  The National Front: both political parties agreed to a sharing power 
formula to peace the nation. Liberals and Conservative would alternate 
the presidency and all political posts equally  
Guerrilla movements started to appear in this period 
1979 - 1990  Terrorism and counterinsurgency characterized Colombia. Guerrilla 
movements were active, political turmoil increased, and drug cartels 
infiltrated politics and the judicial system. 
1991 A new Constitution establishing Colombia as unitary and decentralized 
was enacted. Minorities were given constitutional recognition. Fiscal, 
administrative, and political decentralization were significantly 
expanded. 
1990 – 1994  Presidency of Cesar Gaviria, a Liberal, Convened the Constitutional 
Assembly. 
1994 - 1998 Presidency of Ernesto Samper. Allegations of drug money in his 
political campaign would plague his administration. 
1998 – 2002  Presidency of Andres Pastrana, a Conservative, tried to negotiate peace 
agreements with counterinsurgency and the FARC. Both failed. 
2002 - 2010 Independent candidate Alvaro Uribe was elected President in 2002 and 
reelected in 2006. Military campaigns against the FARC and other 
guerrilla movements were increased. An amnesty was signed with the 
counterinsurgents. Country was heavily criticized for human rights 
abuses. 
2010 Juan Manuel Santos, former Minister of Defense of President Uribe, 
was elected President. 
Source: Author based on Hudson, 2010 
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Structure of Subnational Governance in Colombia 	
The 1991 Constitution: New Design of the Colombian State  	
As noted above, the 1991 Colombian constitution transformed the political, fiscal 
and administrative organization of the country. It was also an attempt to pacify the country 
and give political leaders, and new political players (e.g., demobilized guerrilla leaders), 
more involvement in running the nation. It was the latest of many Constitutions adopted in 
the country’s history (see Table 6 below). 
 
Table 6: Administrative Political Organization of Colombia 
Year of the Constitution System Adopted 
1811 Federal 
1821 Centralist 
1830 Centralist 
1832 Centralist 
1843 Centralist 
1853 Federal 
1858 Federal 
1863 Federal (Created the United States of 
Colombia) 
1886 Centralist/Unitary 
1991 Unitary/Decentralized 
Source: Adapted from Monteoliva & Dangond  
 
The process of convening, drafting, and approving the new constitution was heavily 
influenced by the historical context of the country and its violent past. The traditional 
political parties were not committed to the process, and new forces (former guerrilla 
movements [e.g., M-19], indigenous groups, and other minorities have traditionally been 
excluded) did play a significant role in drafting the new document. The process is best 
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understood as a series of negotiations among different actors with different political and 
negotiating capacities.  
“The traditional parties and the political class that represented them in Congress 
not only were at the margin of this convulsive process, but were also seen as the ones 
responsible for the institutional stagnation that had resulted in the crisis” (Bejarano, 2001; 
page 56).  
The process of convening the constitutional assembly occurred with traditional 
parties playing a marginal role; thus, those traditional political parties (which still 
controlled Congress) had no real incentives to implement the new mandates of the 
constitution (Bejarano, 2001).   
There was high abstention for the election of the Assembly (74%), meaning that 
only a minority of Colombians elected those who represented them at the Assembly. Both 
traditional parties fared worse than expected, and the biggest surprise was the 
representation obtained by the demobilized guerrilla movement, M-19, which obtained 
almost 27% of the votes for a total of 19 representatives to the Assembly; indigenous 
groups obtained almost 2% of the votes for a total of 2 representatives (plus 2 non-voting 
representatives at the Assembly) (See Table 7 below). 
 
Table 7: Votes to the Constitutional Assembly, December 9th, 1990 
Political 
Party/Movement 
Number of 
Delegates 
Percentage of 
Votes in the 
Assembly 
Percentage 
of Total 
Vote 
Number 
of Votes 
Liberal Party 25 35.7 31.2 1,158,344 
Democratic Alliance M-
19 
19 27.1 26.7 992,613 
Movement of National 
Salvation 
11 15.7 15.5 574,411 
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Conservative Party  5 7.1 6.4 236,794 
Independent 
Conservatives 
4 5.7 5.0 185,316 
Christian Union* 2 2.9 3.1 115,201 
Patriotic Union (UP) 2 2,9 2.5 95,088 
Indigenous Groups 2 2.9 1.5 54,226 
Other Lists 0 0.0 6.4 236,362 
Blank votes   1.1 37,735 
Invalid votes   0.7 24,467 
Total 70 100 100 3,710,557 
Source: Adapted from Santos Perez & Ibeas Miguel, 1995 
* Coalition of non-Catholic Christians  
 
 
For the first time in Colombian history, the traditional political parties did not have 
control over the future of Colombian politics. The aim was to modernize the political 
system and make it more representative. But, the fragmentation of the parties represented 
in the Assembly also meant that the Constitution included contradictory articles and too 
many “feel good” intentions (Bejarano, 2001; Kugler & Rosenthal, 2005). The low 
participation rate also meant that citizens were not fully involved in the decision making 
process of the new Constitution.  
Nevertheless, the new Constitution was a watershed for Colombian politics and 
brought about significant changes in judicial, administrative, and political life, with 
important consequences for its governmental organization.  
Below are several important changes to the new Constitution (Bejarano, 2001; 
Kugler & Rosenthal, 2005; Alesina et al., 2005): 
• A strong impetus for decentralization, which been initiated by former 
administrations in the mid-1980s;  
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• It established the popular election of governors and confirmed the popular 
election of mayors (first elected in 1986 as a result of Congressional law); 
• It established three mechanisms for fiscal decentralization: 
o Situado Fiscal to the Departments (general transfers), 
o Transfer of funds for health and education to Departments and 
municipalities, 
o Transfer of Royalties from the exploitation of natural resources 
(Regalias); 
• It established that transfers of national revenues to Departments and 
municipalities should increase annually (until reaching 22% of national 
revenue by 2002).  
 
The new Constitution dismantled the political restrictions that the National Front 
had created and opened up the political system to new political parties and movements; 
new mechanisms for citizen participation at the local level were introduced, along with 
mechanisms of control and accountability over political power (Bejarano, 2001). The 
reforms also impacted how Congress was to be elected. Senators would now be elected at 
the national level and not regionally—to undermine the power of traditional, regionally-
based political elites. In the House of Representatives, regional electoral districts were 
maintained.  
In theory, the Constitution increased the power of control of Congress over the 
Executive branch (But, in general, Colombia continues to be heavily presidential especially 
due to the emergency powers granted to the executive—though limited—and the 
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fragmentation and atomization of parties). The greatest innovation in this regard is the 
ability of Congress to censure cabinet ministers (Hudson, 2010; Bejarano, 2001).  
In regard to political parties, the Constitution eliminated restrictions that in the past 
gave dominance to the traditional parties and recognized the right of citizens to create 
parties, political movements, and groups without limitations. State financing for political 
campaigns was guaranteed, as well as equal access to the State communication media 
during elections.  
The Constitution also introduced the ability for private citizens to contest legislation 
directly with the highest courts in the land. As a result, much legislation is contested and 
sometimes overturned on procedural grounds. Overly egalitarian expectations created by 
the Constitution contribute to a judicial activism that often overrides Congressional 
decisions (Kugler & Rosenthal, 2005). 
Some major changes the new Constitution brought were reforms in the judicial 
system. It created the Constitutional Court (Corte Constitucional), charged with 
interpreting the true meaning of the Constitution and ensuring that legislation passed was 
in accordance with the spirit of the document. As a result, much legislation approved by 
both the Executive and the Legislative has been rejected by this Court, as well as decisions 
made by other courts (including the Supreme Court) (Kugler & Rosenthal, 2005). The 
activism of the judiciary as a consequence of these changes has not gone unnoticed or un-
criticized.  
Articles 275 to 278 of the 1991 Constitution also created the position of the attorney 
general or procurator (Procurador General) elected by the Senate to a 4-year term from a 
	 62 
shortlist presented by the President, the Supreme Court, and the State Council. The attorney 
general is charged with:  
• Monitoring compliance with the Constitution, laws, court decisions, and 
administrative acts; 
• Protecting human rights with the help of the Ombudsman; 
• Defending the interests of society; 
• Defending the collective interests of Colombians, especially with regard to the 
environment; 
• Ensuring the diligent and efficient exercise of administrative functions; 
• Exercising vigilance over the official conduct of those who hold public office, 
including elected officials; preferably exercising disciplinary authority; 
conducting investigations and imposing the appropriate penalties under the law; 
• Intervening in proceedings before the judicial or administrative authorities, 
when necessary, to defend legal order, public property, or individual rights and 
fundamental guarantees; 
• Requiring from public officials and individuals necessary information.  
To fulfill its duties, the Agency of the Attorney General shall have powers of 
judicial police, and may bring such actions as it deems necessary12. These actions are 
closely coordinated with the Ombudsman office (Defensoría del Pueblo), charged mainly 
with the defense, promotion, and respect of human rights. At the local level, the local 
procurators or Personeros are the entities responsible for exercising administrative control 
																																																								
12 https://c-politica.uniandes.edu.co/oec/index.php?ac=oc&main=5&id=1&dat=25#d1  
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in municipalities. It is their responsibility to protect and promote human rights, the public 
interest, and monitor the conduct of those who perform public functions in the 
municipalities. The Personeros are elected by the Municipal or District Council to 4-year 
terms. 
 One area in which the new Constitution had a major impact was on fiscal 
decentralization13. Articles 356 and 357 of the Constitution commit the central government 
to a rigid structure of fiscal decentralization, but the document does not have provisions 
that obligated subnational governments to be fiscally responsible. Regional governments 
can have unbalanced budgets and run fiscal deficits. Criticisms of the fiscal 
decentralization model established by the 1991 Constitution include: this rigid structure 
has negative affected the central government’s finances; the responsibilities of each level 
of government in matters of health and education were not clearly established; and, 
municipal governments have been fiscally irresponsible and have not used the funds 
efficiently or effectively (Kugler & Rosenthal, 2005; Bejarano, 2001; Alesina, 2005).  
 Overall, and as stated above, the 1991 Colombian Constitution, despite its 
shortcomings, applied significant changes to the political system; the document 
represented a fiscal, administrative, and political decentralization model for other unitary 
countries around the world.  
 
  
																																																								
13 This will be discussed in more detail in the next section.		
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Structure of the Colombian State after the 1991 Constitution 		
Territorially and administratively, Colombia is divided in 32 Departments and 
about 1,100 municipalities, and special districts, indigenous entities, and the Capital 
District: Bogota (Hudson, 2010). Governors, who were named by the President before the 
1991 Constitution, are now directly elected by the people for a 4-year term, and cannot be 
immediately reelected. Each Department also has a regional Assembly elected by popular 
vote. The main function of a Department is to coordinate and promote local and 
Departmental development (Hudson, 2010). 
Mayors are elected to 4-year terms and cannot be immediately reelected either. 
Each municipality also elects by popular vote the members of the Municipal Assembly 
(Municipal Council or Junta) with a minimum of seven members to a maximum of twenty-
one.  
The first popular election of mayors occurred in 1988 after a 1986 Law of Congress 
was passed. The 1991 Constitution confirmed their right to be directly elected by the 
people. In the 1994 general election, the first governors were directly elected.  
As is the case in many Latin American countries, the responsibilities of the different 
levels of government are established by the Constitution and the legal framework that 
derives from it. In the case of Colombia, the national government concentrates great power 
and functions. Subnational levels of governments (e.g., Departmental governments) have 
less clearly defined roles and responsibilities and their administrative responsibilities are 
usually defined as “coordination and collaboration” with national and local authorities. 
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Local governments have more autonomy and various administrative responsibilities (see 
Table 8 below).  
 
Table 8: Organization of the Colombian State – Powers by Level of Government 
 Legislative Authority 
(With the capacity to 
enact and propose laws) 
Administrative 
Authority  
(With the capacity to 
enact and enforce 
administrative 
regulations, impose 
administrative sanctions, 
etc.) 
Judicial Authority (With 
capacity to resolve and 
decide conflicts, impose 
sentences, and are of 
universal enforcement) 
National Level - The National Congress 
(two chambers, Deputies 
and Senators) – only one 
that can approve laws.  
 
With capacity to present 
law proposals to 
Congress:  
- The Government 
through the  respective 
Ministry 
- The Constitutional 
Court 
- The Supreme Court 
- The State Council 
- The Superior Council of 
the Judiciary 
- The National Electoral 
Council 
- The Attorney General's 
Office 
- The Comptroller 
General of the Republic 
- The Ombudsman 
- Thirty percent of the 
councilors or deputies 
elected in the country 
- Citizens representing at 
least 5% of registered 
voters 
Executive Power (the 
President of the republic, 
the Vice-President, 
assisted by Ministers) 
 
Constitutional Court  
 
Attorney General 
Judicial Power (Supreme 
Court, Tribunals, 
Constitutional Court, and 
Judges) 
Departmental 
Level  
- No decentralized 
legislative authority 
- Deputies are elected by 
direct vote of inhabitants 
of each Department for 
national congress 
- Governors are the 
executive power at the 
Departmental level 
- Departmental Councils 
enact administrative rules 
- There is no 
decentralization of judicial 
activities 
- There are judicial districts 
with regional judges and 
tribunals but are dependent 
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- Departmental 
Assemblies enact 
administrative or 
regulatory ordinances but 
do not enact laws in the 
formal sense 
on the National Judicial 
system 
- Judicial districts do not 
necessarily match 
Departmental limits 
Municipal 
Level 
 
- Municipalities have 
Councils, can only enact 
administrative or 
regulatory ordinances at 
the local level 
- Mayors are the head of 
the executive at the local 
level 
- Municipal Councils 
enact administrative 
regulations 
- Misdemeanor courts 
impose administrative 
sanctions only 
- Local judges of the 
misdemeanors courts are not 
member of the Judicial 
branch and can only impose 
administrative sanctions 
Source: Author based on Hudson (2010) and Government of Colombia web resources  
 
Departmental Governments in Colombia  	
  Colombia has 32 Departments—that vary greatly in population, geography, and 
natural resources—divided among the Andean region (most populated, with approximately 
30 million inhabitants), the Atlantic (5 million inhabitants) and Pacific (1 million 
inhabitants) regions, and the Orinoco and Amazon regions with 800,000 and 700,000 
inhabitants respectively14.  
 Socio-economic disparities between Departments is clearly observable via 
differences in the Human Development Index (HDI), according to information published 
by the National Planning Department (See Table 9 below). Advances in these indicators 
are not homogeneous; on the contrary, considerable social, demographic and economic 
differences between Departments are present. In 2007, of the 23 most populous 
Departments, only the Departments of Cundinamarca, Atlántico, Antioquia, Valle and 
Santander, in addition to Bogotá—the capital city and a special district—presented an HDI 
																																																								14	Sistema Uno, based on 2005 Census 
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above the national average (0.78). The Departments with lower values for this indicator 
were Cauca, Nariño, Sucre, Caqueta and Choco (0.67) (Grajales & Cardona, 2011). 
Table 9: Human Development Index by Department (2005) 
Department HDI 
Choco 0.67 
Nariño 0.72 
Caqueta 0.73 
Cauca 0.73 
Sucre 0.73 
Magdalena 0.74 
Norte de Santander 0.74 
Cordoba 0.75 
Boyaca 0.76 
Cesar 0.76 
Meta 0.76 
Quindio 0.76 
Tolima 0.76 
Bolivar 0.77 
Caldas 0.77 
Huila 0.77 
Risaralda 0.77 
La Guajira 0.78 
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Anitoquia 0.79 
Atlantico 0.79 
Cundinamarca 0.79 
Valle del Cauca 0.79 
Santander 0.80 
Bogota, DC  0.83 
Total for the country 0.78 
Source: Adapted from Grajales and Cardona (2011)  
  
 Departments have autonomy in managing their affairs and in planning and 
promoting economic and social development within their territory and, under Article 298 
of the Constitution, they can exercise administrative functions of coordination and 
complementarity with municipal governments. They play an intermediary role between the 
national government and municipalities and are in charge of the provision of services as 
determined by the Constitution and laws15. 
 Departmental governments are (according to the 1986 Decree Law 1222) charged 
with: 
1. Participating in the development of national plans and programs for 
economic and social development, for public works, and for coordinating 
their execution in their territories; 
																																																								15	http://portalterritorial.gov.co/apc-aa-
files/7515a587f637c2c66d45f01f9c4f315c/1_Guia%20Elementos%20web.pdf		
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2. Fulfilling the responsibilities of providing national services, or 
coordinating their implementation and fulfillment, in accordance with 
conditions/requirements set by a delegation, contract, or agreement;  
3. Promoting and implementing, in compliance with the respective national 
and Departmental plans, economic activities integral to Department 
development and to the welfare of Department inhabitants; 
4. Providing technical, administrative, and financial assistance to 
municipalities, promoting their development and the welfare of 
Department inhabitants;  
5. Exercising control over municipalities as indicated by the legislation;   
6. Cooperating with the competent authorities in the execution of tasks 
necessary for the conservation of the environment and the proper 
preservation of natural resources; 
7. Performing other administrative functions and provision of services that 
the Constitution and the laws establish. 
 
Departments in Colombia are categorized by the level of own revenue collected and 
by population (Article 302 of the Constitution). The Department’s ability to provide 
services (as delegated and/or decentralized from the central government), in many 
instances, depends on their category (i.e., Departments with less population and less 
capacity to collect their own revenues are less able to provide such services). The table 
below (Table 10) shows the different categories of Departments, as established by Law 
617/2000.  
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Table 10: Departmental Categories 
Category Population (inhabitants) ICLD* 
Special More than or equal to 2,000,000 More than 600,000 SMLM** 
First Between 700,001 and 2,000,000 Between 170,001 to 600,000 SMLM 
Second Between 390,001 and 700,000 Between 122,001 and 170,000 SMLM 
Third Between 100,001 and 390,000 Between 60,001 and 122,000 SMLM 
Fourth Less than or equal to 100,000 Less than or equal to 60,000 SMLM 
*ICLD: current revenues, regularly collected (transfers excluded) (acronym for its Spanish name: Ingresos 
Corrientes de Libre Destinación) 
** SMLM: Legal minimum monthly wages (acronym for its Spanish name: Salarios Mínimos Legales 
Mensuales)  
Source: Author based on Elementos Básicos del Estado Colombiano 
 
As mentioned above, governors are elected directly by the people to 4-year terms 
and cannot be immediately reelected. The governors, who are also agents of the national 
government, direct and coordinate the provision of national services under the conditions, 
and according to the delegation, given by the President of the Republic (Article 181 of the 
Constitution). The President, in cases prescribed by law, is responsible for dismissing the 
governors. 
Their responsibilities, as noted in the 1991 Constitution, include: 
1. To comply with, and enforce, the Constitution, laws, decrees of the 
governor, and the ordinances of the Departmental assemblies; 
2. To direct and coordinate the administrative action of the Department and 
act as manager and promoter of the comprehensive development of the 
territory in accordance with the Constitution and laws; 
3. To direct and coordinate national services in the conditions of delegation 
conferred by the Executive power; 
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4. To provide, in a timely manner, to the Departmental Assembly the draft 
ordinances of plans and programs of economic and social development, 
public works, and annual budget of revenues and expenditures; 
5. To freely appoint and remove managers or directors of public institutions 
and industrial or commercial enterprises of the Department. 
6. To encourage, in coordination with the elected deputies, the social and 
economic development of the region; 
7. To create, eliminate, and merge jobs within the Departmental 
administration and establish their functions. 
8. To remove or merge Departmental entities in accordance with the 
ordinances; 
9. To object—on grounds of unconstitutionality, illegality or 
inconvenience—draft ordinances, or sanction and promulgate them; 
10. To review the acts of the municipal councils and mayors and, on grounds 
of unconstitutionality or illegality, forward them to the competent court 
to decide on validity; 
11. To ensure the accurate collection of Departmental revenues, of the 
decentralized entities, and of those which are subject to transfer to the 
national authorities;  
12. To call for special sessions of the Departmental Assembly in which only 
the issues and materials for which it was summoned can be dealt with; 
13. Exercise the administrative functions delegated by the President and all 
other matters as established by the Constitution and the laws.  
	 72 
Departmental Assemblies or Councils (Asambleas Departamentales) are in charge 
of controlling the Department’s administration (to ensure transparency and that no excesses 
are committed by the administration). Councils are elected by the people (also for four year 
terms) and have budgetary and administrative authority. They must have no less than 11 
members and no more than 31 (Article 299 of the Constitution).  Assemblies also prepare, 
debate, present, and approve Departmental ordinances aimed at improving the living 
conditions of the Department and promote its development.The general functions of the 
Departmental Assemblies include: 
 
1. To regulate the performance of responsibilities, and the provision of 
services, by the Department; 
2. To regulate—in coordination with the municipalities—sport, education, 
and health programs under the terms established by law; 
3. To issue provisions related to planning, economic and social 
development, and financial and credit support to municipalities, as well 
as provisions related to tourism, transportation, environment, public 
works, roads and the development of its border areas; 
4. To request reports on the exercise of functions from the Comptroller 
General of the Department, as well as from secretaries of state, heads of 
administrative Departments, and from the directors of decentralized 
agencies present in the territory;  
5. To adopt development plans and programs, promote their 
implementation, and ensure compliance; 
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6. To propose motions of censure to administrative secretaries and high 
Departmental government officials for malpractice in the performance of 
their duties or for unresponsiveness to Assemblies’ requests for 
information;  
7. To establish taxes and contributions necessary for the performance of 
Departmental functions16; 
8. To approve the Departmental budget and issue the necessary ordinances 
to ensure its approval;  
9. To create and abolish municipalities, organize municipal territories, and 
organize provinces; 
10. To determine the structure of the Departmental administration, the 
functions of their offices, pay scales, creating public facilities and 
industrial and commercial enterprises and approve the formation of 
mixed companies; 
11. To perform other functions determined by the Constitution and the law; 
 
As this brief description of Departmental governments in Colombia shows, the 
intermediate level of government has not been given a specific set of responsibilities by 
the Constitution; only by subsequent legislation have Departments been given shared 
responsibilities with municipalities (e.g., health, education, infrastructure, and the 
promotion of sports and tourism). But the laws are vague and confusion and duplication 
																																																								16	In fact, this prerogative was curtailed by the Constitutional Court, which ruled that only the national 
Congress can create new taxes.		
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of efforts are common. The laws are clear, though, in the cases where municipalities do 
not meet the national government’s minimum requirements to provide basic services 
(especially in health and education). When conditions are met, municipalities are 
“certified.”  
In cases where the municipality is not certified, the law requires that services be 
provided by the Departmental government. This provision has created conflict and tension 
between local and Departmental authorities as the funding is still transferred to the local 
government, and the funds must then be made available to the Department. The autonomy 
of governors is also curtailed by their dual role as both representatives of the people who 
directly elected them and “agents of the President” in the territory.  
Fiscal decentralization has been a major component of Colombia’s decentralization 
process. The next section will briefly describe the structure of municipal governments and 
their roles and competencies—to then examine fiscal decentralization at the subnational 
level.  
 
Municipal Governments in Colombia 	
Across Latin America, municipal governments date back to the era of Spanish 
colonialism and have always played an important role in the structure of the State and in 
local development. Colombia’s case is not different, and local authorities have always 
played a significant role in the political, social, and economic life of the country.  
 With almost 1,100 municipalities, Colombia’s municipal governments are diverse 
in natural resources, population, extension, and levels of development. For example, the 
municipality of Cumaribo in the Department of Vichada comprises over 66,000 square 
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kilometers and has a total population of just 28,800 (2005), and the municipality of 
Sabaneta in the Department of Antioquia comprises just 15 square km and has 44,800 
inhabitants (2005). Very large and complex urban areas characterize Colombian 
municipalities like the capital city of Bogota, Medellin, Cali, Cartagena, Barranquilla—all 
urban areas with well over 1 million inhabitants17.  
 The 1991 Constitution reaffirmed the administrative, political, and fiscal autonomy 
of local governments. It upheld the direct popular election of mayors and councilmembers 
established by law in 1986 for four year terms without possibility of immediate reelection.  
 As is the case with Departments, municipal governments in Colombia are divided 
into seven categories, which are used to establish the mayors’ salaries and to establish 
limits on the operating costs of local governments. The categories are based on the local 
governments’ population, their fiscal and administrative capacity, and current revenue 
capacity (transfers not included). The municipalities in the last three categories of Table 
11, below, tend to be the poorest and possess the least administrative capacity. As of 2007, 
89% of Colombia’s 1,098 municipalities belonged to category six18.  
 
Table 11: Local Governments Categories 
Category Population  
(inhabitants) 
ICLD* Number of 
Municipalities*** 
Special 
More than or equal to 
500,001 
More than or equal to 400,000 
SMLM 5 
First 
Between 100,001 and 
500,000 
Between 100,000 and 400,000 
SMLM 17 
Second 
Between 50,001 and 
100,000 
Between 50,000 and 100,000 
SMLM 17 																																																								17	http://www.semana.com/especiales/los-10-mas/asi-somos/ciudades-mas-pobladas-colombia.html and 
National Department of Statistics (DANE).		18	http://www.portalterritorial.gov.co/preguntas.shtml?apc=r-caqueta;x;x;x1-&x=80241 accessed on 
9/28/2015		
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Third 
Between 30,001 and 
50,000 
Between 30,000 and 50,000 
SMLM 19 
Fourth 
Between 20,001 and 
30,000 
Between 25,000 and 30,000 
SMLM 19 
Fifth 
Between 10,001 and 
20,000 
Between 15,000 and 25,000 
SMLM 31 
Sixth  
Less than or equal to 
10,000 
Less than or equal to 15,000 
SMLM 990 
*ICLD: current revenues, regularly collected (transfers excluded) (acronym for its Spanish name: Ingresos 
Corrientes de Libre Destinación) 
** SMLM: Legal minimum monthly wages (acronym for its Spanish name: Salarios Mínimos Legales 
Mensuales)  
*** As of 2007 (source www.portalterritorial.gov.co) 
Source: Author based on Elementos Básicos del Estado Colombiano and government sources 
 
 The 1991 Colombian Constitution establishes the responsibilities and powers of 
local governments to be: 
1. Manage municipal affairs and the provision of public services as determined by 
law; 
2. Promote the economic and social improvement of the inhabitants of the 
respective municipality; 
3. Organize the development of the territory and build the infrastructure required 
for municipal progress; 
4. Address the unmet needs of health, education, sanitation, drinking water, public 
services, housing, recreation and sport, with particular emphasis on children, 
women, the elderly and disabled sectors, directly and in collaboration, 
complementarity, and coordination with the Departmental governments and the 
national government, under the terms defined by the law; 
5. Plan the economic, social, and environmental development of the territory, in 
accordance with the law and in coordination with other entities; 
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6. Promote community participation, as well as the social and cultural wellbeing 
of the people; 
7. Ensure the responsible use of natural resources of the municipality and proper 
management; 
8. Other activities, as indicated in the Constitution and by the laws19.  
 
Aside from this broad and somewhat vague list of powers and responsibilities of 
municipal governments, established by the 1991 Constitution (Article 311), subsequent 
legislation has sought to better define and clarify the attributions of local governments. 
Since 1991 to 2010, a broad number of laws were approved in this regard, including20: 
- Laws 715 of 2001 and 1176 of 2007 (health, education, drinking water, basic 
sanitation and other sectors); - Law 100 of 1993 (health); - Law 115 of 1994 (education); - Law 181 of 1995 (sports and recreation); - Law 397 of 1997 (culture); - Law 01 of 1991, Law 105 of 1993, Law 336 of 1996 (infrastructure and 
transport); - Law 99 of 1993 (environment); - Law 142 of 1994 (public services); - Laws 3 of 1991, Law 400 of 1997,  Law 38 of 1997, Law 546 of 1999, Law 
708 of 2002 (housing) 
Colombia’s decentralization legal framework not only establishes that municipal 
governments must coordinate and collaborate with Departments in the provision of services 
(in particular health and education), but also clearly states that Departmental governments 
																																																								19	Elementos Básicos del Estado Colombiano, 2011  
 
20  There is also an important number of Decrees and Regulations that further define the roles of 
municipalities and Departments in the provision of these services.		
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must provide these services when municipalities do not meet minimum criteria in service 
provision. 
The constitutional authorities of local governments are the mayor and the municipal 
councils (all elected directly by the people). Based on Article 315 of the Constitution, some 
of the main responsibilities of the mayors include: 
1. To comply with and enforce the Constitution, the Law, the National 
Government decrees, and ordinances and agreements of the Municipal Council; 
2. To keep the public order in the municipality, in accordance with the law and 
the instructions and orders given by the President of the Republic and the 
respective governor; 
3. To direct the administrative action of the municipality; ensure compliance with 
the functions and the provision of services in charge; legally represent the 
municipality in and out of court; 
4. To eliminate or merge municipal entities and in accordance with respective 
agreements; 
5. To present to the Council, in a timely fashion, the draft agreement on plans and 
programs of economic and social development, public works, annual budget of 
revenues and expenditures and others deemed appropriate for the smooth 
running of the municipality; 
6. To sanction and promulgate the agreements that the Council has adopted and 
object to those it considers inappropriate or contrary to law; 
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7. To create, delete, or merge the jobs of its dependencies, define their roles, and 
establish their remuneration in accordance with relevant agreements; 
8. To collaborate with the Council for the proper performance of their duties; 
9. To organize municipal expenditures in accordance with the local investment 
plan and budget; 
10. To execute other activities that the Constitution and the law stipulate. 
Each municipality also has a municipal Council or Asamblea o Consejo with a 
minimum of 7 members and maximum of 2121, based on population size (Law 136 of 
1994). Councils are autonomous in terms of administration and budgets, and they exercise 
political control over the municipal administration.  
The laws and the Constitution establish the following duties of municipal councils: 
1. To regulate the functions and efficient delivery of services by the municipality; 
2. To adopt the social development, economic, and public works plans and 
programs; 
3. To authorize the mayor to enter into contracts and temporarily exercise functions 
that correspond to the Council; 
4. To vote, in accordance with the Constitution and the law, the fees and expenses of 
the municipality; 
5. To approve the annual budget of revenues and expenditures; 
																																																								21	The capital city of Bogota’s Council has 45 members, but a different legislation applies to Bogota.		
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6. To divide municipalities into comunas (for urban areas) and corregimientos (for 
rural areas) to improve service delivery and ensure participation of citizens in 
managing local public affairs; 
7. To regulate land use and oversee planning and zoning and all other activities 
related to the construction and sale of residential properties; 
8. To determine the structure of the municipal administration, the functions of their 
offices, and pay scales and create public facilities and industrial and commercial 
enterprises and approve the formation of mixed companies; 
9. To elect the ombudsman (personero) for the period prescribed by law, and such 
other officers as the law may determine; 
10. To issue the necessary rules for the control, preservation, and protection of the 
ecological and cultural heritage of the municipality; 
11. To propose a motion of censure with respect to the Secretaries of the Office of the 
Mayor for issues related to the performance of their duties; 
12. To perform other functions determined by the Constitution and the law. 
 
In the Colombian local government system, municipal councils have played an 
important overseeing role and their relations with mayors have not always been cooperative 
and collaborative. In fact, interviews with mayors indicate their frustration at Councils that 
overstep their responsibility and become obstructionist. Councilmembers complain that 
many mayors do not respect the council and that mayors tend to centralize all activities in 
the mayor’s office.  
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Another important characteristic of the Colombian subregional level of government— 
aimed at increasing accountability and citizen participation—are Laws 131 and 134 of 
1994, which made it possible to remove ineffective or incompetent mayors and governors 
from office by popular vote (revocatoria de mandato)22.  
Finally, the local level in Colombia includes special districts—those local governments 
that, due to their size and level of development, require special legislation (Articles 322 
and 238 of the Constitution). Special districts combine the fiscal, administrative, and 
political responsibilities of governors and mayors, and their legal framework is especially 
defined by applicable laws. Presently, there are five Special Districts in Colombia: the 
Capital District of Bogota; the Tourist and Cultural District of Cartagena de Indias; the 
Tourist, Cultural, and Historic District of Santa Marta; the Special Industrial and Port 
District of Barranquilla; and the Special Industrial, Port, Biodiversity and Ecotourism 
District of Buenaventura. 
The next section will describe the very significant and far reaching fiscal 
decentralization reforms introduced by the new Constitution, and what these reforms meant 
for the provision of services, especially health and education.  
 
	  
																																																								
22 Very few revocatorias have been successful, partly because the requirements to be met by the proponents 
are complicated and difficult to achieve, but also the law requires that on the day of the vote, 55% of those 
registered must participate. From 1996 to 2014 a total of 47 applications for recalls were voted in the polls, 
but none of them prospered and leaders continued in office. (http://www.registraduria.gov.co/-Revocatoria-
del-mandato,615-.html and http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-6158688).  	
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Fiscal Decentralization in Colombia: Departmental and Municipal Finances 
 
Contrary to other countries where political and administrative decentralization 
came first, Colombia’s decentralization began with fiscal issues. The constitutional reform 
of 1968 established a mechanism to transfer funds to Departments for health and education. 
The 1991 Constitution redefined the roles and functions of Departments and 
municipalities and established a completely new transfer system, which was implemented 
by law in 1993 (Acosta, 2003). The 1968 situado fiscal (portion of revenues transferred 
from the central government to local and Departmental governments) was increased from 
15% to 23%, then nearly to 25% by 1996. These funds were earmarked for education (60%) 
and health (20%), with the remaining 20% standing as discretionary funds. Another source 
of revenue for municipalities came from the Municipal Participation Fund, although the 
transfer system was regarded as complicated and rigid. Those funds were to be spent on 
education (30%), health (25%), water and projects (20%), and 25% on other social projects 
(Alesina et al. 2000). Finally, a portion of royalties from oil and coal production was 
allotted to municipalities.  
Regarding fiscal decentralization, the Constitutions states: 
1- Article 356 established that the central government retains control of revenue 
collection and taxation but is mandated to transfer significant amounts to 
subnational governments.  
2- The goal of decentralization is to make public service delivery, in particular health 
and education, more efficient. Funds are strictly earmarked, and local and 
Departmental governments have little influence on how those funds are to be spent. 
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3- Article 364 established that local governments should not spend beyond “their 
means” but language is otherwise vague. (This provision immediately created 
concerns about the fiscal responsibility of local governments).  
 
Departments collect taxes on liquor, beer, and tobacco consumption representing about 
70% of their total own raised revenues. Another 20% is collected from taxes on motor 
vehicles, and 10% are small taxes. But governors are in a difficult position as they do not 
have clear roles and responsibilities. The 1991 Constitution did not solve this issue and 
they still have few functions and few independent revenue sources (Acosta & Bird, 2003).  
The main source of municipalities own revenues are property, industry, and commerce 
taxes. About 35% of their revenues come from property taxes, 38% from taxes on industry 
and commerce (taxes on gross receipts), and 13% from gas surcharge; the remaining 14% 
of their revenue comes from other fees (Acosta & Bird, 2003).  
Nationally, about 80% of taxes are collected by the national government, and the other 
20% by subregional governments. The national government transfers about 25% of 
collected revenue to Departments, and 60% of the funds must be spent on education while 
20% must be spent on health.  
Overall, the transfers between 1993 and 2001 were divided in three categories (Alesina 
et al., 2000):  
1. The Situado Fiscal (the percentage of current revenues that the national government 
transfers to subregional governments—about 25%) is transferred to all 
Departments, local governments, and the special districts according to very specific 
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and complex formulas (with 4 components in the case of Departments, and 10 
components in the case of municipalities); 
2. The Municipal Participation Fund that originates from the Value Added Tax 
(VAT), which has risen from 12.2% in 1990 to 22% in 2001; 
3. The transfer of royalties, which are collected by the central government and paid 
by the mineral extracting companies (mostly oil and coal). This is regulated by 
different laws, which implement Articles 360 and 361 of the Constitution. The 
royalties revenues were originally divided as follows: 
a. 47.5% is transferred to the mineral producing Departments; 
b. 12.5% is transferred to the producing municipalities; 
c. 8% is transferred to municipalities where exporting ports operate; 
d. 32% is transferred to the National Royalties Fund.23 
Between 2007 and 2011, and according to the National Department of Planning (NDP), 
201 municipalities concentrated 90% of the royalties transferred, and 80% of the royalties 
benefitted just 17% of the country’s population. In the producing Departments, during the 
same time period, the total transferred per person was $280,000 pesos; in contrast, non-
producing Departments received only $35,000 pesos per person (NDP, 2012). In time, new 
legislation was introduced to reduce these imbalances.24 
																																																								23	The National Royalties Fund is in charge of transferring funds to those Departments and municipalities 
that do not receive those funds directly (non-producing Departments/municipalities). The Fund was created 
by the 1991 Constitution and its implementation and regulations can be found on Laws 141 of 1994, and Law 
756 of 2002.			24	In 2012, major reforms were introduced to the National Royalties Fund diminishing the transfers to 
producing Departments and municipalities, and increasing them to all other Departments and municipalities 
with the aim of making the system more equitable. 
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In the case of municipal governments, a formula for national transfers has been 
established by the National Department of Planning, in charge of implementing 
decentralization, and is as follows (Jaramillo, 2004): - 40% according to poor population - 20% accounting for the relative poverty level - 22% according to total population - 6% based on fiscal efficiency - 6% based on administrative efficiency - 6% based on advances on quality of life  
 
Regarding fiscal efficiency, the National Planning Department requires yearly 
reports from all local governments on their executed budget.  
Local governments are required by law to spend the transfers as follows: - 30% for education - 25% on health (15% has to be for the subsidized plans) - 20% for water and sewage - 5% for recreation, sports, and culture (at least 2% on culture) - 20% for other projects such as electricity, municipal equipment, community 
development projects, and debt payment for capital projects such as roads 
(Jaramillo, 2004).  
 
The use of revenues by subnational governments is very rigid and centrally 
mandated (Alesina et al., 2005). Overall, about 80% of all transfers are earmarked for 
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health and education. But, there is confusion surrounding the responsibilities in those areas 
between the three levels of government. The interaction of the different levels of 
government is not clear or transparent, and many contradicting rules add to the confusion. 
In the end, the central government retains much control and responsibility over health, 
education, and the provision of other social services. 
 The rigidity of the fiscal transfers and the lack of clear intergovernmental rules, too 
many contradictory policies, and the emphasis on health and education expenditures, has 
left Departments and municipalities with very little revenue expenditure and collection 
autonomy (Alesina et al., 2005; Acosta & Bird, 2003), making them very dependent on 
central government transfers, and “acting against the emergence of accountable and 
responsible local governments” (page 36).  
 The 1991 Constitution had established that in order for subnational governments to 
fulfill their new roles, the financial mechanisms also needed to be in place (Articles 356 
and 357). The Constitution defined two mechanisms for financing: the abovementioned 
situado fiscal (the resources from the central government transferred to Departments and 
municipalities and earmarked for health and education); and the municipal transfers (or 
participaciones municipales) to be used for specific purposes in health, education, and 
water and sewage (Bonet et al., 2014).  
 The distribution of these resources was regulated by Law 60 of 1993 and 
established a fixed percentage tied to the national current account revenue (Ingresos 
Corrientes de la Nacion). For the situado fiscal, the law envisioned that for 1994, 1995, 
and 1996 it would be 23%, 23.5%, and 24%, respectively. From 1997 onward, the 
percentage was to be 24.5%.    
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By 1997, the central government’s deficit was growing considerably due to a 
decline in the nation’s GDP and a serious downturn of the economy. A series of reports 
concluded that the “principle cause of this deficit was the growth in transfers” (Acosta, 
2003). Controlling macroeconomic stability became a central issue for the national 
government and measures were taken to cap transfers to subregional governments as well 
as more restrictions on how funds could be spent, including how much elected and 
appointed officials could be paid (Restrepo, 2006).  
In 2001, the national government modified for the first time—and transitionally—
the transfer system, de-linking it from the national current account revenue of the country 
(Law 715). In this reform, transfers would increase according to the inflation rate plus a 
2% increase for the years 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005; and a plus of 2.5% for the years 
2006, 2006, and 2008 (Bonet et al., 2014; Zapata, 2010; Restrepo, 2006).  
Law 715 also created the General Sharing System (SGP—reflecting Spanish 
terminology: Sistema General de Participaciones). The SGP consolidated in one fund what 
was previously known as the situado fiscal and the municipal fund (Bonet, et al.,2014). 
The percentages earmarked for education and health were changed to 58.5% and 24.5% 
respectively, and 17% was intended for general purposes including water and sanitation, 
culture, sports, and recreational activities. An important change was also introduced with 
Law 715: instead of first establishing a percentage that then would be distributed to 
subnational governments and subsequently assigned by the policy sector as previously 
required (Law 60 of 1993), the new normative first established the percentage, per policy 
sector, that would then be distributed to subnational governments (Bonet, et al.,2014).   
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 In 2007, again by an act of Congress (Law 1176), the percentages for the SGP were 
redefined and the de-linkage from the national current account revenue was made 
permanent. This new modification again established that the rate of increase would be tied 
to inflation rates plus 4% for the years 2008 and 2009; 3.5% for the year 2010; and 3% 
between 2011 and 2016 (Zapata, 2010). Another modification introduced by this law was 
to separate the provision of water and basic sanitation from the general purpose fund (now 
11.6% from 17%), establishing a distinct percentage (5.4%) (Bonet et al., 2014).  
 Critics of these reforms—including the Colombian Federation of Municipalities—
consider these two laws a setback for the decentralization process, as the central 
government curtails their fiscal autonomy and restricts their funding.  
 This complex fiscal decentralization legal framework can be visualized in Table 12 
below, and shows the active legislative agenda and the central government’s concern for 
balancing the fiscal decentralization required by the Constitution with the need for 
macroeconomic fiscal stability—a major preoccupation for Colombian central government 
authorities.  
 
Table 12: Fiscal Decentralization Legal Framework – Major Changes 
 Political Constitution 
(Articles 356 & 357) 
Law 60 of 1993 
Legislative Act 
01/2001 
Law 715/2001 
Legislative Act 4/2007 
Law 1176/2007 
Type of 
Distribution 
per 
Destination 
Situado Fiscal: 
Departments, capital 
district, and special 
districts of Cartagena 
and Santa Marta 
 
Municipal Participation: 
Municipalities 
General Sharing 
System (SGP): 
Municipalities and 
Departments 
General Sharing System 
(SGP): Municipalities and 
Departments 
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Growth of 
Transfers 
The Situado Fiscal was 
calculated as a 
percentage of ICN*: 
1994 (23%), 1995 
(23.5%), 1996 onward 
(24.5%) 
 
Municipal Participation: 
for investment in social 
areas as percentage of 
ICN: 1994 (15%), 
between 1995 and 2001 
(1% point until reaching 
22%) 
Growth of SGP: 2002-
2005: inflation + 2%; 
2006-2008: inflation + 
2.5% 
From 2009: percentage 
average of the ICNs of 
the previous 4 years.  
 
It was established that 
every 5 years, and as 
an initiative of 
Congress, the amounts 
could be revised as 
well as the distribution 
criteria.  
Growth of SGP: 2008-
2009: inflation + 4%; 
2010: inflation + 3.5%; 
2011-2016: inflation + 
3%. 2017 onward: 
percentage average of the 
ICNs of the previous 4 
years. 
 
Education sector: 2008-
2009: inflation + 5.3%; 
2010: inflation + 5.1%; 
2011-2016: inflation + 
4.8% 
Minimum 
allocations 
by sector 
Situado Fiscal:  
- Education: 60% 
- Health: 20% 
- Education & health 
(other sources): 20% 
 
Municipal Participation:  
- Education: 30% 
- Health: 25% 
- Water & Sanitation: 
20% 
- Sports, Recreation, 
Culture, and Free 
time: 5% 
- Investment (not 
earmarked): 20% 
Education: 58.5% 
 
Health: 24.5% 
 
General Purposes: 
17% 
Education: 58.5% 
 
Health: 24.5% 
 
Water & Basic Sanitation: 
11.6% 
 
General Purposes: 5.4% 
Distribution 
Mechanism 
Geographical 
distribution first to 
Departments and 
municipalities, and after 
by policy area 
(education and health) 
Policy areas first 
(education, health, 
others) and 
subsequently by 
geographical areas 
(Departments and 
Municipalities) 
Policy areas first 
(education, health, others) 
and subsequently by 
geographical areas 
(Departments and 
Municipalities) 
Criteria for 
Resource 
Distribution 
Situado Fiscal:  
- 15% equally for 
Departments, capital 
city, special districts 
- 85% according to 
number of people 
actually receiving 
services, and 
proportion of people 
who need services.  
 
Education Sector: 
- per population 
served 
- per population in 
need of services  
- per equity 
 
Health Sector: 
- per population in 
need 
- per equity 
Education Sector: 
- per population served 
- per population in need of 
services  
- per equity 
 
Health Sector: 
- per population in need 
- per equity 
- per administrative 
efficiency 
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Municipal Participation:  
- 40% per population 
- 20% proportional to 
municipality’s 
poverty rates 
compared to national 
rate 
- 22% according  
population share in 
the national total 
- 6% proportional to 
fiscal efficiency 
- 6% for administrative 
efficiency** 
- 6% for improvements 
in quality of life  
- per administrative 
efficiency 
 
General Purposes: 
- per relative poverty 
- per urban & rural 
population  
- per fiscal efficiency 
- per administrative 
efficiency 
 
 
Water & Basic Sanitation: 
- coverage deficit 
- population served 
- effort in extending 
coverage 
- poverty levels 
- adherence to 
administrative and fiscal 
efficiency 
 
General Purposes: 
- per relative poverty 
- per urban & rural 
population  
- per fiscal efficiency 
per administrative 
Follow up 
Mechanisms 
and 
Resource 
Control 
Poor control and 
oversight in the use of 
resources  
Poor control and 
oversight in the use of 
resources 
Monitoring, reporting, 
follow up, and control of 
the resources in place 
(Decree 028 of 2008) 
*ICN: Ingresos Corrientes de la Nacion (national current account revenue) 
** measured as the lower administrative cost per capita in the delivery of public services 
Source: adapted from Bonet et al., 2014  
 
 Local and Departmental governments in Colombia rely heavily on the transfers 
from the central government. Between 2002 and 2008, the total transfers and royalties from 
the central government to local and Departmental governments clearly surpassed what 
these governments were able to collect on their own (Table13 below). 
 
Table 13: Main Sources of Revenues for Subnational Governments  
(2002 – 2008, million thousands) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 Municipalities        
Current 
Income 
 7,109 8,395 9,443 10,441 11,834 11389 11,673 
 Taxes 5,190 5,896 6,547 7,205 8,424 8,675 9,007 
 Non taxes 1,255 1,722 2,187 2,488 2,607 1,914 1,771 
Transfers  7,774 9,788 10,354 11,063 11,444 11,981 13,320 
Royalties  803 910 960 969 1,261 1,333 1,787 
Totals  15,023 18,317 20,049 21,752 23,736 23,903 25,886 
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 Departments        
Current 
Income 
 3,333 3,789 4,629 5,214 4,695 5,011 4,782 
 Taxes 3,044 3,245 3,450 4,016 3,963 4,167 4,078 
 Non Taxes 219 480 930 941 826 966 799 
Transfers  6,954 6,021 7,303 7,286 7,730 7,666 7,726 
Royalties  1,243 1,488 1,384 1,663 1,802 1,953 2,132 
Totals  11,461 11,233 13,067 13,908 14,328 14,753 14,735 
 Consolidated 
Subregional 
Govs. 
       
Current 
Income 
 10,441 12,184 14,072 15,656 16,529 16,400 16,456 
% of GDP  3.20 3.51 3.77 3.92 3.79 3.53 3.44 
Transfers  14,728 15,809 17,658 18,349 19,173 19,648 21,046 
As % of 
GDP 
 4.51 4.55 4.74 4.60 4.40 4.23 4.40 
Royalties  2,047 2,398 2,343 2,632 3,063 3,287 3,919 
As % of 
GDP 
 0.63 0.69 0.63 0.66 0.70 0.71 0.82 
Total 
Income 
 26,484 29,550 33,116 35,633 38,056 38,656 40,621 
As % of 
GDP 
 8.12 8.51 8.88 8.93 8.72 8.31 8.49 
Source: Adapted from Zapata, 2010  
 
 Municipalities have different capabilities to collect their own taxes and some have 
serious fiscal deficiencies. Zapata (2010) argues that in the 1990s, municipalities with over 
50,000 people (municipal categories 1 and 2) increased their capacity to collect property 
taxes, as well as other taxes and fees. On the other hand, those municipalities with between 
20,000 to 50,000 inhabitants (municipal categories 3 and 4) were able to increase their 
collection beginning in the 2000s. The vast majority of Colombian municipalities, though, 
continue to have serious problems collecting their own revenues, and are dependent on 
transfers from the central government (see Table 14 below).  
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Table 14: Revenue Source of Municipal Governments, 2000 – 2012 (percentage) 
 2002 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Tax 
Revenue 28 32 28 29 30 29 30 32 30 31 31 32 32 
Non tax 
Revenue 
 
6 6 7 8 10 10 9 7 6 5 5 6 7 
Transfers 45 43 46 52 51 48 44 47 47 48 50 45 50 
Royalties 4 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 6 5 5 7 3 
Others 17 15 15 6 4 8 11 8 11 11 9 10 8 
Source: adapted from Bonet et al., 2014  
 
 
Table 15: Revenue Source of Departmental Governments, 2000 – 2012 (percentage) 
 2002 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Tax 
Revenue 25 23 25 27 25 27 27 28 26 26 26 25 25 
Non tax 
Revenue 
 
8 7 2 4 7 6 5 6 4 6 6 6 7 
Transfers 48 53 57 51 54 50 52 51 49 50 49 47 48 
Royalties 12 11 10 12 10 11 13 12 16 13 15 16 12 
Others 8 6 6 6 4 6 3 4 5 5 4 6 8 
Source: adapted from Bonet et al., 2014  
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 Departments continue to be very dependent on liquor and cigarette taxes and lottery 
ticket sales. Departments, contrary to municipal governments, do not have the autonomy 
to create new fees or to modify those they already collect; thus, they have less flexibility 
and the royalties transfers have become a very substantial source of revenue (see Table 15 
above).  
 Overall, and during the first ten years since the approval of the 1991 Constitution 
and the enactment of Law 60 of 1993, the resources transferred from the central 
government to the subnational governments increased by almost 2 percentage points of 
GDP, from 3.5%  to 5.4% between 1993 and 2001 (Bonet et al., 2014). Since the approval 
of Law 715 in 2001, though the transfers have continued to increase, the amount—as 
percentage of GDP—has declined to 4.8% in 2002, then again to 3.8% in 2012 (Bonet et 
al., 2014). The principal reason for this is that the central government has increased its 
revenue with a booming economy and a reformed tax system that allows the central 
government to collect more. Meanwhile, transfers to subnational governments are no 
longer tied to the national current account revenues.  
 Fiscal decentralization in Colombia has been a long and difficult process with many 
adjustments due to the need to ensure the economic macro stability of the country. Large 
amounts of resources have been transferred to subnational levels of government especially 
earmarked for the provision of mostly education and health services, but the relationship 
between Departments, municipalities, and the central government continues to be difficult. 
Duplication of efforts, certification-requirements to provide services, and the multiple legal 
requirements and bureaucratic complexities add to the tensions and distrust between the 
three levels of government.  
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 What is clear is that the principal source of revenues for Colombia’s subnational 
levels of government continue to be the transfers from the central government (SGP) and 
the royalties25. Although both Departments and municipalities have increased their own 
revenue collection capacity, this heavy dependence on national transfers makes them 
dependent on—and weakens their negotiating capacity with—the central authorities.  
 
Other Institutional Players: the Colombian Federation of Municipalities and the 
National Federation of Departments 
 
 
The Colombian Federation of Municipalities 	
 The Colombian Federation of Municipalities (FCM—reflecting Spanish 
terminology) has played a significant role in advancing, defending, and promoting 
decentralization in Colombia. Created in 1989, FCM is a professional municipal 
association, and regarded as one of the most effective of Latin America. Remarkably 
apolitical, it represents all municipalities and districts of the country.  
 The reforms introduced by the 1991 Constitution—where the FCM played a 
significant role in defining the autonomy and new roles of local governments—were a 
major challenge for mayors and local authorities who until recently had been named by the 
central government. With the process of decentralization, mayors became more 
autonomous and were given expanded responsibilities over key policy areas such as 
education and health, as well as access to financial resources for the delivery of those 
services.  
																																																								25	50% for Departments and 28% for municipalities (Bonet et al., 2014) in the case of SGP, and in the case 
of royalties, 13% for Departments and 5% for municipalities.		
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 The FCM was created as an initiative of mayors of large cities like Bogota, Cali, 
and Cartagena with key support (financial and administrative) from the Spanish Federation 
of Municipalities and Provinces, and the German Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Foundation in 
Colombia.  
 The FCM played an important role during the Constitutional Assembly ensuring 
that decentralization was strengthened and that the autonomy of local governments was 
respected. During the first years following the enactment of the Constitution, the FCM 
worked intensely to ensure that the decentralization legislation being discussed in the 
national Congress included the interests and rights of local governments. The FCM also 
provided—with the assistance of multilateral agencies— much needed technical advice to 
local authorities on their new and expanded responsibilities.  
 Between 1992 and 1998, during a period FCM referred to as “constitutional 
euphoria” in its own publication, the enactment of key legislation occurred, including Law 
60 in 1993, which regulated fiscal decentralization, health, and education services. This 
law included a provision to fund the FCM using transfers from municipalities and districts, 
but this was later deemed inappropriate by the Constitutional Court. Thus, the FCM found 
other means of financing its activities: revenue is collected from services and technical 
assistance provided by the FCM, grants and donations, and marketing, as well as, most 
importantly, administering the traffic and drivers’ license system nationally on behalf of 
local governments (10% of the total collected)26.  
																																																								26	The Federation administers, since 2002, the SIMIT system (Sistema Integrado de Multas e Infracciones 
de Transito), the national system for payment of traffic fines and moving violations. With this new system 
violators can pay their fines in any part of the country, and when renewing licenses, the system also shows 
who has pending payments. According to the Federation, collections increased by 1,270%. In 2010 the total 
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 As mentioned in the previous fiscal decentralization section, from 1998 onward, 
the fiscal crisis of Colombia increased and the national government saw this as an 
imperative to control transfers to local governments by adjusting and redefining the 
percentages established by the Constitution. Although the FCM strongly opposed the new 
proposals, in the end, it was unable to block the modifications made by Law 715 of 2001 
and its concurrent legislative acts.  
 The FCM has also played an important role in protecting the lives and well-being 
of local authorities threatened by guerrillas or counterinsurgency groups. To do that, the 
FCM lobbied the national government, and a protection program was established in 
collaboration with the Ministry of Interior and Justice. As a result, in 2008 no mayors were 
assassinated (between 1990 and 1999, an average of 10 mayors were killed each year, with 
a peak of 19 in 2000), and violence against local authorities was greatly reduced27.  
 In 2007—when fiscal decentralization reforms were again being discussed in 
Congress—the FCM played a role in successfully lobbying Congress and the national 
government to increase the percentage points tied to inflation as part of the new formula of 
the General Participation System (SGP) to transfer funds to local governments.  The 
government had originally proposed a permanent formula using an increase based on the 
inflation rate plus 2%. The FCM’s lobbying efforts resulted in a sliding scale of inflation 
plus increasing percentage points through 2016.   
																																																								
revenue of the FCM surpassed 27 billion Colombian pesos or about $US 9 million	
(https://www.fcm.org.co/QuienesSomos/Estados%20Financieros/Balances%202011.pdf)			27	Between 1988 and 2008, a total of 162 mayors were assassinated (FCM numbers—Revista Municipios). 
Since 2004, between 180 and 200 mayors have received special protection.		
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 Interviews with representatives from the FCM point to the many successes of the 
organization in defending the interests of mayors and local authorities, but also note the 
need to be vigilant, as the national government has a “natural tendency to centralize.” Of 
particular concern, and defined as a “pending task” of the FCM, is to reform the 
Constitution to allow the immediate reelection of mayors. In fact, many mayors feel that 
the FCM supported the constitutional reform that allowed President Uribe to be reelected 
in 2006, but resent that mayors and governors were left out of the political reform28.  
The FCM works collaboratively with many of national government agencies in 
areas of interest to municipalities such as education, health, culture, transit, planning, 
public administration reform, public safety, and others. The organization continues to be 
institutionally stable, both in terms of vision and goals, and its professional staff is 
organized into themes or areas and representatives who lobby Congress and follow-up on 
legislation that may impact municipal governments. The national government has 
recognized the FCM as a natural and singular counterpart in consultations involving 
matters of local government. 
 
The National Federation of Departments  	
 While the FCM predates the 1991 Constitution by several years and was key in the 
push for decentralization reform, its counterpart at the Departmental level—the National 
Conference of Governors—was created in 1994. In 1998, the organization changed its 
name to National Federation of Departments (FND—reflecting Spanish terminology).   
																																																								28	In fact, opposition to the immediate reelection of mayors and governors is very strong, and Colombia 
remains the only country in Latin America where mayors cannot be immediately reelected.		
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 The FND brings together the 32 governors from around the country, maintaining 
and managing its own resources. The FND works to promote the development and 
strengthening of Departments, promotes regional and municipal development, and works 
to support Departments in the implementation of national policies delegated and/or 
decentralized by the national government. The organization also provides technical 
assistance to its members on economic development projects. In essence, the FND’s goal 
is to promote the interests of the Departments, defend their autonomy, strengthen their 
administration, and promote decentralization.   
 The FND receives and administers Departmental taxes. This function was granted 
in Law 223 of 1995, which gave the FND authority to collect, manage, and transfer funds 
from taxes on liquor, cigarettes, and tobacco, liquor mixtures, and beers. Its activities are 
funded by membership fees paid by each Department, donations and grants, and by fees 
for the provision of services.   
The Department-centered FND—as is the case with the Municipal-centered 
FCM—represents Departments in matters involving the national government and its 
agencies, the national Congress, and other government entities and international agencies; 
FND is recognized as the official interlocutor of the governors by the central government. 
 
Conclusions 	
As described in the previous sections, Colombia’s political and administrative 
decentralization process responded to the acute need to re-legitimize a political system 
besieged by conflict, tension, lack of trust, and violence. Fiscal decentralization (and some 
administrative decentralization) predated the 1991 Constitution. In fact, fiscal 
	 99 
decentralization began in 1968 and 1985 with transfers to subnational governments 
earmarked for health and education in both cases as attempts to calm social discontent with 
service provision.  
The reforms introduced in the 1991 Constitution brought about political changes of 
great significance for the country. The popular election of mayors and governors 
accelerated the fragmentation of the two main political parties, new local elites surged, and 
the traditional link between the political elites based in Bogota, and the regional barons 
were cut (Gutierrez Sanin, 2010). The changes also indicated that the many independent 
political movements emerging in the country had no obligation to the traditional parties, 
further weakening them.  
In the process of administrative decentralization, local governments and 
Departments were given broader responsibilities in the areas of health and education (two 
areas where both had been previously involved), and expanded roles in water and 
sanitation, recreation, planning, and local and regional development. However, as in other 
countries facing similar reforms, regional government responsibilities were not clearly 
defined and the duplication of efforts and tensions were considerable.  
Gutierrez Sanin (2010) argues that due to Colombia’s history and heavy reliance 
on central authorities, decentralization was not an endogenous phenomenon, and it 
transferred responsibilities and funds to governments that were not administratively ready 
to handle them29. The lack of local capacity continues to be a criticism of local and regional 
governments, and a fact that is addressed both by the Municipal Federation (FCM) and 
																																																								29	This vision is shared by many authors such as Garay Salamanca & Salcedo-Albaran (2010): Escobar 
Lemmon to cite just a few.		
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Departmental Federation (FND) through their training activities and technical assistance 
programs. But, in a country where more than 80% of local governments (as indicated in 
the status of local governments in this section), belong to categories five and six (smaller 
populations and the weakest administrative capacity), the lack of local capacity is not 
surprising. In cases where local governments lack capacity to provide services, Colombian 
legislation mandates Departmental governments to take over service delivery.  
An important element of the Colombian model is that the 1991 Constitution 
established percentages for central government transfers and created a national royalties 
fund. This has made the process of changing the percentages, or adjusting for fiscal 
imbalances, more difficult; many times, constitutional changes were needed to address 
issues (Zapata, 2010).  
Fiscal decentralization was an important aspect of the first ten years of Colombia’s 
new Constitution. That period saw transfers from the central government to subregional 
governments increase dramatically, though simultaneously, national revenues fell due to 
the economic crisis. As noted above, an alarmed central government viewed decreasing 
transfers as the only way to control the macroeconomic stability of the country. Thus, 
starting in 2001, a slow but persistent fiscal recentralization began.  
 In many Latin American countries, including the case of Colombia, subnational 
governments rely heavily on transfers from the central government, making them not only 
less autonomous, but also less likely to be prudent and efficient in the use of those resources 
(Zapata, 2010). Although municipal governments in particular have been able to increase 
their capacity to collect taxes and fees, they—as well as the Departmental governments—
are still heavily reliant on transfers from the central government. Moreover, the transfer 
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system in Colombia is very complex not only in structure, but also in the criteria used, 
making it difficult to understand and manage. 
 Decentralization has empowered local and regional political elites, promoted the 
emergence of new actors, increased citizen participation, and re-legitimized the Colombian 
state in the view of citizens—helping to bring about necessary political reforms. 
Decentralization has also opened new modes of participation, and given local and regional 
governments a voice in the delivery of services (Gonzalez Sanin, 2010). As in many other 
countries, the results of Colombia’s decentralization process are mixed and still unfolding.  
 This chapter has offered a brief summary of Colombia’s history and institutional 
evolution, presented the main institutional actors of the decentralization process, and 
reviewed Colombia’s political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization reforms. 
Chapters 5, 7, and 9 will review the impact of these reforms on Colombia’s political system 
and on the provision of health and education services. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
PARAGUAY: INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND DECENTRALIZATION 
 
Introduction  
 
The Republic of Paraguay, a country of approximately 6.3 million inhabitants30 (2010), 
is located in the heart of the South American continent. Paraguay has a long and proud 
history of asserting itself while surrounded by powerful, and at times hostile, neighbors. In 
the late XIX century, after declaring independence, the country confronted its two largest 
and most powerful neighbors, Brazil and Argentina with the help and support of Uruguay; 
the conflict (known as the Triple Alliance War or the Great War, 1864-1870) decimated 
Paraguay’s male population,31 destroyed its economy, and brought the country not only 
great human suffering but also the loss of almost one third of its territory.32 Nearly sixty 
years later, in the 20th century, Paraguay faced another war, this time with its neighbor to 
the West, Bolivia, for the Chaco territory (1932-1935). This war also devastated the 
country’s economy and psyche. These wars initiated long periods of institutional instability 
and political turmoil among the ruling elites and the political parties they represented.  
Without major migratory movements, and detached from global cultural trends, and wary 
																																																								30	Paraguay. Dirección General de Estadística y Censos. Proyección de la población nacional 2000 – 2050.			31	The estimated Paraguayan population in 1864 was 800,000. Of those, about 200,000 survived, and about 
68,379 were male, half of them children. Carlos Pastore. La lucha por la tierra en el Paraguay in Flecha 
(2013).			32	Paraguay lost to Brazil and Argentina 140,000 sq. km or 50,054 sq. miles 
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of attack from its larger neighbors, Paraguay’s political culture encompasses strong 
nationalism and proud independence.  
 
Historical Background  	
From Independence to 1870 	
Paraguay’s political tradition is authoritarian and centralist, with strong caudillos 
(political leaders) in control of government for extended periods of time. After gaining 
independence, the country was governed by Juan G. Rodriguez de Francia (1816-1840) 
whose presidency was characterized by his authoritarianism and central control over the 
country and the important reforms he introduced, including compulsory and free public 
education (Flecha, 2013).  
Carlos Antonio Lopez succeeded Rodriguez de Francia in 1840 and subsequently 
governed for 22 years. His government aimed to ensure Paraguay’s independence and the 
promotion of commerce, trade, industry, and the arts and sciences. Lopez promoted 
progress and modernization, notably without emphasis on individual liberties (Flecha, 
2013). During his term, the Constitution of 1844 was approved, and the division of power 
was established, but all power was concentrated in the Executive branch. Individual rights 
were not explicitly recognized. Members of Congress were elected by landowners only. 
Carlos Antonio Lopez was succeeded by his son, Francisco Solano Lopez in 1862. 
The legacy of his presidency includes isolationist policies and the promotion of agricultural 
and industrial innovations, but also the Triple Alliance War and the near annihilation of 
the country. 
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Since the creation of the Paraguayan nation, the State has controlled society and the 
economic system. The Lopez presidencies nationalized all wealth and made the State the 
central actor in both economic and commercial life, inhibiting any other form of economic 
development (Flecha, 2013).  
 
The Republic of the Liberal Constitution (1870 – 1936)  	
After the Triple Alliance War, opponents of the Lopez government who had been 
in exile, along with some Paraguayans that fought with the enemy, took control of the 
government, called for a national constitutional assembly, and, as a result, the 1870 
Constitution was enacted—with a clear liberal bias. This modern and progressive 
Constitution formalized the division of power, the independence of the press, the 
protections of freedom of religion and association, and the universal right to vote (except 
for women, who at the time were the majority of the population). The Constitution also 
reorganized the State by creating several ministries (foreign affairs, finances, and interior, 
among others).  
The Triple Alliance War not only brought a new political class to power, but also 
meant the entrenchment of nationalistic sentiment in the country and installed a deep 
resentment and suspicion of neighboring countries. The social fabric of Paraguay was 
destroyed, and the need to reconstruct the State and its reach was imperative. Political 
instability and conflict continued and the Constitution’s was barely implemented. 
In the 1890s, the political situation partially stabilized. By 1894, the Liberal Party 
was created by a group of young students leaders opposed to the authoritarian government 
of Bernardino Caballero. As a reaction to the creation of the Liberal Party, Bernardino 
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Caballero created the “Asociacion Nacional Republicana” (known as the Colorado Party). 
From that point forward, the two political parties were a constant presence in Paraguayan 
political history, including fights, confrontations, and even civil wars; numerous coup 
attempts, armed uprisings, conspiracies, civil strife, and three military-civilian wars 
marked the beginning of the twentieth century.  
In 1923, Eligio Ayala of the Liberal Party became president and a period of 
modernity and progress was initiated. Finances were improved, budgets were balanced, 
basic education improved, and infrastructure was built—the government attempted to 
implement a Liberal Constitution.  
The Chaco War 1932-1935 (peace treaty signed in 1938) brought even more 
instability to Paraguayan politics. Paraguay kept most of the Chaco territory, and the war 
gave impetus to the national economy through the defense industry, food services, and 
provisions for the troops.  
 
Military Power as a key player in Paraguayan politics – from 1936 onward 	
In February of 1936, another military coup occurred in Paraguay. The difference 
this time was that the movement was not led by civilians, but by military men, who saw 
themselves as the guarantors of peace and progress. The military suspended the Liberal 
Constitution of 1870. A new form of military interventionism and identification with the 
State began, and continued until the early 1990s.  
The period from 1936 to 1947 was characterized by factionalism within political 
parties and within the army, with constant military revolts, and with the Liberal Party and 
other smaller parties (like the Communist and Febrerista parties) wrestling for power with 
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the Colorado Party (which was also divided between a more democratic fraction and a neo-
fascist conservative one). By 1947, these divisions and the struggle for control of the State 
ended with a violent and terrible civil war between the right wing fraction of the Colorado 
Party and its military supporters, and the opposition. In the end, the Colorado Party, and its 
supporters in the armed forces, were victorious; they imposed one of the most repressive 
regimes in the Southern Cone, forcing the exile of hundreds of thousands of Paraguayans. 
The regime also consolidated the politization of the armed forces, and the control of every 
level of the State by the Colorado Party and its supporters. Instability and internal fights 
continued within the governing Colorado Party, culminating in 1954 with a coup by 
General Alfredo Stroessner, the leader of the military movement, and the person who 
would become the authoritarian leader of the country for the next 35 years.  
 
The Stroessner years: 1947 – 1989  	
General Stroessner´s administration was characterized by extreme repression of 
anyone who opposed the government. The marriage between the Colorado Party and the 
armed forces, with complete obedience to Stroessner, was achieved. By the 1960s, with the 
opposition repressed, jailed, or exiled, Stroessner’s control over the State was complete. 
The State, dominated by the Colorado Party, its supporters, and the armed forces, became 
the only provider of economic or social wealth. Stroessner was able to co-opt some support 
from representatives of opposition political parties, and by 1967 a new Constitution was 
approved, which gave a democratic façade to the regime and allowed the reelection of 
Stroessner eight consecutive times. The Colorado Party, monopolized by the “stronismo,” 
became the government’s propaganda arm and the controller of public employment (i.e., 
	 107 
everyone who aspired to work in the public sector had to be affiliated with the party). 
Members of the armed forces had to swear loyalty to the party, and even private companies 
that depended on approvals from the government needed to pledge allegiance to the 
Colorado Party. The symbiosis between the Colorado Party, the government, and the armed 
forces was complete (Flecha, 2013).   
“The price of peace” of the Stroessner years was rampant corruption, contraband, 
and drug and arms dealing, among other illegal activities done by regime supporters. In the 
1980s, the end of the economic boom—brought about by the construction of the Itaipu and 
Yacireta hydroelectric dams—meant that members of economic and social sectors such as 
the peasantry, the industrial workers, and the lower middle classes, who were dependent 
on government largesse, began to question the dictatorial government (Flecha, 2013). The 
economic crisis also meant that the economic benefits of the military and the powerful 
business elites were reduced. The international order was also changing rapidly with the 
return of democratic systems to the Southern Cone, and a new impetus to support 
democracy in the Western Hemisphere by the United States and certain European 
countries. Thus, divisions within the Colorado Party deepened, and in February of 1989, a 
military coup ended the Stroessner regime and initiated the transition to a democratic 
system.  
 
The return of democracy: 1989 – 2010 	
General Andres Rodriguez led the military revolt against Stroessner. Even though 
the head of the presidency changed, the traditional link between the Colorado Party, the 
armed forces, and the government bureaucracy was not broken, and no major 
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anticorruption efforts or state modernization initiatives occurred. New elections were 
called to select the new president for the 1989-1993 period. The democratic transition was 
done from the top and from within the regime (Flecha, 2013; Paredes, 2008) with very little 
participation of the opposition or civil society.  
Elections occurred in May of 1989 and General Andres Rodriguez, the candidate 
of the Colorado Party, was elected president with 73.3% of the votes. The Liberal Party 
with Domingo Laino obtained 21.6% of the votes, and, in accordance with electoral law in 
place at that time, the winning party secured two thirds of all seats in both chambers of 
Congress.  
The Rodriguez administration faced many challenges and difficulties trying to 
move away from a very personalized and authoritarian regime. In the political arena, 
democratization meant: dismantling repressive structures within the police and the security 
forces of the State, ensuring civil liberties, and severing the links between the Colorado 
Party and the armed forces. On the economic front, the challenges included eradicating 
poverty and improving an obsolete system of production. And, finally, in the social arena, 
the administration faced serious urban/rural inequalities in terms of access to land, services, 
income, and labor conditions (Flecha, 2013; Flecha & Martini, 1994).   
Part of the transition urgently required a new electoral code that ensured fairness 
for the opposition in future elections. In 1990, a new electoral code was enacted that, 
though not perfect, was perceived by all parties as fair. The electoral code was first tested 
with the municipal elections of 1991—the first ever to occur in the country’s history.   
The municipal elections of 1991 were the first serious challenge to the dominance 
of the Colorado Party. The Party only received 43% of the votes, a significant drop from 
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their last national results, while the Liberal Party obtained 33% of the votes. Of the eleven 
municipalities in the greater Asuncion area, six were won by the Liberal Party, and four by 
the Colorado Party. Asuncion, by far the largest and most important of all Paraguayan 
municipalities, was won by a former student leader, Carlos Filizzola, who headed an 
independent civic movement. The Colorado Party saw losing the municipality of Asuncion 
as a disaster. In the rest of the country, 45 municipalities (out of 217 at the time) were won 
by the Liberal Party (Flecha & Martini, 1994).   
The next step in the democratic transition of Paraguay was drafting a new 
constitution. The Colorado Party had understood that internal differences were 
undermining their ability to win elections, and all the factions agreed on a power 
distribution quota in view of the upcoming elections to the Constitutional assembly. In 
December of 1991, representatives to a Constitutional assembly were elected and the 
Colorado Party won a majority of the vote (54%), indicative of how much the party had 
learned from past failures in the municipal elections, and how well it understood the 
importance of the new Constitution (Paredes, 2008).  
The new Constitution was approved in 1992 and, even if it was not very progressive 
in social and economic rights, it was a great improvement in terms of political and citizens’ 
rights. The Constitution established the division of power between the Executive, the 
Legislative, and the Judicial branches of government and did not allow the president to 
serve a second term (Silvero Salgueiro, 2011).  
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The elections of 1993 	
In the 1993 elections, Juan Carlos Wasmosy, a successful businessmen but not a 
traditional Colorado Party activist, was elected President with 39.9% of the votes. Domingo 
Laino of the Liberal Party received 32%, and Guillermo Caballero Vargas of the Encuentro 
Nacional received 23% of the votes. Within the Colorado Party, Wasmosy was not 
supported by a faction loyal to Luis Maria Argaña—a traditional, popular leader—nor did 
he have the support of Lino Oviedo—a powerful and influential army general.  
Lacking majority support in the national Congress, governance was challenging during 
the Wasmosy-Seifart presidency. In essence four major elements made it very difficult 
(Paredes, 2008): 
1) Distributing power quotas and government jobs among the many Colorado groups, 
the armed forces, and the business sector traditionally close to the party was 
challenging; and clear public policy and administration were difficult to establish; 
2) Lacking a majority in Congress, and the alliance of the “argañistas” with the 
Liberal Party, meant that key legislation was not approved;  
3) The emergence of General Lino Cesar Oviedo as a key influential figure in the 
armed forces with presidential aspirations, became a constant source of instability 
in the coming years;  
4) The divisions, and lack of a clear leader, within the Colorado Party continued to 
affect the presidency. 
 
Nevertheless, the Wasmosy-Seifart administration was able to pass reforms toward the 
consolidation of democracy. With the support of the Liberal Party, the Judicial power was 
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reformed by: the creation of the Judicial Council (Consejo de la Magistratura), the 
appointment of new judges—members of the armed forces who were “de-affiliated” from 
the Colorado Party (an important reform to eliminate armed forces interference in 
politics)—and the establishment of a Supreme Electoral Court.  
 
From the 1999 March Crisis to the election of Fernando Lugo (2008) 	
In 1996 municipal elections were held. The Colorado Party, which had rallied 
around the traditional leader, Argaña, won 52% of the votes, regaining many of the 
important municipalities that it had lost in the previous elections. The city of Asuncion 
though, was once again won by the opposition, with Martin Burt as new mayor.   
The triumph of the Colorado Party signaled an entente between Argaña and his 
supporters and President Wasmosy. Argaña’s candidates had won a majority of the votes—
his leadership within the party was unquestionable and his presidential aspirations were 
within reach. But Argaña needed resources and Wasmosy had control of government 
resources (Paredes, 2008). Thus, Argaña committed himself to support Wasmosy and his 
agenda through the end of his presidency, accepting a Wasmosy confidant as his eventual 
vice presidential candidate, guaranteeing his silence regarding allegations of corruption 
among the business community linked to the Itaipu damn (the so called “Itaipu barons”), 
and favoring those “Itaipu barons” in future public works.  
However, with the 1998 presidential elections fast approaching, the entente was 
short lived. Different factions within the Colorado Party jockeyed for positions in the future 
government. The primary elections within the Colorado Party tested and impacted the 
future of the country and of its democracy very seriously. General Oviedo had surged as a 
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key figure and enjoyed wide support within the Colorado Party. He was adamant in his 
opposition to Argaña and his faction. In an effort to remove Oviedo from the presidential 
contest, President Wasmosy directed the arrest of the general for previous allegations of 
malpractice. Oviedo was arrested and condemned to ten years in prison. Nearly one year 
later, a compromise was reached and Raúl Cubas Grau (supporter of Oviedo, during his 
time in prison) and Luis Maria Argaña were selected to represent the Colorado Party in the 
1998 election (Paredes, 2008).  
The Colorado Party won the election with 54% of the votes, while the Laino-
Filizzola opposition from the Liberal and Encuentro Nacional Party received 43%. In 
Congress, the Colorado Party won 45 out of 80 seats in the House of Representatives, and 
24 of 45 seats in the Senate. The divisions between those close to Oviedo and those close 
to Argaña ensured political instability. In order to remove the possibility of a future Oviedo 
presidency, the Argañistas worked out an agreement with the Liberal Party with the 
intention of eventually impeaching the President. In effect, Cubas Grau, as previously 
agreed with Oviedo, ordered the release of the general, but when the Supreme Court ruled 
the release decree unconstitutional, political instability became rampant. In March of 1999, 
the Vice-president, Argaña, was assassinated in an attack that was seen by all as ordered 
by General Oviedo. Political chaos followed, protesters gathered in Asuncion, Oviedo fled 
the country, first to Argentina and then to Brazil, and the Chamber of Deputies decided to 
impeach President Cubas Grau who finally resigned. The President of the Senate, Luis 
Gonzalez Macchi, was named interim president (Paredes, 2008).   
Although the Presidency of Gonzalez Macchi began with a broad political accord 
that included the Liberal Party and the Encuentro Nacional (in fact some ministries of 
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relevance were given to representatives of those parties), conflict and ineptness 
characterized the administration. In fact, the Liberal Party left the coalition by the end of 
April 1999, after a request for 40% of the government administration positions was not 
honored. The Encuentro Nacional, which performed poorly in the 1996 municipal elections 
and in 1998 presidential elections, remained in the coalition government (Flecha, 2013; 
Paredes, 2008).  
The 2000 election to select a new vice-president became a watershed moment for 
Paraguayan political life and, in particular, for the Colorado Party. For the first time since 
the return of democracy, the Colorado Party was defeated in a national election by the 
Liberal Party, whose candidate—Federico Franco—won with the support of Oviedo’s 
followers. The election reaffirmed the importance and value of securing the support of 
Oviedo and his party (UNACE).  
In the 2001 municipal elections, the Colorado Party once again showed its strength 
and ability to organize and won most of the municipalities in the country, including the city 
of Asuncion, with Enrique Riera elected as mayor.  
The poor performance of the Colorado Party in the presidential elections held in 
April of 2003, was likely a reflection of its constituencies’ fatigue with the very public 
infighting and animosity within the Party’s different factions. Its candidate, Nicanor Duarte 
Frutos, was elected, but only earning 37.1% of the votes; The Party lost its majority in 
Congress.  
The Duarte Frutos presidency (2003-2008) was marked by significant socio-
economic challenges, as well as political turmoil, resulting from permanent internal 
struggles for power and influence within the Party, the lack of support from the opposition, 
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and the destabilizing figure of General Oviedo. Duarte Frutos himself, who by 2006 was 
strongly promoting and pursuing a modification of the 1992 Constitution that would allow 
the reelection of the President, made the situation worse. His reelection plan finally failed 
and ultimately exacerbated existing political animosity and conflict (Flecha, 2013).  
By 2006, with the general presidential elections of 2008 approaching, the political 
arena in Paraguay was dramatically changed by the emergence of former bishop Fernando 
Lugo as a galvanizing figure for the opposition; he gained support from many in the 
Colorado Party who had grown tired of unfulfilled promises, the constant political 
infighting, and the lack of socio-economic progress.  
The 2008 presidential elections proved to be historical for the democratic process 
of the country. The Liberal Party had agreed to support Fernando Lugo, who had support 
from many smaller parties, both on the right and the left on the political spectrum. 
Conversations with the two other important opposition parties (UNACE of Oviedo and 
Patria Querida, a center right party) had failed, and both parties presented their own 
candidates for the national election (Lino Oviedo and Pedro Fadul respectively). Once 
again, the Colorado Party, after bitter and rancorous primaries, had finally settled on the 
candidacy of Ms. Blanca Ovelar, former Minister of Education and a protégé of President 
Duarte Frutos.  
On April 20, 2008, sixty years of Colorado Party dominance ended with the election 
of Fernando Lugo as President. The support of the Liberal Party proved essential to his 
election, as well as the split of the Colorado votes between Blanca Duarte and Lino Oviedo.  
Expectations were high and the governing challenges confronting the Lugo 
administration were immense. Until that moment, the political transition to democracy in 
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Paraguay had been strongly linked to the internal processes of the Colorado Party that 
benefitted from a weak and divided opposition. The election, for the first time, of a non-
Colorado to the highest office in the country shocked the political world of Paraguay and 
filled society with great expectations of renewal and change.  
Many of these expectations, though, would not be fulfilled. President Lugo, early 
in his presidency, faced scandalous allegations about his private life that undermined his 
legitimacy as a different type of leader. His political movement did not have a majority in 
Congress, and relied on its main political ally, the Liberal Party, to secure approval of its 
legislative agenda. The alliance proved to be fragile at best and conflictive most of the time. 
Differences among the disparate and diverse political movements that comprised the 
governing coalition made matters worse for President Lugo and his team.  
President Lugo was unable to build a working coalition with opposition parties in 
Congress or within his own political movement (Flecha, 2013). From the moment he took 
office, and up to 2011, his administration failed to propose a participatory plan to deal with 
the many demands facing the country.33 In 2009, and in part as a result of the worldwide 
economic crisis, Paraguay’s economy faced serious challenges. Its main export products’ 
prices plummeted, remittances from abroad had dwindled, and the lack of foreign currency 
impacted its ability to import goods and services; thus, Paraguay’s economic growth 
declined from 6.8% in 2006 to 5.8% in 2008 to 1.5% in 2009 (Flecha, 2013). Socio-
																																																								33 	Interviews with Paraguayan historians and political scientists, as well as with former mayors, and 
legislators. Asuncion, September 2013.			
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economic indicators declined drastically, the political situation did not improve, and 
general discontent with the government increased.  
The governability and economic crisis continued to deepen, and the administration 
was unable to move reforms forward without exhausting its dwindling support and political 
capital. By 2012, the situation became unbearable, with congressional threats of political 
impeachment of the president for poor performance. That same year, and as a consequence 
of a serious and confusing incident in which 6 police officers and 11 peasants were killed 
by armed men alleged to be part of a nascent guerrilla movement, the impeachment of the 
president was approved by the Chamber of Deputies. The president lost the support of the 
Liberal Party and in less than 24 hours the president was impeached, removed from office, 
and his vice president, the Liberal Federico Franco became the country’s new president.34 
The new political era envisioned by many Paraguayans came to an abrupt end, and 
generated one of the most serious challenges to Paraguay’s democratic institutions in the 
country’s history (see Table 16).35  
 
Table 16: Turning points in Paraguay’s political history  
Since Independence to 2010 
1811 – 1813 From Independence to the dictatorship of Francia 
1813 – 1839 Dictatorship of Jose Gaspar Rodriguez de Francia 
																																																								34	Much has been said and discussed about the legality and the procedure of the President’s impeachment. It 
is not the intention here to fully discuss all aspects of the process or to describe the political situation in great 
detail. The scope of this study ends in 2010.  	35	President Franco served the remaining years of Lugo’s term and in 2013, new presidential elections 
occurred in which the Colorado Party returned to power, winning an overwhelming majority at all levels of 
government. Mr. Horacio Cartes was elected as President for the 2013 - 2018 term.		
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1839 – 1840 Consulate of Mariano Roque Alonso and Carlos Antonio Lopez 
1840 – 1862 Presidency of Carlos Antonio Lopez 
1862 – 1870 Presidency of Francisco Solano Lopez 
1864 – 1870 War of the Triple Alliance 
1869 – 1887 Weak governments and the formation of the Liberal and Colorado Parties 
1887 – 1904 Hegemony of the Colorado Party 
1904 – 1936 The Liberal Era 
1932 – 1935  Chaco War – Presidency of Eusebio Ayala 
1936 – 1937 The Febrerista (February) Revolution 
1937 – 1939  Subalternizacion of the Liberal Party to the military 
1939 – 1940  Estigarribia establishes the basis for an authoritarian regime 
1940 – 1946 Dictatorship of Higinio Morinigo with the support of the armed forces 
1946 – 1947 “Democratic Spring” – coalition  
1947 – 1989  The Stroessner era 
1989  - Present Democratic transition and consolidation of democracy  
Source: Author based on historic documents 
 
Concluding Comments on the Transition to Democracy 	
The past influences the future. The “Paraguayan nation” is built on a foundation of 
its history, including past wars, suffering at the hands of powerful neighbors, and struggle 
for autonomy and respect (Lopez, 2010). 
 The history of democratic transition in Paraguay is strongly linked to the evolution 
of different factions within the Colorado Party, and how each was able or unable to prevail 
over others, because control of the party meant control of the resources of the State and the 
government (Fretes Carreras, 2011). Paraguay, unlike its neighbors, and due to its history, 
lacked a “democratic culture” or a “historical memory” of democracy.  
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The State, and access to government, has traditionally been seen as a way to 
advance politicians’ careers and benefit those who support them. The Paraguayan transition 
to democracy occurred from above and from within the power system itself. Those who 
were close to Stroessner’s deposed regime—namely the armed forces and a sector of the 
Colorado Party—accomplished the transition. It was not a revolutionary coup or an 
abandonment of the prevailing system (Arditi, 1990). Thus, the democratic transition 
entailed the reform and struggle for control in an alliance between the Colorado Party, the 
armed forces, and the state bureaucracy (Fretes Carreras, 2011).  
In its early stages, the Paraguayan transition to democracy was characterized by:  
1) The presence of authoritarian and traditional actors who were part of the old 
system and who initiated the process; 
2) The inclusion of leaders and political parties of the opposition in the political 
process but without conditions or a unified democratic vision;  
3) Electoral processes characterized by some irregularities and lack of public 
information; 
4) The immediate modification of the armed forces’ structure;  
5) Proposals for the reform and modernization of the State and the privatization of 
public services; 
6) A loosely defined legal framework that showed poor control mechanisms of 
governmental institutions. 
Given Paraguay’s long history of authoritarian regimes and centralism, the 
challenge was not to “regain” democracy, but to establish and create new democratic 
institutions in a context lacking any democratic history. The Colorado Party’s acceptance 
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of results from the 2008 elections marked the beginning of the consolidation of Paraguay’s 
democracy and the end of this transition (Fretes Carreras, 2011).  
 
Structure of Subnational Governance in Paraguay  	
The 1992 Constitution: New Design of the Paraguayan State  	
A milestone of the Paraguayan transition to democracy was the 1992 new 
Constitution that replaced the 1967 Constitution enacted during the Stroessner era, defining 
the country as unitary and decentralized (see Table 17 for summary of Paraguay’s previous 
constitutions’ main provisions).  
 
Table 17: Paraguay’s Political Constitutions 
Year  
 
 
1844 
Political Administration Law of the State: it established three branches of 
government but all power was concentrated on the Executive branch. Individual 
rights were not explicitly recognized. Congress was to be elected by the people, 
but even though the right to vote was universal, only people with property could 
be elected to office.  
 
 
 
1870 
Liberal Constitution—a very modern and progressive constitution, it formalized 
the division of power, the independence of the press, the protections of freedom 
of religion and association, and the universality of the right to vote (except for 
women, who at the time were the majority of the population). The constitution 
also reorganized the State with the creation of several ministries (foreign affairs, 
finances, interior, among others). 
 
1967 
Constitution of the Stroessner era. It was of authoritarian and presidentialist 
character. It allowed the indefinite reelection of the President. The Legislative 
and Judicial powers were subordinated to the Executive.   
 
1992 
Defines the country as unitary and decentralized. Guarantees individual rights 
and establishes the division of power between the Executive, Legislative, and 
Judicial branches of government. It does not allow for the reelection of the 
President. 
Source: author based on Balmelli (2004), Flecha (2013), Silvero Salgueiro (2011) 
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The new Constitution sought to remedy some of the problems brought about by 
excessive centralization and authoritarianism by: maintaining the division of powers but 
redefining them, creating control institutions independent and autonomous of the 
government, and establishing the State both as unitary and decentralized.  
The Constitution also mandated the creation of the Electoral Tribunal in charge of 
running the country’s elections.  
Some of the most important reforms introduced by the 1992 Constitution include:  
a) Introduction of a broad definition of democracy with participatory and pluralist 
principles; 
b) Guaranteeing a respect of peoples’ rights; 
c) Introduction of the principle of decentralization as a key element of the 
Paraguayan state. In this regard, Articles 1 and 3 of the Constitution defined the 
state as unitary and decentralized; 
d) Curtailing presidential authority; 
e) Assigning new control powers to the Congres; 
f) Deeply reforming the Judicial system to ensure its independence. 
 
In the new Constitution, the principle of decentralization is clearly expressed with 
the new political/administrative structure established for administration of the territory. 
Furthermore, the 1992 Constitution, for the first time in Paraguayan history, gave 
administrative autonomy to the regional level (Departments), and reaffirmed the existing 
autonomy of the municipalities. Both Departments and municipalities became 
decentralized administrative territories. This element of autonomy was reinforced by the 
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fact that governors, mayors, and Departmental and local councilmembers were to be 
directly elected by the people, though confusion and lack of clarity on their responsibilities 
(especially in the case of governors) abound.  
In regard to presidential power, the new Constitution eliminated all the prerogatives 
in the former Constitution that allowed this power to be concentrated in the president. The 
president is no longer allowed to dissolve Congress or govern by decree. The president can 
no longer order a state of emergency without the approval of Congress, nor is reelection 
allowed. The curtailing presidential power does not mean that the Executive is reduced in 
attributions. The president remains the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, is head 
of the government and of the State, names and removes ministers of the Executive without 
the approval of Congress, establishes the guidelines of the government, and can propose 
legislation to Congress; the President can also veto laws approved by Congress and can 
condone or pardon sentences. The introduction of the figure of a vice president did not 
reduce the preeminence of the president within the political system (Silvero Salgueiro, 
2011).  
The new Constitution redefined the role of Congress. In addition to the traditional 
role of enacting laws, it must approve the General Budget of the Nation and approve 
international treaties. Congress was also given new oversight authority over the 
government. The Senate and the Chamber of Representatives can summon ministers of the 
Executive and senior civil servants for questioning. They can propose a vote of no 
confidence, and they can propose a motion removing the involved minister or civil servant 
(to the president), though the president is not obligated to comply. Congress can appoint 
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investigative commissions, and it can demand information and documentation from 
different private and public agencies.  
The introduction of impeachment procedures (juicio politico) is evidence of the 
intent to strengthen the oversight role of Congress (Article 255). The Chamber of 
Representatives can initiate impeachment procedures against the president, the vice 
president, ministers, members of the Supreme Court, and other senior government officials 
for misconduct or crimes committed while in office. The Senate is charged with judging 
and, if found guilty, the accused will be removed from office.  
The 1992 Constitution introduced reforms to ensure the independence of the 
Judicial system. The president no longer appoints all judicial posts, including the members 
of the Supreme Court who are now appointed by the Senate for life, in accordance with the 
Executive, from a list proposed by a Judicial Council or Consejo de la Magistratura (in 
itself a newly created institution). Lower court judges are named by the Supreme Court, 
but also nominated from lists proposed by the Consejo de la Magistratura. The 
Constitution also guarantees the economic independence of the judicial system by 
establishing that no less than 3% of the national budget should be allocated to it, and the 
Supreme Court administers these funds. To avoid electoral fraud and political 
manipulations, an Electoral Court was established and charged with registering voters and 
organizing, conducting and verifying the electoral process in general (Flecha, 2013; Silvero 
Salgueiro, 2011; Balmelli, 2004).  
In a country without a tradition of decentralized governance, the Constitution also 
created significant tension between the principle of decentralization and the concept of a 
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unitary state, defining many rights but not clearly establishing what level of government 
was in charge of providing them (Silvero Salgueiro, 2011).  
The Paraguayan state is unitary because the Executive power directs the general 
administration of the country, and Departments’ and municipalities’ development 
programs are subordinated to the national development plans (Article 177); the National 
Parliament is the only branch of government allowed to enact laws (municipal and 
Departmental councils can enact ordinances and rules, but they are administrative and 
cannot overrule national laws or contradict national legislation); the Judicial system is 
centralized, and final decisions are made by the Supreme Court (Flecha, Sosa, Cristaldo et 
al., 2003).  
The decentralized nature of the State is evidenced by the strengthening of 
municipalities, and the establishment of governors as heads of Departmental governments 
(replacing the much despised “presidential delegates” of the Stroessner era), directly 
elected by the people. These regional governments are entrusted with political, 
administrative, and normative autonomy. Departments and municipalities are given fiscal 
autonomy (as allowed by financial laws), and the Executive power cannot arbitrarily 
remove governors and mayors (there are specific mechanisms to be followed).  
Article 156 of the Paraguayan Constitution states that: 
 “… in the interest of the political and administrative organization of the State, the 
national territory is divided into Departments, municipalities, and districts36 which, within 																																																								36	The Constitution introduces here the concept of “District” without further explanation of its functions or 
attributions. All articles of the Constitution refer to the administrative organization of the state as divided in 
Departments and municipalities. Some assume that some representatives at the constitutional convention 
wanted to introduce a difference between rural and urban municipalities (Barboza, 1993), but the term 
“Districts” is not mentioned in any other part of the National Constitution.		
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the limits of this Constitution and its laws, enjoy political, administrative, and normative 
autonomy for the management of its interest and autarchy for the collection and investment 
of its resources”.  
The table 18 below summarizes the organization of the State and the powers of the 
different levels of government as established by the 1992 Constitution.  
Table 18: Organization of the Paraguayan State – Powers by Level of Government 
 Legislative Authority 
(With the capacity to 
enact laws) 
Administrative 
Authority  
(With the capacity to 
enact and enforce 
administrative 
regulations, impose 
administrative 
sanctions, etc.) 
Judicial Authority 
(With capacity to 
resolve and decide 
conflicts, impose 
sentences, and are of 
universal enforcement) 
National Level The National 
Congress (two 
chambers, Deputies 
and Senators) 
Executive Power (the 
President of the 
republic, the Vice-
president, assisted by 
Ministers) 
Judicial Power 
(Supreme Court, 
Tribunals, and Judges) 
Departmental 
Level 
(Gobernaciones) 
- No decentralized 
legislative authority 
- Deputies are elected 
by direct vote of 
inhabitants of each 
Department for 
national congress 
- Departmental Juntas 
or Councils enact 
administrative or 
regulatory ordinances 
but do not enact laws 
in the formal sense 
- Governors are the 
executive power at the 
Departmental level 
- Departmental 
Councils enact 
administrative rules 
- There is no 
decentralization of 
judicial activities 
- There are judicial 
districts with regional 
judges and tribunals but 
are dependent on the 
National Judicial 
system 
- Judicial districts do 
not necessarily match 
Departmental limits 
Municipal Level 
(Intendencias) 
- Municipalities have 
Councils or Juntas but 
these do not have 
legislative powers, 
they enact 
administrative or 
regulatory ordinances  
- Mayors are the head 
of the executive at the 
local level 
- Municipal Juntas 
enact administrative 
regulations 
- Misdemeanor courts 
impose administrative 
sanctions only 
- Local judges of the 
misdemeanors courts 
are not member of the 
Judicial branch and can 
only impose 
administrative 
sanctions 
Source: author based on Flecha, Sosa et al., 2003 
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Departmental Governments in Paraguay  	
 Article 161 of the Constitution established that the governments of the 17 
Departments would be presided over by a governor and by a Departmental Council or Junta 
(see Table 18 above). Both the governors and the members of the Departmental Council 
are elected directly by the residents of the Department, and only councilmembers can be 
reelected. For the first time, in the 1993 election, governors and Departmental councils 
were elected.  
 One potential problem in the office of governors: the 1992 Constitution (Article 
161), as well as the Administrative Departmental Law (Law 426/94), established that 
governors are expected to represent the president in the Department, even though governors 
are directly elected by the people. This provision creates tension between governors and 
the president when conflicts of interest arise between the residents of the Department and 
the sometimes broader concerns of the national government (Rosenbaum & Rodriguez 
Lagier, 1995).  
 Under the Constitution, and the Administrative Departmental Law, governors are 
responsible for the “general administration of the government.” They can create 
secretariats to help them better administer governmental issues such as health, education, 
public works, planning, etc., according to their priorities. Departmental Councils must have 
a minimum of seven members and a maximum of twenty-one with the same number of 
alternates. Each Council must have one president, one vice-president, and two secretaries. 
Councils can enact ordinances, statutes, and regulations; they have a supervisory role over 
the actions of the Departmental executive, and approve Departmental development plans 
and the budget. Overall, though, the functions of the Departmental councilmembers are not 
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clearly defined and this has resulted in many confrontations with governors, and even in 
calls for their dissolution.37  
 In summary, and according to the Constitution and the Administrative Law, 
Departmental governments have the following authority (Rosenbaum & Rodriguez Lagier, 
1995): 
1. To coordinate activities with different municipalities of the Departments; to 
organize Departmental services that jointly affect more than one municipality;  
2. To prepare and approve Departmental development plans, which must be 
coordinated with the National Plan of Development;  
3. To prepare and approve a budget to be submitted to the Ministry of Finances 
and approved in the nation’s general budget by the National Congress; 
4. To coordinate and support activities of the national government in the territory, 
especially in the areas of health and education;  
5. To facilitate the creation of Departmental development councils. 
 
Departmental governments should also: coordinate the activities of the Regional 
Health Councils and the Education Councils; and the provision of services such as water, 
electricity, public works, and transportation. Through Departmental development plans, 
Departmental governments should promote agriculture, industry, and commerce. In reality, 
																																																								37 	Interviews with Paraguayan politicians, political scientists and analysts, news analysts. Asuncion, 
September 2013 and December 2014.		
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and given the significant diversity among the 17 Departments,38 the level of services 
provided by these Departmental governments varies greatly.  
 
Departmental Revenues 	
 As stated above, Departmental governments are governed by the Administrative 
Departmental Law (Law 426/94) and by the National Constitution. Most Departmental 
governments consider the law to be too restrictive on their fiscal autonomy and on their 
attributions and functions.  
 In terms of revenue, Departments are highly dependent on transfers from the central 
government, as up to 80% of their revenue is transferred from the central government 
(COPLANEA interviews), and the remaining 20% is transferred from municipalities. The 
Constitution established that 15% of the revenue collected by municipalities on property 
taxes should be transferred to the Departments (Article 169), but the Administrative 
Departmental Law failed to establish clear transfer mechanisms. As a result, since the 
beginning of the decentralization process in Paraguay, the Ministry of Finance has at times 
moved very slowly, or not at all, in distributing collected revenue to the Departments.  
 Departments also receive transfers from the Valued Added Tax (15%) collected in 
the Department, and from gambling, earmarked for education, health, and public works. In 
																																																								38	The Department of Central, for example, the one closest to the capital city of Asuncion, is the smallest 
geographically but the most populous Department with a population of over 1.5 million (2008) representing 
35% of the population, it has the best social standards and infrastructure; and it concentrates more than 56% 
of the country's industries (http://www.central.gov.py/newsite/?page_id=26). On the other hand, the 
Department of Alto Paraguay, though much larger in land area, has a population of approximately 12,000 
(http://www.dgeec.gov.py/Publicaciones/Biblioteca/Atlas%20Censal%20del%20Paraguay/20%20Atlas%2
0Alto%20Paraguay%20censo.pdf)			
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the case of gambling, Article 40 of the law transfers the revenues from gambling licenses 
to the municipalities, which then are required to transfer a percentage to the Departments.  
 Finally, beginning in the year 2000, Departments also received transfers from 
royalties collected by the national government for administering the Itaipu and Yacireta 
national hydroelectric dams (Law 1309/98).  These funds can be used for capital 
improvements but under no circumstances for personnel salaries or benefits.  
 In terms of expenditures, Departmental governments, per the national Constitution, 
have autonomy in the use of their revenues. National legislation also established that 
governors and Departmental councilmembers must be paid from the Department budgets 
(Law 426/94), and they must abide by the national Administrative Financial Law, which 
establishes that Departmental budgets must be approved by Congress (Law 1535/99).  
Table 19 below summarizes the legal framework pertaining to resource revenue and 
expenditure of Departmental governments. 
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Table 19: Legal Framework of Departmental Governments Finances 
 Judicial Norm Description Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Revenues 
 
1992 Constitution 
Transfers from the national 
budget 
15% of municipal property 
taxes 
- Governorships do not 
have their own source of 
revenues  
- Extremely dependent on 
central government 
transfers 
- Do not collect national 
taxes or any other 
revenue 
- Lack of clear formulas 
for national transfers 
 
Administrative 
Departmental 
Law 426/94 
15% of municipal property 
taxes 
Transfers from gambling and 
Value Added Tax (VAT) 
 
Law 1309/98 
(Royalties law) 
 
Transfers from royalties of 
Itaipu and Yacireta dams  
 
 
 
 
 
Expenditures 
1992 Constitution Autarchy on expenditures 
decisions 
Autarchy is not fully 
implemented as there are 
irregularities in the way 
central government 
transfers the funds, and 
due to changes in transfer 
formulas  
 
Administrative 
Departmental 
Law 426/94 
Salaries for governors and 
councilmembers must be 
paid from Department 
budget 
 
National 
Administrative 
Financial Law 
(Law 1535/99) 
Departmental governments 
must adjust their 
expenditures to what the law 
allows 
 
 
Budget  
1992 Constitution 
 
National 
Administrative 
Financial Law 
(Law 1535/99) 
Budgets are prepared by 
Departmental governments, 
submitted to the Ministry of 
Finance for approval, and 
included in the national 
budget which is approved by 
Congress 
- Departments do not 
approve their own budget 
as its final approval is 
subject to the Ministry of 
Finances and Congress 
- Any reallocation of the 
budget must be approved 
by the Finance Ministry 
Source: adapted from COPLANEA, 2003 
 
Municipal Governments in Paraguay  	
 Mayors and local council members (Municipal Juntas) are elected by direct vote of 
a municipality’s residents (Article 167). The population and budget size of each 
municipality determine the number of members to the municipal councils. Mayors can be 
reelected for one additional five-year term (Law 1830/01), and councilmembers can be 
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indefinitely reelected. The first time mayors and municipal councilmembers were directly 
elected was in 1991.  
 The 231 Paraguayan municipalities are regulated by Articles 166 to 171 of the 1992 
Constitution, and by Administrative Municipal Law 3966 of 2010, which replaced Law 
1294 of 1987, the law that was in effect for much of the period analyzed in the present 
research.39 Article 166 of the national Constitution defines municipalities as “organs of 
local government, with legal status which have political, administrative, and normative 
autonomy within their jurisdiction, as well as absolute sovereignty in the collection and 
investment of resources.” In contrast to the constitutionally created governmental 
Departments, municipalities have always existed in the political/administrative history of 
Paraguay, though subject to political manipulations and without much autonomy. In the 
Stroessner years, mayors were named by the regime.  
 Mayors are the general administrators of the municipality and have the authority to 
organize its secretariats, directorates, and divisions according to the needs and budget of 
the respective local government. Members of the municipal councils are elected at the same 
time as the local executives. The municipal councils must be organized—with a president, 
a vice-president, and advisory committees—and they are free to establish internal rules.  
																																																								39	As mentioned above, in the 1990-2010 period that concerns this study, the Municipal Administrative Law 
in force was Law 1294 of 1987. In fact, much of the political discussions and divisions regarding furthering 
decentralization within Congress and the political establishment involved the approval of the new municipal 
administrative law, which was not achieved until 2010. Thus, we will consider the impact of Law 1294/87 
throughout the study and discuss the approval of Law 3966/10 later on.		
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Article 168 of the Constitution lists the functions and attributions of municipal 
governments, which include40:  
1. Jurisdictional management in areas of urban planning, environment, education, 
culture, sports, tourism, sanitary and health services, municipal police, and 
inspection agencies;  
2. The administration of its assets; 
3. The budget process; 
4. Participation in national revenues; 
5. Issuance of ordinances, regulations, and resolutions; 
6. Regulation and control of transit, including public transportation and other 
matters related to the circulation of vehicles.  
The Administrative Municipal Law 1294/87 (which was in effect until 2010) 
described in more detail the responsibilities of municipal governments, which 
included: 
1. The establishment of a physical, urban, and rural planning system; 
2. The construction, maintenance, and beautification of urban infrastructure such 
as parks, streets, avenues, and other public places that are not under the 
jurisdiction of another government agency;  
3. Waste collection and disposal; 
4. Maintaining public places and roadways; 
																																																								40	This section relies on the 1995 study of Paraguayan decentralization done by the author in conjunction 
with Dr. Allan Rosenbaum for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) – see references for 
details.		
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5. Urban planning authority; 
6. Control, regulation, and services of public markets, slaughterhouses, fairs, and 
other food services; 
7. Fostering public education, culture, sports, health, public housing, public 
welfare programs, and tourism; 
8. Responsibilities over the preservation of historical monuments, works of art, 
and other cultural heritage in cooperation with other government agencies; 
9. Regulation and control of public transportation, and other matters related to the 
circulation of vehicles;  
10. Regulation and control of public performances, publicity, sports and 
recreational activities; 
11. Creating and regulating the municipal police force for the control and 
performance of only those activities under municipal jurisdiction;  
12. Furnishing services such as lighting, water, and sewage in the event that these 
services are not provided by other public services;  
13. Some environmental authority for the protection of the environment; 
14. Promoting citizen participation; 
15. Other functions in compliance with municipal goals.  
Law 1032/96 expanded the role of municipalities in the area of health with the 
establishment of a National Health System that sought to decentralize certain aspects of the 
health services provision to the municipalities. The law allowed for the creation of Local 
Health Councils, which were coordinated by the municipalities. In the area of education, 
changes in the legal framework gave municipalities a role in the coordination of District 
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Education Councils (Law 1264/98), with mixed results in their implementation. A series 
of other laws (Law 1590/2000 for national transportation; Law 100/92, which created local 
and regional transportation councils; Laws 1100/97 and 1561/2000 for environmental 
protection; and Law 1334/98 for consumer protection) expanded the role of local 
governments in regulating and controlling public transportation and protection of the 
environment and consumers, but little has been accomplished in terms of actual 
decentralization of such services.  
While the listing of areas of responsibility suggests that municipalities have broad 
authority and power, the reality is for all but a dozen or so of the country’s local 
governments, the situation is quite different. Lack of local capacity, and the country’s long 
tradition of centralized government, has meant that most public services are in fact 
delivered by agencies of the national government. Asymmetries between municipalities are 
also a factor, as some (e.g., the capital city of Asuncion, Encarnacion, and Ciudad del Este) 
are able to provide certain services, but others are too small to effectively deliver services.  
 
Municipal Revenues  	
 Historically, local governments in Paraguay have been very limited in their capacity 
to collect revenue. National governments have no tradition of revenue sharing with 
subnational governments. Laws dealing with municipal finances are, for the most part, very 
restrictive and highly centralized in that their administration is closely overseen by central 
government agencies, in particular the Ministry of Finances.  
 A significant change in this regard began with the new Constitution, which allowed 
municipalities to collect property taxes and retain 70% of those revenues. The remaining 
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30% is split 15% for the Departments, and 15% to a fund that supports the poorest 
municipalities. In the case of Asuncion, territorially not a part of any Department, its 30% 
is split between the poorest municipalities’ fund and one to improve transportation and 
access to the capital city.  
 A central problem for municipalities in collecting property taxes is that values have 
historically been under-assessed, and municipalities are restricted in their ability to increase 
those assessments. Under the law, the Ministry of Finances sets the values to be charged 
for the property tax, composed of a tax on the land and a tax on the building. Tax rates are 
differentiated by geographic zones within each municipality, and the value is assessed 
depending on whether properties are located on paved streets, stone streets, or dirt roads.  
 Municipalities do have a wide array of fees and services (including car registrations 
and licenses, waste collection, and road maintenance, among others) they can charge and 
have autonomy to collect such fees.41 Municipalities can also generate revenue by renting 
property. Revenue from gambling activities and, especially, royalties from the Itaipu and 
Yacireta hydroelectric dams, which are transferred by the central government, are also 
important sources of revenue for Paraguayan municipalities.  
 Municipal expenditures vary by municipalities’ size and capacity to provide 
services, but overall, municipal employee salaries represent the largest expenditure item 
(up to 45% of municipal expenditures), followed by capital investments in maintaining 
streets, buildings, and machinery equipment and repairs of municipal property.  
																																																								41	Municipalities in Paraguay are not allowed to create new fees; only the fees allowed by law can be 
collected, though they can regulate the amounts charged as long as the increases are in line with services 
provided.	
	 135 
 In terms of budget authority, local governments in Paraguay have autonomy and 
autarchy in the approval of their budgets, not needing supervision or approval from the 
Ministry of Finance and/or the Congress. Table 20 below summarizes the legal framework 
pertaining to the resource revenue and expenditure of municipal governments. 
 
Table 20:	Legal Framework of Municipal Governments Finances	
 Judicial Norm Description Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Revenues 
1992 Constitution  
 
Administrative Law 
1294/87 
Autarchy for revenue 
collection 
- Lack of proper cadasters 
and tensions with the 
National Cadaster Service 
office 
- Lack of willingness to 
collect taxes and fees by 
municipal authorities 
- Complexity of fees and 
of the new tax regime, 
making implementation 
confusing  
- Ministry of Finances not 
always cooperative in the 
transferring of funds 
- Lack of local capacity 
hinders local 
governments’ ability to 
implement projects or 
make use of newly 
transferred funds from 
royalties  
- Lack of transparency 
from the Central 
government in the 
transferring of funds.  
- Complicated transfer 
formulas makes the 
process difficult to 
understand 
- Lack of transparency at 
the local level  
1992 Constitution 
 
Administrative Law 
1294/87 
 
National Tax system 
Law 125/91 
- Municipalities can 
collect property taxes and 
retain 70%  
- Law 125/91 provides 
that the property tax is 
assessed by the National 
Cadaster Service, an 
agency of the central 
government 
- Municipalities can 
collect taxes and fees 
Law 881/81 
establishing the tax 
regime for the City 
of Asuncion 
 
Law 620/76 and Law 
135/91 establishing 
the tax regime for 
other municipalities  
Regulation of municipal 
taxes: 
-Taxes (licenses, raffles 
and drawings, 
entertainment, slaughter 
houses, construction 
permits, etc.) 
- Fees (sweeping and 
cleaning, garbage 
collection, inspection of 
vehicles, cemeteries, etc.) 
- Contributions 
(pavement maintenance, 
etc.)  
Law 1309/98 
establishing the 
transfer of royalties 
from Itaipu and 
Yacireta to 
Coparticipation of 
royalties funds 
transferred from the 
central government  
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Municipalities and 
Departments 
 
 
 
Expenditures 
1992 Constitution Autarchy in the 
administration and 
investment of resources 
- There is no agreement as 
to who is “administrative 
personnel” 
- Maximums are based on 
estimated revenues and 
not on actual revenue, 
thus creating 
overestimated budgets 
Administrative 
Municipal Law No. 
1294/87 
Legislation establishes 
maximum salaries that 
can be paid to mayors 
and councilmembers, as 
well as to administrative 
personnel  
 
 
 
 
Budget 
1992 Constitution They are authorized to 
approve their own 
budgets; are not 
dependent on the 
Nation’s budget. They 
must comply with norms 
established by Law 
1294/87 
- There are major tensions 
and conflicts in many 
municipalities between 
the mayors and their 
Municipal Councils 
during the budget 
approval process and 
during its implementation 
Law 1535/99 
Financial 
Administration of 
the State 
Applies to them only in 
case the Law 1294 is 
repealed  
Source: adapted from COPLANEA, 2003 
 
Fiscal Decentralization in Paraguay  	
 As mentioned in previous sections, Paraguay’s 1992 Constitution and a number of 
laws, some enacted before the transition to democracy and others after the new Constitution 
was approved, have sought to establish a legal framework for fiscal decentralization. The 
process has been characterized by conflict emanating from transfer formulas that are not 
clear, the very limited revenue collecting capacity at the local level (and nonexistent for 
regional governments), and from the preeminence and control of much of the process by 
the Finance Ministry, which has been at times reluctant, if not overtly opposed, to fully 
transfer funds entitled (by law) to local and regional governments.  
 Part of the problem has been, and continues to be, the overgrown size of the 
Paraguayan state. Efforts to reduce its size have been marred by confrontations, tensions, 
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and regressions. The Presidency of Juan Carlos Wasmosy (1993-1998), for example, 
launched a campaign to privatize state enterprises, which was met with much resistance by 
unions, Congress, and many in society (Neffa, 1996). The efforts, aimed at reducing the 
number of state employees, failed over the years, and in fact, the Paraguayan state 
continues to be the largest employer in the country.  In 1994, 97.4% of public expenditures 
were done by the national government, only 0.3% by Departmental governments (which 
had recently been created in 1992), and 2.3% by municipalities. In 1990, the proportion 
was 99% by the central government, and just 1% by municipalities (Neffa, 1996). Not 
much has changed, according to the President of the Governors Association: by 2010, the 
share of expenditures by Departmental governments was still about 1% and for local 
governments around 2%.42 
 The national budget is divided in two parts: the central administration (Legislative, 
Executive, and Judicial branches), and the so-called “decentralized entities or agencies,”43 
including the 17 Departments, the National University system, Social Security agencies, 
development promotion agencies, public enterprises, and financial entities.  
																																																								42	Meeting with President of Paraguay’s Governors’ Council. Asuncion, December 2014.			43	Decentralized entities or agencies is the name given by the Paraguayan government to public agencies 
having legal status and autonomy to administer themselves, but are dependent on the Executive branch; they 
include the Paraguayan Central Bank, autonomous agencies such as the Directorate for Social Welfare 
(Direccion de Beneficiencia y Ayuda Social – DIBEN), the National Social Prevention agency, public 
enterprises, and national universities. It is important to note that Departments are under this category, further 
complicating the relations between governors and the Executive branch.		
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Evolution of Fiscal Decentralization Reforms  	
 Before the creation of governorships and the reforms introduced by the new 
Constitution in favor of local governments, the only fiscal relationship between 
municipalities and the central government was the property tax, which was collected by 
the central government, which subsequently transferred 16% to the then Institute of 
Municipal Development (IDM—reflecting Spanish terminology).  
The IDM distributed only 4.4% of the funds to the municipalities of the interior, 
1.6% was transferred to the Water and Sewer agency (CORPOSANA, itself a public 
agency), and 10% was retained by the IDM for its budget. The Municipality of Asuncion 
received its 16% directly from the Ministry of Finance. No municipality was allowed to 
borrow foreign loans without approval from the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank, 
and investment projects in any municipality needed to be included in the National 
Development Plan, previously approved by the Secretariat for Technical Planning—an 
agency of the Executive branch (Neffa, 1996).  
 The first wave of reforms occurred after the 1992 Constitution was adopted. The 
Constitution was vague on revenues for Departments (Article 164), basically leaving 
Congress to enact the necessary laws that would fund the newly created governorships.  
 A second wave of reform in the early 1990s included the approval, in 1994, of the 
Administrative Departmental Law 426 (Ley Orgánica Departamental 426/94) that 
regulated transferring 15% of the property tax revenue to the Departments. The new law 
introduced sharing (coparticipacion) of the Value Added Tax (VAT or IVA in Spanish). 
That is, 15% of the VAT collected in each Department was to be transferred back—
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earmarked for health, education, and public works. The law assigned the Ministry of 
Finance with the collection and transfer of funds, as well as coordinating and controlling 
the collection process.  
 Another new source of revenue for Departmental and local governments introduced 
by the new law was the sharing of gambling revenues. The law established that 30% of 
funds collected from gambling activities would be transferred to the municipalities where 
gambling occurred, 30% to the Departments of the involved municipalities, 30% to the 
Directorate of Social Welfare of the Central Government (DIBEN—reflecting Spanish 
terminology),44 and 10% to the national treasury. The percentages are slightly different for 
the Municipality of Asuncion, where most of the gambling in Paraguay occurs, with 25% 
to the Municipality, 20% for Departmental governments, 20% for poor municipalities, 25% 
for the DIBEN, and 10% for the national treasury (Rosenbaum & Rodriguez Lagier, 1995).  
 Subregional governments are bound by the Financial Administrative Law 1535/99 
that regulates their relationship with the Ministry of Finance in terms of budget preparation 
and approval, particularly budgets of Departmental; the law established what is/is not 
allowable under the law in terms of expenditures.  
 A new, and very important, component of subnational governments’ revenue was 
the approval, in 1998, of Law 1309 that established and regulated the transfers of royalties 
paid to the Paraguayan central government by Brazil and Argentina for the use of the Itaipu 
and Yacireta hydroelectric dams. These funds are transferred to the Ministry of Finance, 
which, in the year 2000, began incrementally transferring them to Departmental 
																																																								44	Dirección de Beneficiencia – DIBEN		
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governments (up to 10%), and to municipalities (up to 40%), with differentiation between 
those territories affected or not by the flooding caused by the construction of the dams (see 
Table 21 below).45  
 
Table 21:	Royalties Distribution by Level of Government	
 Affected by 
Flooding 
No Flooding Total 
Central Government   50% 
Departmental Gov. 5% 5% 10% 
Municipal Govs.  15% 25% 40% 
Totals 20% 30% 100% 
Source: Author 
 
 Problems in the implementation of these laws abound. The lack of political will by 
the Ministry of Finance to transfer funds to Departmental governments in particular 
seriously hinders their ability to provide services as required by law or to implement 
programs and projects beneficial to their communities. Withholding of transfer, or 
transferring partial amounts, is one of the most common concerns expressed by governors, 
mayors, and former subnational authorities.46 Lack of capacity and knowledge of financial 
management is also a concern for many smaller municipalities and governorships, as well 
																																																								45	The 50% corresponding to subnational governments started to be transferred in the year 2000. No more 
than 10% was transferred on that first year, the proportion was to increase by 5% each year.			46	In fact, as early as November of 2014, serious tensions emerged between the Ministry of Finance, the 
Executive, and the Governors Association for the approval of the 2015 budget, where Governors complain 
that the Ministry of Finance is only transferring 2% of the VAT and not the fully 15% as required by Law 
426. http://www.abc.com.py/edicion-impresa/politica/gobernadores-no-quieren-ser-floreros-responde-luis-
gneiting-al-ministro-1306659.html and http://www.ultimahora.com/lanzoni-niega-conspiracion-y-ratifica-
legalidad-aumento-n848057.html			
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as the lack of clear rules and procedures (or effective implementation of the rules and 
procedures) to ensure transparency and accountability.  
 The central government continues to have a prominent role in the country’s public 
spending both in total numbers, and as a proportion of the country’s GDP. The size of the 
central government can also be assessed by the amount of expenditures that are committed 
to the payment of salaries and pensions. In the 2000-2009 period, the bulk of public 
spending was used to pay for personnel services,47 representing about 44% of the public 
spending; 14% was paid on pensions and retirement and about 20% on capital expenditures 
(Table 22);  an average of 16% was spent on infrastructure (Zarate, 2010).  
 
Table 22: Composition of Total Expenditures of the Central Government (as 
percentage of the total)	
Area Average  
2000 – 2004 
Average  
2005 – 2009 
Average  
2000 - 2009 
Current Expenses 79.2 77.8 78.5 
Personnel Services 43.6 43.7 43.6 
Goods and Services 6.2 7.0 6.6 
Contract Interests 6.9 4.9 5.9 
Current account transfers  6.1 7.2 6.6 
Pensions & Retirements 15.1 12.5 13.8 
Capital Expenditures 20.8 22.2 21.5 
Infrastructure Investment 17.8 15.1 16.5 
Financial Investment 0.2 0.7 0.4 
Transfers 2.8 6.4 4.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Zarate, 2010  
 
																																																								47	It includes salaries for doctors and teachers.		
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In 1994, central government expenditures represented almost 15% of GDP, and by 
the year 2000, its share represented about 23% of GDP and the Departmental governments 
had barely reached 0.4% of GDP (Table 23).  
 
Table 23: Departmental Governments Spending Compared with the Central 
Government and GDP 	
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average Annual 
Change 
Percentage share of Governorships in Central Administration and GDP  
G/GDP 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 
G/CA 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.2 
Source: COPLANEA, 2003 
 
The Departmental governments’ continued dependence on transfers from the 
central government affects their ability to plan and to allocate funds for social programs or 
to provide services. Decentralized entities, dependent on the Executive branch, on the other 
hand, have maintained and increased their participation in public spending. 
Since the year 2000, royalties have become a fundamental source of revenue for 
both Departments and municipalities. Some Departments’ budgets have become more 
dependent on royalties than others. In the Departmental government of Central (the largest 
in terms of population and economic activity), royalties were 14.5% of capital revenues for 
the 2000-2006 period, while in both Canindeyu and Neembucu it was over 80% 
(COPLANEA, 2007).  The Departmental government of Central has been transferred 
approximately 4.6 million US dollars in the 2000-2010 period, while the Department of 
Neembucu has received approximately 11.2 million US dollars (Table 24 and 25 below). 
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Table 24:	Revenues as per contract for Itaipu and Yacyreta (Millions of Guaranies)	
Year Itaipu Yacyreta Total 
1989 61,830 - 61,830 
1990 139,348 - 139,348 
1991 137,193 - 137,193 
1992 178,226 - 178,226 
1993 335,395 - 335,395 
1994 463,686 - 463,686 
1995 346,001 5,947 351,948 
1996 369,299 13,844 383,143 
1997 504,327 24,497 528,824 
1998 702,490 47,125 749,615 
1999 942,478 54,287 996,765 
2000 718,782 62,967 781,749 
2001 1,226,604 57,281 1,283,885 
2002 1,128,009 131,184 1,259,193 
2003 1,443,967 47,673 1,491,640 
2004 1,422,386 220,473 1,642,859 
2005 1,550,503 100,534 1,651,037 
2006 1,566,768 316,122 1,882,890 
2007 1,539,656 502,595 2,042,251 
2008 (*) 1,314,943 672,184 1,987,127 
Total 16,091,891 2,256,713 18,348,604 
* Projected 
Source: COPLANEA based on Ministry of Finance  
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Table 25: Transfers of Royalties to Departmental Government (in Guaranies, millions)	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Departments directly impacted by the flooding of Itaipu and Yacireta  Source: www.hacienda.gov.py
Departments 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Concepción  -       547.8     968.4     1,302.7    1,620.8    2,221.5    2,703     2,939.1    3,039.0    3,918.0    3,732.0    
San Pedro  300.5    547.8     968.4     1,302.7    1,620.8    2,250.3    2,865  2,939.1    3,039.0    3,918.0    3,732.0    
Cordillera  300.5    547.8     968.4     1,302.7    1,620.8    2,455.8    2,605  1,762.2    3,039.0    3,918.0    3,733.0    
Guairá  300.5    547.8     968.4     1,302.7    1,620.8    2,477.2    2,760  2,939.1    3,040.0    3,918.0    3,732.0    
Caaguazú  300.5    547.8     968.4     1,302.7    1,302.7    2,230.2    2,845  2,952.1    3,039.0    3,918.0    3,733.0    
Caazapá  300.5    547.8     968.4     1,302.7    1,620.8    2,287.8    2,878    2,939.1    3,039.0    3,918.0    3,732.0    
Itapúa*  976.5    1,780.5    2,324.1    3,126.4    3,908.8    6,044.5    6,908   7,053.9    7,295.0    9,404.0    8,958.0    
Misiones*  976.5    1,780.5    2,324.1    3,126.4    3,908.8    4,721.8    6,454  7,053.9    7,294.0    9,403.0    8,958.0    
Paraguarí  300.5    547.8     968.4     1,302.7    1,620.8    1,999.5    2,875  2,939.1    3,039.0    3,918.0    3,732.0    
Alto Paraná*  976.5    1,780.5    2,324.0    3,126.4    3,908.8    5,253.7    6,784  7,053.9    7,468.0    9,404.0    8,958.0    
Central  -       -       968.4     1,302.7    1,620.8    2,272.9    1,840  2,939.1    3,039.0    3,918.0    3,732.0    
Ñeembucu  300.5    547.5     2,324.1    3,126.4    3,908.8    5,451.7    4,030     7,053.9    7,295.0    9,404.0    8,958.0    
Amambay  300.5    547.5     968.4     1,302.7    1,620.8    2,325.8    2,435     2,939.1    3,039.0    3,918.0    3,732.0    
Canindeyú*  976.5    1,780.5    2,324.1    3,126.4    3,908.8    5,871.5    6,899  7,053.9    7,295.0    9,403.0    8,958.0    
Presidente Hayes  300.5    547.8     968.4     1,302.7    1,620.8    2,448.0    2,102   2,939.1    2,474.0    3,919.0    3,733.0    
Boquerón  -       -       968.4     1,302.7    1,620.8    2,325.8    2,875   2,939.1    3,039.0    3,918.0    3,732.0    
Alto Paraguay  300.5    547.8     968.4     1,302.7    1,620.8    2,215.7    2,338    2,939.1    3,098.0    3,918.0    3,732.0    
Total Millions of guaraníes  6,911   13,147  23,241    31,264  38,675    54,853    62,204 69,374  72,610   94,035  89,577 
Exchange Rate  3,485    4,105     5,719     6,436     5,969     6,164     5,620     5,047     4,350     4,860  4665 
Millions of US dollars 2.0 3.2 4.1 4.9 6.5 8.9 11.1 13.7 17.1 19.3 19.2 
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Transfers from VAT tax and gambling are not as important to the Departments 
compared to royalties transfers, except in economically significant Departments such as 
Central, Alto Parana, and Itapua—where the VAT and gambling revenues are substantial 
(Tables 26 and 27 below).  
	
Table 26: Transfers of Valued Added Tax to Departments (in Guaranies, millions)	
 
Source: Ministry of Finance report on “Transfers to Departmental Governments, 2001 – 2011” 
 
 
 
Gobierno(Departamental 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Totals
Concepción 717++++++++++ 422++++++++++ 228++++++++++ 936++++++++++ 873++++++++++ 1,013+++++++ 1,013+++++++ 1,305+++++++ 1,419+++++++ 1,419+++++++ 9,345((((((((((
San+Pedro 320++++++++++ 230++++++++++ 180++++++++++ 2,929+++++++ 544++++++++++ 575++++++++++ 575++++++++++ 669++++++++++ 727++++++++++ 728++++++++++ 7,477((((((((((
Cordillera 514++++++++++ 355++++++++++ 312++++++++++ 577++++++++++ 596++++++++++ 632++++++++++ 632++++++++++ 726++++++++++ 789++++++++++ 789++++++++++ 5,922((((((((((
Guairá 693++++++++++ 759++++++++++ 635++++++++++ 1,539+++++++ 1,616+++++++ 1,666+++++++ 1,666+++++++ 1,914+++++++ 2,081+++++++ 2,081+++++++ 14,650((((((((
Caaguazú 1,680+++++++ 1,209+++++++ 675++++++++++ 2,364+++++++ 2,399+++++++ 2,613+++++++ 2,613+++++++ 3,012+++++++ 3,274+++++++ 3,274+++++++ 23,113((((((((
Caazapá 701++++++++++ 251++++++++++ 133++++++++++ 628++++++++++ 659++++++++++ 699++++++++++ 755++++++++++ 803++++++++++ 873++++++++++ 873++++++++++ 6,375((((((((((
Itapúa 2,779+++++++ 1,973+++++++ 1,365+++++++ 2,666+++++++ 2,799+++++++ 2,949+++++++ 3,185+++++++ 3,389+++++++ 3,684+++++++ 3,684+++++++ 28,473((((((((
Misiones 574++++++++++ 520++++++++++ 418++++++++++ 763++++++++++ 801++++++++++ 878++++++++++ 948++++++++++ 1,037+++++++ 1,128+++++++ 1,128+++++++ 8,195((((((((((
Paraguari 422++++++++++ 594++++++++++ 319++++++++++ 1,249+++++++ 1,310+++++++ 1,390+++++++ 1,502+++++++ 1,598+++++++ 1,737+++++++ 1,736+++++++ 11,857((((((((
Alto+Paraná 7,692+++++++ 8,481+++++++ 9,351+++++++ 9,786+++++++ 10,151+++++ 9,756+++++++ 11,609+++++ 12,382+++++ 13,459+++++ 13,459+++++ 106,126((((((
Central 7,448+++++++ 5,850+++++++ 4,046+++++++ 10,901+++++ 11,308+++++ 13,589+++++ 14,482+++++ 15,555+++++ 16,908+++++ 16,909+++++ 116,996((((((
Ñeembucu 504++++++++++ 333++++++++++ 179++++++++++ 932++++++++++ 793++++++++++ 870++++++++++ 940++++++++++ 999++++++++++ 1,086+++++++ 1,086+++++++ 7,722((((((((((
Amambay 920++++++++++ 857++++++++++ 462++++++++++ 1,727+++++++ 1,814+++++++ 1,815+++++++ 2,076+++++++ 2,209+++++++ 2,402+++++++ 2,402+++++++ 16,684((((((((
Canindeyú 752++++++++++ 499++++++++++ 256++++++++++ 1,029+++++++ 1,052+++++++ 1,145+++++++ 1,237+++++++ 1,316+++++++ 1,431+++++++ 1,431+++++++ 10,148((((((((
Presidente+Hayes 793++++++++++ 500++++++++++ 270++++++++++ 1,078+++++++ 871++++++++++ 1,195+++++++ 1,291+++++++ 2,556+++++++ 1,492+++++++ 1,493+++++++ 11,539((((((((
Boquerón 376++++++++++ 254++++++++++ 149++++++++++ 1,291+++++++ 598++++++++++ 674++++++++++ 737++++++++++ 786++++++++++ 855++++++++++ 855++++++++++ 6,575((((((((((
Alto+Paraguay 469++++++++++ 329++++++++++ 163++++++++++ 668++++++++++ 660++++++++++ 716++++++++++ 788++++++++++ 838++++++++++ 911++++++++++ 912++++++++++ 6,454((((((((((
Totals 27,354((((( 23,416((((( 19,141((((( 41,063((((( 38,844((((( 42,175((((( 46,049((((( 51,094((((( 54,256((((( 54,259((((( 397,651((((((
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Table 27: Transfers to Departmental Governments – Gambling Revenues (in 
Guaranies, millions)	
 
 Source: Ministry of Finance report on “Transfers to Departmental Governments, 2001 – 2011” 
 
Municipalities also saw their revenues increased with the collection of property 
taxes, as allowed by the new Constitution, and the capacity to collect fees for goods and 
services. The table below (Table 28) shows the evolution of public spending between 1993 
Gobierno(Departamental 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Totals
Concepción 338++++++++++ 195++++++++++ 195++++++++++ 460++++++++++ 624++++++++++ 504++++++++++ 504++++++++++ 660++++++++++ 556++++++++++ 735++++++++++ 4,771((((((((((
San+Pedro 442++++++++++ 406++++++++++ 2,165+++++++ 601++++++++++ 844++++++++++ 723++++++++++ 723++++++++++ 893++++++++++ 698++++++++++ 993++++++++++ 8,488((((((((((
Cordillera 374++++++++++ 407++++++++++ 492++++++++++ 516++++++++++ 655++++++++++ 594++++++++++ 594++++++++++ 693++++++++++ 633++++++++++ 771++++++++++ 5,729((((((((((
Guairá 341++++++++++ 358++++++++++ 358++++++++++ 458++++++++++ 602++++++++++ 225++++++++++ 225++++++++++ 637++++++++++ 561++++++++++ 709++++++++++ 4,474((((((((((
Caaguazú 545++++++++++ 461++++++++++ 1,461+++++++ 731++++++++++ 973++++++++++ 803++++++++++ 803++++++++++ 1,030+++++++ 901++++++++++ 1,146+++++++ 8,854((((((((((
Caazapá 802++++++++++ 349++++++++++ 672++++++++++ 419++++++++++ 562++++++++++ 419++++++++++ 590++++++++++ 594++++++++++ 535++++++++++ 661++++++++++ 5,603((((((((((
Itapúa 572++++++++++ 509++++++++++ 1,527+++++++ 745++++++++++ 1,010+++++++ 696++++++++++ 1,062+++++++ 811++++++++++ 784++++++++++ 1,190+++++++ 8,906((((((((((
Misiones 218++++++++++ 144++++++++++ 144++++++++++ 383++++++++++ 506++++++++++ 444++++++++++ 531++++++++++ 535++++++++++ 478++++++++++ 595++++++++++ 3,978((((((((((
Paraguari 333++++++++++ 432++++++++++ 523++++++++++ 507++++++++++ 695++++++++++ 529++++++++++ 731++++++++++ 453++++++++++ 651++++++++++ 820++++++++++ 5,674((((((((((
Alto+Paraná 1,345+++++++ 1,572+++++++ 1,632+++++++ 850++++++++++ 1,394+++++++ 1,184+++++++ 1,424+++++++ 2,665+++++++ 1,098+++++++ 2,408+++++++ 15,572((((((((
Central 1,750+++++++ 1,810+++++++ 3,636+++++++ 2,744+++++++ 3,142+++++++ 899++++++++++ 3,310+++++++ 3,333+++++++ 2,471+++++++ 3,711+++++++ 26,806((((((((
Ñeembucu 271++++++++++ 287++++++++++ 303++++++++++ 357++++++++++ 490++++++++++ 409++++++++++ 515++++++++++ 519++++++++++ 428++++++++++ 577++++++++++ 4,156((((((((((
Amambay 300++++++++++ 343++++++++++ 416++++++++++ 394++++++++++ 553++++++++++ 421++++++++++ 581++++++++++ 585++++++++++ 491++++++++++ 652++++++++++ 4,736((((((((((
Canindeyú 295++++++++++ 351++++++++++ 805++++++++++ 357++++++++++ 564++++++++++ 482++++++++++ 592++++++++++ 597++++++++++ 566++++++++++ 665++++++++++ 5,274((((((((((
Presidente+Hayes 221++++++++++ 171++++++++++ 227++++++++++ 362++++++++++ 483++++++++++ 403++++++++++ 507++++++++++ 511++++++++++ 487++++++++++ 569++++++++++ 3,941((((((((((
Boquerón 210++++++++++ 210++++++++++ 210++++++++++ 301++++++++++ 431++++++++++ 329++++++++++ 453++++++++++ 456++++++++++ 395++++++++++ 508++++++++++ 3,503((((((((((
Alto+Paraguay 220++++++++++ 245++++++++++ 377++++++++++ 316++++++++++ 395++++++++++ 327++++++++++ 414++++++++++ 385++++++++++ 367++++++++++ 465++++++++++ 3,511((((((((((
Totals 8,577((((((( 8,250((((((( 15,143((((( 10,501((((( 13,923((((( 9,391((((((( 13,559((((( 15,357((((( 12,100((((( 17,175((((( 123,976((((((
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and 2001, and the total amount spent by local governments in Paraguay. In this period, 
municipalities more than doubled their budget expenditures.48  
	
Table 28: Evolution of Public Expenditure Budget (in Guaranies, millions)	
Year Central Government Governorships Municipalities 
1993 2,004,109,352,786 - 52,497,190,626 
1995 3,262,506,809,605 37,269,381,000 90,449,931,935 
1996 4,186,941,636,802 70,610,656,000 122,093,042,072 
1999 5,757,711,119,794 171,286,255,000 76,953,301,641 
2000 7,604,699,304,000 196,747,781,000 137,216,203,590 
2001 6,563,116,873,652 170,940,893,000 144,574,000,000 
Source: COPLANEA. Central Government and Governorships from the Ministry of Finance. Municipalities, 
information for the years, 1993, 1993, 1995, 1996 and 1999 are from the IDM; years 2000 and 2002 are from 
the Accounting Division of the Ministry of Finance  
 
 Transfers from royalties have become a major source of revenues for local 
governments (e.g., Departments) in Paraguay. In a 2007 study of 145 municipalities of 
Paraguay, the percentage of local government expenses paid for with royalties increased 
from less than 0.6%, in the year 2000 when transfers begun, to 46.4% in 2006 (see Table 
29), with an average of 83% spent to cover capital expenses 49 (Table 30). Royalties 
transfers have become a source of tension between subnational governments because so 
many modifications have been made to the law, resulting in many local governments not 
																																																								48	It is important to note again, that the capacity to collect and spend revenues in Paraguay varies greatly by 
the size of the municipality. The Municipality of Asuncion is by far the largest in the country and the one 
that spends the most in comparison to other municipalities.			49	The law requires that up to 80% of royalties revenues be spent on capital investment.			
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directly affected by the flooding caused by the Itaipu and Yacireta dams benefitting more 
than those directly affected.50 
 
Table 29: Percentage of Selected Municipalities’ Total Expenses Financed by 
Royalties 	
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Expenses 0.6 13.9 31.2 25.9 32.9 45.8 46.4 
Source: COPLANEA, 2007 
 
Table 30: Percentage of Royalties Spent by Selected Municipalities (by type of 
Expense)	
Type of 
Expense 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Average 
Current 
Expenses 12.9 15.3 10.5 22.2 20.8 17.2 15.8 16.4 
Capital 
Expenses 86.6 84.7 88.6 76.4 79.2 81.5 84.2 83.0 
Financial 
Expenses 0.5 0.0 0.9 1.4 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Adapted from COPLANEA, 2007 
  
 Table 31 shows the total royalties transfers to municipalities by Departments from 
2005 to 2010 with significant increases each year since the transfers began. In fact, when 
comparing the total figures of Table 32 and Table 33 (which show total revenue transfers—
including gambling, royalties, and other resources), the overreliance on royalties is clearly 
seen. For example, the municipalities of the Department of Neembucu received in 2010 a 
total of 25.4 billion Guaranies, of which 24.1 billion came from royalties’ transfers. Even 																																																								50	http://www.vanguardia.com.py/v1/index.php/edicion-impresa/politica/item/3306-ley-de-royalties-se-
promulgó-como-intercambio-de-favores-pol%C3%ADticos and http://www.abc.com.py/edicion-
impresa/editorial/injusta-e-irracional-distribucion-de-royalties-y-compensaciones-553719.html		
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the Department of Central, one of the richest and the most populated in the country, the 
difference is barely 4 billion Guaranies—it received total transfers of 63.9 billion 
Guaranies and royalties were 58.1 billion. Gambling is not a significant source of revenue 
for local governments (Table 33). 
 
Table 31: Royalties Transfers to Municipalities, by Departments (in Guaranies, 
millions)	
 
Source: Prepared with information of the reports “Transfers to Municipal Governments” of the Ministry of 
Finance
Departaments 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Totals
Capital 8,877************ 7,823************ 9,883************ 8,121************ 13,942********** 10,873********** 59,5193333333333
Concepción 5,473************ 4,832************ 6,413************ 6,059************ 9,983************ 8,819************ 41,5793333333333
San*Pedro 13,205********** 11,668********** 14,733********** 16,623********** 19,644********** 19,731********** 95,6043333333333
Cordillera 12,166********** 10,805********** 14,676********** 14,873********** 17,951********** 19,628********** 90,0993333333333
Guairá 10,051********** 8,506************ 12,194********** 11,725********** 16,469********** 15,980********** 74,9253333333333
Caaguazú 15,573********** 13,737********** 18,681********** 18,614********** 22,744********** 24,367********** 113,71633333333
Caazapá 6,483************ 5,730************ 7,353************ 7,705************ 9,402************ 10,547********** 47,2203333333333
Itapúa 52,590********** 47,621********** 64,049********** 65,059********** 79,908********** 82,551********** 391,77833333333
Misiones 9,076************ 7,968************ 10,776********** 10,129********** 13,125********** 13,184********** 64,2583333333333
Paraguari 10,779********** 9,520************ 12,895********** 12,615********** 15,528********** 16,793********** 78,1303333333333
Alto*Paraná 27,038********** 26,154********** 35,046********** 33,336********** 44,179********** 46,111********** 211,86433333333
Central 30,449********** 26,864********** 40,074********** 43,427********** 52,474********** 58,177********** 251,46533333333
Ñeembucu 16,928********** 15,076********** 20,004********** 18,801********** 20,954********** 24,148********** 115,91133333333
Amambay 2,572************ 2,273************ 3,207************ 2,875************ 3,991************ 4,312************ 19,2303333333333
Canindeyú 14,186********** 12,035********** 17,348********** 16,869********** 20,341********** 21,361********** 102,14033333333
Presidente*Hayes 3,451************ 2,645************ 4,824************ 5,590************ 7,070************ 7,838************ 31,4183333333333
Boquerón 1,033************ 865************** 1,644************ 1,509************ 2,576************ 2,335************ 9,96233333333333
Alto*Paraguay 1,105************ 968************** 2,143************ 2,218************ 3,337************ 3,243************ 13,0143333333333
Totals 241,03533333333 215,09033333333 295,94333333333 296,14833333333 373,61833333333 389,99833333333 1,752,31333333
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Table 32: Total Transfers to Municipal Governments by Departments (all sources, 
in millions, Guaranies)	
 
Source: Prepared with information of the reports “Transfers to Municipal Governments” of the Ministry of 
Finance 
 
Departaments 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Totals
Capital 10,958------------ 9,904------------- 11,455----------- 15,409----------- 15,910----------- 11,109----------- 74,74544444444444
Concepción 6,309-------------- 5,486------------- 6,877------------- 10,931----------- 10,797----------- 9,857------------- 50,25744444444444
San-Pedro 15,843------------ 13,811----------- 16,340----------- 22,316----------- 22,139----------- 22,807----------- 113,256444444444
Cordillera 14,254------------ 12,742----------- 15,895----------- 20,344----------- 20,347----------- 22,645----------- 106,227444444444
Guairá 12,063------------ 10,170----------- 13,706----------- 18,687----------- 18,604----------- 18,945----------- 92,17544444444444
Caaguazú 18,086------------ 15,933----------- 20,641----------- 25,472----------- 25,397----------- 28,139----------- 133,668444444444
Caazapá 7,876-------------- 6,786------------- 8,020------------- 10,708----------- 10,658----------- 12,471----------- 56,51944444444444
Itapúa 55,588------------ 50,142----------- 65,995----------- 83,159----------- 82,988----------- 86,589----------- 424,461444444444
Misiones 10,210------------ 8,930------------- 11,533----------- 13,951----------- 14,002----------- 14,482----------- 73,10844444444444
Paraguari 12,811------------ 11,231----------- 14,387----------- 17,546----------- 17,536----------- 19,532----------- 93,04344444444444
Alto-Paraná 28,949------------ 27,728----------- 36,632----------- 45,990----------- 46,131----------- 48,981----------- 234,411444444444
Central 33,824------------ 30,329----------- 42,951----------- 56,415----------- 55,736----------- 62,977----------- 282,232444444444
Ñeembucu 18,847------------ 16,598----------- 21,060----------- 21,752----------- 22,038----------- 25,413----------- 125,708444444444
Amambay 2,892-------------- 2,559------------- 3,397------------- 4,219------------- 4,172------------- 4,762------------- 22,00144444444444
Canindeyú 15,037------------ 12,758----------- 17,998----------- 21,251----------- 20,989----------- 22,762----------- 110,795444444444
Presidente-Hayes 4,024-------------- 3,017------------- 5,213------------- 7,620------------- 7,666------------- 8,987------------- 36,52744444444444
Boquerón 1,261-------------- 1,006------------- 1,730------------- 2,818------------- 2,782------------- 2,632------------- 12,22944444444444
Alto-Paraguay 1,193-------------- 1,050------------- 2,270------------- 3,486------------- 3,466------------- 3,447------------- 14,91244444444444
Totals 270,0254444444444 240,180444444444 316,100444444444 402,074444444444 401,358444444444 426,537444444444 2,056,274444444
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Table 33: Gambling Transfers to Municipal Governments (by Departments, 
Guaranies, millions)	
 
Source: Prepared with information of the reports “Transfers to Municipal Governments” of the Ministry of 
Finance 
 
 
Overall, the process of fiscal decentralization that began in Paraguay in the early 
1990s has created some institutional and legal framework conducive to its 
implementation—however, serious political and administrative concerns remain.  
Overreliance on transfers from the central government, in particular royalties, place 
local and Departmental governments at the mercy of administrators from the Executive 
branch, especially from the Ministry of Finances. The transfers are not reliable and their 
Departaments 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Totals
Capital '((((((((((((((((((( '((((((((((((((((((( '((((((((((((((((((( 1,467(((((((((((( 1,968(((((((((((( 236(((((((((((((( 3,67144444444444
Concepción 428(((((((((((((( 274(((((((((((((( 119(((((((((((((( 423(((((((((((((( 385(((((((((((((( 535(((((((((((((( 2,16444444444444
San(Pedro 1,669(((((((((((( 1,241(((((((((((( 760(((((((((((((( 1,274(((((((((((( 814(((((((((((((( 1,254(((((((((((( 7,01244444444444
Cordillera 1,198(((((((((((( 1,112(((((((((((( 407(((((((((((((( 963(((((((((((((( 762(((((((((((((( 1,213(((((((((((( 5,65544444444444
Guairá 1,284(((((((((((( 1,009(((((((((((( 777(((((((((((((( 801(((((((((((((( 668(((((((((((((( 987(((((((((((((( 5,52644444444444
Caaguazú 1,348(((((((((((( 1,112(((((((((((( 766(((((((((((((( 1,155(((((((((((( 1,028(((((((((((( 1,502(((((((((((( 6,91144444444444
Caazapá 920(((((((((((((( 616(((((((((((((( 286(((((((((((((( 564(((((((((((((( 385(((((((((((((( 637(((((((((((((( 3,40844444444444
Itapúa 1,520(((((((((((( 1,146(((((((((((( 525(((((((((((((( 1,515(((((((((((( 1,296(((((((((((( 1,930(((((((((((( 7,93244444444444
Misiones 706(((((((((((((( 564(((((((((((((( 308(((((((((((((( 427(((((((((((((( 360(((((((((((((( 577(((((((((((((( 2,94244444444444
Paraguari 1,241(((((((((((( 975(((((((((((((( 624(((((((((((((( 790(((((((((((((( 656(((((((((((((( 1,028(((((((((((( 5,31444444444444
Alto(Paraná 578(((((((((((((( 377(((((((((((((( 348(((((((((((((( 1,467(((((((((((( 1,227(((((((((((( 1,894(((((((((((( 5,89144444444444
Central 171(((((((((((((( 359(((((((((((((( 63(((((((((((((((( 3,283(((((((((((( 2,463(((((((((((( 3,787(((((((((((( 10,1264444444444
Ñeembucu 1,349(((((((((((( 992(((((((((((((( 497(((((((((((((( 586(((((((((((((( 448(((((((((((((( 777(((((((((((((( 4,64944444444444
Amambay 86(((((((((((((((( 68(((((((((((((((( '((((((((((((((((((( 228(((((((((((((( 181(((((((((((((( 284(((((((((((((( 84744444444444444
Canindeyú 342(((((((((((((( 274(((((((((((((( 166(((((((((((((( 574(((((((((((((( 452(((((((((((((( 710(((((((((((((( 2,51844444444444
Presidente(Hayes 321(((((((((((((( 137(((((((((((((( 167(((((((((((((( 366(((((((((((((( 293(((((((((((((( 478(((((((((((((( 1,76244444444444
Boquerón 150(((((((((((((( 68(((((((((((((((( '((((((((((((((((((( 101(((((((((((((( 99(((((((((((((((( 171(((((((((((((( 58944444444444444
Alto(Paraguay '((((((((((((((((((( '((((((((((((((((((( '((((((((((((((((((( 149(((((((((((((( 129(((((((((((((( 204(((((((((((((( 48244444444444444
Totals 13,3114444444444 10,3244444444444 5,81344444444444 16,1334444444444 13,6144444444444 18,2044444444444 77,3994444444444
Years
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amounts fluctuate, many times, depending on the political circumstances of the moment. 
In addition, subnational governments’ lack of political will to enforce full collection of 
revenues (in the case of municipalities), and the poor professionalization and capacity of 
much of their human resources (see next section, below), complicate the planning, 
implementation, and evaluation needed to provide services and goods.   
 
Human Resources at the Subnational Level 	
 Since the beginning of the decentralization process, the lack of capacity at the 
subregional level of government has been, and continues to be, one of the major challenges 
to the effective implementation of fiscal and administrative decentralization. This reality 
has continuously been cited by the central government to limit the extent to which 
decentralization is allowed to progress.  
 In Paraguay, a large number of people actively work in the public sector. Although 
difficult to ascertain and verify, in 2003, the Central Government employed an estimated 
174,362 individuals (including contractors, but excluding armed forces or health and 
education workers), up from about 96,600 in 1994 (Rosenbaum & Rodriguez Lagier, 
1995). By 2008, the number had increased to 204,722; and by 2013, the number had 
reached 255,253.51 The increase in personnel at the Departmental level can only be inferred 
from the growth in payroll services paid, which has increased, in particular from 2003 
																																																								51	http://www.abc.com.py/edicion-impresa/economia/la-cantidad-de-funcionarios-publicos-crecio-cerca-
del-50-en-una-decada-1235762.html and 
http://www.portalguarani.com/2335_victor_manuel_sosa/16871_reinventando_la_gestion_publica_en_el_p
araguay__por_jose_maria_ibanez__victor_manuel_sosa.html			
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onward (coinciding with increased fiscal transfers). At the local level, numbers are nearly 
impossible to find. By 1994, about 4,000 people worked in the 217 municipalities, of which 
nearly 3,200 did so at the Municipality of Asuncion; in 2003, almost 53% of all municipal 
employees worked for the Municipality of Asuncion, and by 2013 the number of 
employees at the Asuncion municipality had increased to 8,000.52 
 Efforts to improve capacity have occurred under the auspices of, and mostly funded 
by, multilateral organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the United 
Nations Development Program, the Organization of American States, the U.S. Agency for 
International Development, and the German and Japanese cooperation, as well as many 
others, sometimes in collaboration with national and foreign universities. However, these 
efforts have lacked continuity.   
 The constant growth of the public sector, and the continued politization of many 
government positions, as well as nepotism and patronage at all levels, have slowed reforms 
in the public sector. The Paraguayan Organization of Municipal Cooperation (OPACI), the 
municipal association that represents the interests of Paraguayan local governments, has 
promoted training for its members but these initiatives have not been sustained, and the 
lack of financial resources continues to be a challenge.  
 The problems of human resources at the Departmental and municipal levels can be 
summarized as (COPLANEA, interviews): 
																																																								52 	http://www.ultimahora.com/nomina-funcionarios-confirma-superpoblacion-la-municipalidad-asuncion-
n735226.html Information on the number of employees at other municipalities is not readily available. Even 
the Secretary of Civil Service does not have access to that information, and there is great reluctance to provide 
such information.		
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• Lack of administrative, fiscal, and managerial capacity, with serious difficulties in 
budget management; 
• Tensions between long term civil service and political appointees, delaying in many 
instances the implementation of programs and services; 
• Growth of number of staff as result of political cycles, by which every new election 
brings a wave of new people hired by the winners of the election;  
• Promotions that are still very much based on political loyalties and not necessarily 
on performance or capacity; in fact, there are no evaluations of personnel 
performance;  
• Absence of rules for selecting and promoting public personnel at the Departmental 
or municipal level;  
• Lack of flexibility to dismiss employees;  
• The opposition to Law 1626/2000 (which regulates and seeks to professionalize 
civil service in Paraguay) by many unions and interest groups who have challenged 
the constitutionality of the law—making civil service reform difficult to achieve;  
• Lack of transparency and accountability for the actions of civil service workers, 
their incomes, and non-compliance with their obligation to submit affidavits of 
goods and properties owned. 
 
Furthermore, many of these problems are believed to have contributed to increasing 
society’s perception that subnational authorities are corrupt, inept, and unable to solve the 
problems of their communities and regions. All of this adds to a general lack of trust and/or 
support of the decentralization process, and can potentially be a serious drawback in a 
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historically centralized country, where decentralization was presented as a solution to so 
many local needs. 53  
 
Other Institutional Players: the OPACI and the Governors’ Council 
 
OPACI 	
Paraguayan local governments are represented by the Paraguayan Organization for 
Municipal Cooperation (OPACI—reflecting Spanish terminology), which acts as the 
country’s municipal association. The former Institute for Municipal Development (IDM—
reflecting Spanish terminology) was abolished in 1999. The objective of OPACI is to 
advance the interests of municipalities.  
 The objectives of OPACI, as described on its organizational chart, are: 
1) To promote cooperation between the municipalities of the country and 
coordinate actions with state and non-state public institutions to promote 
development and planned common interests; 
2) To strengthen the system of municipal autonomy enshrined in the 
Constitution and Municipal Organic Law; 
3) To promote and develop the institutional strengthening of municipalities 
and consolidation of participatory democratic principles; 
4) To promote citizen participation in municipal management. 
 
																																																								53 	Interviews with former Governors of Department Central and COPLANEA. Asuncion, Paraguay, 
September 2013	
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The association aims to act as an intermediary between local governments and other 
government branches, in particular the Executive and the Legislative branch, but its impact 
has been, at best, moderate. Its capacity to lobby Congress in support of municipalities has 
been weak, and the organization itself has been impacted by internal political infighting. 
Its financial situation has been seriously strained by the 1992 Constitution, which 
eliminated the mandatory appropriation of funds from municipalities that provided the 
organization with significant revenue. Its capacity to provide services to municipalities has 
thus been impacted as well. Many mayors have become more autonomous and have opted 
not to be part of OPACI.  
Another problem for OPACI is that members of municipal councils have not been 
actively involved in it, and actually have their own association, the Paraguayan Association 
of Municipal Councils (AJUMPA), which strives to represent the interests of elected 
councilmembers.  
With a staff of about 80 people, the organization’s principal activity is to gather 
data about license plates, vehicles, and drivers’ licenses,54 to record this data at a computer 
center, and to report it to the municipalities, other public and private organizations, and to 
private citizens. It also performs a limited amount of legal counseling and drafts and 
modifies laws pertaining to the municipal movement, and occasionally organizes 
conferences and seminars (Rosenbaum & Rodriguez Lagier, 1994; interviews).  
																																																								54	These activities represent 80% of the organization’s budget, and it is now being challenged by new 
legislation that would create a National License Plates Registry endangering OPACI’s main source of 
revenue.  	
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One of the main achievements of OPACI, during the decentralization discussions, 
was its success in lobbying Congress for the approval of the royalties transfer legislation.55 
It is one of the few occasions in which the organization was truly effective. However, 
overall, OPACI has not developed a clear vision of how local governments can express 
their common interests in order to present an effective lobbying effort.  
 
The Governors’ Council  	
 The Paraguayan Council of Governors was created in the mid-1990s to provide 
newly elected governors with a voice and to influence the discussion and implementation 
of decentralization policies at that time.56 The organization represents the interests of the 
country’s 17 governors.  
Each governorship contributes to the organization’s general budget57 and its staff is 
quite limited (about 4 people, mainly administrative personnel). The lobby activities of the 
Council reside mainly in its president, and its effectiveness depends on this person’s ability 
to negotiate with the national Congress and/or with the president of the republic on issues 
related to greater fund allocation to the governorships. Governors do not have clear 
responsibilities under the Constitution, and existing laws do not clarify their duties and 
																																																								55	Interview with OPACI legal counselor, Asuncion, Paraguay, December 2014.			56	In fact, the Institute for Public Management & Community Service, through a US Agency for International 
Development (USAID) funded project, played a fundamental role in giving technical assistance and advice 
for the creation of the Council.			57	In December of 2014, the amount paid by each Governorship to the Council was about 2 million guaranies 
or the equivalent of about US$ 400 per Department. Most of the budget is spent on office rental and staff 
salaries. (Interview with Governors’ Council President, December 2014).			
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responsibilities. As indicated in previous sections, their financial situation is also very 
unstable—completely relying on transfers from the central government.58 
 In short, the Governors’ Council has yet to emerge as an established influential 
voice in Paraguayan politics. After more than 20 years of decentralization, the governors 
have not been able to establish themselves as autarchic subnational authorities, and quite 
often there is conflict and overlap with local authorities.  
 
Some Final Thoughts on Paraguay’s Political and Fiscal Decentralization 	
 Overall, Paraguay’s political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization has been a 
slow process with many advances and setbacks along the way. Since 1992, with the 
approval of the new Constitution, the country has achieved great successes in political 
decentralization; elections are perceived as fair by the majority and citizen participation 
has increased and many are empowered.  
Fiscal decentralization has been difficult to implement. It has resulted, mostly, in 
subnational governments becoming increasingly reliant on central government transfers, 
with little effort from local governments to increase their revenue capacity or to lobby for 
the creation of new revenue sources. The situation is worse for Departmental governments. 
Royalties from the hydroelectric dams have become the most important revenue source for 
subnational governments, leaving them in a weakened position when dealing with the 
central government.  
																																																								58	The unreliability of the transfers by the central government continues to be a serious problems for 
Governors in Paraguay. For example, of the 15% of the VAT collected in each Department that must be 
transferred to them, the Ministry of Finances only transfers about 0.8% of the funds collected (interview with 
Council’s President, Asuncion, December 2014).		
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Administrative decentralization has also advanced, especially in health, and 
setbacks have occurred in education policy, water management, or public transportation.  
A lack of clear understanding by most social actors of what decentralization means and 
implies, as well as an unwillingness from most political actors to commit to the 
decentralization process, have infused the process with uncertainty.  
Transforming a historically, culturally, and socially centralized country into a more 
decentralized one is a process that takes many decades; thus, the process is not without 
controversy, political power struggles, and differences in opinion. In the case of Paraguay, 
decentralization was seen as an integral part of the democratization process in the search 
of ensuring political stability.  
 The next chapter will examine the process by which key decentralization legislation 
was approved or opposed at the Congressional level, and the role played by political parties 
in this process.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
DECENTRALIZATION AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS:  
THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES: THE CASE OF COLOMBIA AND 
PARAGUAY 
 
Introduction 	
This chapter will analyze the role of political parties and their interactions in 
defining and implementing decentralization processes (in particular, for the provision of 
public services), as well as their role in promoting or slowing down decentralization in 
Paraguay and Colombia. In doing so, we will analyze the role of political parties, 
clientelism, and patronage in slowing down decentralization in Paraguay (Hypothesis 3)59; 
and, in the case of Colombia, the chapter will examine the role of political parties and how 
decentralization has promoted the emergence of multiple regional and local political 
movements and parties, contributing then to the slowdown of decentralization in that 
country as well (Hypothesis 4)60.  
The main assumption is that the greater the support of political parties represented 
in legislative bodies for decentralization policies, the greater the probability for the 
passage, approval, and implementation of public service decentralization laws. As a 
consequence, special attention will be given to the underlying political relationships 
																																																								59	H3: In the case of Paraguay, the presence of one dominant and clientelistic political party has slowed down 
political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization; thus, shifting the balance of power back to the national 
government.		60	In the case of Colombia, the presence of multiple regional and local political movements, as power is 
centralized in the Executive branch, the slowing down of decentralization is more likely; thus, shifting the 
balance of power in favor of the national government.	
	 161 
driving this process (Gomez, 2003). The principal theoretical framework is based on 
institutional theory: “an institutional approach is one that emphasizes the role of 
institutions and institutionalization in the understanding of human actions within an 
organization, social order, or society” (March & Olsen_B; 1998).  
 This chapter will begin with a brief literature review of political parties and how 
decentralization has impacted them through deinstitutionalization and fragmentation. It 
will also examine the role of Paraguayan and Colombian political parties to test how these 
parties have or have not supported the enactment and implementation of decentralization 
legislation in each country to assess the validity of the abovementioned hypotheses. It will 
conclude that in both countries, the decentralization movement has indeed slowed down; 
and, political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization has impacted already weakly 
institutionalized political parties in a way that has hindered the progression of the process.  
 
Conceptual Framework: Political Parties and Decentralization  	
According to institutional theories, political democracy depends not only on 
economic and social conditions but also on the design of political institutions. Thus, rules, 
procedures, roles, and strategies become important (March & Olsen, 1989). 
Decentralization is then the result of the interaction of numerous institutions including 
legislative bodies, political parties, subnational levels of government, executive office 
holders and their deputies, and civil society, among others. Utilizing an institutional 
approach, in the case of decentralization in Colombia and Paraguay, we will examine the 
role played by presidentialism and its relationship to stable democracies (Mainwaring, 
1990; Haggard & McCubbins, 2001), political clientelism and how it affects the 
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implementation (or abandonment) of policies (Roniger, 2004), and how presidentialism 
and state size affect party behavior in these two countries—as state size is key to 
understanding the amount of resources controlled by the executive (Zucco, 2003).  
The interactions between legislative bodies and the executive power may be 
important in defining decentralization, as executives may be more interested in supporting 
legislation that furthers administrative decentralization, and legislators more in favor of 
legislation that enhances political decentralization (Escobar-Lemmon, 2003).   
In the research literature, the role played by political parties, party systems, and 
electoral systems is examined. To understand decentralization, close attention should be 
paid not only to the nature of political parties and how subnational leaders are able to 
influence national leaders (Willis, Garman, & Haggard, 1999; Montero & Samuels, 2004), 
but also to the structure of individual parties at particular points in time and the electoral 
incentives that might encourage the advancement of decentralization reforms (O’Neill, 
2005). According to this view—what O’Neill proposes as an “electoral theory of 
decentralization” —central level politicians with greater political sensitivity to subnational 
political outcomes are more likely to support decentralization.  
Parties that are regionally based, and are institutionalized, will support 
decentralization as it would allow them to access politically significant government 
positions (Escobar-Lemmon, 2003). In this view, the internal organization of political 
parties becomes important, as those with strong state-level party organizations would back 
decentralization: deputies from areas expected to benefit from decentralization will be 
more likely to introduce decentralization legislation. Thus, parties that are not nationally 
dominant would support decentralization. Furthermore, parties with decentralized 
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nomination procedures are more likely to support decentralization (Escobar-Lemmon, 
2003).  According to this logic, legislators who must respond to subnational officials within 
their parties are more likely to support decentralization than legislators who are more 
responsive to national party leaders (Eaton, 2004; Dickovick, 2011).  
Decentralization shifts the focus of competition from only the national level to 
include both the local and regional levels. It changes the “cost of entry” into the political 
arena for all parties involved, or must provoke fundamental changes to the internal 
characteristics of political parties (Faguet, 2011). 
Political decentralization, by increasing the number of political “positions,” 
increases the number of politicians who are willing to run for office, and thus, increases 
the competitive incentives to offer better public services. “The principle of democratic 
advancement also increases subnational politicians’ effort to win popular support, which 
strengthens their party competitively in national elections”, “thus national party 
sponsorship of local challengers can raise competition in local elections, and so improve 
the quality of local policy-making” (Faguet, 2011).  
The party system can be fundamental to understanding how decentralization is 
shaped. In a party system that favors national elites, local leaders can be forced to accept 
institutional changes that compromise their power (Weingast, 2011). On the other hand, in 
political systems where local elites have dominance, the reverse could occur and national 
elites might be forced to accept subnational elites’ preferences.  
When the “legislative accountability” system makes congressmen accountable to 
provincial party leaders and not voters, it allows those provincial party leaders to gain 
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control over areas of national policy in ways that allow them to perpetuate themselves in 
their leadership positions and extend their influence.  
Scholars also argue that decentralization in Latin America further weakened 
already fragile party systems (Sabatini, 2003). When decentralization was initiated, both 
national and international actors expected that it would reinvigorate political parties and 
make them more responsive to local and regional needs. “In practice, however, national 
parties have often floundered amid the new circumstances, with locally defined parties 
emerging where old national organizations have failed” (Sabatini, 2003: 139).  
Direct appointment of governors and mayors, as well as control of financial 
resources, contributed to party discipline and cohesion. But, the discrediting of national 
parties, along with the availability of hundreds of directly elected positions, created the 
conditions for aspiring politicians and political movements to enter politics without having 
to depend on the traditional parties for support. “The irony has been that many of the parties 
that pushed for decentralization are simply not well-equipped organizationally to deal with 
its political consequences” (Sabatini, 2003: 149).  
Citizens’ trust in government and in political parties would also seem to play an 
important role in the decentralization process (Escobar-Lemmon, 2003). In her analysis of 
the Venezuelan and Colombian cases, Escobar-Lemmon posits, “While the data support 
prior findings that decentralization is supported by parties whose future electoral 
prospects are better at the subnational level, the analysis also shows that citizen’s trust in 
government and greater wealth affect deputies’ support for decentralization” (2003: 683). 
As the effectiveness of the government to deliver services and goods is questioned, citizens 
will demand more responsiveness; thus, deputies that represent those areas of the country 
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with the least trust in government will back decentralization as a way of increasing trust in 
government.  
In contrast, Falleti argues that more important than the structure of political parties 
and electoral incentives is the sequence by which decentralization occurs in each particular 
situation. Falleti posits that the “type of territorial interests (national or subnational) that 
prevails in the reforming coalitions is the main factor leading to the adoption of different 
types of policies” (2010: 13). It would then be relevant to any analysis of political 
decentralization to examine how coalitions are formed and what kind of impact subnational 
authorities have on the decentralization process. Falleti’s “sequential theory of 
decentralization” proposes that the types of reforms, their extent, and their degree are 
largely dependent on what type of decentralization is implemented first, and who initiates 
the process (national versus subnational governments). The sequential order of different 
types of decentralization (fiscal, administrative, and political) will help explain the 
resulting change in the intergovernmental balance of power.   
 
Decentralization and the Deinstitutionalization of Political Parties  	
As previously noted, policy outcomes are the result of the interaction among many 
different political players, and this interaction is influenced by different political and 
institutional factors (Scartascini et al., 2010) such as the political party system; the type of 
legislature present in each country (and the dynamics within it); the presidential system; 
the legal framework established by the national constitution and the laws (including the 
electoral law), and; the autonomy and capacity of the national and subnational 
bureaucracies; as well as the judiciary and civil society.  
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Also, as mentioned above, the level of institutionalization is a significant 
characteristic of party systems. The more institutionalized a party system is, the more likely 
that parties will have long-term programmatic goals with clear positions on key policy 
issues and concrete proposals (Jones in Scartascini et al., 2010). In parties where the 
program is important and stable, voters demand more accountability and people know what 
to expect from each party. Institutionalized party systems also help ensure greater policy 
consistency “because of the strong role played by parties in political recruitment and the 
concerted efforts made by elites to promote and protect the value of the party label. In 
weakly institutionalized party systems, interparty competition is based primarily on 
personal appeals or short term populist policy proposals designed to win over voters and 
then be forgotten once the election takes place” (Jones, 2010: 20-21). 
The consequences of decentralization for political parties have been extensively 
researched (Dargent & Muñoz, 2011; Hopkin, 2003; Harbers, 2010; Lago-Peñas, 2010; 
Scartascini et al., 2010), and there is general consensus that decentralization reforms 
present a financial resource dilemma for parties as they are forced to compete in many 
more elections (in the case of political decentralization). Competing in many different 
jurisdictions requires not only resources for the campaigns, but also increases the need for 
clientelistic resources to ensure loyalty to the party.  
Fiscal decentralization also increases the autonomy of local leaders from national 
party leaders, as they no longer necessarily need this support to win elections. Also, by 
opening new spaces for political competition at the subnational level, local authorities gain  
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new protagonism to the detriment of traditional party bosses who were previously involved 
in appointing local and regional authorities—and thus could gather clout both locally and 
nationally.  
Dargent and Muñoz (2011) contend that deinstitutionalization of political parties is 
linked not only to the distribution of power, but also to resources. “Resources are crucial 
for party aggregation, and that reforms designed to distribute power and resources in the 
political system can reduce local candidates’ incentives to join and remain loyal to 
political parties, particularly when those parties’ reputations are weak” (page 47).  
Decentralization, in particular fiscal decentralization, has contributed to reducing 
the power of traditional political parties’ regional bosses who controlled the distribution of 
resources and could deliver votes during national elections.  These bosses were able to 
ensure clientelistic programs and strongly opposed decentralization—understanding that 
the reforms would empower mayors and governors to the detriment of their influence. For 
resource-based theories, regional party bosses become the “gatekeepers” of those 
resources, and through patronage are able to provide incentives to local politicians to be 
and remain loyal to the political party (Dargent & Muñoz, 2011). It is argued that—
especially—fiscal decentralization breaks this link of dependence between national and 
local political leaders, allowing local political cadres to advance their own electoral goals. 
As a result, party cohesion and discipline is harder to maintain and enforce and, as a 
consequence, the party system gradually deinstitutionalizes (Dargent & Muñoz, 2011; 
Harbers, 2010).  
Thus, the spatial and geographical aspects of party competition matter when we 
examine decentralization, and the “territorial dimension” or “nationalization” of the parties 
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can be defined as the extent to which political parties obtain similar vote shares throughout 
the national territory (Harbers, 2010).   
As decentralization reforms have been implemented around the world, the 
“denationalization” of electoral politics has become more common with the arrival of new 
political movements that represent regional or local interests gaining more power and 
relevance than traditional political parties. Thus, the need to better understand the territorial 
dimension of electoral politics becomes clear (Hopkin, 2003) 
Jones (2010) also suggests that “differences in nationalization also are likely to 
have public policy consequences. Decisions related to national transfers to subnational 
units, administrative reform, and subsidies may be strongly influenced by the degree of 
party system nationalization. Where a party’s base of support is relatively constant across 
geographic units, it may be more likely to treat all units equally. In contrast, where its 
support varies widely across geographic units, the party may tend to base its decisions in 
part on the degree of support it receives in specific geographic units” (page 26).  
In analyzing the level of institutionalization and nationalization of the party system, 
the following factors are particularly relevant: the individual(s) in control of the candidate-
nomination process; how the electoral system is designed; the timing of national and 
subnational elections; and the level of autonomy of subnational authorities (governors and 
mayors) (Jones, 2010; O’Neill, 2005).   
In regard to the forces propelling denationalization of political parties, Hopkin 
(2003) points to two reasons beyond regional power struggles that are insufficiently 
studied: first, the influence of clientelism and/or the presence of powerful political figures 
at the subnational level; and, second, the way national leaders or political parties adapt to 
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the threat posed by the emergence of powerful subregional political parties, and the 
increased importance of subnational and “supranational” electoral arenas.  
If political parties are seen as organizations, and not as parts of a “party system,” 
as Panebianco (1988, cited in Hopkins) posits, then it is important to examine how changes 
in the political environment impact the ability of parties to adapt to changes. Panebianco 
stresses the limitations to parties’ abilities to adapt and change posed by institutionalization 
and the rigidities of party organizations. Thus, impacts such as decentralization pose a 
challenge to parties, as they are not able to adapt rapidly to changes. In a process of 
decentralization, with its concurrent “denationalization,” traditional parties are at a 
disadvantage to adapt to those challenges.  
“It is also the case that such reforms are not always welcomed by national-level 
party organizers”, since “severe functional or territorial changes dislocate the party 
organization and upset channels of patronage” (Ashford 1982, 1-2 in Hopkins, page 5).  
Unintended consequences of institutional reforms are the result of changes in the 
balance of power inside the party organization. When changes brought by decentralization 
make elections revolve around local and regional issues, and voters cast their ballots in 
favor of local and regional candidates to the detriment of national leaders, the internal 
dynamics of the parties are changed. The balance of power will shift from the center to the 
periphery.  
Not all share the view of decentralization’s impact on the institutionalization of 
political parties. Contrary to Harbers (2010) and Hopkin (2003), Lago-Peñas and Lago-
Peñas (2010) did not find empirical evidence supporting the relationship between the 
degree of decentralization and the nationalization of parties. In their view, what matters is 
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the internal dynamics and history of each party, and their ability to adapt to changes: 
“decentralization reforms should be seen as a consequence of parties’ responses to 
strategic opportunities and threats, and the organizational changes resulting from multi-
level electoral politics are mediated by parties’ own internal histories and conflicts” 
(Lago-Peñas & Lago-Peñas, 2010: 8). The internal dynamics of each political party are as 
important to keep in mind as the level of influence that political subnational authorities 
could have on national political authorities of the same party. Conflict, both within 
subnational authorities and within national authorities, can limit their capacity to promote 
or oppose decentralization reforms (Eaton, 2004). 
 
Clientelism and Patronage 	
A danger of decentralization that is closely linked to the level of institutionalization 
of political parties relates to clientelism and patronage. By decentralizing, new sources of 
corruption and ineptitude are transferred to the local levels. New political actors are 
introduced by decentralization and new relationships are established (Garcia-Guadilla & 
Perez, 2002). But what is the relationship between clientelism/patronage and 
decentralization? Does the presence of patronage and clientelism hinder or advance 
decentralization?  
Clientelism is defined as an exchange system based on a “complex of rules and 
practices for the organization, representation, and control of demands and interests of 
society; these relationships are based on political subordination in exchange for the 
discretionary granting of available public resources and services” (Heredia, 1997 in 
Garcia-Guadilla & Perez, 2002: 93). 
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Clientelism in Latin America can be explained by politicians’ desire to rise within 
their parties and as a first step toward building their political careers and by politicians’ 
inclination to see the goods and services of the state as primarily private benefits that will 
help them muster the support they need from their colleagues to advance their political 
careers.  Public policies are also seen as goods useful to promote their careers (Benton, 
2007).  
“In Latin America, politicians have concentrated on promising particularistic 
benefits rather than public goods because ‘patronage is the primary glue that holds modern 
clientele networks together’ (Mainwaring, 1999:180). Those politicians with the greatest 
ability to distribute largesse had the best chance of building support and surpassing party 
colleagues during the race to further [their] careers” (Benton, 2007, 57).  
Policy goals are thus sacrificed by the dynamics of patronage. Politicians will prefer 
a candidate that offers better patronage benefits. Intra-party divisions are the logic 
consequence of the struggle over state resources and goods. “Latin American politicians’ 
efforts to secure patronage and pork to build careers have led them to build minimum 
winning coalitions rather than consensus around candidates, leading to divisive factional 
disputes”61 (Benton, 2007; 78).  This also helps explain the tendency to shift policy 
positions, the lack of strong ideology, numerous political allegiances, and the lack of 
substantive policy platform. This type of behavior could impact the ability of reformers to 
achieve decentralization—the continually changing positions of politicians affect the 
possibility that decentralization reforms will be enacted and implemented.  
																																																								61	Interviews with various Colombian political figures shared this view and noted that the Colombian 
political and electoral system deepens this tendency.		
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If political parties are highly institutionalized and programmatic, the parties would 
compete based on policy, “in clientelist systems, political parties compete based on the 
distribution of selective incentives to voters, and are judged by voters primarily based on 
their ability to distribute/deliver these incentives” (Saiegh in Scartascini et al., 2010: 40).  
Hilgers (2012) posits that clientelism involves an asymmetric relationship, but a 
mutually beneficial one in terms of power and exchange for those who are part of the 
exchange: “All clientelistic relationships operate a mediated and selective access to 
resources and markets from which others are normally excluded” (2012: 26). At the core 
of clientelism is the unequal power relationship by which political parties, leaders, and 
their constituents establish the exchange of goods and services that often requires political 
allegiance. Voting for the party, for example, would ensure the person has access to state 
jobs or benefits.  
As Hilgers notes, clientelism “erodes” (by inhibiting the development of a vibrant 
civil society, dividing society, and weakening the legitimacy of the state), “accompanies” 
(by letting clients choose among a number of patrons with access to resources), “and/or 
supplements democratic processes”; democratic electoral processes not only allow for 
different patrons to compete for clients, but also might provide opportunities for a new type 
of patron and a new type of clientelistic relationship to arise (2012:17). 
 
Political Parties and Decentralization in Paraguay:  
The Persistence of Clientelism and Patronage 	
Paraguay’s political history and political development is marked, as in the case for 
all countries, by its particular history and experiences. The two major wars that affected 
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the country in the nineteenth century, the Triple Alliance War and the Chaco War (for more 
details, please refer to Chapter 4), shaped Paraguayan politics and its political parties. The 
wars also initiated long periods of institutional instability and political turmoil among the 
ruling elites and the political parties they represented (the two major parties—the Liberal 
and the Colorado Parties—emerged in the 1890s).  Without major migratory movements, 
detached from major cultural trends, and wary of attack from its larger neighbors, 
Paraguayan political culture expresses strong nationalism and proud independence.  
The political instability brought by years of conflict among the ruling elites ended 
in the 1950s with the arrival to power of Alfredo Stroessner, a military leader that would 
unify the government in alliance with the Colorado Party and the armed forces. General 
Stroessner exercised almost absolute control over the fate of the nation for the next forty 
years. The Stroessner years were characterized by the monopoly of power, the 
militarization of politics, the politization of the armed forces, and the militarization of the 
Colorado Party. The Colorado Party became the conduit for clientelism and patronage: 
Party membership was a prerequisite for entrance into the military academy, the police, or 
any civil service job. Economically, any company aiming to provide services to the State 
needed to have the approval of the Colorado Party.  
By the late 1980s, internal divisions within the Colorado Party (always latent) 
intensified as the General aged and succession questions challenged the status quo. 
Economic malaise and poor economic performance further challenged the business elites’ 
alliance with the government, and frictions within the military led to a revolt against 
Stroessner—who was deposed in 1989. It was the beginning of Paraguay’s transition to 
democracy, but the process would be marked by years of political instability, as well as by 
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the power struggles within the Colorado Party and its allies for the control of the State and 
its resources.  
With the return to democracy in 1989, a series of reforms were introduced including 
the enactment of a new electoral code (introducing party primaries for the first time) and a 
new Constitution in 1992.  
The new Constitution was undoubtedly influenced by the political and cultural 
history of the country. Central to that history had been very strong government 
centralization and decades of authoritarianism. The new law of the land sought to remedy 
some of those problems by: maintaining the division of powers but redefining it, creating 
control institutions independent and autonomous of the government, and defining the 
Paraguayan State as both unitary and decentralized.  
 
Some of the most important reforms introduced by the 1992 Constitution include62:  
a) Introduction of a broad definition of democracy with participatory and pluralist 
principles;  
b) Guaranteeing respect of peoples’ rights; 
c) Introduction of the principle of decentralization as a key element of the Paraguayan 
state. In this regard, Articles 1 and 2 of the Constitution defined the Paraguayan 
state as unitary and decentralized; 
d) Curtailing presidential authority; 
e) Assigning new control powers to the Congress; 
																																																								62	For more details, please refer to Chapter 4		
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f) Deeply reforming the Judicial system to ensure its independence; 
g) Creating the Electoral Tribunal in charge of running the country’s elections. 
 
In the new Constitution, the principle of decentralization is clearly expressed with the 
new political/administrative structure established for administration of the territory. 
Furthermore, the 1992 Constitution, for the first time in Paraguayan history, gave 
administrative autonomy to the regional level (Departments) and reaffirmed the existing 
autonomy of the municipalities. Both Departments and municipalities became 
decentralized administrative territories. This element of autonomy is reinforced by the fact 
that governors, mayors, and Departmental and local councilmembers are to be directly 
elected by the people. 
The impetus for decentralization in Paraguay occurred in the early 1990s—partly from 
the efforts of representatives from the country’s interior in the constitutional convention 
that aimed to balance the power gap between the capital city of Asuncion and the country’s 
other regions. Years of appointed central government “delegates” and mayors had led to a 
desire for more control at the local and regional level. This group, called the “bancada 
campesina” or the “peasants’ delegation,” effectively lobbied the rest of the constitutional 
representatives to include decentralization, and the elections of governors and mayors 
directly by the people, in the new Constitution (Flecha & Martini, 1994; Nickson & 
Lambert, 2002; interviews)63.  																																																								63 	Reviews of the discussions held by representatives to the Constitutional Assembly show great 
discrepancies on what decentralization meant and what interpretation—and more significantly what impact 
—it would have on the political structure of the country. Some argued in favor of just administrative 
decentralization without any significant political decentralization, while representatives from the interior of 
the country argued for both political and administrative decentralization as ways to ensure accountability 
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Regardless of the reasons for decentralization, since the early 1990s, the country has 
seen a push for policy decentralization in areas such as health, education, and finances. 
Some reforms have been introduced with mixed results, but, since the early 2000s with the 
serious political and economic crises that followed, there has been a lack of political will 
to fully decentralize certain policy areas.  
It is argued here that greater support from political parties and legislatives for 
decentralization policies increases the likelihood of passing, approving, and implementing 
public service decentralization laws.  
The clientelistic and patronage nature of Paraguayan politics and political parties make 
decentralization policies very difficult to implement.  
The two main political parties of Paraguay are the Colorado Party and the Liberal Party. 
The Colorado Party has traditionally been the dominant party and the one that controlled 
the State and its resources through its unconditional alliance with General Stroessner. At 
its origin, the Colorado Party represented the rural oligarchy; broadly speaking, its 
ideological stance is considered more rural-oriented, traditional, clerical, statist, and 
conservative (Abente Brun, 2007).  
																																																								
from the central government in Asuncion, increase citizen participation, and promote economic development. 
Most debates transpired between members of the Colorado party, but some representatives of the Liberal 
Party expressed similar concerns about the possible impact of declaring Paraguay both a unitary and 
decentralized state.		
Interviews with former representatives to the Constitutional assembly confirm the view that introducing 
decentralization was a way for the central authorities of the Colorado Party, in particular, to appease the 
demands of Colorado members from	the interior, though central authorities were not particularly interested 
in implementing it.  
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The Liberal Party has traditionally represented the more urban, commercial 
bourgeoisie; thus, it is considered more urban-oriented, more modern, mildly anti-clerical, 
and more pluralist (Abente Brun, 2007).  
Other political parties that have played a role following the transition to democracy 
include the Patria Querida party (more urban and conservative, pro-business), the 
Encuentro Nacional party (representative of the urban middle classes), and the Pais 
Solidario Party (a socialist group). There is also a diversity of smaller left-leaning political 
parties, including the Frente Guazu of former President Lugo, as well as a splinter group 
of the Colorado Party that created the UNACE Party, led by former General Lino Oviedo 
until his death.  
All these parties have—during the 1990-2010 period—had representation in the 
Paraguayan Congress, and have had the opportunity to move decentralization forward. But, 
all these parties have matched the clientelistic nature and habits of the Colorado Party when 
it was in power. The “pervasive logic of clientelism,” as Abente Brun calls it, has been 
present in all Paraguayan governments since the transition to democracy regardless of who 
controlled the Executive (i.e., the Colorado Party, for the most part except during the 2008-
2010 period – see table 34), or the Congress (which alternated between the Colorado Party 
and the opposition thanks to odd alliances with different parties, and with differences in 
the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies).  
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Table 34: Control of Congress by Political Party	
1989 – 1993 period controlled by the Colorado Party 
1993 – 1998 period controlled by the opposition 
1998 – 2003 period controlled by the Colorado Party 
2003 – 2008 period shared control, but with more leverage by the opposition parties 
2008 – 2012 period controlled by the Colorado Party 
Source: author 
 
 
All political parties in Paraguay perceive access to the State and its resources as the 
only way to extend their political base64.  A good indicator of this can be observed in the 
growth of public sector employees, which has not diminished, regardless of political party 
in control of the government. Table 35 below shows the percentage of GDP generated by 
taxes and fees and the percentage of those revenues that are spent on salaries and benefits 
to state employees—an indicator of what Abente Brun (2012) calls “bureaucratic 
pressure.”  
 
Table 35: Bureaucratic Pressure in Paraguay	
 1980-
1989 
1989-
1999 
2000-
200365 
2004-
2005 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Fiscal 
Pressure 
 
7.7% 
 
10.5% 
 
9.7% 
 
11.9% 
 
12.0% 
 
11.4% 
 
11.8% 
 
13.0% 
 
13.1% 
Bureaucratic 
Pressure 
 
42.4% 
 
61.3% 
 
86.0% 
 
61.0% 
 
62.0% 
 
63.0% 
 
61.0% 
 
66.0% 
 
61.0% 
Source: Abente Brun. Page 56 
																																																								64	Review of local press throughout the 1990-2010 period, show many articles and reports on the increased 
number of people named to government agencies, ministries, in the Parliament, and at the local and 
Departmental level by each new	administration regardless of the political power (newspapers Ultima Hora, 
ABC, Radio Nanduty, among others).  
 
65 This period saw the election of a vice-president of the Republic of the Liberal Party. The increase in 
bureaucratic pressure can be attributed to a spike on government jobs created to benefit Liberal supporters.  	
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The table above shows that the capacity to collect revenue in Paraguay has been 
increasing, but, more importantly, the expenses spent on salaries has increased from about 
42% in the 1980 to 1989 decade to 61% by 201066. A recent study by the IDB notes that, 
on average, the cost of public employees in the countries under study accounts for 41% of 
tax revenue67.  
The introduction of electoral reforms, such as the need for party primaries, have 
contributed to fragmentation in Paraguayan political parties. This is the case, in particular, 
for the Colorado Party as the primaries have made unifying the different factions of the 
Party much harder to achieve (Setrini, 2010). To some extent, the same can be said for 
larger parties such as the Liberal Party, which has seen personal rivalries divide and split 
alliances within the party. In Paraguay, both major parties, if not all political parties, are 
highly personalistic; thus, programmatic values and policy areas are not as important as 
loyalty to a party leader or party faction.  
Decentralization has also introduced further incentives for party fragmentation as 
now mayors and governors also see their role as providers of jobs and benefits to their 
supporters, weakening party loyalty, and increasing clientelism and patronage practices 
(Dargent & Muñoz, 2011; Harbers, 2010).  
Regarding support for decentralization legislation, the impact of the Paraguayan 
political parties represented in Congress has been mixed. Though most political parties pay 
																																																								66	The growth of the public sector has been a persistent point of contention among political parties in 
Paraguay. Numbers are hard to come by and difficult to verify. Even the Secretary of Civil Service does not 
have an accurate account of how many people work for the national, Departmental, or municipal levels in 
Paraguay. Reviews of newspapers show that the issue is constantly discussed, and each political party or 
faction accuses the other of using State employment as a way to reward political loyalties.  
 67	http://www.eltiempo.com/economia/sectores/nomina-publica-en-2015-/15114935	
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lip service to decentralization, their record of support for decentralization in Congress 
indicates otherwise: during the 1992-2010 period, only eight laws related to 
decentralization were approved; of those laws, only two related to public service delivery 
(health and education decentralization), four were finance related, and two dealt with the 
municipal and Departmental structure of the country. Though all these laws were approved 
by a majority of parties represented both in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, many 
languished in committee for years before being taken up68.  
As an indicator of the level of clientelism and patronage prevalent in the country—
researchers argue that legislators in Paraguay are more inclined to pursue particularistic 
policies rather than pursue large policy changes (Molinas et al., 2004). The authors 
reviewed every single piece of legislation introduced since the return of democracy up to 
2003. A further review of legislation proposed between 2003 and 2010, for the present 
analysis, also revealed that Paraguayan legislators tend to introduce laws dealing with 
particularistic or private issues (e.g., giving pensions to constituents or former Chaco War 
veterans, proposals to solve land issues, etc.), and hesitate to introduce what could be 
perceived as controversial legislation69.  
The need to ensure political support through clientelism and patronage (and not 
only from their constituents but also from large state bureaucracies) would incentivize 
legislators to avoid controversial policies that could also reduce the level of support from 
																																																								68	Regrettably, the Paraguayan Congress does not keep records of how each representative by political party 
voted these laws. Only recently has this been done.	It would had been interesting to examine how	members 
of different political parties voted for the laws, and if there were significant deviations from party rhetoric.			69	Digesto Legislativo. http://digesto.senado.gov.py/index.php		
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now elected mayors and governors who are often seen as potential rivals; not to mention 
the reticence to upset large bureaucracies that are very reluctant to give up power. The fact 
that only two major pieces of legislation dealing with public service delivery (health and 
education) have been introduced and voted on solidifies this view. Other laws dealing with 
fiscal, education, and political decentralization have also been voted on; however, none has 
had—in the period studied here—as much implementation as the health decentralization 
law due in part to lack of bureaucratic support and the inability of key stakeholders to create 
strong coalitions to push reforms forward.  
 The composition of the Senate (45 members, elected from closed party lists in a 
nation-wide electoral district) is also attributed as a contributing factor that encourages 
centralization, as senators do not necessarily represent local elites and tend to be more 
responsive to national party leaders (Molinas et al., 2004). Interviews with members of the 
Senate reinforced this view, and also stressed the fact that—in many instances—governors 
(who cannot be re-elected) eventually aspire to be members of the Senate; thus, incumbent 
Senators would not be very supportive of decentralization legislation that could empower 
governors (and potential rivals). 
 Interviews with members of the Chamber of Representatives (Cámara de 
Diputados) and political analysts reinforce the view that Deputies, who are elected in a 
regional base (by Departments), tend to be more supportive of decentralization (in fact, 
every major piece of legislation dealing with decentralization was started by the Chamber 
of Representatives). Because Representatives must respond to their local constituents, and 
garner much support from mayors and the governor of their respective Department, they 
are more inclined to promote decentralization legislation. In the Paraguayan case, even 
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though Representatives are responsive to their subnational leaders, they have been unable 
to greatly influence their national leaders in deepening or enforcing decentralization 
reforms (Willis, Garman, & Haggard, 1999; Montero & Samuels, 2004; O’Neill, 2005).  
Moreover, many of these laws faced strong opposition and even overcame vetoes 
from the Executive branch. Reticence toward the implementation of decentralization 
policies persists in large government bureaucracies and many political leaders do not want 
to upset them, as they constitute a very important voting bloc.  
We argue here that in the case of Paraguay, with parties that are weakly 
institutionalized and highly personalistic, as long as the most important job of the State is 
perceived to be providing jobs and perks to political supporters of the current government, 
effective decentralization of public policies will not be achieved. Resources are shifted 
from priority areas to the salaries, perks, and other benefits of those with an interest in 
keeping the status quo, or to those who desire access to such benefits. As Richards 
(2008:101) notes, “important reforms are blocked by a lingering institutional overhang 
that continues to serve the predatory state.”  
Thus, in the case of Paraguay, the proposed hypothesis three (H3) is positive: the 
presence of two dominant and clientelistic political parties has slowed down political, 
fiscal, and administrative decentralization, thus shifting the balance of power back to the 
national government.  
	 183 
Political Parties and Decentralization in Colombia: 
Deinstitutionalization/Fragmentation, Regionalism, and a Return to Centralism? 	
Colombia’s decentralization process ranks among the most ambitious and far 
reaching in Latin America. Prompted by the need to re-legitimize the state and its 
institutions 70 , the process—as noted above—has seen difficulties in implementing 
decentralization due, in part, to the particulars of the country’s history.  
Decentralization has also been challenging for Colombian political parties. 
Traditionally the country has had two major political parties: the Conservative and Liberal 
Party, which—given their inability to find consensus and negotiate differences—had many 
times led the country to violent confrontations and civil wars. The Conservative Party has 
traditionally been the party of the landed elites and those who are rural-based and very 
supportive of the Catholic Church. The Liberal Party, on the other hand, has traditionally 
been urban-based. The increase of urbanization has meant the continuous increase of the 
Liberal Party’s representation in the national Congress from the 1960s onward. In general, 
the average representation of the Liberal Party in Congress had been about 55%; 
Conservatives, 25%; and the remaining 20% among other political groups (Cardenas et al., 
2006; Roland & Zapata, in Alsina et al., 2005).  
Clientelism, a longtime characteristic of Colombian politics, can be traced to the 
country’s Spanish colonial past (Martz, 1997). The practice has been an integral part of the 
relationship between national party leaders and regional and local ones, and every 
administration, throughout its history, has used patronage and clientelism as mechanisms 
																																																								70	For more details see Chapter 3.			
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of social and political control (Martz, 1997; Osterling, 1989). Andrade (2011) assigns much 
of the crisis of Colombian political parties in terms of legitimacy and representation to their 
clientelism and corrupt practices.  The failure of the Colombian state to exercise its 
presence in vast areas of the country, its unresponsiveness to popular needs, and its inability 
to curtail violence have often been explanatory variables used to, if not justify at least 
explain, the persistence of clientelism (Hudson, 2010).  
Decentralization has impacted the nationalization—defined as the extent to which 
parties obtain similar shares of the votes throughout the national territory (Harbers, 2012) 
—of Colombian political parties as both the Liberal and Conservative Parties have seen 
their share of votes diminish to regional parties or movements in each election since the 
mid-1990s.  
Political and fiscal decentralization created the incentives for regional leaders to 
distance themselves from the traditional leadership of their parties to strengthen their own 
support base (Dargent & Munoz, 2011; Cardenas et al., 2006; Gutierrez Sanin, 2010). The 
extensive fiscal decentralization in Colombia has certainly contributed to the fragmentation 
of parties and helped foster the emergence of regional political movements like those along 
the Colombian Atlantic coast.  
With decentralization, Colombia has also given its local and regional authorities a 
large number of functions ranging from primary and high school education, infrastructure, 
health programs, transportation, and local economic development, while simultaneously 
guaranteeing access to national transfers and, very importantly, royalties from oil and coal. 
Thus, local and regional governments, though not autonomous in their revenue sources 
(and though much controversy still surrounds the efficiency and regional equity in the 
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allocation of royalties funds), do have a steady source of funding and have reduced their 
financial dependence from national parties. Election campaign reforms have exacerbated 
the financial independence of political candidates, as they now receive funding directly 
from the State and are not dependent on their “national party’s” resources (Cardenas et al., 
2006). Colombian traditional parties have, as a consequence, deinstitutionalized and 
fragmented (Dargent & Munoz, 2011; Hudson, 2010; Cardenas et al., 2006; Restrepo, 
2004; Sabatini, 2003; Gutierrez Sanin, 2010).  
Much of these changes are a result of the reforms introduced in the 1991 
Constitution, which included electoral reforms specifically aimed at reducing the power of 
regional barons already in Congress (by eliminating budget resources); the Constitution 
also lowered the requirements for new parties to compete in national and local elections71, 
thus opening the system to new parties. The electoral law allows multiple factions to 
present lists under the same party label (Cardenas et al., 2006; Roland & Zapata, 2005)72. 
As a consequence, and beginning in the mid-1990s, the Conservative and Liberal Party 
gradually—and increasingly— began losing their share of the votes in national and local 
elections (Table 36 below).  
 
 
																																																								71	Only 50,000 valid signatures are needed to create a new political party. Many legislators leave their 
traditional party to create a new movement or party. His or her representation is largely regionally based, and 
the incentives for clientelism increase as they only need to satisfy the needs of their much smaller 
constituencies.			72	“In the 1994 congressional elections, the Liberal Party presented 134 lists for the Senate and 293 lists for 
the House of Representatives” (Hudson, 2010; page 240).  
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Table 36: Presidential Share of the Vote (1998-2010) 
Year Liberal 
Party 
Conservative 
Party 
Si 
Colombia 
(Sanin) 
Uribe’s 
Party 
Polo 
Democratico 
Partido 
Verde 
1998 34.6 34.3 26.9 - - - 
2002 31.8 - 5.8 53.1 - - 
2006 11.8 - - 62.4 22 - 
2010 4.4 6.1 - 46.5 9.2 21.5 
Source: Dargent & Munoz, page 54 
 
 
In Congress, all of these changes have meant that, at times, it can be very difficult 
to keep track of which congressman is in which party, and on which platform said 
congressman might run for president. The changes have impacted the possibility of further 
policy decentralization moving forward, as the excessive fragmentation has affected 
legislators’ abilities to influence the policymaking process.  
The largest remainder system (LR-Hare) used until 2003 73 , also encouraged 
fragmentation, as the system rewarded seats based on large remainders and not necessarily 
by filling quotas; thus, Congressmen were elected by narrow bases and they had to cater to 
their clientelistic needs. In the case of the Senate, no representation thresholds were put in 
place to discourage small lists. Again fragmentation was encouraged as the system of 
remainders was left in place. As a result, smaller and smaller numbers of Senators have 
been elected by the quota system since 1998, and more and more were elected by the 
																																																								73	In 2003, the d’Hondt system was introduced requiring a minimum of 2% of the total vote to obtain 
representation in the Senate, and a minimum of 50% of the electoral quotient to obtain seats in the House. 
The minimum requirement for creating a new party were raised, participating in multiple parties was 
forbidden, party discipline in Congress is now compulsory (Hudson, 2010). This reduced the number of lists 
presented in the 2006 election, but in the 2007 subnational level elections, the numbers increased as writes-
in were allowed.  
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remainder system. Thus, senators only need to gather enough votes regionally to be elected, 
and do not need to campaign on a national district level (Hudson, 2010; Roland & Zapata, 
2005). Also, by using a single nationwide district, Departments with less population are 
underrepresented (Hudson, 2010), and their regional needs sometimes are not taken into 
account during the legislative process.  
As centralist Executives (concerned with macroeconomic stability and security 
issues) try to re-centralize functions, a divided, diverse, and multiparty representation in 
Congress has been less able to form a front to push back advances aimed at curtailing 
decentralization74.  
Colombia has always had a very powerful Executive. The president, before the 
1991 reforms, had many proactive powers including the ability to issue decrees, urgency 
petitions, ex-post judicial review, and declarations of states of siege and of economic 
emergency. With the 1991 Constitution, these powers were somewhat curtailed, 
particularly in the issuing of decrees and states of emergency, which now require approval 
from the new Constitutional Court. But, an area that remained unchanged is the president’s 
ability to prioritize bills in the legislature’s agenda through the “discharge of urgency 
petition.” In this process, Congress has 30 days to approve or reject a proposed bill 
(Cardenas et al., 2006). Thus, the president retains much of the initiative on legislation, but 
also is the only one authorized to introduce bills concerning the ministries, salaries of 
public employment, foreign exchange, budgets, and national debt, among others (Cardenas 
																																																								
74 But, Congress still retains influence through the work of the Committees and membership to them (which 
is party determined), thus legislators organize procedural coalitions to secure membership, and sometimes 
are able to push back on certain initiatives.		
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et al., 2006). As these authors note, a powerful Executive and a very personalistic electoral 
system delegates much of the national agenda to the Executive and its ministries. 
In fact, interest groups such as the Colombian Federation of Municipalities and the 
Colombian Federation of Departments (formerly the Governors Association) have 
increased their lobbying efforts in Congress, and even directly with the Executive, to 
influence policies that might impact the territories.  Interviews with the Colombian 
Federation of Municipalities, and the organization’s documents and reports, highlight the 
significant role it played in pushing back the scope of fiscal decentralization reforms that—
in both 2001 and 2007—were passed as initiatives from the Executive branch.  
Thus, decentralization in the case of Colombian political parties involves 
multiplication of regional parties and political movements, all highly variable in their 
allegiances, with weak ideological principles—convenience and electoral aspirations have 
replaced the two traditional political parties.  
It is then important to measure the level of support that political parties had lent to 
decentralization75. A significant indicator is the number of laws actually voted on that deal 
with decentralization. In contrast to other countries such as Paraguay, Colombia between 
1990 and 2010 has produced an impressive array of legislation, including decrees, 
ministerial orders, and other regulations establishing a complex and vast legal framework 
in favor of political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization (see Table 37 below 
indicating number of laws).  
																																																								75	As is in the case of Paraguay, Colombia has not kept records of voting patterns by members of Congress. 
Only recently are voting records by legislators and parties recorded, but for the period considered here, that 
information is not available. Congress minutes keep only the total of votes in favor or against each law and 
they are not differentiated by political party. 	
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Table 37: Number of Key Decentralization Laws Approved by Country for the 1990 
– 2010 period 
 
 New 
Constitution 1990 – 1995 1996 – 2000 2001 – 2010 Total 
Colombia 1991 14 10 8 32 
Paraguay 1992 1 5 2 8 
Source: Author 
 
The laws include political laws such as the Popular election of Governors and 
Departmental Assemblies, citizen participation law (Law 134/94), and extension of 
government periods for subnational authorities (Legislative act 02/02), among others.  
Other laws relate to fiscal matters, such as Law 60/1993 establishing the revenue 
sharing system, the co-financing system and royalties law (142/94), reforms to the transfer 
system (Legislative act of 01/02; Law 715/01), fiscal adjustment laws (617/00; 549/99; 
550/99), strengthening of territorial revenues (Laws 633/00; 788/02; 863/03), and fiscal 
responsibility law (Law 819, 2003).  
Finally, many administrative-oriented laws were also approved, including the 
public services provision laws on health, education, and other services; the new municipal 
law (Law 136/94); the reorganization of service provision law (715/01); law 152/94 
establishing the organic development plan; Law 225/95, which modified the administrative 
budget law; and Law 344/96 for the rationalization of public expenditures, etc.  
In fact, there is almost a contradiction in that this vast legal framework has hindered 
the autonomy of subnational governments—the implementation of these laws is strictly 
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and largely regulated and controlled by the central authorities, especially in the areas of 
health and education, as well as in fiscal matters76.  
Thus, in the case of Colombia, the constitutional and electoral reforms introduced 
by the new Constitution contributed to the denationalization and fragmentation of political 
parties, and though decentralization has greatly advanced, the central authorities 
maintain—through legal requirements and strict reporting demands—control of the 
decentralization process. As such, hypothesis 4 (H4) tends to be positive.  
 
Conclusions 	
This overview of decentralization’s impact on Colombian and Paraguayan political 
parties, and their respective ability to influence the decentralization process, has found that 
decentralization has indeed contributed to the deinstitutionalization and fragmentation of 
well-established traditional parties in Colombia by making regional legislators more 
independent (politically and fiscally) from central party authorities; and, in the case of 
Paraguay, decentralization has exacerbated internal differences within the two main 
traditional parties, contributing to more clientelism and patronage, as new players (mayors 
and governors) seek to control resources and benefits. In both cases the increased number 
of veto players have imposed a low rate of policy change.  
The differences among supporters of decentralization, and their internal divisions, 
contribute to the Executive’s lack of support for decentralization in the case of Paraguay; 
and in the case of Colombia, to the Executive’s ability to define the decentralization agenda 
																																																								76	Some political reforms are still hotly debated, including the immediate reelection of mayors, which has 
not been approved although the Colombian Federation of Municipalities have heavily lobbied for this reform.		
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with an emphasis on fiscal issues and control over policy areas—restraining the autonomy 
of subnational governments. In both cases, the deepening of decentralization reforms has 
been inhibited over the years.  
Escobar-Lemmon posits that regionally based and well institutionalized parties will 
tend to support decentralization (2003). The Colombian case seems to support her 
findings—at least at the beginning of the decentralization process. In the case of Colombia, 
where regional parties and/or political movements have dominated elections over the last 
fifteen years, decentralization (administrative, financial, and political) is maintained on the 
political agenda thanks to their pressure (and the pressure exercised on them by mayors 
and governors) and representativeness in Congress, as well as by legislators’ ability to 
negotiate with the Executive. But, their lack of cohesion and ability to set a common agenda 
also motivate the Executive’s tendency to re-centralize government functions, especially 
in areas of fiscal decentralization.  
In the case of Colombia, some of the consequences brought about by the 1991 
Constitution relate to what Restrepo (2004) calls a “technical tie”: as mayors and governors 
no longer need to respond to the Executive’s requests, the Legislative and the Executive 
branches work together to advance their agendas to the detriment of subnational 
governments. Local and regional governments are still largely dependent on the Executive 
and Legislative branches for their budgets and their revenue transfers; thus, although there 
is still an incentive to work together, the Executive branch maintains the upper hand.  
In the case of Paraguay, a country without strong regionalism—that is much smaller 
in size and population than Colombia—regional interests have not been able, in the long 
term, to influence or sustain the process of decentralization. Clientelism and patronage, 
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partly measured by the number of legislation introduced of particularistic nature and by the 
increase in public sector employees, play an important role in hindering further 
decentralization. From the beginning of the democratic transition, decentralization was a 
concept not clearly understood by the political elite as the reviews of the constitutional 
convention demonstrate; moreover, there was no consensus on the potential impact of 
decentralization.  
In Colombia, and as predicted in previously mentioned research, extensive fiscal 
decentralization has indeed encouraged autonomy of regional leaders from the national 
party leaders, contributing to party fragmentation. In Paraguay, which only recently has 
seen an increase in fiscal decentralization, it is too early to predict if regional and local 
leaders will become more assertive, or if clientelism and patronage will further increase. 
Interviews with national, regional, and local political leaders seem to support the latter 
view.  
In both countries, political parties lack strong programmatic bases and rely on 
caudillism and personal leadership—lacking stability and policy consistency. 
Decentralization, and the implementation of decentralization policies, is then subject to the 
will of political leaders who may or may not support it. Not having a strong party ideology 
or program also limits society’s chances to demand accountability on crucial policy issues. 
In both cases, weakly institutionalized parties lack long-term programmatic goals (Jones 
in Scartascini et al., 2010) and lack consistency on key policy issues; thus, it is easy for 
them to switch and offer support for certain legislation and not for others. This may explain 
the reasons behind why political parties—both in Colombia and Paraguay—support 
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decentralization in their official discourse, but do not demonstrate their support for 
decentralization through their actions. 
	 194 
CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
PARAGUAY: HEALTH DECENTRALIZATION 1990 – 2010  
 
 
Introduction 	
Paraguay, one of South America’s poorest countries has a long tradition of both 
government centralization and authoritarianism. The country’s transition to democracy 
began in 1989 with the ousting of General Alfredo Stroessner, who held uninterrupted 
power for over 35 years.  
The democratization of the country coincided with a new impetus around the world 
of government decentralization processes. In fact, the late 1980s and 1990s saw the 
promotion of decentralization as a principal issue on the agenda of many national 
governments, regional leaders, and development agencies. Decentralization was viewed as 
key to reestablishing the democratic credentials of the State in formerly authoritarian 
regimes—a way to make governments more responsive, closer to the people, and 
transparent. Many also proposed decentralization as the best way to promote better 
governance, provide better services, reduce inequalities, and strengthen economic 
development. Decentralization, by dispersing power, was viewed as key to improving 
governance. 
An early attempt to decentralize Paraguay was initiated by the administration of 
then President Juan Carlos Wasmosy (1993-1998) in the area of health. In 1996, a new 
legal framework for health decentralization was enacted and pilot projects were initiated. 
After almost 20 years of health decentralization, what has been the impact of 
decentralization in terms of key health indicators in Paraguay? Has decentralization really 
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improved health conditions in those municipalities that have been part of the 
decentralization process? This chapter examines infant mortality rates (deaths of children 
under one year old; live births) to analyze if decentralization of health services has 
impacted (or not impacted) a critical health problem in Paraguay. We will attempt to test 
two of the research hypotheses:  
H1: If national, regional, and local political leaders participate and collaborate in 
the promotion of political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization, there is a 
greater probability for the passage, approval, and implementation of public service 
decentralization laws.  
 
And,  
 
H2: Once public service delivery decentralization has been enacted, the higher the 
degree of collaboration between national, regional, and local levels of government 
(in essence the type of intergovernmental relations established), stakeholders and 
citizens (other socio-political actors), the greater the probability for its success and 
effectiveness. 
 
To accomplish this, we will briefly review the health decentralization process in 
Paraguay and its main reforms, examine its implementation at the Departmental and 
municipal level, and compare the results of the process in seven Departments of the 
country. The chapter concludes with an overall assessment of the decentralization process 
that occurred in Paraguay between 1996 and 2010.  
 
Decentralization and Public Service Provision: Literature Review  	
Decentralization is defined as the transfer of political, administrative, and fiscal 
responsibilities and authority to subnational (regional or local) levels of government 
(Falleti, 2005). Administrative decentralization gives subnational levels of government 
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more responsibility in public policy delivery including planning, implementation, and 
(depending on the case) financing. 
A key argument of decentralization proponents is that decentralizing the provision 
of services—such as health and education—to local governments will improve the quality, 
equity, and efficiency of those services, as well as increase users’ satisfaction (Ugalde & 
Homedes, 2008; Lockwood, 2009).   
The World Bank points to two main reasons why services such as health, education, 
water, and sanitation should be decentralized to the local level: first, central governments 
have systematically failed to adequately provide those services especially in terms of 
meeting the needs of the poor; and secondly, these services are consumed locally (Ahmad 
et al., 2005). Local governments are closest to the people; they are most likely to know and 
understand their needs, and will be better suited to allocate scarce resources according to 
the real needs of their communities and not according to misguided policies designed from 
a distant central capital (Mehrotra, 2005; Platteau, 2009). The willingness of people to pay 
for public services that respond to their priorities, particularly if they were involved in the 
decision making process, is another potential advantage of decentralization (Litvack & 
Seddon, 2007). Local governments become in essence more accountable to the local 
communities (Ahmad et al., 2005; Mehrotra, 2005; Khaleghian, 2003; Azfar et al., 1999).  
As stated by Khaleghian (2003), “Many of the proposed benefits of decentralization 
are based on the premise that it brings local decision makers closer to the constituencies 
they serve.” With decentralization, social actors will put pressure on local level leadership 
to respond to local needs and demands, and then two benefits can result: “synergy between 
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interventions across sectors and the effective delivery of individual public services” 
(Mehrotra, 2005).  
Katorobo (2004) stresses the importance of the principles of subsidiarity and of 
management by results in the decentralization of public service delivery: 
“The concept of service delivery to citizens forces actors (local governments, 
groups of affected citizens, etc.) to focus on what exactly the subnational 
government intends or plans to provide to the citizens, and what the citizens should 
expect in terms of quantity and quality of the services being rendered.” (Katorobo, 
p. 26, 2004).  
 
The literature on the benefits and types of decentralization is extensive (Faguet, 
2000; Gerring, Thacker, & Moreno, 2005; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Falleti, 2005) and 
stresses the importance of decentralization to strengthening local governments and their 
service provision capacity. The research literature also examines problems posed by 
decentralization—among them the lack of capacity at the local level to implement and 
deliver new services (Ahmad et al., 2005); the dangers of local elite capture (Bardhan & 
Mookkherjee, 1998); problems with local corruption and lack of clear legal framework; 
and excessive borrowing (Ahmad et al., 2005); and, central government resistance 
(Khaleghian, 2003). 
Introducing a competitive political process, free flow of information, expanded and 
strong NGO networks, and a reduction in inequality are ways to reduce the risk of local 
capture (Bardahm, 2009). The lack of proper accountability and citizen involvement in the 
design and implementation (including budget allocations) of public service delivery 
decentralization is a major obstacle to its success and is the result of what Devarajan, 
Khemani, and Shah (2009) call “partial decentralization.” In partial decentralization—
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which they argue has been the norm in most developing countries implementing service 
delivery decentralization—central governments might have decentralized resources but 
local authorities have no control over those resources, which have been earmarked, thus 
reducing local governments incentives “to pursue effectiveness of spending and policies, 
opening the door to clientelistic policies.” In a situation of partial decentralization, in 
communities where local authorities do not have ownership over budgetary decisions and 
outcomes, and where their only role is to distribute funds received from above, citizens 
will have an incentive to mobilize to obtain private benefits from these funds, thus helping 
to explain the risk of “capture.”  
Partial decentralization is less a design problem and more a political problem, as 
decentralization policies are often decided by central authorities who like to maintain 
control over local and regional governments by deliberately withholding resources from 
local governments, transferring those resources under strict conditions, or transferring them 
to those local politicians who are more closely identified with them (Devarajan et al., 
2009).  
In an effort to ensure that services are effectively delivered, issues of relevance and 
responsiveness must be taken into account, as well as adequacy, costs and benefits, quality 
and quantity of service, expected outcomes, impact, and timely delivery (Katorobo, 2004).  
A key question continues to be: are subnational levels of government capable of 
providing services? In the decentralization processes around the world, much has been 
discussed both about the capacity of local governments to provide services, as well as the 
justifications for it. Some of the arguments—and the variations of opinion—are partly 
based on the vision of what the role of subnational governments should be. If a “managerial 
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view” prevails, in which local governments’ main role is to efficiently deliver services, 
then local governments would then have clearly defined competencies, resources, and 
purposes. As central governments define such competencies, local governments are 
considered subordinate to central governments, and decentralization would then be dictated 
by what the central governments think is the appropriate role of local governments 
(Nickson, 2011). This, most likely, is a recipe for conflictive relationships.  
If, on the other hand, the view is one of “governmental type,” then local 
governments are not only the providers of services, but also have a distinctive and 
important relationship with their communities that allows them to make policy decisions 
(Nickson, 2011). In this view, local governments are considered partners of central 
governments, with shared responsibilities based on the principle of subsidiarity; thus, there 
should be more autonomy to decide, at the local level, what services to provide and how to 
fund service provision. The relationship between central and local levels should be 
characterized more by negotiation and consensus and less by confrontation.  
Other authors (Cetrangolo & Goldschmit, 2012) are concerned with questions of 
efficiency in decentralized service delivery at the local level, and if it contributes to greater 
“social cohesion” at the territorial level. Their concern relates more to the ability of 
decentralization to reduce the large inequalities present in Latin America and within 
countries themselves.  
Reforms are almost always shaped and influenced by the institutional framework 
of each country, the way society interacts with its institutions, and the broader international 
context, as well as by the many political contingencies and strategies that sometimes open 
up opportunities for policy change (Kingdon, 2003). Policy changes are also, in grand part, 
	 200 
dependent on the presence of policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 2003; Mintrom & Norman, 
2009; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996), those specific advocates of policy change who are able 
to garner support from different stakeholders, create coalitions, bring in inside and outside 
expertise or support to promote and enact the aimed policy changes.  
Different processes shape and implement reforms such as decentralization of 
service delivery (Kaufman & Nelson, 2004). Reform of public service delivery tends to be 
long, complicated, played in multiple arenas, and not without setbacks and challenges. 
Kaufman and Nelson (2004) distinguish four phases in any public policy decentralization 
reform that are important when analyzing these processes: the inclusion of the proposed 
reforms in the policy agenda of decision makers; the initiation of concrete proposals for 
reforms that would be eventually presented to the decision makers; the formal authorization 
of such reforms (usually through legislative initiative or by decree); and finally, the 
implementation phase. All these phases imply the need to analyze “veto points” formed by 
a combination of constitutional rules and political majorities and circumstances at any 
given time (Immergut, 2008), and “veto players” are defined as any institutional or political 
actor whose agreement is necessary for the approval of not only the needed legislation 
(Tsebelis as per Immergut, 2008), but also for its implementation.   
In light of the arguments in favor of decentralization, many developing countries 
initiated the process of decentralizing health and education services to regional and local 
levels. The decentralization of health and education services usually involves the 
devolution of some administrative functions to local or regional levels of government or 
—in certain instances—to local branches of the central government. Functions include—
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depending on the country—control over personnel, equipment, supplies, procurement, and 
delivery of services (Hutchinson, 2002).  
In regard to the effectiveness of services decentralization, the literature is mixed. 
Kubal (2006) in studying the case of Chile, emphasizes the need for increased resources at 
the local level for the implementation of health services decentralization to be successful. 
Further, Kubal argues that the lack of adequate resources is partly to blame for the initial 
lack of success of the process in Chile.  
In an analysis of Tanzania’s health decentralization process, Hutchinson (2002) 
finds that in general, districts that experienced decentralization reported better outcomes 
compared to those not involved in decentralization. Both Bardhan (2002), in evaluating the 
decentralization of public service delivery in Brazil, Nicaragua, and Bolivia—and 
Mehrotra (2005) in his study of decentralization cases in Latin America, South Asia, and 
Africa—conclude that in all cases the results of decentralizing public services has been 
positive.    
Some case studies provide “descriptive and suggestive correlations,” but evidence 
of the relationship between decentralization and effective service delivery is not conclusive 
(Bardhan, 2002). What seems to be clear—as Ahmad et al. and Azfar et al. (2005) note—
the importance of accountability and access to information at the local level is vital to the 
success of services decentralization, along with other key elements such as the existence 
of a clear legal framework, well defined fiscal and financial arrangements, definition of 
administrative responsibilities and the infrastructure present locally, the educational level 
of the communities involved, institutional arrangements, and the levels of poverty present 
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at the time of initializing the decentralization process (Ahmad et al., 2005; Bardhan, 2002; 
Khaleghian, 2003; Azfar et al., 1999). 
 
Paraguay’s Health Sector 	
Paraguay, with a population of about 6.3 million (IMF 2009 World Economic 
Outlook) is one of South America’s poorest countries with great regional disparities: the 
wealthiest eastern part of the country is home to close to 97% of the total population, while 
the Western part—by far the largest geographical region of the country—contains only 3% 
of the population (largely aboriginals).  
Politically, the 1992 Constitution defines the country as a “decentralized unitary 
state,” with 17 Departments headed by governors elected by popular vote, and 236 
municipalities with directly elected local mayors and municipal councils.  
Investment in education and health has generally been very low and there has only 
been a slow advance in the implementation of structural and institutional reform. The 
economic recession of the last decade has further deteriorated quality of life. The country 
has a significant social deficit and is highly unlikely to achieve the objectives of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) (World Health Organization-WHO, 2007); 
poverty has increased to about 35.6% of the population with the highest concentrations of 
poor people found in rural areas (Dirección General de Estadística, 2007).  
Health problems in Paraguay are acute and reflect regional and income inequalities. 
Vector-borne diseases, as well as vaccine-preventable diseases, are common. Other chronic 
communicable diseases such as TB are common and constitute important health problems 
(WHO, 2007). Leading causes of death among all age groups in the country are diseases 
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of the circulatory system, malignant neoplasm, accidents, and communicable diseases. 
Among the many issues facing the health sector, infant mortality is a serious problem. It 
has been estimated that every year 7,000 deaths occur among children less than 1 year of 
age (WHO, 2007). Lack of proper vaccinations for children (especially under five) is a 
great contributor to this tragedy77.  
 
General Organization of Health Sector 	
 The 1992 Paraguayan political Constitution established that health is a basic right 
of all citizens and called for the creation, by an act of Congress, of a National Health 
System. Article 168 of the Constitution specifically calls for local governments to be 
responsible for preparing local health plans; preparing and implementing reproductive 
health plans at the local level; the organization and coordination of the Local Health 
Councils (LHCs); the promotion, coordination, and implementation of health plans of the 
National Health Ministry; and the provision of health services. The Constitution did not 
specify the responsibilities of Departmental governments in health policy implementation, 
aside from calling for a coordinating role between Departments, local governments, and 
central government health authorities (Estrada et al., 2010). Many aspects were left to be 
later defined and dealt with by Congress.  
 Provision of health services in Paraguay is divided between the public, the semi-
public, and the private sector. The Ministry of Health is in charge of providing health 
																																																								77	Many of these indicators have to be taken with a grain of salt, as underreporting is a serious problem in 
Paraguay, thus the reliability of data has to be considered. Regional and ethnic disparities also need to be 
taken into account as indigenous populations have much higher mortality rates than the general Paraguayan 
population.  
	 204 
services to the majority of the Paraguayan population (about 63%), particularly the low 
income and vulnerable population without medical coverage. Military health services 
cover about 3% of the population and they have their own medical facilities, as do the 
national police. Other public health institutions include the municipal and Departmental 
health services, the National University of Asuncion, and other agencies of the national 
government (Itaipu and Yacireta78). The public sector includes the vast majority of district 
and specialized hospitals in the country, as well as about 130 health centers, 50 
dispensaries, and about 670 health posts (Boslaugh, 2013; PAHO, 2001; Angeles et al., 
1999). 
The semi-public sector is mainly comprised of the Institute of Social Welfare 
(Instituto de Prevision Social) or IPS—the organization’s Spanish acronym. IPS provides 
health care for government and private sector employees and their dependents. 
Government, employers, and employees pay toward the financing of the system. IPS is 
funded by 9% workers’ contribution, 14% by employer’s contribution, and 15% by the 
State. Though contributions to the IPS are mandatory, the IPS system suffers from 
problems of exclusion and low coverage due to high informality in Paraguay’s labor 
market; contributions are often stopped or are discontinued when workers change jobs; and 
high contribution evasion exists—up to 70% per some estimates (Gimenez Caballero, 
																																																								78 	Itaipu and Yacireta are two hydroelectric dams that Paraguay shares with Brazil and Argentina 
respectively. The Itaipu dam, the second largest in the world in terms of annual energy generation, is a great 
source of revenue to the Paraguayan government as Brazil pays large sums for the surplus energy generated 
by the dam and not used by Paraguay. Yacireta does not generate as much revenue as Itaipu, but it is also an 
important source of revenue. Both Itaipu and Yacireta are independent-state-run enterprises considered 
“decentralized agencies” by the Paraguayan government, meaning that they are autonomous in their 
administration and revenue management.			
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2012). IPS includes a smaller number of hospitals (12), as well as clinics (5)—mostly in 
urban areas (Boslaugh, 2013; PAHO, 2001; Angeles et al., 1999). 
Finally, the private sector includes non-profit organizations, as well as for profit 
health providers, with hospitals and clinics that concentrate mostly in the city of Asuncion 
and the Central Department. The quality of their service varies, but they are generally 
perceived as expensive and inaccessible to most people.  
 
Health Decentralization Reform in Paraguay 1990 – 2010  	
 In Paraguay, as in other parts of the continent, health reform was part of a broader 
process of democratization and strengthening of subnational governments. The 
decentralization occurred in two main phases. One phase started in 1990 with the transfer 
of certain administrative responsibilities from the central level to the Ministry’s own 
regional centers (Regiones Sanitarias). This phase can better be called deconcentration and 
not really decentralization. This deconcentration helped strengthen regional centers and 
improved their administrative capacity, empowering some of the regional directors and 
their staff. Changes in the Ministry and political tensions slowed down this process during 
1993-1995 (Angeles et al., 1999).  
In 1994, newly elected mayors and governors began demanding more 
decentralization and autonomy. By 1995, the Chamber of Deputies of Congress created the 
National Commission on Decentralization, in charge of evaluating law proposals related to 
decentralization (Rojas, 2000). 
 A second phase of decentralization started in 1995 with new authorities in the 
Ministry and more political support (Angeles et al., 1999). In December of that year, the 
	 206 
first meeting of Departmental Health Secretaries, Regional Health Directors, mayors, and 
the Ministry was held. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed in support of 
health decentralization as a way to improve service delivery.79 The MOU was adopted and 
approved by Congress and it became the basis for the discussions regarding the proposed 
health decentralization law in 1996 (Rojas, 2000).  
The health decentralization process had a heavy component of international 
agencies’ support, in particular from the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID), which at the time funded a relatively large project supporting local governments, 
decentralization, and citizen participation.80 USAID’s involvement continued for many 
years, and its support has been viewed as essential to the process. Critical to the process of 
decentralization was the appointment of Dr. Andres Vidovich Morales as Minister of 
Health, because unlike his predecessors, he supported and promoted decentralization as the 
only possible way to improve health conditions in Paraguay. In Congress, the initiative 
garnered support in the Chamber of Deputies or Representatives, but not in the Senate. 
Many informational meetings were held around the country with governors, mayors, civil 
society, and communities in general to explain the initiative’s aims; much technical 
assistance was also given in the mid-1990s to the Ministry to strengthen the institution and 
to clarify the aims of the reform (Flecha & Rodriguez Lagier; 1994).   
																																																								79	The meeting was organized by Florida International University (FIU), contracted by USAID in the 
framework of a decentralization and democracy project being implemented at the time.			80	Disclaimer: the project was being implemented by the Institute for Public Management & Community 
Service of Florida International University, and the author was closely involved in the design and initial 
implementation of the health decentralization process, though the active FIU involvement ended right before 
the approval of the law that created the National Health System in 1996.		
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In nearly all of these meetings and lobbying activities, the efforts of Minister 
Vidovich Morales as a policy entrepreneur must be highlighted. Although conscious that 
decentralization was not a high priority for the Wasmosy administration or many Senators 
in Congress, Minister Vidovich Morales was able to create an advocacy coalition, and used 
the influence and support of the USAID funded project as an outside force to galvanize, 
and leverage, support from many stakeholders.  
Finally, after much consultation, the proposed law was approved by the Chamber 
of Deputies, rejected by the Senate, and ratified again by the Deputies. It then went back 
to the Senate where it was not acted on. Thus, and in accordance with Paraguayan Law, 
due to the Senate’s inaction, the Executive Branch approved and enacted the law in 
December of 1996.  Thus, in just one year, the first significant legislation to decentralize 
service delivery was approved through the support and lobbying efforts of governors, 
mayors, and the Ministry of Health (in particular, support from then Minister Dr. Andres 
Vidovich Morales)81 (Rojas, 2000; Flecha and Rodriguez Lagier, 1994).  
 Law 1032/96 was a watershed in Paraguay’s political history. As the first attempt 
to decentralize services, it had a significant component of citizen participation; it called for 
collaboration and cooperation between the public and private sector, as well as civil 
																																																								81	Minister Vidovich Morales was very successful at gathering support from Representatives in Congress by 
taking advantage of the technical assistance provided by IPMCS through the USAID funded project. In the 
mid-1990s Colombia was seen as successful decentralization example, and Minister Vidovich Morales – with 
the support of IPMCS - organized many seminars and conferences with Colombian health experts, former 
Governors, and Ministers to galvanize support for his initiative. At one point, with the assistance of IPMCS, 
and to get the commitment of then President Wasmosy, the then Assistant Secretary of Health and Human 
Services of the US, Dr. Walter Broadnax, visited the country and made the case for decentralization to the 
full Congress and in private meetings with President Wasmosy.		
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society, in the implementation of health reforms; and it empowered mayors, and to a certain 
extent governors, in the provision of services at the local level.  
 The National Health System Law aimed to: 
- improve the efficiency and quality of service provision, 
- improve the equity of service provision, and 
- promote community participation in the planning and delivery of health 
services.  
In search of efficiency, the law also created new governmental agencies to assist 
and oversee the desired reforms. Thus, the following entities were created: the National 
Health Advisory Board (Consejo Nacional de Salud); a National Health Fund (Fondo 
Nacional de Salud) that was to execute health financing functions; a regulatory and rule-
making body, the National Medical Directorate (Dirección Médica Nacional); and a 
monitoring and auditing agency, the Health Superintendent (Superintendencia de Salud).  
In the new National Health System, citizen participation was explicitly outlined via 
the creation of Local Health Councils (LHCs). During the first year after the approval of 
Law 1032/96, the Ministry concentrated its efforts to establish as many LHCs as possible 
in the municipalities and in the Departments. Thus, one measure of decentralization success 
is the number of LHCs that have been established through the years.  
As mentioned above, the process had, from the beginning, a significant component 
of citizen participation—it was expected that each municipality, through their recently 
created LHCs, would identify, design, and implement their local health plans with the input 
of the community. The strategic health plans, designed by the Ministry, had citizen 
participation strategies as key objectives calling for “citizens who are involved, aware, and 
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responsible for their role as leaders in the health planning of their communities” (Law 
1036/96). Activities, technical assistance, and support aimed to train communities on the 
meaning of health decentralization and the mechanisms to involve citizens in the process 
were initiated. The objective was to ensure citizens’ empowerment, as well as improve 
transparency and accountability (Colindres & Veldhuyzen Van Zanten, 1996; CIRD, 
1997). Overall, and as noted by Rojas (2000), citizen participation, especially at the local 
level, has been instrumental to the decentralization process—helping identify needs and 
solutions and overseeing implementation and monitoring of local programs (PAHO, 2001; 
USAID, 2008). 
The implementation phase initially faced many obstacles, including: a lack of 
understanding of the process by community members, mayors, and authorities at the three 
levels of government; complexities in the creation of LHCs and Local Health Plans; 
resistance by some Regional Health Directors (which are named by the Ministry of Health); 
tensions between government authorities due to lack of clear mandates, especially in the 
case of governors and their health secretaries, and; in some areas of the country, lack of 
citizen participation (Rojas, 2000).  
An important development in the implementation of the law was the approval of 
Decree 19966 in 1998, which sought to operationalize Law 1032/96. Again, the importance 
of citizen participation is underscored in the decree’s title: “Through which local health 
decentralization, citizen participation, and self-management are regulated as an essential 
strategy for the development of the National Health System” (Angeles et al., page 8). By 
this decree, administrative responsibilities of local health facilities (health posts, district 
hospitals, and health centers) were transferred to local governments through a formal 
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agreement between the Health Ministry and the respective local government. The transfer 
though, was not mandatory.  
The process of decentralization required a step-wise progression before 
administrative responsibilities could be transferred to the local level. These steps included 
securing political support from the municipality—indicating willingness to take over these 
responsibilities. A functioning LHC needed to be created/in place. Also required was a 
signed contract agreement between the Ministry, the mayor of the municipality, other local 
and regional authorities, and the directors of the major health facilities present in the 
territory to formalize and define the obligations of the Ministry, the municipality, and the 
LHC. By way of the agreement, responsibilities for the administration, supervision and 
monitoring of health facilities providing basic healthcare were transferred to the local level, 
and the municipal government delegated administrative responsibilities to the LHC. The 
design, planning, and implementation of local health plans, as well as the control of the 
budget and the performance supervision of the public health facilities, was to be done 
jointly by the municipality and the LHC (Angeles et al., 1999).  
As part of the reforms, LHCs were to be funded not only by transfers from the 
Ministry (based on past expenditures and projected expenditures, as indicated by local 
health plans), but also by the local municipality, which had to allocate 5% of its budget to 
the LHC, and by the revenues generated at each facility; these funds were to be deposited 
into a municipal government account and earmarked for health activities. Regrettably, how 
municipalities defined health expenditures was not clearly outlined and, thus, some 
municipalities did not transfer the resources to the LHCs.  
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Table 38 below indicates the role assigned by Law 1032/96 to the different 
stakeholders involved in the process.  
 
Table 38: Role of Principal Stakeholders at the beginning of the decentralization 
process 
Ministry of Health  Municipal 
Governments 
Local Health Councils Civil Society 
• Transfer of 
administrative 
responsibilities 
and 
infrastructure, as 
well as funding 
• Ensure 
availability of 
Human Resource 
at each health 
facility 
• Salaries are paid 
by Ministry 
• Provide training 
and technical 
assistance 
• Allocate 5% of 
municipal 
budget to health 
expenditures 
• Form the LHC 
 
• Prepare and 
design the Local 
Health Plan 
• Comply with all 
sanitary laws and 
regulations 
• Administer 
financial resources 
• Monitor 
implementation of 
Local Health Plan 
• Organizations 
would be 
involved in the 
creation of 
LHCs 
• Organization 
would actively 
participate in 
the design and 
implementation 
of local health 
plans.  
• Would oversee 
process and 
demand 
accountability  
Source: Adapted from Gustavo Angeles et al. (1999) 
 
 The implementation of the program was not without confusion; decentralization 
was new in Paraguay, and real change did not simply materialize—time was required to 
finalize agreements among the municipalities, the other stakeholders, and the Ministry. By 
1998, 23 municipalities had signed decentralization agreements: 17 in Central Department, 
2 in Cordillera, and 4 in Misiones. By 1999, 17 of the 23 renewed their agreements. But, 
of the 23 original municipalities that signed agreements in 1998, only 10 (and all of them 
in Central Department) actually initiated administrative changes, mostly to improve the 
quality of available services, by using the revenues generated locally at the health facility.  
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 In 1999, the process suffered a significant slowdown due to the political situation 
in Paraguay. The vice president was assassinated and reports of a looming coup were 
widespread. The resulting political turmoil hampered the process. Only the Central 
Department continued and sustained the process (Rojas, 2000) as the LHCs and mayors 
involved remained active and continued receiving support and technical assistance from 
organizations such as the Resource and Information for Development Center (CIRD—
reflecting Spanish terminology), which was heavily funded by USAID.  
Also in 1999, an important development significantly impacted the progress of 
health decentralization services in Paraguay. The new agreements to be signed with the 
Ministry of Health required that funds generated at each local health center, health post, or 
district hospital be deposited in a Ministry of Finances’ bank account, which would then 
transfer those funds back to the Health Ministry, and from there back to the local level. 
This was done in accordance with the Financial Administrative Law of the country, which 
regulates procedures for all government institutions; however, central authorities were 
ultimately given control over resources that were never fully transferred back to local 
levels. The new requirement also allowed Health Ministers who were not enthused with 
the process to delay the implementation of decentralization—based on technicalities within 
the law.  
Other persistent problems: numerous municipalities did not comply with the 
stipulation that 5% of their budgets were to be allocated to LHCs; underhanded tactics were 
common (e.g., considering trash collection to be a health service provision; thus, those 
expenses counted toward the 5% they were required to allocate for health).  
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Health workers at the local level remained employees of the national health 
ministry. This jeopardized the process of decentralization. By the year 2000, there were 
19,842 health employees at the Health Ministry, including doctors, nurses, and other health 
professionals. About 7,000 of those were administrative and administrative support 
personnel82. LHCs were not able to reform human resource policies and/or discipline 
workers, who considered themselves accountable to the Regional Health Secretaries 
(named by the Ministry in Asuncion). A major problem was that Regional Health 
Secretaries retained funds sent by the Ministry, and used those funds to contract new 
employees or to buy supplies not needed by the LHCs (CIRD, 2002; and interviews). By 
the early 2000s, these developments had heavily impeded the implementation of health 
provision decentralization (CIRD, 2002).  
 Nevertheless, by 2001, even though the decentralization process was progressing 
slowly, citizen participation and collaboration among the municipalities involved in the 
program continued. International organizations continued to support the institutions that 
had been established, continued to strengthen human resources, and assisted with the 
funding of medicines and other medical needs (PAHO, 2001).  
 During the 1996-2003 period, the Ministry continued the deconcentration of some 
technical and administrative services to regional and local authorities. Improvements in 
some health indicators were noted, especially vaccination rates, maternal health care, infant 
mortality rates, and infrastructure improvements at hospitals and health posts. Health 																																																								82	These numbers are to be taken cautiously as there is no reliable information on the number of public 
employees at the different government agencies in Paraguay. Many people are employed by the Ministry of 
Health and also by the Institute of Social Welfare (IPS for its Spanish acronym) or by a regional health center 
or hospital, and thus they can be counted multiple times. Those who are hired on temporary contracts are 
often not included in the counts.		
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expenditures as percentage of GDP remained at the same level (see Table 39), or in some 
instances increased during this period (CIRD, 2002)  
Table 39: Total Health Expenditures 1998 - 2010 
Year Health Exp. % of Public Exp. Health Exp. % of GDP 
2012 17,13% 4,34% 
2011 16,08% 3,43% 
2010 14,93% 3,00% 
2009 15,25% 3,25% 
2008 14,13% 2,41% 
2007 13,08% 2,40% 
2006 12,17% 2,35% 
2005 11,61% 2,12% 
2004 11,43% 2,16% 
2003 10,92% 2,07% 
2002 11,58% 2,39% 
2001 12,41% 2,65% 
2000 15,24% 3,23% 
1999 14,88% 3,03% 
1998 N/A 2,82% Source:www.datosmacro.com/estado/salud/Paraguay		
 
Between 2000 and 2006, under the administration of at least three different 
ministers (See Table 40 below), there were different levels of political commitment and, 
consequently, varying levels of incentives for continuing the decentralization 
implementation process. Often, little was done to implement the local health plans or to 
sign new agreements at the local level—though the plans continued to be supported by 
some senior officials at the Health Ministry, USAID, and the Pan-American Health 
Organization (PAHO). 
 
Table 40: Health Ministers of Paraguay, 1996 – 2010 
Period of Government  Name Political Party 
July 1994 – August 1998 Dr. Andres Vidovich Morales Colorado Party 
August 1998 – March 1999 Dr. Carmen Frutos de Almada Colorado Party 
March 1999 – January 2003 Dr. Martin Antonio Chiola Colorado Party 
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January 2003 – August 2003 Dr. Jose Antonio Mayans Colorado Party 
August 2003 – May 2005 Dr. Julio Cesar Velasquez Colorado Party 
May 2005 – June 2006 Dr. Teresa Leon Mendaro Colorado Party 
June 2006 – August 2008 Dr. Oscar Martinez Doldan Colorado Party 
August 2008 – June 2010  Dr. Esperanza Martinez Frente Guazu Government  
Source: Author – Ministry of Health of Paraguay  
 
 A third phase in the decentralization process started in the year 2004—with the 
administration of Dr. Julio Velazquez as health minister—when new decentralization 
agreements were signed or existing ones were renewed. Thus, in 2004, the Ministry 
reinitiated the decentralization process with the signing of 32 agreements with local 
governments in 12 Departments. Regardless of these advances, the funding of LHCs, and 
their ability to collect and use revenues, continued to be a source of controversy.  
 In 2005, given the lack of clarity on the use of funds by LHCs, local and regional 
political leaders endorsed a Congressional law that would clarify the situation. The law 
was approved in 2006 (Law 3007/06) and established that regional and local health 
councils that collected funds, while administering the LHCs as established by their 
agreements with the Ministry of Health, will be able to use and allocate those funds without 
having to transfer them to the Ministry of Finances as required by Law 1535. A major 
obstacle had been removed. By the end of 2008, a total of 49 new agreements had been 
established (Gaete, 2012).  
 But, as of 2008, the country still lacked a general decentralization law, which 
impacted the implementation of health decentralization by local agreements—many local 
authorities feared working in a potential legal vacuum that could make them susceptible to 
central government accusations of malpractice.   
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 The Lugo Administration took office in August of 2008 and established a new 
vision of health policy. Fundamentally, it focused on free access to health services for all 
Paraguayans (Gaete, 2012; Gimenez Caballero, 2012; Mancuello y Cabral, 2011). LHCs 
would no longer collect fees. To replace this funding, the Ministry of Health was to transfer 
1% of its budget to LHCs. These funds were named Equity Funds (Fondos de Equidad). 
With equity, all people were to have equal access to health services (Barrios Kuck, 2002). 
Table 41 below summarizes the legal framework of the revitalized approach to health care 
decentralization in Paraguay.  
In this new modality, municipalities and the Ministry (not Departments), signed 
decentralization agreements, and some administrative functions are thus decentralized, but 
LHCs now administer funds transferred from the central government and not locally 
generated funds. Those funds were to be complemented by transfers from the local 
government (5% of budget), Departmental governments, and civil society organizations.  
 By 2011, 196 agreements were in place—about 82% of municipalities in Paraguay. 
From 2008 to 2011, about 20 million dollars had been transferred to LHCs in the form of 
Equity Funds83 (Gaete, 2012).  
  
																																																								83	Equity Funds refer to the concept that all LHCs and municipalities will receive “equity funding” according 
to their needs and history. The concept in Spanish is referred as Fondos de Equidad	
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Table 41: Legal Framework for Health Decentralization in Paraguay 
National Constitution  •  Defines the country as        
decentralized 
• Article 69 call for the 
promotion of a National 
Health System 
Law 1032/96 Created the National Health 
System 
• Established the 
administrative 
decentralization of health 
services 
• Established community 
participation as key element 
in the management of 
services through local, 
regional, and national Health 
Councils 
• Promoted the signing of 
decentralization agreements 
and contracts between 
municipalities and central 
authorities  
Decree 19966/98 Regulated the local health 
decentralization, citizen 
participation, and the 
management of health 
facilities at the local level as a 
way to help the 
implementation of Law 
1032/96 
• Made possible the temporary 
transfer of basic health 
services (district hospitals, 
health posts and centers) to 
municipalities.  
• Established the requirements 
needed for the signing of 
decentralization agreements 
• Agreements are optional and 
municipalities may or may 
not request the transfer of 
services 
• Municipalities that sign the 
agreement must allocate 5% 
of their budget to health 
Contractual agreements 
between Municipalities 
and Ministry (starting in 
1998 to present) 
 • Details which health services 
will be transferred to the 
local level 
• Establishes the 
responsibilities of the 
Ministry, the municipality, 
and the Local Health Council  
Law 426/94 Created Departmental 
Governments 
• Created, within the structure 
of Departmental 
Governments, the 
Departmental Health 
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Source: author based on Angeles et al., CIRD, USAID, Rojas, Mancuello & Cabral, Gimenez Caballero, 
Uharte Pozas 
 
Have Reforms been Successful? 	
 In regard to the evaluation of results, “there is no evidence at this time that would 
allow (one) to see if the health sector reforms have had an impact in reducing the gap in 
health indicators” (PAHO, 2001). But there have been direct investments in certain areas 
—as a result of the emphasis of local health plans—namely, in children (vaccinations) and 
pre and post maternal health care (PAHO, 2001).  
 In general, critics of health service decentralization argue that the process has not 
accomplished its stated goals. It has led to increased inequality, reduced efficiency and 
quality of services, and increased costs. There is insufficient evidence to establish if 
decentralization failures are a result of inadequate policy choices or issues surrounding 
implementation (Ugalde & Homedes, 2002).   
Secretaries (but clear 
mandates were not defined) 
Law 3007/06 Exempted LHCs from 
transferring funds as required 
by Administrative Financial 
Law 
• LHCs could collect and keep 
funding generated for service 
provision at the local level.  
Law 5099/08 Established Free Health 
Provision  
• Guaranteed free access to 
health care regardless of 
social class or income 
• Eliminated fees collected at 
the local level or at hospitals 
for most services  
• Established the so called 
Equity Funds by which the 
Health Ministry transfers 1% 
of its budget to LHCs.  
• Promoted the creation of 
Family Health Units  
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 Ugalde and Homedes (2002) name two phases in the decision making process of 
decentralization: choosing policies and policy-implementation. Paraguay has had serious 
problems both with defining decentralization and with its implementation  
In Paraguay, by not clearly defining coordination mechanisms between all 
stakeholders, in particular among the three levels of government, many implementation 
problems ensued. The difference in responsibilities between Departmental Health 
Secretaries (named by the governors) and the Regional Health Directors (named by the 
Health Ministry) were not clearly defined, generating tensions and duplication of efforts. 
The funding system, and the transfer of those funds, was also not clearly established, 
creating confusions and frustration (Ugalde & Homedes, 2002; Gaete, 2012; COPLANEA, 
and interviews).   
 According to Martinez (2005), and many knowledgeable observers interviewed for 
this research, weaknesses of the process include:  
• lack of clarity within the Health Ministry of what the process entailed; 
• divided opinions about its merits; 
• technical support units lacking enforcement authority and lack of technical 
guidance to LHCs;  
• lack of political commitment;  
• lack of leadership role from the Ministry;  
• absence or deficient definition of roles and responsibilities among Regional Health 
Secretaries, Departmental Health Secretaries, and local authorities;  
• among some local authorities, not considering the provision of health services to be 
a local responsibility;  
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• lack of leadership among some LHCs, and not providing adequate services;  
• internal political divisions and rivalries within communities and among the three 
levels of government involved;  
• lack of resources;  
• insufficient communication and clarity about the goal of the process;  
• weakness of the legal framework that has left many decisions subject to legal 
review or contestation;  
• uncertainty about the stability of public health officials, which created resistance to 
implementation.  
 
Lack of political will and lack of administrative capacity at all levels of government 
generated serious implementation problems (Martinez, 2005; Recalde, 2011; Gimenez 
Caballero, 2012; interviews). According to the Pan-American Health Organization 
(PAHO), as of 2012, the Law has not been able to fundamentally change the health system. 
In the twenty years since its enactment, the management model has not changed, nor have 
the care or financing systems (Gimenez Caballero, 2012; interviewees).  
Fiscal decentralization has not advanced much as Departments and municipalities 
only spend 3% of the public health budget, and with the reforms enacted by the Equity 
Funds Law, LHCs lost the little financial autonomy they had in revenue collection.  
Many aspects of Law 1032/96 have yet to be implemented (e.g., the National Health 
Directorate or the National Health Fund). Only the Superintendence of Health has been 
created. The National Health Council does not function consistently and has not met in 
regularly since its creation. Between 1996 and 2008, less than 10% of municipalities had a 
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working LHC. In 2008, with the introduction of free public health for all, and through the 
Equity Funds, about 200 municipalities progressively signed up (about 80% of the total).  
 Supporters of the process point to successes that—given Paraguay’s weak data 
collection systems—are more difficult to measure, but include (Martinez, 2005; 
interviews):  
• extension of care hours at the local health posts or centers; 
• new services such as emergency care extended hours and lab services; 
• reduced doctor and nurse absenteeism; 
• increased number of patient visits; 
• increased revenues;  
• the development of LHCs as essential to citizen participation. This aspect is the 
most important successful element of the process (Gimenez Caballero, 2012; 
interviews). 
 
According to Uharte Pozas (2012), the most important development in the health 
decentralization process of Paraguay was the establishment of free access to services in 
2008 by the Lugo Administration. The number of people visiting hospitals increased by 
50% and the number of people accessing primary health centers increased from 4 to 8 
million in 2010. Investment in health also increased by 77%. The creation of the Family 
Health Units (Unidades de Salud de la Familia) provided basic primary health care in the 
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18 Health Regions84 of the country. By mid-2011, 503 of these units had been established, 
improving health coverage by 33%.    
 The health decentralization process in Paraguay has been a dynamic process, 
subject to political will, and not necessarily a structured or strategically planned one. 
Among those involved in the process, there is a general consensus that the pressure to 
continue the process has come mostly from subnational levels of government and civil 
society, with the assistance of donor organizations, and not necessarily from the Ministry 
of Health (Gaete, 2012; interviews). 
 
Can Health Decentralization Impact be measured in Paraguay? 	
The process of health decentralization in Paraguay started in 1996 with the approval 
of the National Health System Law, but implementation did not begin until 1998; several 
phases of implementation occurred, hindered by serious challenges. The first phase 
(between 1998 and 2000) saw the signing of several agreements between the Ministry of 
Health and Local and Departmental governments as indicated on Table 42. In 2004 and 
2005, more agreements were signed and previous agreements were renewed; finally, 
between 2008 and 2010, as a result of the decision to provide free basic health care and 
with the creation of Equity Funds, the number of signatories more than doubled.  
Table 42: Number of LHCs incorporated by year and with agreements in place 1998 
– 2010 
Year 1998 1999 2000/3 2004/5 2008 2009 2010 
Number of LHCs 23 17 0 32 33 106 175 Source:	Author	based	on	CIRD	materials,	and	General	Directorate	for	Health	Decentralization,	Ministry	of	Health																																																										84	The Ministry of Health administratively divides the country in 18 “health regions,” which correspond to 
the 17 Departments plus the City of Asuncion (Regiones Sanitarias in Spanish).  
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The objectives of the reform, as indicated, were to transfer some decision-making 
authority to the regional and local level in the design of local health programs that would 
effectively reflect the needs of the population; there was an expectation that, with 
community oversight of programs, plans would become more efficient and quality of care 
will improve—achieving more transparency and accountability (Semidei et al., 1996).   
 Table 43 below shows the number of municipalities by Department that have signed 
decentralization agreements with the Ministry of Health, and thus have LHCs in place. The 
table shows how many LHCs were in place for each Department in 1998, 2008/2009, and 
2010, also indicating the total number of municipalities that have not signed agreements, 
do not have an LHC in place, and have not initiated decentralization reforms—these 
municipalities do not benefit from fund transfers.  
The Department of San Pedro, with a total of 19 municipalities, has the fewest 
number of municipalities (as of 2010) that have signed decentralization agreements with 
the Health Ministry (14), followed by the Departments of Guaira (13) and Canindeyu (10). 
On the other hand, the Departments of Itapua (29 out of 30 municipalities), Cordillera (19 
of 20), and Caaguazu (17 out of 21) have the largest number of municipalities with 
decentralization agreements. The Department of Central, the most populated of the 
country, is one of the few that has been involved in the decentralization process from the 
very beginning; Central has a relatively large number of municipalities that have signed 
agreements (13 out of 19), and those agreements have been in place the longest.  
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Table 43: Total LHCs per Municipality and per Department (number of 
municipalities with decentralization agreements signed)85   
Source:	 Author	 -	 based	 on	 CIRD	 materials,	 and	 General	 Directorate	 for	 Health	 Decentralization,	Ministry	of	Health				
 This section will analyze whether health decentralization—as defined and 
implemented in the Paraguayan context in the above mentioned Departments—has 
positively impacted basic health indicators such as infant mortality rates (under 1 year old). 
Because the Ministry of Health has placed so much emphasis on LHC contributions to 
reduce infant mortality, it is interesting to compare the three Departments with the fewest 
LHCs (San Pedro, Guaira, and Canindeyu) and the three Departments the most LHCs 
																																																								85 A requirement for signing a decentralization agreement with a municipality is the presence of Local Health 
Council. Thus, “decentralized municipalities” must include in each case a LHC. 	
Department Total 
Mun. 
With 
dec. 
agreem
ents 
1998 
With dec. 
agreeme
nts Year 
2008/09 
New 
agreements 
2010 
Total w/ 
agreements 
With no 
agreeme
nts  
Concepcion 7 0 6 0 6 1 
 19 0 4 1 5 14 
 20 2 19 0 19 1 
 18 0 4 1 5 13 
 21 1 15 2 17 4 
Caazapa 10 0 7 1 8 2 
 30 0 24 5 29 1 
Misiones 10 2 9 0 9 1 
Paraguari 17 12 11 1 12 5 
Alto Parana 20 4 14 2 16 4 
 19 3 12 1 13 6 
Neembucu 16 0 4 3 7 9 
Amambay 3 0 3 0 3 0 
 11 0 1 0 1 10 
Pte. Hayes 8 1 5 0 5 3 
Alto Paraguay 4 0 0 0 0 4 
Boqueron 3 0 1 0 1 2 
Total 237 25 139 17 156 80 
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(Itapua, Cordillera, and Caaguazu), and the Department of Central, which has been 
involved in the decentralization process from its beginnings in 199686.  
As health decentralization expands, and as more health centers are established at 
the local level, and as local health centers become more responsive to the demands of 
communities, access to health care and information will increase and, thus, rates of infant 
mortality (under one year old, live births) at the Departmental level should decline. 
It is also expected that higher education levels and lower poverty rates will impact 
infant mortality rates, as better educated parents will seek medical assistance sooner, and 
will have more resources to seek help.  In the case of the seven Departments, the average 
illiteracy rate and poverty indexes were calculated based on historical trends obtained from 
the Ministry of Health Basic Indicators yearly reports.  
Access to appropriate funding is important. Lack of resources can affect the ability 
of local and regional governments to provide the necessary services. In the case of 
Paraguay, serious challenges to the funding of LHCs have been present throughout the 
process with significant lapses of time where no funding—or autonomy in the use of 
funding—was available to LHCs, and political opposition to the process slowed down 
decentralization significantly.  
Data on budget transfers for health decentralization (Table 44) to the Departments 
was obtained from the Under-Secretariat for Health Decentralization of Paraguay. The 
point of reference is the year 1998, when budget transfers were initiated to some of the 																																																								86	Regrettably, there are many serious limitations in Paraguay’s health/government data. From accessibility 
to under-reporting, to the fact that many other institutions working on health do not report to the Health 
Ministry. Consequently, information provided must be viewed with caution. Another problem encountered 
had to do with the lack of consistent data gathering for the time period sought. 	
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Departments as a component of pilot projects in health decentralization initiated by the 
Ministry of Health. 
Table 44: Budget Transfer from Health Ministry to Departments 
Department Total 
Transfers 
1998* 
Equity Funds 
(only) 
 2008 
Equity Funds (only)  
2009 
Equity Funds 
(only) 
 2010 
Concepción 47,165,270 100,000,000 1,763,805,661 2,015,000,000 
San Pedro 74,169,500 120,000,000 918,062,005 1,250,000,000 
Cordillera 125,750,000 15,000,000 1,797,422,095 3,042,342,496 
Guairá 133,001,310 140,000,000 500,905,883 935,000,000 
Caaguazú 34,537,500 160,000,000 2,053,193,953 2,955,000,000 
Caazapá 19,500,000 60,000,000 858,780,099 1,185,000,000 
Itapúa 0 475,000,000 4,864,521,065 5,553,280,832 
Misiones 107,433,100 150,000,000 2,093,644,868 2,198,280,832 
Paraguari 77,650,000 155,000,000 1,396,603,768 2,150,000,000 
Alto Paraná 310,388,000 100,000,000 1,558,463,116 2,080,000,000 
Central 806,754,000 240,000,000 3,051,848,187 2,915,000,000 
Ñeembucú 158,000,000 0 496,096,080 1,270,000,000 
Amambay 0 135,000,000 744,825,394 865,000,000 
Canindeyú 0 0 150,000,000 420,000,000 
Presidente 
Hayes 28,600,000 
120,000,000 730,320,379 902,500,000 
Boquerón 0 30,000,000 321,507,447 503,280,832 
Alto 
Paraguay 0 
0 0 0 
Capital  0 0 0 0 
Total 1,922,948,680 2,000,000,000 23,300,000,000 30,239,684,992 
In millions Guaranies 
*it includes all transfers made at the time by the Health Ministry in all categories  
Information on transfers for the 1999 – 2007 periods were not available  
Equity Funds refers only to the funds transferred to LHCs beginning with the Lugo Administration.  
 
 
Given the limitations on data on the Departments, the tables below include data that 
enables us to observe improvements in infant mortality rates for each Departments (Tables 
45, 46 and 47). 
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Table 45: Department of San Pedro 
Department of San 
Pedro  
Health 
Facilities 
Transfers Mortality 
Rate 
1997 85  17.03 
1998 87 74,169,500 17.4 
1999 84  13.8 
2000 84  18.1 
2001 87  17.9 
2002 101  22.1 
2003 101  19.8 
2004 104  16.5 
2005 104  17 
2006 108  15.7 
2007 110  11.8 
2008 110 120,000,000 12.1 
2009 112 918,062,005 10.1 
2010 120 1,250,000,000 14.5 
2011 124 2,117,300,000 9.4 
Estimated Rate of analphabetism 7.7%   
Estimated Poverty Rate 
37% (extreme, 2000) 
   
Source: Author, based on Ministry of Health’s yearly basic indicators (Indicadores Básicos de Salud) 
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Table 46: Department of Guaira 
 
Department of Guaira Health 
Facilities 
Transfers Mortality 
Rate 
1997 54  25.15 
1998 42 133,001,310 25.6 
1999 42  15.4 
2000 42  21.5 
2001 43  21 
2002 48  22.6 
2003 48  29.6 
2004 50  25.2 
2005 50  21.6 
2006 62  20.6 
2007 64  21.4 
2008 64 140,000,000 14.5 
2009 62 500,905,883 12.8 
2010 66 935,000,000 12.6 
2011 79 1,419,373,334 15 
Estimated Rate of 
analphabetism 10.5% 
   
Estimated Poverty Rate 25% 
(extreme, 2000) 
   
Source: Author, based on Ministry of Health’s yearly basic indicators (Indicadores Básicos de Salud) 
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Table 47: Department of Canindeyu 
 
Department of Canindeyu Health 
Facilities 
Transfers Mortality 
Rate 
1997 35  39.62 
1998 29 0 23.5 
1999 36  23.8 
2000 36  23.5 
2001 36  18.9 
2002 47  20 
2003 47  20.3 
2004 45  24.3 
2005 45  29.1 
2006 49  22.9 
2007 55  21 
2008 55 0 10 
2009 68 150,000,000 12.7 
2010 72 420,000,000 11.9 
2011 74 982,500,000 12.5 
Estimated Rate of 
analphabetism 17.4% 
   
Estimated Poverty Rate 23% 
(extreme, 2000) 
   
Source: Author, based on Ministry of Health’s yearly basic indicators (Indicadores Básicos de Salud) 
 
 
In the case of the three Departments that have the fewest municipalities with 
decentralization agreements (and thus the least number of LHCs), and where extreme 
poverty is more widespread than in other Departments considered here, there seems to be 
a relationship between number of health facilities, increased access to funding, and declines 
in infant mortality rates of children under one. In the Department of San Pedro, one of the 
poorest in Paraguay, the number of health facilities incrementally increases starting in the 
year 2002 reaching 124 by 2011, with a decrease in infant mortality rates from a peak of 
22.1% in 2002 to 9.4% in 2011—a reduction of almost 43%. Both Guaira and Canindeyu 
also experienced significant decreases in mortality rates; and in the three cases, significant 
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changes begin in the year 2008—the year that Equity Funds and free access to basic health 
care were established. The total funds transferred to each Department starting in 2008 were 
significant, as all three saw increases of over ten times what they initially received, and, 
these funds have most likely impacted the ability of LHCs to implement their local health 
plans through the existing, or newly created, health facilities at the local level. 
 Let us now examine the three Departments with the most municipalities with 
decentralization agreements and, thus, the highest number of LHCs (Tables 48, 49 and 50 
below). 
 
Table 48: Department of Itapua 
Department of Itapua Health 
Facilities 
Transfers Mortality 
Rate 
1997 117  26.2 
1998 86 0 20.7 
1999 77  21.5 
2000 77  21.2 
2001 77  25 
2002 87  20.6 
2003 87  18.8 
2004 82  15.6 
2005 82  14.5 
2006 78  17.2 
2007 79  16.8 
2008 79 475,000,000 9.6 
2009 85 4,864,521,065 10.1 
2010 90 5,553,280,832 10.1 
2011 102 7,045,810,992 9.9 
Estimated Rate of analphabetism 9.5%   
Estimated Poverty Rate 
20% (extreme, 2000) 
   
Source: Author, based on Ministry of Health’s yearly basic indicators (Indicadores Básicos de Salud) 
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Table 49: Department of Cordillera 
Department of 
Cordillera  
Health Facilities Transfers Mortality 
Rate 
1997 54  20.16 
1998 39 125,750,000 20.3 
1999 42  22 
2000 42  20.3 
2001 42  21.3 
2002 42  16.5 
2003 42  20.8 
2004 44  15.8 
2005 44  17.6 
2006 42  16.7 
2007 45  12.8 
2008 45 15,000,000 11.2 
2009 49 1,797,422,095 10.5 
2010 55 3,042,342,496 10 
2011 65 3,385,000,000 10.1 
Estimated Rate of 
analphabetism 7.4% 
Estimated Poverty Rate 
17% (extreme 2000) 
   
    
Source: Author, based on Ministry of Health’s yearly basic indicators (Indicadores Básicos de Salud) 
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Table 50: Department of Caaguazu 
Department of 
Caaguazu 
Health Facilities Transfers Mortality 
Rate 
1997 80  17.03 
1998 68 34,537,500 19.8 
1999 62  18.3 
2000 62  17.7 
2001 62  18.4 
2002 65  40.5 
2003 65  13.8 
2004 58  15.2 
2005 58  16.4 
2006 66  12.7 
2007 69  13.1 
2008 69 160,000,000 9.3 
2009 73 2,053,193,953 9.7 
2010 79 2,955,000,000 10.4 
2011 84 3,439,000,000 8.1 
Estimated Rate of 
analphabetism 7.5% 
   
Estimated Poverty 22% 
(extreme 2000) 
   
Source: Author, based on Ministry of Health’s yearly basic indicators (Indicadores Básicos de Salud) 
 
 
In the first ten years of the process, when legal frameworks were not clear, the cases 
of Itapua, Cordillera, and Caaguazu were similar to those of San Pedro, Guaira, and 
Canindeyu. Funding and/or use of funding was either not available, not properly transferred 
or the autonomy on its use was curtailed; there are no significant changes in the infant 
mortality rates. In fact, available data indicate that changes begin in the year 2008 when 
funding, and the use of the funding, is significantly increased.  
Although the number of health facilities in these instances remains somewhat 
constant, there seems to be a positive impact in the reduction of infant mortality rates. In 
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the case of Cordillera, for example, in ten years (from 2000 to 2010), the rate decreased by 
50% from 20.3% to 10%.  
 Finally, we examine the case of the Department of Central (Table 51), the most 
populous of the country, and the one that has, through the 1998-2010 time period, been 
involved the longest with health decentralization. Results are, though, similar to the other 
six Departments analyzed here; namely, improvements are mostly observed after the year 
2008. The Department witnessed a 55% reduction in the infant mortality rate in the ten 
years between 2000 and 2010, and data suggest that the biggest drops begin in the year 
2008.  
 
Table 51: Department of Central 
Department of Central  Health 
Facilities 
Transfers Mortality 
Rate 
1997 134  16.45 
1998 26 806,754,000 15.1 
1999 71  15.6 
2000 71  18.4 
2001 72  16.2 
2002 68  15.6 
2003 68  15.5 
2004 73  15.4 
2005 73  14.1 
2006 72  14.7 
2007 72  13.3 
2008 73 240,000,000 8.6 
2009 83 3,051,848,187 9.2 
2010 123 2,915,000,000 10.2 
2011 150 3,797,163,636 8.7 
Estimated Rate of analphabetism 3%   
Estimated Poverty Rate 
3% 
   
Source: Author, based on Ministry of Health’s yearly basic indicators (Indicadores Básicos de Salud) 
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 By summing the total population of San Pedro, Guaira, and Canindeyu (i.e, the 
three Departments with the fewest municipalities with decentralization agreements; and 
thus, the least number of LHCs) in the periods where data on funding is available (1998, 
2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011), and doing the same for Itapua, Caaguazu, and Cordillera (i.e., 
the three Departments with the most municipalities with decentralization agreements), and 
combining that information with the total budget transfers of each Department, a health per 
capita average can be calculated to examine whether those with the most decentralized 
agreements (and thus the most LHCs) have had greater success in attracting funding to 
their regions. The table below summarizes the result (Table 52): 
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Table 52: Per capita health expenditures in selected Departments 
San Pedro, Guaira, 
Canindeyu (least 
number of LHCs) 
Year Total 
population 
Total 
Budget US 
Dollars 
Per 
Capita 
US$ 
Number 
of LHCs 
Infant 
Mortality 
Rate (%)* 
 1998 653856 47,625 0.07 0 22.1 
 2008 653856 59,770 0.08 10 12.2 
 2009 1307712 360,682 0.49 10 11.8 
 2010 2615424 598,850 0.8 11 13 
 2011 4576992 1,038,890 1.388  12.3 
Caaguazu, 
Cordillera, 
Itapua 
      
 1998 7192416 36,847 0.032 3 20.2 
 2008 11769408 149,425 0.117 58 10 
 2009 18961824 2,003,479 1.568 58 10.1 
 2010 37923648 2,655,315 2.06 65 10.1 
 2011 68654880 3,188,462 2.456  9.3 
       
Central       
 1998 1225612 185,460 0.163 3 15.1 
 2008 1929918 55,172 0.043 12 8.6 
 2009 1998994 701,574 0.549 12 9.2 
 2010 2068066 670,115 0.519 13 10.2 
 2011 2144591 872,911 0.672  8.7 
Source: Author, based on Ministry of Health’s yearly basic indicators (Indicadores Básicos de Salud)  
US$ 1 = Gs 4,350 as per the year 2008 – Ministry of Finance data  
*Average per Department 
   
 As shown above, the per capita transfer of funds is minimal by any standards, but 
in those Departments with the most LHCs, as funds per capita increased, the infant 
mortality rates seem to decline. Though other factors likely played a role, and causation 
cannot be established, there is some correlation between increased numbers of LHCs (a 
result of decentralization requirement), increase funding to the local level (also a result of 
decentralization), and improvement in basic health indicators such as infant mortality rates.  
Discussion  	
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 It is difficult to establish a causal relationship between the increase of funding, 
increased number of health facilities, the levels of education and poverty, and the reduction 
of infant mortality rates as data limitations do not allow us to further explore the possible 
links between them. However, major changes can be observed after the Paraguayan 
government established progressive free access to health care (with reducing infant 
mortality rates through improved maternal health care as main objectives), and as funding 
to LHCs and Regional Health Councils were significantly expanded. Though the limited 
autonomy on revenue collection and expenditure that LHCs had was lost with the 
administration of President Lugo (2008-2010), the benefits of free health care and the 
increased number of LHCs positively impacted some basic indicators such as infant 
mortality rates (children under one year old) as shown in the cases of the seven 
Departments considered here.  
In light of the reforms implemented in Paraguay, where so much emphasis was put 
on aspects of citizen participation—and due to the severe political limitations faced by the 
reformers—the relevance, responsiveness, adequacy, costs and benefits, quality and 
quantity of services, as stated by Katorobo (2004), are difficult to assess.  
The lack of information continues to be a problem in assessing the impact that 
health decentralization has had on Paraguay’s local communities. Though outcomes such 
as infant mortality rates have improved, this cannot be attributed only to LHCs and the 
work they have promoted. Other factors, independent of the control of LHCs, such as 
central government extensive vaccination campaigns, have most likely also played a role.  
Part of the difficulties health reformers faced involved the uncertainty of support 
from key decision makers such as health ministers in office or legislators in Congress that 
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were able to keep the issue on the political and policy agenda. In this regard, and at the 
beginning of the health decentralization process, the figure of Minister Vidovich Morales 
as a keen policy entrepreneur must be stressed. It is noteworthy that after he left the 
Ministry (1998) and the political upheavals the country endured, the impetus for reform 
slowed.  
Political turmoil and the consequent change of authorities in the Ministry impacted 
the continuity of the reforms, especially in the 1999 to 2005 period where health reforms 
practically stalled. Concrete reforms were proposed, but formal authorization (legislative 
or ministerial decrees) was harder to come by.  Many veto points (Immergut, 2008) 
occurred along the way. For example, the original difficulties faced by LHCs to use the 
revenues generated locally—as initially provided by the health decentralization law—
conflicted with the National Financial Administrative law. This situation created a series 
of political, fiscal, and administrative challenges, and many years passed before this 
problem was solved by Congress.  
The lack of a clear legal framework has been a constant problem throughout the 
process, and this is further exacerbated by the National Constitution itself in its creation of 
governors and Departmental governorships. The Constitution does not clearly specify the 
powers and responsibilities of governors. Subsequent enacted legislation has done nothing 
to clarify this situation. Thus, governors can name health secretariats but their 
responsibilities are not defined, aside from their need to “coordinate” their work with local 
governments and central authorities. In a country as centralized as Paraguay, and with a 
tradition of caudillismo and clientelism, the fact that the original agreements signed 
between the Ministry and the local governments did not specify the role of governors, or 
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how coordination was to occur, created conditions for conflict, rivalries, and duplication 
of efforts.  
The process of health decentralization in Paraguay has been one of partial 
decentralization (Devarajan et al., 2009), as the central government decentralized 
administrative responsibilities and some financial resources, but the overall control of the 
process remained in the hands of the Ministry of Health. Funding was earmarked and only 
at the very beginning of the process did LHCs have access to resources and some 
independence in their use—though the amounts were insignificant.  
In the case of Paraguay’s health decentralization, a “managerial view” (Nickson, 
2011) has prevailed with the Ministry of Health, and other agencies of the central 
government like the Ministry of Finance, controlling the overall process. The relationship 
of local governments with their communities was certainly recognized and given priority—
importance was given to citizen participation, to involvement of community organizations 
in the creation of local health councils, and to citizens’ role in the preparation and 
implementation of local health plans. But this did not mean that those LHCs were given 
autonomy in the use of funds, the management of human resources administration, or 
administration.  
Faced with so many difficulties and contradictions, it was the persistence of 
mayors, governors, some committed senior health officials, local NGOs, and multilateral 
organizations that kept the issue of health decentralization on the policy agenda; pressure 
was also felt from local communities87 that had been empowered by participation in LHCs 
																																																								87	In interviews with project coordinators and directors from the NGO, CIRD (in charge for most of the 
period of the USAID funded project to support the health decentralization process) the issue of LHCs’ 
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and the local health plans. Some mayors who were part of the health decentralization 
process were later elected to Congress or elected governors, or were later named as senior 
government officials at the Ministry of Health; these individuals ensured that reforms were 
kept on the agenda 88. In interviews with former senior health officials, mayors, and 
representatives of LHCs, the members of LHCs are credited with lobbying Congress and 
driving the legal reforms needed for harmonization between the Health Law 1032/96 and 
the Administrative Fiscal Law.  
Most people involved in issues of health reform in Paraguay credit emphasis on 
citizen participation—and increased citizen participation—as an achievement of the 
process. In a country with decades—if not centuries—of citizen apathy, this is not a small 
achievement.  
The chapter showed that the degree of collaboration between national, regional, and 
local authorities on health decentralization in Paraguay has been inconsistent, heavily 
influenced by political upheavals in the country, and thus very dependent on the good will 
of Health Ministers and Financial Ministers. There was not a broad national discussion on 
the issue, neither consensus on how to implement decentralization. However, citizens and 
stakeholders were involved and continue to be. The collaboration of all stakeholders at the 
beginning of the process (1994-1999), and the role played by policy entrepreneurs, 
																																																								
members being empowered by the	process was continuously brought up; as well as their ability to influence 
the mayors of their communities to keep the programs in place.	Women, especially, were empowered and 
played a key role in demanding accountability.			
88 For example a former mayor of Itagua became General Director of the Ministry of Health’s Directorate 
for Decentralization. Others became Governors of their Department as it was the case of one mayor in the 
Central Department. In many other instances, mayors became members of the Chamber of Deputies in 
Congress and their former constituents were able to lobby them for support.		
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guaranteed the enactment of health decentralization policies, but not its success or 
effectiveness. The degree of collaboration was not sustained, in particular for the 1999-
2004 period, and thus the process slowed down and its impact on health indicators was not 
fully measurable. For the period 2005 to 2010, there seems to be a convergence of 
stakeholders, giving a new impetus to the process; thus, collaboration and coordination of 
stakeholders improved and progress was renewed. Thus, hypothesis one89 and two90 are 
partially confirmed. The impact on basic indicators, with the information accessible at the 
time of this research, has been difficult to measure, but, there seems to be a correlation 
between increased funding and access and improved indicators. 
																																																								
89	H1: If national, regional, and local political leaders participate and collaborate in the promotion of political, 
fiscal, and administrative decentralization, there is a greater probability for the passage, approval, and 
implementation of public service decentralization laws.			
90 H2: Once public service delivery decentralization has been enacted, the higher the degree of collaboration 
between national, regional, and local levels of government (in essence the type of intergovernmental relations 
established), stakeholders and citizens (other socio-political actors); the greater the probability for its success 
and effectiveness.		
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
 
HEALTH DECENTRALIZATION IN COLOMBIA 1990 – 2010  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Colombia, with 45 million inhabitants (2010), 91  is characterized by its great 
cultural, geographical, and social diversity. It has also been marked by decades of conflict 
and violence while, at the same time, experiencing remarkable economic stability by Latin 
American standards.  
In the 1990s, and as a model of decentralization for many unitary countries in the 
region, Colombia was—as previously mentioned—at the forefront of political, fiscal, and 
public service delivery decentralization. Two key service delivery areas were targeted by 
reformers: health and education. As such, here we examine the country’s experience with 
health decentralization.  
We intend to test the validity of hypotheses:  
H1: If national, regional, and local political leaders participate and collaborate in 
the promotion of political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization, there is a 
greater probability for the passage, approval, and implementation of public service 
decentralization laws.  
 
And,  
 
H2: Once public service delivery decentralization has been enacted, the higher the 
degree of collaboration between national, regional, and local levels of government 
(in essence the type of intergovernmental relations established), stakeholders and 
citizens (other socio-political actors); the greater the probability for its success and 
effectiveness. 
																																																								
91 http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/poblacion Banco Central de la Republica de Colombia 
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This section will analyze Colombia’s experience with health decentralization by 
reviewing the decentralization process, the approval of major reforms, and its impact on 
basic health indicators, in particular infant mortality rates for children under 1 year of age 
(one of the main goals of the reforms). We will compare the indicators of ten regional 
governments (Departments), examining those that have the largest number of certified 
municipalities with those that have the fewest certified municipalities. The chapter 
concludes with an overall assessment of the process that occurred in Colombia between 
1995 and 2010 and its implication for the hypotheses posited here.  
 
Colombia’s Health Sector 
 
Before the 1990s decentralization reforms, Colombia had a mixed and fragmented 
health system (Hernandez, 2002; Yepes et al., 2011; Santa Maria et al., 2011; Galilea et 
al., 2011) ). In fact, by the 1960s, health care was provided via	five different mechanisms: 
(1) services for the very wealthy were provided by private doctors and clinics, sometimes 
supported by private insurance; (2) compulsory insurance, with many variations, which 
covered workers in the private and public sector; (3) services for the poor, which were 
usually delivered either by charities, both public (called public assistance) and private 
(especially the Catholic Church); (4) care and control mechanisms provided by the State 
for major epidemics or sicknesses of high impact; and, (5) popular non-medical, non-
scientific care. This fragmented system was based on an individual’s ability to pay, with 
limited State interference.  
The system, though fragmented by type of provider, was very centralized and the 
National Health System, directed by the Ministry of Health, was the agency in charge of 
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establishing rules and overseeing the three basic subsystems: the public, social security, 
and the private sector. 
The social safety system was composed of different social security funds that 
covered both public and private employees. The public sector was comprised of hospitals 
and health centers that provided services to those who did not qualify for the social safety 
system or those who could not afford to buy private insurance (65% of the population used 
this system). Finally, the private sector covered wealthy individuals, and it was comprised 
of private insurers and providers (Santa Maria, 2011; Galilea et al., 2011).  
 Each system was financed by different mechanisms. The social safety system was 
funded by a 7% contribution per employee. Services were offered in full to the employee 
but only partially to his/her family. In the case of public employees, their contribution was 
5%, and, as in the case of the social safety system, the employee was fully covered, but not 
the immediate family. The quality of care provided, the efficiency and equity of services 
and care, in all cases was disparate.  
 The public sector (basically, public hospitals) was funded by Departments and the 
Ministry of Health. The principal source of funding was the Situado Fiscal (funds 
transferred by the central government), established back in 1968, and the voluntary 
contributions of Departments and municipalities. Resources of the Situado Fiscal were 
distributed in accordance with a population and poverty rate formula, based on historical 
expenditures of each hospital and health center (Galilea et al., 2011; Santa Maria, 2011).  
In the late 1960s, the World Health Organization and the Pan-American Health 
Organization reinforced the concept that universal health care, or at least access to it, should 
be a basic service provided by the State. But in Colombia, as Hernandez (2004) argues, the 
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dynamics of the political alliance of the Frente Nacional—where both political parties and 
their supporters benefitted from a segmented health care system—did not push for reforms 
but did support a clientelistic, patronage based, and exclusionary state. Thus, the reforms 
proposed by Law 12 of 1963, which required the creation of unified health service 
provision system, were never fully implemented. All stakeholders involved in the provision 
of health services—from state workers, to medical associations, to charities, and political 
parties—preferred to protect their benefits (Hernandez, 2004).  
Nevertheless, technocrats in the Ministry of Health moved toward the idea of 
creating a unified system, or at least expand the provision to cover the poorest of the 
population. In 1972 reforms were proposed, but Congress and the political parties rejected 
them as a “communist” project. It was not until the 1980s, and with the funding and 
technical assistance of the World Bank, that the idea to reform the system through 
decentralization begun to be taken seriously (Hernandez, 2004).  
By the late 1980s, 25% of the Colombian population had no access to health care, 
18% were covered by public assistance, 17% by the private sector, and about 40% by the 
formal sector (Hernandez, 2004; Yepes et al., 2010); great differences in quality, access, 
and efficiency of care existed. An important development toward reform was the passage 
of Law 10 of 1990, which municipalized some of the health care provision, but with serious 
administrative and fiscal challenges for its implementation.  
Law 10 of 1990 transferred to the Departments and the municipalities the 
responsibility to provide health services, including human resources management. The law 
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established that Departments would provide secondary and tertiary care (the more 
sophisticated services), and municipalities would be in charge of primary health care92.  
Later on, Law 60 of 1993 ratified the constitutional mandate establishing that 
Departments would lead the Sectional Health System, confirming their role of providing 
secondary and tertiary health services, as long as certain administrative and technical 
requirements were met. The law also ceded to Departments and municipalities the health 
facilities established in their territories. The law confirmed that municipalities were in 
charge of providing primary health care but, also allowed them—with the approval of the 
respective Department—to provide secondary and tertiary care. In these cases, the 
Department would be required transfer the necessary funds to the local level.  
Law 60, in the area of health, established that the national government would be in 
charge of the overall health policy in the country, oversee the process of implementation 
and the flow of resources, ensure transparency and accountability in the use of funds, and 
ensure levels of enrollment and the quality of services provided (Santa Maria, 2001).  
Departments would be in charge of: implementing, at the regional level, the 
national health plans, especially in regard to the organization and reforms of public 
hospitals; overseeing and controlling enrollment to health plans offered by municipalities; 
and	overseeing and controlling health services. 
Municipalities would ensure that people (especially the most disadvantaged) would 
enroll in health plans (subsidized based or contribution based). In this regard, 
municipalities were put in charge of ensuring that the health companies authorized to sell 
																																																								92	In interviews with mayors, the importance of this law as a key milestone for Colombia’s decentralization 
reform was always mentioned.		
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health plans were offering the best opportunities and savings for the subscribers, ensuring 
transparency and accountability; local governments also had to help identify and select the 
most needed population and assist them in the process of enrollment.93 
Municipalities that could demonstrate the capacity (as defined by the Ministry) to 
implement health decentralization at the local level, were considered “certified” and were 
transferred the resources and competences to implement health decentralization at the local 
level. The requirements that a municipality must demonstrate to be certified for the 
provision of health services include: 
1. Organization and implementation of the local health directorate. 
2. Having the needed health professional and administrators in place, and the 
enactment of a manual of procedures. 
3. Institutional reforms necessary for the provision of health services, including 
providing health units with legal status and administrative structures. 
4. Signing contracts for the provision of services. 
5. Creation and organization of the local health fund. 
6. Membership of employees to unemployment funds, health providers (EPS—
reflecting Spanish terminology), and pension fund. 
7. Organization and operation of a basic information system, in accordance with 
technical standards, and the adoption of procedures for the programming, 
implementation, evaluation, control and physical and financial monitoring of health 
programs. 
																																																								93	This would become a source of criticism as some mayors favored some people over others.  	
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8. Adoption of the methodology for the municipality’s annual quality, efficiency 
and service coverage evaluations, in accordance with the criteria prepared by the 
Department’s health development plan.  
9. Implementing, with the assistance of the respective Department, the institutional 
changes required by Law in terms of hospitals’ organizations, human resources, 
and health management94.  
 
In 1990, only 31% of the Colombian population had access to health care through 
the social security system. The public hospitals network was deficient and inefficient, with 
too many resources spent on salaries and benefits due to generous contract negotiations for 
health sector workers, and politicians who provided jobs for their supporters in health 
facilities (Santa Maria, 2011). 
The late 1980s saw the international trend of modernization of the State influence 
Colombian politics in two major ways: decentralization, and the introduction of market 
oriented reforms for the provision of public and social services. These trends heavily 
influenced the 1991 constitutional convention process.  
The early 1990s also saw citizens’ demands for better services provision increase, 
sometimes resulting in violent confrontations with government authorities. At the same 
time, the political disarray provoked by the narco-terrorist threat and the deep de-
legitimization of the State, led to the constitutional convention of 1990 and the new 
																																																								94	From Portal Territorial. Translation by author. http://www.portalterritorial.gov.co/documentos.shtml  	
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Constitution of 199195 —which was influenced by progressive and left leaning groups (the 
M-19 representatives) —ensured health care as a benefit of all Colombians96.  
Thus, the new Constitution was the result of negotiations between those who 
wanted a more benefactor and protector State, and those who promoted market reforms 
with emphasis on efficiency and quality of services as a result of open competition (Yepes 
et al., 2010). 
 
The Approval Process of Law 100/1993: the Legislative Process  
 
Opposite positions in regard to health care reform already clashed in the 
constitutional assembly in 1990 (Ramirez, 2004). The government aimed to introduce 
elements of competition, something not supported by the Social Security Institute (ISS), 
but supported by the private sector and some delegates in the Assembly. The ISS was 
interested in promoting solidarity, universality, and a non-segmented system to ensure a 
strong presence and control of the State. The ISS supported competition only in the 
provision of services. The doctors’ professional association was strongly opposed to 
competition and wanted to keep the monopoly of the State. The Ministry of Health took an 
intermediate position, pushing for reform that would introduce solidarity in the system, but 
also with elements of competition. According to Ramirez (2004), the Ministry of Health 
was not in a strong position to negotiate as, at the time, it was headed by a former member 																																																								95	All people interviewed for this research, regardless of their political affiliation, agreed that the political 
and social situation the country was going through at the time cannot be underestimated when trying to 
analyze the Colombian process. The need to re-legitimize the State was paramount for Colombia’s political 
elite. 		96	It was not until 2013 that access to health was defined by law as a basic human right of all Colombians 
(Bernal & Zamora, 2013).		
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of the guerrilla movement that was not particularly supported by the president, and there 
was high rotation among ministers (during the Gaviria administration there were four 
ministers, and during the Samper and Pastrana administrations, three each).  
 “The Assembly and commission debates were paralleled by a much broader 
process of discussion among sector specialist and stakeholders. University forums, 
workshops, and international seminars were held not only in Bogota but also in the 
regions; think tanks, universities, nongovernmental organizations, unions, and government 
representatives with their varied views took part.”  (Ramirez, 2004. page 129).  
 A key reformer was Juan Luis Londoño97, named Minister of Health by Gaviria in 
1992. He became a strong and outspoken leader of reform, regaining control of the process 
for the Executive branch. Since there was strong opposition within the Ministry to the 
reforms, Londoño assembled a team of outside experts. The team was technical, highly 
professionalized, and did not have particular political party connections.  
 Londoño was very successful in building support for the reform throughout the 
executive bureaucracy. He successfully negotiated with the president, the Minister of 
Finance, and the Director of the National Planning Department. He was also able to work 
horizontally with pension groups, unions, the ministry of labor, the Deputy Minister of 
Finance, the ISS, and with those in charge of developing the System for Identifying 
																																																								97 	Minister Londoño’ successful experience with implementing health decentralization made him an 
international expert. In fact, the Paraguayan Minister of Health, Andres Vidovich Morales, when started the 
reform process a few years later (in 1995) requested the advice of Mr. Londoño who traveled to Paraguay 
and offered a week long technical advice to the Minister and his senior staff, as well as to Paraguayan 
members of Congress. In 2003, Dr. Juan Luis Londoño died in a plane accident. He was at the time Minister 
of Social Protection in the Uribe administration.			
	 250 
Possible Beneficiaries of Social Programs (SISBEN—reflecting Spanish terminology)98, a 
mechanism within the National Planning Department. He also secured support from several 
universities, research centers, and NGOs. His team played a crucial role in making sure the 
reforms were understood in the national Congress, and in advising Congress during the 
drafting and final approval of Law 100, which was to set the whole process of health 
decentralization in motion. Minister Londoño’s actions, and his ability to create and sustain 
a reform coalition in the initial phase of the health decentralization process, highlights his 
role as policy entrepreneur (Kingdom, 1995; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996; Mintrom & 
Norman, 2009) able to move the process forward and to negotiate with many different 
stakeholders.  
 During the legislative approval process, many professional associations were 
involved in the discussion, along with government agencies. Patients and civic groups, 
though, had little influence due to their lack of organization and lack of trust in the decision-
making process, and because they did not see clear channels for participation. Unions were 
strongly opposed to the reform, especially teachers, oil workers, and the armed forces, all 
of whom—in the end—were not included in the health reform and were able to keep their 
existing insurance plans. Issues such as the extent of the reform, funding, limitations, and 
how to introduce concepts of solidarity with market reforms, among many other technical 
																																																								98	Mechanism that measures poverty and health needs, used to determine what segments of the population 
are to be included in the government subsidized health scheme.	
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issues made the discussions very heated. The law was finally approved in December of 
1993 and signed into law by President Gaviria (Ramirez, 2004).  
The law significantly changed the existing health care provision in the country and 
its funding. The same year (1993), Law 60 was introduced, greatly changing the role of 
Departments and municipalities in public service delivery, deepening decentralization.  
 In their strategy to have the reforms approved, Londoño and his team involved each 
legislator in the discussions, making sure to understand individual concerns99. They also 
framed the discussion in the larger long-term objective of reforming social security and 
pensions. The close alliance between the ministers of health and labor also aided to reduce 
the opposition of unions. “During this stage, and as a result of the congressional request 
to consult a wide range of groups, the reform team talked to every visible leader of the 
groups involved in the reform: unions, doctors, producers’ associations, prepaid medicine 
organizations, academic forums, and so on” (Ramirez, 2004; page 137).  
 The implementation of the law suffered greatly because of the political crisis that 
ensued following the election of the Samper administration (1994-1998) and by the law’s 
lack of specificities. Many aspects of its implementation were achieved via decrees and 
ministerial resolutions. The lack of legitimacy, and the governability crisis that involved 
all levels of government, made implementation very difficult. Moreover, in 1999, 
Colombia entered a serious financial and economic crisis—the worst since the 1970s. In 
addition to the economic crisis, the country experienced an intensification of internal armed 
conflict and increased violence and insecurity, and internal displacement of the population 
																																																								99	In all interviews, the importance of Londoño’s negotiating skills were recognized and highlighted.		
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was on the rise. The Pastrana administration (1998-2002) also faced these problems; thus, 
the implementation of reforms was difficult to fulfill.  
 Neither Samper nor his first Minister of Health (Alonso Gomez) were great 
supporter of reform. In July of 1995, Samper appointed a new Minister (Augusto Galan 
Sarmiento) and reforms began to move forward. The pace of reforms further increased with 
the appointment of his third Minister (Maria Teresa Forero de Sade).  
 During the Pastrana administration, the central government understood that the 
progress of reform needed to occur more rapidly, and that adjustments were needed due to 
the implementation challenges of both Law 60 and Law 100. Thus, in 2001, Congress 
modified the Constitution and passed Law 715, which aimed to address earlier problems 
of financing and accountability 100 . These reforms were seen as key solutions to the 
macroeconomic instability impacting the country’s finances, which was partly blamed on 
the fiscal decentralization initiatives put in motion by the 1991 Constitution, and the 
decentralization laws approved up to that point. Nevertheless, national and local 
bureaucracies, hospitals, and health workers remained strongly opposed to many aspects 
of the reform. Hospitals continued to receive funding from the national annual budgets, 
though Law 100 had technically put an end to this, and the deepening economic crisis also 
meant that many people were not able to enroll in the health programs.  
 Colombia was able to implement such broad, complex, and difficult reforms partly 
because the political class understood the dangers of disintegration and lack of legitimacy 
faced by the state and its agencies. Health reform was part of a wider discussion on how to 
																																																								100	A former Senator interviewed in Bogota noted that, without Law 715/2001, Colombia’s decentralization 
might have failed altogether due to the fiscal pressure the process was having on the country’s fiscal balance.		
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reform social pensions, and reformers were successful in linking health decentralization to 
an overall initiative to reform social security. The administration of President Gaviria was 
able to seize the moment and propose and pass important legislation. The strategy pursued 
by Minister Londoño—of building consensus by involving all stakeholders and drawing 
on significant expertise—gave the process substantial legitimacy despite problems and 
challenges during implementation. The presence of a policy entrepreneur such as Minister 
Londoño likely ensured the success of the approval process.   
 In contrast with education decentralization—where Ramirez (2004) believes 
progress has not been made—in the case of health decentralization, four factors were 
important: first, linking health reform to pensions helped gain the support of the president 
and his administration, as pension reform was one of his main objectives; second, there 
was a commitment to the reforms from many senior government officials in the national 
government; third, the health worker unions were divided and did not achieve consensus 
in their opposition to the reforms, contrary to the case in the education sector; and fourth, 
the proposed health reform included values that were important to many, including 
universal coverage, equity, solidarity, and the principles of efficiency.  
 Having reviewed the approval process of the law, we now direct the discussion 
toward analysis of the significant changes the law brought about in the Colombian health 
system.  
 
Law 100 and the Reform of Colombia’s Health System: Radical Changes  
 
The 1991 Constitution and the Law 100 of 1993 sought to create a new system 
where universal coverage, efficiency, solidarity, integrality, unity, and participation 
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became core values—creating what has been called a “regulated market.” The 
implementation of the new system started in 1995 (Yepes et al., 2010). 
Law 100 of 1993 radically changed the provision of health services. Its objective 
was to guarantee universal health coverage and to generate competition between health 
insurers and health providers. It formally created the General System of Social Security in 
Health (SGSSS—reflecting Spanish terminology) 101 . Exempted from the new health 
system were the military, congressmen, teachers, employees of the Bank of the Republic, 
and oil workers, who all kept their health providers.  
Law 100 sought to provide universal health care coverage for all Colombians 
through a universal health insurance aimed at guaranteeing efficiency through competition, 
quality through the free selection of insurers and providers, and equity and solidarity 
through a contributive scheme for those who could afford it, and subsidized scheme for the 
poor. The assumption in the Colombian model was that the market would ensure the 
optimization of resources with the regulatory participation of the State (Bernal & Zamora, 
2014; Yepes et al., 2010; Santa Maria et al., 2011; Galilea et al., 2011; Avila Urdaneta, 
2010; Molina & Spurgeon, 2007; Molina et al., 2006; Homedes & Ugalde, 2005; Bossert 
et al., 2003; Jaramillo, 2002; Hernandez, 2002).  
With the new law, local governments also played a role in the provision of basic 
health care, mostly through awareness campaigns in areas such as reproductive health, 
vaccination campaigns, preventable diseases campaigns, and environmental health (e.g., 
local campaigns promoted proper waste disposal). Mayors are responsible for 
																																																								101	Sistema General de Seguridad Social en Salud	
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implementing these local health plans (called PABs or Plan de Atencion Basica) with most 
of the funding provided by the national government. This is now part of what is referred to 
as public health care.  
The national government reserved for itself four major roles: (1) setting guidelines 
in collaboration with the National Health Council; (2) subsidizing demand for those in 
extreme poverty; (3) oversight and overall control of the system; and, (4) controlling health 
policy in areas such as catastrophes and epidemics. These functions are now called “public 
health” but are distinctively separated from the provision of medical/health services, which 
is done exclusively through the contributive or subsidized schemes.   
 One of the main objectives of the Law was to provide universal coverage (Yepes et 
al., 2010; Santa Maria, 2011), which was achieved through two schemes: the contributory 
and the subsidized. The previous social security system by which employers contributed a 
portion of their salaries was expanded to cover their immediate family, and independent 
workers who earned at least one legally established minimum wage, and to those who could 
afford it. The contributory system does not receive government funding, and employees 
contribute 8% of their salaries (8.5% after 2007), and employers 4%.  
 The subsidized scheme was the result of the constitutional mandate to offer 
universal coverage, and the market oriented trend for a system based on demand and not 
necessarily on supply. It was intended to cover the poorer segments of the population. This 
system is funded 47% by funds of the nation’s current revenues account, which are 
transferred to local governments and/or Departments depending on whether or not 
municipalities are “certified,” 34% by transfers from the contributive system, and 19% by 
municipalities and Departments from their own budgets (Yepes et al., 2010).  
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 The subsidized scheme works with two central instruments:  
- A national standard health plan called POS (Plan Obligatorio de Salud) that must 
be offered to all insured people.  
- A per capita payment unit or UPC (Unidad de Pago per Capita), which is the same 
for all insurers and paid to them per person insured.  
 
Both the UPC and POS amounts are established by the National Council on Social 
Security and Health or CNSSS (Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Social en Salud).  
 To ensure compliance, the law creates the Health Promotion Entities or EPSs 
(Entidades Promotoras de la Salud) as new actors in charge of providing health insurance, 
and the creation of a network of providers, both public and private, called the Service 
Providers Institutions or IPSs (Instituciones Prestadoras de Servicios).  
 The EPSs could also be public or private, not-for-profit or for profit. They all have 
to offer the same POSs. In this way, it was expected that insurers would compete for quality 
and efficiency as the services they provide and the revenues they receive are regulated.  
In order to qualify for the subsidized scheme, a mechanism to evaluate poverty 
levels and capacity of payment was devised by the National government, called the 
SISBEN or Sistema de Seleccion de Beneficiarios de Programas Sociales (Santa Maria et 
al., 2011)102. The SISBEN is an instrument designed to identify structural poverty; it is 
based on classifying the population in six categories—taking into account socio-economic 
																																																								102	An important factor in the Colombian reform was to maximize and optimize the use of subsidies on those 
with the most need. In order to better identify those in need, Colombia (based on the Costa Rican and Chilean 
models) developed a Beneficiary Identification System (SISBEN).  	
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characteristics. It is a point system based on a survey, which is then combined with other 
socio-economics and statistical information. The municipalities are in charge of collecting 
the information that feeds the system in the areas of their municipality considered poor103.  
 Levels 1 and 2 of the SISBEN are for those who qualify for the subsidized scheme; 
in some municipalities belonging to Level 3 might also qualify for the subsidized scheme. 
As of 2008, 70% of participants in the subsidized scheme belonged to Levels 1 and 2 of 
the SISBEN and 15% to Level 3, and 15% (up to 1.3 million people) had registered for the 
subsidized scheme but had not been classified by the SISBEN, and thus it was not known 
if they actually qualified for the scheme. 
The contributive scheme is composed of people employed with payment capacity 
or those in Level 3 or higher in the SISBEN mechanism. Those belonging to the 
contributive system have health coverage for themselves and their immediate family, but 
coverage is limited to each individual in the subsidized scheme. In 2006, a Partial 
Subsidized Scheme (RSP or Regimen Subsidiado Parcial) was established with reduced 
coverage offered to some in the Level 3 of the SISBEN. 
The subsidized system is managed by the ARS (Administradora del Regimen 
Subsidiado), which contracts with service provider institutions (Instituciones Prestadoras 
de Servicios or IPSs). The administration of the insurance is done by the EPSs (Empresa 
Prestadora de Servicios), and the provision of the services by the IPSs. The idea was that 
both public and private institutions will seek insurance providers in a market system and 
the population would be able to choose between EPSs and IPSs.  
																																																								103	This has been criticized as being a source of corruption and clientelistic practices, as some mayors have 
benefitted supporters by making sure they qualify for categories 1 and 2 of the SISBEN.		
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For those employed, but who did not qualify for either scheme, the Law anticipated 
a transition period—ultimately categorizing those individuals into one of the two schemes. 
The original deadline was 2001, but as of 2010, this had not yet been achieved (Santa 
Maria, 2011). 
In the contributory scheme, workers and employers pay into the system. Each 
beneficiary is free to choose from established insurers (EPSs) and the services are 
provided by the IPSs contracted by the EPSs. A principle of solidarity was established in 
the system by which, the contributive scheme transfers 1.5% to the subsidized scheme, 
and people with less health risks contribute to those with higher health risks.  
 
Figure	1: Contributory scheme
 
Source: Adapted from Yepes et al. (2010) 
 
FOSYGA*
FOSYGA	receives	funding	from	well	performing	EPSs	and	transfers	to	deficitary	EPSs.	The	EPS	receives	a	UPC	per	person	covered	
IPSProvides	established	services	as	per	POS	to	the	insured	and	beneficiaries
EPSEPS	contracts	with	an	IPS	network	and/or	establishes	its	own	network
Worker	+	Employer	contribute	12.5%	of	salary- Insured	selects	EPS	- IPS	and	receives	POS- Independent	worker	contributes	12.5%
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The fiscal resources for the subsidized scheme are transferred by the national 
government to the municipalities, and the resources for the solidarity fund (collected from 
the contributive system) are transferred by Solidarity and Guarantees Fund (or FOSYGA—
reflecting Spanish terminology)104.  
In the subsidized scheme, the municipality receives the transfers from the FOSYGA 
and the General Transfer System (national government). The municipality hires and pays 
the EPSs (insurers)105, in turn the EPSs contracts out services—and pay for services 
provided—to the IPSs (providers). Municipalities must identify people in need, applying 
the criteria established by the government (SISBEN), and the EPS is in charge of enrolling 
those identified.  	 	
																																																								104	Fondo de Solidaridad y Garantia			105	As mentioned before, allegations of corruption, patronage, and clientelism have been rampant both on 
the contracting of EPSs and in the SISBEN access.		
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Figure	2: Subsidized scheme 
 
Source: Adapted from Yepes et al. (2010) 
 
Administration and provision of services 	
Law 100 also transferred ownership of hospitals and health centers to the 
Departments and municipalities, as well as the responsibility for coordinating health 
services. On the other hand, public hospitals were transformed into quasi-state agencies 
with more management autonomy, with a directorate comprised of professionals and 
members of the community, and with the competency to seek resources in the private 
market as well. Briefly, public hospitals were transformed into public social enterprises.  
    
 Law 715 of 2001 replaced Law 60 of 1993 and established the responsibilities of 
each level of government in health services provision (Santa Maria et al., 2011; Galilea, 
2011; Yepes et al., 2010).  
Municipality
National	Transfer	System	and	FOSYGA
IPSEPS
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As such, the law established that the national government is in charge of designing 
the system, establishing regulations, and directly funding some of the services (Table 53 
below summarizes the competences per level of government). The Departments are to 
manage the hospitals of Categories 2, 3, and 4 (offering more sophisticated and complex 
care). Municipalities administer the subsidized scheme (select beneficiaries through the 
SISBEN administration, contract with the ARSs, and provide funds for such services). 
Local governments are also in charge of local health centers and hospitals providing 
services of Category 1. The fact that all three levels of government have a role in the 
administration, management, and funding of health service provision, makes for a very 
complex and often confusing system, with difficulties for oversight, follow-up, and 
accountability.106  
																																																								106	In fact, interviews with representatives of the health sector, as well as mayors, and advisors for both the 
municipal and Departmental Federations indicate that irregularities in the use of funds, as well as accounting 
bottlenecks have caused that the national government now directly transfers the funds to the EPSs, and the 
Departments and municipalities only record the transactions for accounting reasons, without actually 
receiving those funds.		
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Table 53: Competences in Health by Level of Government 
Central Government Departmental Government Municipal Government 
- Formulate public health 
policies, service delivery, 
sets objectives for 
population receiving 
subsidies, and creates a 
National Health Information 
System 
  
- Establish the priorities for 
the Basic Health Plan  
 
- Decide and provide for the 
National Vaccination Plan 
 
- Provide technical assistance 
to the Departments 
 
- Distribute and control fiscal 
transfers 
 
- Oversight the 
implementation of health 
reforms and the delivery of 
services 
 
- Provide highly specialized 
health treatments in 
coordination with other 
agencies  
- Adopt and implement 
public health policies, 
provide services, and 
distribute resources 
 
- Formulate the Basic Health 
Plan for the Department 
 
- Administer the regional 
health plan, and provide 
health services of secondary 
and tertiary level 
 
- Oversee the Departmental 
health plan implementation, 
the control of health 
provision services, and the 
resources 
 
- Provide technical assistance 
to the municipalities 
 
- Grant legal registration to 
health institutions 
 
- Implement the Health 
Information system 
 
- Distribute and control the 
funds of the Subsidized 
Regimen  
- Adopt and implement 
public health policies, 
provide services, and 
allocation of subsidies to 
the target population 
 
- Formulate and implement 
the Basic Health Plan: 
preventive programs and 
health promotion 
 
- Provide health services to 
the population either by 
contracting out or with its 
own health care institutions 
 
- Oversee and control public 
health, and of the services 
provided by health 
organizations 
 
- Promote the creation of 
community organizations to 
participate in and control 
the quality of services 
 
- Implement the Health 
Information system 
 
- Carry out the survey of the 
Subsidized Beneficiaries 
Identification System 
(SISBEN), and create a 
database of the population 
by social and economic 
category 
 
- Allocate subsidies to poor 
populations  
 
- Contract the provision of 
services for the poor 
population included in the 
subsidized system 
Source: Molina & Spurgeon (2007) based on Laws 10/1990; 60/1993; 715/2001 
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 Article 153 of Law 100 charged the regulation, oversight, and general direction of 
the national health system to three agencies: (a) the National Council on Social Security 
and Health (CNSSS or Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Social en Salud), the highest 
authority, responsible for updating and designing the POSs and for setting the value of 
UPCs; (b) the Ministry of Social Protection (MPS or Ministerio de Proteccion Social) in 
charge of policy setting, strategies, design of programs and plans, charged with increasing 
efficiency in the management of the system; and, (c) the National Health Superintendence 
(SNS or Superintendencia Nacional de Salud) in charge of oversight, inspection, and 
control of the different players in the system.  The SNS is also charged with conflict 
resolution in disputes involving pre-existing conditions or when other complaints are 
raised.  
 The CNSSS is composed of 14 members representing each sector involved in the 
provision of services (government, companies, professionals, users, employees), the 
Minister of Finances, representatives of regional and local governments, and the Ministry 
of Social Protection. Eight members—proposed by companies, the EPSs, the IPSs, health 
professionals, employees, retired personnel, and users in rural areas—are selected by the 
national government.  
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Summarizing, the reform has created new important actors in the Colombian health 
system:  
- The EPSs, which replaced the state institutions in providing health coverage. They 
must offer an “integral” health plan as established by the Obligatory Health 
Services Plan (POS)107 regulated by the government.  
- FOSYGA, created as a fiduciary, administers the funds of the contributive scheme, 
as well as the solidarity fund of the subsidized scheme.  
- Users’ Associations, created for all participants to represent them in the defense of 
their rights and to oversee the quality of services provided.  
The reform also changed the roles of traditional players, in particular: 
- Public hospitals became state social enterprises: public hospitals that had 
traditionally been funded and administered by Departments and municipalities, 
were transformed in state social enterprises, autonomous in their administration and 
management, ruled by a Board Council with state participation, community leaders 
and health professionals, and funded by the provision of services (90% as of 2010). 
Public hospitals had to learn how to bill for services, change their incentives, and 
restructure their administrations.  
- Public insurers with a captive clientele became the EPSs, competing amongst 
themselves: public insurers had to adapt to a new system, by becoming EPSs or 
were dissolved. The political implications were many as these unions were strong 
and well represented.  
																																																								107	Plan Obligatorio de Servicios de Salud (POS)	
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- The Health Superintendent Office took a new role as the agency that authorizes 
new EPSs and supervises their performance, particularly in regard to selection 
criteria to avoid discrimination. It is also the mediator in cases of conflict; receives 
complaints about the system, and establishes sanctions if needed.  
 
In summary, Law 100/1993—and the many decrees, rules, and regulations that 
followed it—substantially changed the provision of health services in Colombia while 
trying to keep a difficult balance between market oriented incentives and government led 
policies aimed at achieving universality, equality, and equity in health care.     
Citizen Participation in the Health Decentralization Process 	
 The Colombian reform also considered citizen participation mechanisms that 
would ensure accountability and control over the system, making it more democratic, 
participatory, and reflective of local needs; in doing so, the links between communities and 
the state were strengthened (Arevalo, 2004; Yepes et al., 2010; Santa Maria, 2011; 
interviews).  
 Overall, interviews with mayors, health secretaries, and health reformers indicate a 
consensus that, despite advances in promoting participation in general, there have been no 
significant advances in social control of the process, there is dispersion and atomization of 
social control, and there are serious weaknesses in participation encoded into institutional 
policy. Years of intense political and often violent confrontations are noted as explanations 
for the lack of effective citizen participation in the process.  
Nevertheless, attempts to promote citizen participation date back to the late 1950s 
when the Community Action Councils (Juntas de Accion Comunal) were created by the 
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National Front to legitimize and improve relationships between the State and local 
communities. The process though was hijacked by clientelism and patronage. In the 1970s, 
independent groups and social movements demanded more participation in the design of 
social policies. The decentralization reforms of the 1980s, including the direct election of 
mayors, were a response to these demands for more direct participation. It was during this 
time that the Local Administrative Councils or JALs, for their Spanish name, (Juntas 
Administradoras Locales), were created as administrative subunits of local governments 
with an advisory role in budgetary issues, and a surveillance role in the provision of public 
services. The Constitution of 1991 expanded the roles of JALs giving them a bigger role 
in oversight of public funds and the allocation of the budget (Arevalo, 2004).  
In 1989, the Committees for Community Participation or COPACOs (Comites de 
Participacion Comunitaria) were created. Law 10 of 1990 expanded their role and gave 
communities the opportunity of being part of the local health boards through the 
COPACOS. Several decrees regulated the implementation of citizen participation: citizens 
could create users’ associations and could be represented on boards of the IPS or the ARS, 
both public and private; also, municipal health directors were to be part of the COPACOs, 
as well as the Departmental health director and representatives of the education sector. 
Each COPACO was to include the local mayor or his/her representative, the local health 
director, the director of the most representative IPS in the municipality, and one 
representative from each social or community organization.  
In general, citizen participation was expected to play a role in the planning process 
of local health plans and in the oversight of implementation. Though the design and 
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management of the plans needed to be done with the different social sectors, the 
mechanisms to do it were not put in place. 
Citizen participation, and its ability to have an impact on the decision making 
process and implementation of local health plans, is influenced by size of the municipalities 
and their respective institutional capacity. The low levels of technical capacity, the lack of 
professionalized human resources, and ignorance about the legal framework have been 
obstacles to implementing many aspects of citizen participation (Arevalo, 2004; interviews 
with local health directors, and former mayors).  
Most users’ associations have a very small number of members, with an average in 
2004 of about 10 people, and only the largest municipalities had associations with more 
than 25 members. In a survey, almost 80% of IPSs have at least one users’ association, and 
only 10% of IPSs did not have an association (Arevalo, 2004).  
An important role—not originally planned—in oversight of the system, and in 
promoting citizen participation, has been taken on by the Personeros in charge of ensuring 
the efficiency and transparency in the delivery of public services. Since Law 100 of 1993 
also emphasized the need of municipalities to ensure that citizen participation mechanisms 
were put in place in the decision making process, the role of Personeros in this regard has 
increased, but with moderate success.  
Overall, the implementation of citizen participation mechanisms in the health 
decentralization process have had mixed results with the size and capacity of municipalities 
being—quite naturally—one of the most important factors, along with the political will of 
the local political authorities. Lack of resources, trust, and weak inter-institutional 
collaboration have been impediments to the ability of users’ associations to influence the 
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process. The preeminence of a fiscal oversight role for the users’ associations and the 
COPACOs108 has also reduced their ability to be part of the decision making process. 
Citizen participation in general has been limited109.  
 
 
Evaluation, Impact, and Results of the Health Reform 
 
 Trying to assess the success of health decentralization is a difficult task. Many 
factors must be accounted for while analyzing the results obtained over 20 years of 
decentralization. As Nelson (2004) states,  “health outcomes of course are determined not 
only by the amount and quality of health care but also – indeed, more importantly – by 
nutrition, housing, and related services (especially the supply of clean water), income and 
education, environmental factors, and an array of public health measures” (page 24). 
 A review of different studies conducted on the results of health decentralization 
implementation shows mixed results, but with an overall consensus that the principal goal 
of universal coverage had, by 2010, mostly been achieved with about 95% of the 
population having access to health care—be it through the contributive or the subsidized 
scheme (Bernal & Zamora, 2014; Santa Maria et al., 2011; Yepes et al., 2010; Galilea et 
al., 2011; Avila Urdaneta, 2010; Molina & Spurgeon, 2007; Molina et al., 2006; Homedes 
& Ugalde, 2005; Bossert et al., 2003; Jaramillo, 2002; Hernandez, 2002). Nuances in the 
																																																								108	Their greatest contribution has been to provide information about local needs, populations in need (for 
the SISBEN requirement), preferences and complaints about providers and insurers. They have not always 
been taken into account at the time of designing policy initiatives or programs. 	109	The Secretary of Health for the City of Bogota, and an advisor to the Colombian Federation of 
Municipalities, as well as other former mayors interviewed, confirm that the lack of a clear understanding 
of the process by many citizens and actors involved, made the efficacy of citizen participation questionable.	
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level of success are to be expected, with the quality of care and equity of access continuing 
to be a serious structural problem not yet solved by the reform.  
 Some studies have concentrated on the effectiveness of using formulae based 
allocations to improve equity in resource allocation (Bossert et al., 2003), finding that, in 
general, smaller municipalities had spent more from their own budgets on health services 
than larger ones.  
 Previous studies show, and interviews with former mayors and health officials in 
Colombia confirm, that the lack of local capacity—both at the government level and within 
the EPSs, has been a major problem in the implementation of health reforms, along with 
poor participation by communities in the management process of health decentralization 
(Galilea et al., 2011; Avila Urdaneta, 2010; Molina & Spurgeon, 2007).  
To implement reforms, municipalities, in particular, need ample administrative 
capacity. Results of analyses by Molina & Spurgeon (2007) find that municipal health 
directorates, in general, lack the administrative capacity to fulfill their duties. Clientelism, 
with mayors tending to appoint those with shared political affiliation and/or personal 
loyalty over those with capacity, has resulted in plans not implemented, poor oversight, 
and high personnel rotation. The Ministry of Health has not provided sufficient or 
consistent technical assistance either.  
 Hospitals have found themselves with higher administrative costs as a consequence 
of personnel increases to comply with new regulatory and reporting demands.  
 Others criticize the process as an imposition by multilateral organizations such as 
the World Bank and other multilateral agencies (Homedes & Ugalde, 2005), where 
privatization and market reform considerations prevail over the needs of the population 
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and, as a consequence, many of the neediest individuals still lack access to decent health 
care. In their view, the EPSs were able to find loopholes to bypass the requirements of the 
law, offering poor quality health care or not coverage at all; thus, most people remain in 
the subsidized system110. Hernandez (2002) joins this criticisms and argues that the reforms 
have only perpetuated the inequalities (including clientelism and patronage) present in 
Colombia’s society, which are the results of the country’s violent and often conflictive 
history111.  
 Jaramillo’s evaluation (2002), after ten years of health decentralization 
implementation, noted that the new system had three basic characteristics: 
1) public subsidies were decentralized to Departments and municipalities; 
2) public hospitals have become state social enterprises, with significant changes in 
management model; 
3) a system of health subsidies has been created for the poorest citizens, and the old 
monopoly on health and social security was eliminated.  
Jaramillo finds that the reforms have increased financial resources, which has led 
to an increase in public health staff and higher salaries. Hospitals have increased their 
budgets, and 20% of the poorest have benefitted from subsidies on demand. “However, 
																																																								110	Interviews with health officials in Colombia confirm that one of the main problems of the system is that 
too many people still remain in the subsidized scheme when the original previsions expected most people to 
move to the contributive scheme after about 10 years. The financial long-term sustainability of the program 
is then threatened.  	111	For Hernandez (2002), the fact that the subsidized POSs needed to meet only 70% of the benefits offered 
by the contributive one, already set the poor at a disadvantage. It must be clarified though, that in 2015 a new 
law was passed aimed at correcting this problem, and all EPSs have now to offer the same POSs regardless 
of the scheme people belong to.		
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indicators of public health have fallen and health professionals are critical of a system 
based on mediation, which increases transaction costs” (Page 48).  
  Molina and Spurgeon (2007), in their analysis of elements of citizen participation 
and institutional capacity of municipalities to implement health decentralization, find that 
clientelism is still a key factor for the implementation and progress of the process. The mix 
of decentralization and privatization has also created conflicts in the delivery of services.   
 Contracting problems are present in many municipalities including, in some 
instances, EPSs that have not delivered the necessary services to the municipalities, 
requiring patients to visit different hospitals and travel significant distances. Some EPSs 
and ARSs do not renew their contracts on time and delay payment to hospitals or health 
providers112; and the provision of services has been fragmented so patients are forced to 
visit several health organizations to receive basic services (Molina & Spurgeon, 2007; 
Hernandez, 2002).   
 Clientelism has been a serious problem with mayors, councilmembers, and even 
Departmental councilmembers—benefiting those who are politically loyal to the detriment 
of those who really need the subsidies. Clientelism and patronage have impacted local 
governments’ capacity to mobilize political, social, and technical resources, and their 
capacity to gain credibility and autonomy.  
																																																								112	Delay in payments to EPSs and to IPSs continues to be a significant problem. Interviews in Colombia 
indicate that the national government has opted to transfer funds directly to the EPSs instead of to 
Departments and certified municipalities in order to avoid financial bottlenecks. The transfers are still 
recorded as to subregional governments for accounting purposes.			
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 Ironically, the private sector, with more resources and capacity, has benefitted from 
the reforms, gaining access to public funding easier than public hospitals, without assuming 
responsibility for the poorest population.  
 Lack of capacity at the local and regional level has also hindered the control and 
oversight of the system. Molina et al. (2006) in a study of three Departments (Antioquia, 
Caldas, and Risaralda, with over 164 municipalities considered) found that 81% have a 
health director, though 40% of them do not have the qualifications required for the position. 
Control and oversight is still weak or lacking. Moreover, 79% of municipalities have 
various providers, offering people more options; but in cases where ARSs are selected by 
mayors, those who use ARSs do not have choices in providers. 
 In the same Molina et al. (2006) study, the authors find that decentralization has 
not greatly impacted access, quality, and coverage. All municipalities have community 
participation organizations but they do not play a fundamental role in the decision making 
process.  
 In essence, the questions to consider are then: has the system reduced barriers to 
access and increased coverage? Has competition and freedom of choice increased the 
quality and efficiency of health services? Has equity in access improved? Have health 
indicators improved and is there more health equity in Colombia? 
 Overall, different evaluations indicate that, as previously mentioned, the 
contributive scheme has grown more slowly than the subsidized one, but—as of 2010—a 
significant difference remained between the POSs of the contributive system vs. the 
subsidized system (Yepes et al., 2010).  
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 Reforms have increased coverage of the most poor among the population (Levels 
1 and 2 of SISBEN) and in rural areas. But the differences in the services provided by the 
two systems make it structurally unequal, as poor people are offered less services than 
those in the contributive system.  
 Serious problems remain with universal coverage by income, as 43% of the poorest 
people have not joined vs. just 14% of the richest (Yepes et al., 2010). An important 
accomplishment has been to reduce the gap between insured and uninsured in rural and 
urban areas; as well as the age gap with younger (less than 15) and older people (over 60) 
being covered (Yepes et al., 2010).  
 Regarding access to health, there is not enough information as a baseline prior to 
the implementation of reforms. A proposed way to measure access to health is via insured 
individuals’ ability to obtain services. Data from 2007 and 2008 indicate that 79.5% of 
participants of the contributive scheme and 74.4% of those in the subsidized scheme 
received services when they first felt sick; only 49.7% of those without insurance did 
(Yepes et al., 2010)  
 The Colombian Constitution allows citizens to contest the way services are 
provided through a system of “wardship” or tutelage aimed at protecting basic rights. If the 
number of tutelages can measure lack of access, then a high number of tutelages presented 
(over 60,000 per year between 1999 and 2005) by individuals covered by some kind of 
POS could be an indicator of serious access problems (Yepes et al., 2010, interviews).  
 A second consideration in the study of Yepes et al. (2010) is the impact of 
competition and freedom of choice on the quality and efficiency of services provided. The 
impact of competition is, quite naturally, bigger in large and mid-size cities, but it is not 
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possible in most of the country’s municipalities where often there are very few insurers 
and/or providers, and the population is too small to justify more insurers or providers to 
enter the market. This lack of competition impacts people’s freedom of choice (again, 
especially in rural areas and small urban centers).  
 Other common problems that have impacted quality of care provided involve too 
many administrative requirements, such as: constant contract renewals between 
Departments, municipalities, and insurers; peoples’ need to change plans due to unsteady 
jobs; the need to constantly update the SISBEN; and delays in transferring funds. 
Corruption, overpricing, medical absenteeism, and unscrupulous enterprises that do not 
register all their workers in the system contribute to the lack of quality care. The 2007 Law 
1122 required the establishment of a quality control system for all IPSs, but, as of 2010, it 
has not yet been implemented. 
 In evaluating the impact of reforms on equity of access to health services, 
researchers (Yepes et al., 2010; Santa Maria et al., 2011) note the lack of a baseline to 
compare from, but nevertheless emphasize that this goal has not been achieved. The 
existence of different schemes with different services and procedures covered implies a 
lack of equity in access (Yepes et al., 2010; Hernandez 2002). Typically, the poorest 
individuals have POSs with fewer benefits. In the case of independent workers, to access 
the contributive system they must assume all costs related to the plans’ contributions, 
which puts them at a disadvantage, creating barriers to access equality.  
 Better equality in certain services have been achieved (for example, in pre-natal 
care and delivery services), but inequality by programs and by income is still a significant 
problem.  
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 Have overall health indicators improved? Most analysis and studies point to a lack 
of advances in improving health indicators in Colombia, partly due to a system that was 
not adapted to the highly unequal Colombian reality113. Some indicators, such as infant 
mortality rates for those under five years old and malnutrition, have decreased, but other 
serious diseases such as tuberculosis, respiratory infections, and maternal-birth-related 
deaths have not seen major changes (Bernal & Zamora, 2014; Santa Maria et al., 2011; 
Yepes et al., 2011; Galilea et al., 2011; Avila Urdaneta, 2010; Molina & Spurgeon, 2007; 
Molina et al., 2006; Homedes & Ugalde, 2005; Bossert et al., 2003; Jaramillo, 2002; 
Hernandez, 2002). 
As of 2010, some positive results of the reform include: 
- A reduction in out-of-pocket expenses. Between 1977 and 1980, the proportion of 
family income spent on health was 12.1% (Yepes et al., 2010); in 1997 it was about 
10.7%, and in 2003 about 7.24%.  
- Overall increase in total coverage both through the subsidized and the contributive 
schemes. The number of members in the subsidized scheme tripled between 1997 
and 2008 (from 7 million to 23 million), mostly the very poor (those classified as 
Level 1 and 2 in the SISBEN). Increase in coverage has also reduced the gap 
between the very rich and the poor in terms of access. While in 1993 only 24% of 
																																																								113	Interviews conducted in Colombia confirmed the fact that the country’s historical inequalities have made 
the principle of equity of care and access very difficult to achieve. A mayor explained that one of the major 
challenges in the whole decentralization process in Colombia, has been the fact that the country’s inequalities 
and diversity were not taken into account while designing the decentralization laws and programs. Thus, the 
same programs apply to all local and regional governments regardless of their size and capacity, when a 
staggered process would have been	more appropriate. He referred to the challenge of the “Three Colombias”: 
the Colombia of the big cities with large capacities, the Colombia	of the mid-size cities,	and the ‘forgotten 
Colombia’, the one of the poorest and where the national government does not reach.		
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the population had access to health services, and of those about 90% belonged to 
Categories 3 and up; in 2003 that percentage was 85%, of which about half were 
from Categories 1 and 2 (Santa Maria et al., 2011). 
- Reduction of inequality in terms of coverage between urban and rural regions, by 
age, and by education level.  
- Optimization in the use of subsidies. Though there have been great improvements 
in the allocation of subsidies, the SISBEN system has not been exempt of serious 
criticism114.  
- Better access to health services for those with coverage. 
- Increase number of preventive visits to health centers.  
 
On the other hand, as of 2010, some the negative results of the reform include:  
- In terms of access to services, structural problems remain such as the differences 
between POSs, the high number of tutelage actions in response to lack of services, 
and the lack of qualified human resources to implement reforms.  
- Among structural problems, the reform has put too much emphasis on financial 
issues and ensuring its smooth implementation without an overall vision of the 
complexity of the problem and a lack of a national health policy agenda. The need 
to constantly verify who qualifies as poor (through the SISBEN), and thus who 
qualifies for the subsidies, adds administrative costs and burdens to the system. The 
differences between POSs that were supposed to be transitory have not been fixed, 
																																																								114	Besides the allegations of corruption already mentioned, some people - who the SISBEN leave out of the 
subsidized scheme, consider it unfair or discriminatory. 	
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aggravating the existing inequality. Delays in funds transfers, lack of incentives, 
and deficient information systems.  
- The negative impact the reforms have had on the labor market, with many 
companies laying off or changing the labor status of their workers, to reduce the 
contributions they are required to make to the contributive system (Santa Maria et 
al., 2011).  
- Duplication of efforts and duplication in the use of funds, especially in the case of 
hospitals, where many expenses are made more for political reasons than technical 
ones (per Law 715/2001, the management of hospitals was transferred to the 
Departments). The efficient use of resources continues to be a problem.  
- Problems of “adverse selection” with many EPSs and ARSs taking in high risk 
patients (as they are paid by services provided and based on UPCs) with the 
probability of serious financial consequences.  
- As previously mentioned, the subsidized scheme has become a financial liability. 
When Law 100 was enacted, the expectation was that the contributions and 
enrollment of the contributive system would suffice to cover the needs of the 
subsidized scheme. But, over the years, experience has shown that enrollment in 
the subsidized scheme continues to increase, but the contributive one does not. In 
fact, in the Santa Maria et al. report (2011) it is estimated that 22 million people are 
in the subsidized scheme while only 16 million are in the contributive one115. It is 
																																																								
115 As of November of 2013, 52.51% (22,586,073 people) belonged to the subsidized scheme, while 46.59% 
(20,040,671 people) were enrolled in the contributive scheme, and 0.90% (387,986 people) were in the 
special scheme. The Departments of Cundinamarca, Antioquia, Risaralda, San Andres, Santander, Valle del 
	 278 
clear that the long-term financial sustainability of the system is at risk. Also, the 
fiscal stability of the system is further at risk by continually relying on transfers 
from the central government. Interviews in Colombia confirmed this assertion.  
- The eligibility mechanisms of the SISBEN are not clear and thus its impact on the 
selection process is not always transparent116. It seems the pool of poor is ever 
larger, and political considerations also seem to impact who qualifies for the 
subsidized scheme.  
- Institutional problems include the complexity of the financial and institutional 
arrangements creating bottlenecks in the transfer of funds, making the follow-up, 
oversight, and accountability of the system very difficult, especially in the 
subsidized scheme. The CNSSS is also highly dependent on the Ministry of Social 
Protection as its guidelines, as well as all administrative and technical support, 
comes from the Ministry. The members of the Council also have a high level of 
rotation making consistency and long-term planning difficult. There is no 
accountability system for members of the Council, making them susceptible to third 
party influences in the decision-making process.  
- Another institutional problem is the status of EPSs and ARSs; though they act as 
financial institutions, their financial activities are not supervised by the 
Superintendence of Finances.   																																																								
Cauca and the city of Bogota are the only ones where over 50% of enrolled are in the contributive system 
(Ministry of Health).  	116 	Some of the variables used by the SISBEN include information on human capital, demography, 
unemployment, income, overcrowding, housing characteristics and ownership of home appliances, as well 
as access to public services such as potable water, bathrooms, and waste disposal (Santa Maria et al., 2011).		
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- And finally, many EPSs (almost 70% of them) offer their services only through 
their providers’ network, making the freedom of choice for consumers difficult and 
generates congestion and client attention problems.  
 
Examining Health Indicators 	
 To asses if health decentralization has impacted some basic indicators, and given 
that improving infant mortality rates was one key indicator to be taken into account, this 
section will now try to analyze if Departments with the highest number of certified 
municipalities have achieved better indicators than Departments with the least number of 
certified municipalities. The exercise will also help to determine if there is a difference 
when Departments are in charge of decentralization—since in the case of municipalities 
that are not certified, Departments are given competence over health care—as opposed to 
those with the largest number of certified municipalities117.  
 The Departments considered are some of the wealthiest and most populated ones 
in Colombia (Antioquia, Cundinamarca, and Valle del Cauca), as well as some of the 
poorest (Choco, Boyaca, and La Guajira), representing areas where a great number of 
Colombians reside.  
 The Departments with the largest number of certified municipalities (see Table 54 
below) considered here are Antioquia with 94.4% of municipalities being certified (as of 
2005), and Cesar with 92%, Huila with 100%, Santander with 64.3%, and Tolima with 
74.4%.  
																																																								117	Data available on the number of certified municipalities was obtained from the Colombian Planning 
Department (DANE) as for the year 2005. Data on the infant mortality rate under 1 year of age was obtained 
from the Ministry of Health for the 2001 – 2011 period.		
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 The Departments with the fewest certified municipalities include the Department 
of Cundinamarca, one of the most populous in the country, with just 12% of local 
municipalities certified as of 2005, Boyaca with just 2.4%, Choco with just one local 
municipality certified, La Guajira with 13.3%, and Valle del Cauca with 28.5% of 
municipalities certified. 
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Table 54: Number of Certified Municipalities by Department (Health – 2005) 
Department* Number of 
Municipalities 
(Total) 
Number of Certified 
Municipalities (2005) 
Number of NOT 
certified Municipalities 
(2005) 
Antioquia 125 118 7 
Atlantico 23 12 11 
Bolivar 48 33 15 
Boyaca 123 3 120 
Caldas 27 12 15 
Cauca 42 2 40 
Cesar 25 23 2 
Cordoba 30 21 9 
Cundinamarca 116 14 102 
Choco 31 1 30 
Huila 37 37 0 
La Guajira 15 2 13 
Magdalena 30 5 25 
Meta 29 11 18 
Nariño 64 44 20 
N. Santander 40 6 34 
Quindio 12 2 10 
Risaralda 14 9 5 
Santander 87 56 31 
Sucre 26 9 17 
Tolima 47 35 12 
Valle del 
Cauca 42 12 30 
*Departments of Caqueta, Arauca, Casanare, Putumayo, San Andres, Amazonas, Guainia, Gauviare, Vaupes 
and Vichada were not included as data was not available. Special districts such as Bogota, Medellin, and Cali 
were not included either as their size and resources are not representative and are treated differently by the 
DANE.  
 
In the case of the Department of Antioquia118 it can be argued that there have been 
no major differences or improvements on infant mortality rates (children under 1 year old, 
live births) when compared to the Department of Cundinamarca (See Tables 55 and 56 
																																																								118	Both Antioquia and Valle del Cauca Departments are the only ones, throughout the period considered, 
where the majority of the population belong to the contributive scheme.			
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below). As shown in the tables below, neither one of these Departments improved 
dramatically, nor did the other Departments considered here119. 
Table 55: Infant Mortality Rate (Per 100,000) per Department – 1 year old (live 
births) – Departments with the most certified municipalities 	
Source: Author, based on Basic Health Indicators Reports 2001 – 2011, Ministry of Health. 
Table 56: Infant Mortality Rate (Per 100,000) per Department with the least 
certified municipalities 
 
Source: Author, based on Basic Health Indicators Reports 2001 – 2011, Ministry of Health. 
 																																																								119	These results are consistent with interviews conducted in Colombia in the fall of 2015 where secretaries 
of health, former hospital directors, and advisors concurred that the “certification” of municipalities was not 
to have a major impact on the ability of local governments or Departments to improve basic health indicators, 
as all policy programs are designed by the central government and whoever is in charge of the funding (be it 
certified municipalities or Departments), all have to comply with the central government’s directives.		
Department 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Antioquia 1319 1375 1627 1420 1192 1256 1257 1212 1198 1174 955 
Cesar 772 1043 1435 1659 1431 1452 1486 1633 1842 1804 1568 
Huila 1702 1964 1919 2005 1493 1234 1443 1383 1242 1261 1078 
Santander 1069 1008 1068 1018 881 856 1172 1065 1102 947 929 
Tolima 1597 1411 2020 1787 1519 1094 1155 1242 1222 1009 884 
Department 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Boyaca 1243 1234 1278 1191 1257 1075 1422 1379 1115 1179 923 
Cundinamar
ca 
945 1241 1408 1365 1378 1300 1323 1158 1155 1095 926 
Choco 1256 1043 1670 1771 1616 1661 1254 1438 1217 1307 1525 
La Guajira 1564 1516 2137 2137 2194 1539 1326 1201 1358 1080 1134 
Valle del 
Cauca 1126 1196 1198 1230 1068 1053 1119 1137 1015 1104 922 
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Per capita health expenditures, as a percentage of GDP (See Table 57 below), does 
not seem to greatly impact indicators either. While many other factors including education 
levels, income, employment, and poverty rates influence, and impact infant mortality rates, 
a correlation between more funds spent per capita and improved indicators could not be 
established. From 2005 onward, when the country spent more per capita on health, the 
Departments with the most certified municipalities saw few improvements in the indicator 
considered here (actually the Department of Cesar’s indicator worsens in this period). In 
the case of the Departments with fewest certified municipalities, three saw continuing 
reductions for the 2005-2011 time period (La Guajira, Choco, and Cundinamarca), while 
in the other two (Boyaca and Valle del Cauca), the reductions fluctuated more. Since La 
Guajira and Choco—being two of the poorest Departments in the country—have benefitted 
from other social policies, it is difficult to establish a direct link between GDP health 
expenditure per capita and reductions in infant mortality rates. If anything can be garnered 
from these comparisons, it is corroboration that more certified municipalities does not 
necessarily mean better indicators, and certainly many other factors might be playing roles 
as well.  
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Table 57: Health Expenditure per Capita and as Proportion of GDP – 2001 - 2010120 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
GDP Per Capita  
Invested on 
health  
(US$ per person) 
75.9 n/a 104 69 125 116 116 116 237 317 323 
National Health  
Expenditure  
per year as a  
Proportion of 
GDP (%) 
7.7 n/a 8.2 8.2 8.2 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.4 5.9 6.4 
Source: Author, based on Basic Health Indicators Reports 2001 – 2011, Ministry of Health.  
  
While in general the indicator considered here has improved in the overall period 
between 2000 and 2010, great disparities depending on ethnic, income, and rural/urban 
divide remain. As of 2013, and according to reports of the Ministry of Health, infant 
mortality rates under one year old were 32% higher among the poorest of Colombians. 
Departments in the Colombian Amazon region as well as in Choco and La Guajira (though 
improved), continued to see higher rates in this indicator than other Colombian 
Departments. Table 58 below shows that income is still an important factor when 
considering mortality rates, with the poorest quintile (Quintile 1) with higher rates than the 
wealthiest quintile (Quintile 5).  
Table 58: Mortality Rates under 1 year old 1995 – 2013 per wealth quintiles 
 1995 2005 2013 
Quintile 1 (poorest) 39.0 27.9 9.2 
Quintile 2 25.0 22.2 8.1 
Quintile 3 31.0 20.9 7.0 
Quintile 4 28.0 9.4 7.8 
Quintile 5 (richest) 19.0 6.7 7.1 
Source: Santa Maria et al., 2011 and Ministry of Health’s “Analysis of Health Sector 2013” 																																																								120	Health reforms were initiated in 1995. In 1998, Colombia’s Department of Planning changed how these 
indicators were calculated. Thus, only the period 2001 – 2011 was used.		
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Most reports conclude that there were improvements in areas expected to improve 
such as maternal and children care (Bernal & Zamora, 2014; Santa Maria et al., 2011; 
Yepes et al., 2011; Galilea et al., 2011; Avila Urdaneta, 2010; Molina & Spurgeon, 2007; 
Molina et al., 2006; Homedes & Ugalde, 2005; Bossert et al., 2003; Jaramillo, 2002; 
Hernandez, 2002). In those cases, the impact was very important and indicators positively 
improved. Other indicators did not show the expected impact and many problems persist.  
 
Conclusions 	
 Examining the process of health service decentralization in Colombia, as in other 
parts of Latin America, reveals that decentralization has taken the form, mostly, of 
deconcentration as the central government has maintained its role as director, regulator, 
and controller of the system (Molina & Spurgeon, 2007).   
Administration of the services were decentralized but the central government has 
retained control over regulation and supervision of the system. Heavy dependence on 
transfers from central government continues, and resources are still controlled by the 
central government. The lack of clarity on who is finally responsible for oversight and 
control of the reforms among the three levels of government continues to make 
implementation very difficult.  
Colombia has designed a highly complex and ambitious health decentralization 
process where the mix of market initiatives, competition, privatization, and 
decentralization has made the reform difficult to understand and implement; and while 
universal coverage has almost been achieved, serious problems in terms of equity and 
quality of care remain.   
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Supporters of health decentralization in Colombia were able to push reforms 
through Congress by aptly working out a coalition of stakeholders that supported the 
reforms, as well as by linking the need for health decentralization with other necessary 
reforms impacting fiscal stability like pension reforms. Undoubtedly, the difficult political, 
social, and economic problems Colombia experienced in the 1990s provided momentum 
to reforms and an urgency that contributed to building consensus in support of the reforms. 
Thus, in contrast with other countries where reforms were barely supported by the political 
elites in Congress, in the Colombian case, and thanks to the role played by policy 
entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 2003), there was generalized support not only to approve the 
required legislation, but also to enact the necessary rules, regulations, and normative 
needed for implementation as soon as possible. By doing this, some details were left for 
later review, which made duplication of efforts and confusion common.  
Many veto points (Immergut, 2008) occurred along the way, including incidences 
of violence against local authorities, or takeovers by guerrilla and/or paramilitary groups 
of municipal governments (be it by way of elections, or by ensuring the elected officials 
responded to their demands). Complexities in contracting out services between insurers 
(EPSs) and providers (IPSs), as well as cases of corruption, duplication in enrollment, and 
the failure to move people from the subsidized scheme to the contributive one, also gave 
the perception that the reforms were ineffective or insufficient.   
   The complex, new health system devised by the health reformers made the 
relevance, responsiveness, adequacy, costs and benefits, quality and quantity of services, 
as stated by Katorobo (2004), difficult to establish. The fact that there are no clear 
guidelines of who is ultimately responsible for services and results, especially in cases of 
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municipalities that are not certified, make oversight and accountability of the reforms hard 
to evaluate. The fact that governors are only required to “coordinate” service delivery gives 
them a reason to avoid responsibility when difficulties and contradictions arise.  
The process of health decentralization in Colombia has been one of partial 
decentralization (Devarajan et al., 2009), and a “managerial view” (Nickson, 2011) has 
prevailed, as the central government decentralized administrative responsibilities and 
financial resources, but the overall control of the process remained in the hands of the 
Ministry of Health and the National Planning Department. Though substantial financial 
resources were decentralized to regional and local governments, funding is strongly 
earmarked—also, these governments do not have the capacity to create new resources and 
they are highly dependent on government transfers.  
 The relationship of local governments with their communities was certainly 
recognized and given priority, evidenced by the importance given to citizen participation, 
and the need to involve community organizations in the local health councils and in the 
preparation and implementation of local health plans; but, overall, the Colombian case 
shows very few instances of effective citizen participation in the health decentralization 
reforms and/or during implementation.  
 This chapter has shown that, in the case of Colombia, the close collaboration of 
political leaders represented in Congress (and given the urgency to re-legitimize the State), 
key stakeholders, and civil society organizations contributed to the approval of health 
decentralization reforms that impacted Colombia’s health system. Thus, hypothesis one 
(H1) is generally positive.  
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In regard to hypothesis two (H2), the evidence is harder to establish. The review of 
ten Departments (five with a majority of certified municipalities; five with a minority of 
certified municipalities), as well as a review of per capita expenditures on health as 
percentage of GDP, did not provide clear indication of having an impact on the chosen 
indicator (infant mortality rate under 1 year old, live births). 
As Colombia implemented a health system that has practically privatized the 
delivery of all health services (reserving for the government only services such as 
vaccination campaigns, public health campaigns, or dealing with catastrophic events and/or 
pandemics), the ability of political parties or the political elite to influence the delivery of 
health services has been very limited. The degree of collaboration between the three levels 
of government, as well as with other stakeholders, has been essentially defined by the way 
the system has been redesigned, with a limited role for the government sector. Though 
collaborative mechanisms have been established, there have been difficulties with 
implementation. The impact of reforms on health indicators has been more difficult to 
establish. Thus, H2 is partially confirmed: collaboration impacts successful reforms’ 
approval and implementation, but it does not necessarily translate to improved indicators.   
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CHAPTER EIGHT 		
EDUCATION DECENTRALIZATION IN PARAGUAY: 1990 – 2010  
 
 
Introduction 	
This chapter will examine the education decentralization process in Paraguay as 
another way of testing hypothesis one (H1)121 and two (H2)122 of this study. It will first 
consider a brief overview of education decentralization literature emphasizing what 
conditions make the process successful. The chapter will then analyze the role played by 
political parties, congress, and other stakeholders in the passage and approval of education 
decentralization policies. It will attempt to assess the impact of education decentralization 
on basic indicators.  
The research will argue that implementation of the proposed decentralization 
reforms was confronted with serious political and financial challenges from representatives 
of the central government and unions and by tensions among governors, local mayors, and 
authorities of the national government themselves. 
 
 
																																																								121	H1: If national, regional, and local political leaders participate and collaborate in the promotion of 
political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization, there is a greater probability for the passage, approval, 
and implementation of public service decentralization laws. 	122	H2: Once public service delivery decentralization has been enacted, the higher the degree of collaboration 
between national, regional, and local levels of government (in essence the type of intergovernmental relations 
established), stakeholders and citizens (other socio-political actors); the greater the probability of its success 
and effectiveness.	
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Education Decentralization: Background and Some Concepts 	
Over the last two decades, education decentralization has been implemented using 
various approaches in many different parts of the world.  The education-specific rationales 
for education decentralization include: improving enrollment rates; improving quality of 
education and equity in education; and increasing communities’ participation and 
accountability (Winkler, 1989; Hanson, 1997; Berhman et al., 2002; Naidoo, 2003; 
Kaufman & Nelson, 2004; Gropello, 2004; Daun, 2007; Lora, 2007; Meade & Gershberg, 
2008).  
Specific reforms usually accompany education decentralization including: 
devolution of authority to local governments (spending, staffing, and content); school-
based management; community financing of education; curriculum reform; school 
vouchers; and demand-side financing (Berhman et al., 2002).   
While the reasons to decentralize have been mostly political or fiscal in nature, 
there is the expectation, from an educational perspective, that indicators will improve as a 
result. Outcomes in schooling are many but at a minimum involve “level and distribution 
of learning and years of schooling” (Winkler & Gershberg, 2000). 
Winkler (1989) grouped the rationales for education decentralization under three 
broad categories: educational finance, efficiency and effectiveness, and redistribution of 
political power.  Aside from improving quality of education, Hanson (1997) refers to 
different possible goals and strategies sought with education decentralization, including: 
accelerating economic development by dispersing power, wealth, and executive talent; 
increasing management efficiency; redistribution of financial responsibility by distributing 
power; increasing democratization; promoting market-based education; and neutralizing 
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competing centers of power.  Daun (2007) includes economic decline, cultural factors, the 
weakening of the state/public sector, and/or international/globalization pressures as reasons 
behind the promotion of education decentralization. Arguments linking education and 
development, and the need to have better human capital, have also been emphasized by the 
World Bank, and other international organizations (Kaufman & Nelson, 2004), as essential 
for the long-term future of developing countries.   
In regard to claims of improving or promoting citizen participation through 
education decentralization, Naidoo (2003), by reviewing education decentralization in a 
number of countries, identifies a series of important factors that increase community 
participation in the process, including: a positive perspective in the communities involved 
on basic education; regular and stable household income; a history of social mobilization; 
the level of community organization and leadership present; a community’s involvement 
in education beyond the financial aspects; the general status and appreciation for education 
that local leaders show support for; the level of community involvement in the decision 
making process; the kind of government support provided to the process; and students’ 
achievements, among others. Economic factors, such as poverty levels and income 
distribution, impact the success of decentralization, along with other indicators related to 
health and political stability.  
 When discussing citizen participation, within an education decentralization 
process, certain key questions are relevant, including who can participate, how 
participation takes place, the inclusiveness of the process, the role of civil society’s 
participation in the process, how democratic the participation process is, and if roles are 
clearly defined. The answers to these questions can help define if an education 
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decentralization process (or any type of service provision decentralization for that matter) 
is considered successful or not (Meade & Gershberg, 2008; Hanson, 2006; Berhman et al., 
2002). 
 In regard to the financing of education decentralization, the types of services that 
are actually decentralized is a central issue, and this will have implications for the financial 
impact of the process. Over the past decades, many countries have experimented with 
different types of education decentralization, but Naidoo (2003) places them in four broad 
categories: (1) decentralization of school budgets to buy basic supplies (this implies a the 
minimum level of decentralization); (2) decentralization of specific functions such as 
school management, building maintenance, and school feeding programs; (3) full school 
autonomy (including fiscal autonomy); and, (4) competitive grants and incentives.  
 As correctly pointed out, but often overlooked, “system-wide cost implications are 
often a key factor in decentralization reforms” (Naidoo, 2007). And, the difference between 
the cost of education services and the financing of the system is important, as the former 
refers to the actual cost of factors such as supplies and teachers’ salaries, and the latter 
refers to where those funds are coming from, who decides how funds should be spent, and 
who collects those funds. 
 One of the main concerns, and the reason for many criticisms of education 
decentralization processes, involves the quality of human resources capacity at the local 
level to implement decentralization and, consequently, involves issues of capacity 
building. Developing capacity “requires the state and its several partners to make 
deliberate and sustained efforts to train local leaders and their communities, as well as 
local organizations in the skills needed to support decentralized governance” (Naidoo, 
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2007). For this to occur, multiple stakeholders must be part of the process, including not 
only central, regional, and local government agencies, but also businesses, cultural 
institutions, NGOs, students, and parents. Important attention should be given to ensuring 
that traditionally excluded groups are not left out of the process, and that their needs are 
properly addressed.  
 Capacity development should be an ongoing process that must be implemented in 
phases to be successful. Many of the capacity building strategies used will be conditioned 
by the context in which they are implemented, and political commitment is essential for 
long term sustainability and continuity.  
Winkler (1989), in his analysis of education decentralization from an economic 
perspective, points to different factors that are necessary for successful implementation of 
education decentralization, including:  
1. The presence of a tradition of self-reliance at the local level (this is 
important as many education decentralization policies aim to increase 
parents’ participation in defining education policies or make the process 
more participatory);  
2. Local authorities’ or communities’ capacity to have their own source of 
revenues, create them, or control its spending;  
3. Local demand for decentralization, as opposed to decentralization being 
imposed from central planners; 
4. Keeping key stakeholders in the process (parents organization, teachers 
unions, local bureaucracies, etc.) well informed and involved in the 
development and implementation of decentralization process; and  
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5. Existing local administrative capacity or providing such capacity through 
training.			
 
 Very similarly, Naidoo (2007), in evaluating the successful implementation of 
education decentralization, finds the following issues as critical:  
1. Understanding the reforms: clear communication exists, legal instruments 
are present, and roles are clearly established and understood by all.  
2. Communication: clear information to all stakeholders is available 
3. Staggered implementation: regions and local governments require 
administrative capacity and local political support.  
4. Systemic approach: decentralization process must take into account the 
needs of all levels of government and the necessary coordination.  
5. Clear lines of monitoring/evaluation: a strong system of accountability 
should be established, well understood and applied to the process.  
6. Clearly connect educational quality with educational management reforms: 
a clear connection between educational reforms and outcomes should be 
developed and monitored.  
7. Clear role of community/local level: this also requires the strengthening of 
grass roots structures in the communities.  
8. Transparency in delivery of resources and decision-making: transparency 
and accountability also from local leaders to their constituents.  
9. Data and information: as the process widens, is essential to monitor and 
evaluate the success of programs.  
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In essence, for education decentralization to be successful, a “mix of political will” 
(policy makers working together with stakeholders) is essential, including: whether or not 
the main political parties have a shared vision about the objectives of the reform and agree 
on collaboration; technical inputs (competent policies and personnel in education); and 
economic factors (adequate resources) (Naidoo, 2007; Hanson, 2006).  
 Education services in Latin America have usually been organized around a 
centralized Ministry of Education, which had control over resources, personnel, 
curriculum, and administrative decisions, as well as assessments. This monopolistic 
organization produces users that have no input in the process; generates strong, and 
difficult to deal with, unions; and creates inefficiency in structures where control and 
oversight are too difficult to achieve (Lora, 2007).  
 The decentralization of education in the 1990s occurred in the context of a wave of 
democratization in the Hemisphere, and the need to reform government policies that have 
proven inefficient. In the case of Latin America, “The decentralization of the 
administration and, to a lesser extent, the financing of public school systems to subnational 
governments (or directly to the schools) have been the most common reforms in the region 
since the 1990s”  (Lora, 2007; p. 48).  
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The Case of Paraguay 
 
Introduction 	
 The Paraguayan state has a long and sad record of failing its citizens—especially 
the poorest among them—in the provision of quality education that could equip them with 
the necessary tools to attain a better future.  
Though the Constitution ensures that education should be accessible to all (Article 
73), many people do not have access to education and, when they do, its quality its very 
poor. The failures of the school system have contributed to increased poverty rates, and 
have not helped to improve human capital or contributed to strengthening workers skills, 
with many socio-economic repercussions. Grade repetition and dropouts rates are still 
alarmingly high and great socio-economic and ethnic disparities exist (Oscar Flecha et al., 
1996).  
 The end of the Stroessner regime in 1989 marked a new impulse toward education. 
The 1992 Constitution not only established free, basic education as a fundamental human 
right, but also guaranteed that the first years of education could be completed in the 
maternal language of the child123 (Gaete, 2012).  
 In 1998, a new General Education Law (Law 1264) was enacted, establishing the 
guidelines for public and private education in the country; and making education one of 
the main goals and priorities of the Paraguayan state (Gaete, 2012).  
																																																								123	Paraguay is an officially bilingual country with two main languages: Spanish and Guarani. 37% of 
Paraguayans speak only Guaraní, 50% Guaraní and Spanish, 7% only Spanish, and 6% use other languages 
(Gaete, 2012).		
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The Ministry of Education and Culture is in charge of regulating the educational 
system and implementing its reforms. The Paraguayan education system has three levels: 
pre-K and basic/elementary education; middle school (grades 7-9); and high school 
education (grades 10-12). Special needs education, and other training and vocational 
studies, are also provided by public schools. Universities (both private and public) are 
autonomous and are covered by a separate legal framework.  
 All aspects of public education from the design of academic curricula, to 
supervising the implementation of the curricula, the national academic calendar, the 
evaluation of the process, hiring and firing of human resources, and expenditures, as well 
as investment in infrastructure, are controlled by the Ministry of Education (Gaete, 2012). 
Most students in Paraguay attend public schools (on average 65%), and the rest attend 
private schools (about 25%), and lesser numbers attend private schools that receive funding 
from the state.124 Most special-needs education children attend public schools.  
 The lack of access to, and quality of, education in Paraguay can be seen in the great 
differences that exist among rural and urban areas, with urban children benefitting from 
better schools and infrastructure. There is also greater concentration of resources—both 
material and human—in the city of Asuncion, its metropolitan area, and other large urban 
areas. Ethnicity is also a great indicator of inequality, as illiteracy and dropout rates are 
prevalent among indigenous groups.  
 
  
																																																								124	Information gathered from http://datos.mec.gov.py/index available on the Ministry of Education’s web 
page. Accessed on 8/11/2015		
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Financing of Education system 	
The financing of education in Paraguay depends almost completely on the 
allocations assigned to it in the National Budget. According to the National Constitution, 
the amount allocated to education must not be less than 20% of the total allocated to the 
central administration (Article 85). On average 92% of the education budget is spent on 
current expenses, and only 8% on capital expenditures (Gaete, 2012; Villagra Carron et al., 
2011).  
Governorships and municipalities have invested in education out of their own 
budgets, but have not had any input in school management and oversight, or on education 
management issues. In the time period analyzed here (1990-2010), their investments—
when they did occur—were done with the knowledge of the Ministry but there were no 
official agreements signed or required. There were no fiscal rules guiding how much the 
subregional levels of government must spend on education. And, in general, those expenses 
were for repairs and infrastructure, custodian/janitorial services, or to assist with the 
nutritional needs of the students (Gaete, 2012).  
The table below (Table 59) shows that expenditures on education, as a percentage 
of the overall national budget, and as required by the Constitution, has more or less been 
complied with over the years. But, as a percentage of GDP, expenditures on education have 
not increased over the same period of time, and are actually low by international and 
regional standards. The administration of President Lugo (2008-2010) saw increases in 
education’s budget. Information on how much governors and mayors have spent on 
education was not available, but in general these subregional levels of government have 
invested few of their own resources on education, partly because the legal framework is 
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not clear on their roles, and also because the financial resources were not available. Only 
after 2012, with the approval of the National Fund for Development and Investment Law 
(FONACIDE), which allocates a portion of royalties collected to governorships and to local 
governments, did subregional levels of government secure access to funds that are 
earmarked for school infrastructure and for nutritional programs.  
Table 59: Education Expenditures – Paraguay – 1999 – 2011 
Year Education Budget (Millions €) 
Budget Education  
(% public spending) 
Budget Education 
(% of GDG) 
2011 805,7 22,48% 4,80% 
2010 587,0 18,72% 3,77% 
2007 356,9 19,33% 3,55% 
2004 221,3 18,23% 3,44% 
2003 230,1 20,86% 3,95% 
2002 259,6 18,82% 3,88% 
2001 363,7 19,88% 4,25% 
2000 405,4 21,56% 4,57% 
1999 350,5 21,88% 4,45% 
Source: http://www.datosmacro.com/estado/gasto/educacion/paraguay 
 As indicated above, the majority of budget is spent on salaries of education sector 
personnel, and very limited resources are available for capital expenditures or for teacher 
training programs. Numbers of total employees in the education sector are hard to 
determine and, thus, it is difficult to estimate the total number of employees and/or how 
much is spent on salaries125. As is the case in many countries, resources are very limited 
but, in the case of Paraguay, interviews and reviews of the press indicate that many of those 
financial resources are misused.  
																																																								125	Only in 2013, did the Ministry of Education, for the first time in its history (and in compliance with a 
new civil service law), provide an estimated number of employees. About 11,000 people -between 
administrators (about 5,100), teachers (about 5,000), and contractual employees (about 880) – work for the 
education sector in Paraguay (http://www.abc.com.py/nacionales/mec-divulga-su-lista-de-funcionarios-
632217.html). It is important to keep in mind that the appointments in the education sector are a notorious 
source of patronage in Paraguay 	
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Legal Framework of Education Sector in Paraguay 	
The three main legal texts dealing with education in Paraguay are the National 
Constitution of 1992, the General Education Law of 1998 (Law 1264), and the Childhood 
and Adolescence Code of 2001 (Law 1680) (Villagra Carron et al., 2011). The 
administrative organizational laws of both the regional governments (Departments) and the 
municipal governments also give some role to these authorities in the education sector (see 
table 60 below); and Law 1725 of 2001, which describes the responsibilities and rights of 
workers in the education field. The latest significant piece of legislation was approved in 
2009 establishing free middle school and free pre-K education in all public schools in 
Paraguay.  
The Departmental Administrative Law (Ley Orgánica Departamental), established 
that governors will “coordinate school education and training activities with the relevant 
organizations” (Article 16), but there are no specifications as to what that coordination 
entails, and Article 45 of the same law also established that governors must, in their 
“investment plans”, include educational development and—in particular—contribute to the 
construction and maintenance of educational centers. The law, though, fails to allocate 
resources to governorships for these tasks; further legislation has also failed to clarify the 
coordination among the three levels of government—or other relevant organizations—and 
how expenses will be covered.  
In 2009, the Ministry of Education signed a cooperation agreement with the Council 
of Governors in which both parts committed to deepen and strengthen the decentralization 
process in education; but, the text does not clearly state what each party is responsible for—
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or how reforms (and their funding)—would be implemented. As of 2014, interviews 
conducted reveal a consensus that not much has been achieved.  
The municipal administrative law (Ley Orgánica Municipal), in force at the time 
of this study, established that in the area of education, municipalities are responsible for:  
1) providing “education services”—the law is vague but states that municipalities 
are responsible for providing education services according to local needs, under 
the supervision of the Ministry of Education, and according to the guidelines 
provided by the Ministry; 
2) Elaborating municipal education plans; 
3) Encouraging community educational activities; 
4) Building and maintenance of locally based education infrastructure (including 
furniture, equipment, supplies, and consumables);  
5) Promoting culture, sports, and tourism;  
6) Promoting civic education and participation.  
 
As noted above, the law is ambiguous and did not establish financing mechanisms, 
nor did it clarify which specific responsibilities were assigned to the local government, the 
regional government, and the national government. For example, the lack of clarity on 
subsection 4 above, which notes that municipal governments are responsible for supplies 
and consumables, has led to conflict as local governments fear that they could be asked to 
provide—paid using their own resources—school supplies (a responsibility of the national 
ministry) or the “glass of milk” program—a responsibility of the Departmental 
governments (Merino Estrada et al., 2010).  
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Interviews with former senior education government officials indicate that 
opposition to decentralization reforms from the education unions has been strong, and this 
has played a significant role in blocking the process.  
 
Table 60: Summary of Legal Framework, 1990 – 2010 
1992 National Constitution Chapter VII of the Constitution 
established the gratuity of 
education and the role of the 
State 
• Article 75 defined the role 
of the State in education 
 
• Article 163 established that 
Governorships should 
coordinate with the central 
government the provision of 
educational services 
 
• Article 168 established the 
role of municipalities in 
regard to education  
Law 426/94 Creates Departmental 
Governments 
• Article 16 established that 
Governorships must 
coordinate in the their 
respective territories the 
actions of the Executive in 
regard to education 
according to their local 
needs 
Law 1294/87 Municipal Administrative Law • Articles 18, 33, 43, and 69 
gave municipalities 
responsibilities in 
promoting education, allows 
Municipal Juntas/Councils 
to have education 
committees, and gave local 
governments a role in 
assisting educational 
institutions.  
Law 1264/98 General Education Law 
established the role of the State 
in providing educational services 
• Article 4 established that 
the State is responsible for 
providing free education 
and that it should guarantee 
access and equity. Funding 
for education will come for 
the General National 
Budget 
 
• Article 6, the State will 
promote education 
decentralization. The 
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education budgets for the 
Departments will be 
prepared in coordination 
with the Governorships 
 
• Article 16, municipalities 
will promote local 
education 
 
• Article 90, the Executive 
branch will promote 
education decentralization, 
supporting and advising 
Governorships and 
municipalities 
 
• Article 117, the Ministry of 
Education will develop its 
general plans of action and 
curricular needs in 
accordance with the needs 
of decentralization 
Resolution 10711 of the Ministry 
of Education (2000) 
 • Established the 
Departmental Educational 
Councils in each of the 17 
Departments and describes 
their responsibilities  
Law 1725/01 Administrative Charter Law for 
workers of the education sector 
– regulates the teaching 
profession in the levels of initial, 
primary and secondary school 
education in the national 
education system, both at public 
or private educational 
institutions. 
• Article 35 established that 
Departments and 
municipalities can support 
and promote the training 
and continuing education of 
teachers in their region or 
communities 
Law 4088/10  • Established free pre-K and 
middle school education in 
all public schools  
Source: Author based on documents and laws reviewed  
 
Reform and Decentralization 	
Paraguay’s history shows no significant experience with education 
decentralization. The Ministry of Education was first established in 1870 but it was not 
until the year 2009 that its charter was drafted (Table 61 below).  
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Table 61: Ministry of Education, Paraguay 
1870 The Department of Justice, Worship, and Public Education was established 
1942 Department of Education established 
1956 The area of Worships affairs its included to the Education Department 
1998 Name is changed to Department of Education and Culture 
2009 The charter of the Department is drafted  
Source: author based on Department of Finance documents  
  
Through the years, many reforms to improve the sector’s performance were 
introduced. But, the objectives of the reforms were mostly aimed at the deconcentration of 
the Ministry’s work and not the decentralization of education services. The main goal with 
deconcentration was to improve education management and efficiency, as well as the 
modernization of the general administration.  
 Deconcentration dates back to 1921 when the first School Directors at the 
Departmental level were named to supervise schools. In the 1940s, “education areas” were 
established in which certain schools were considered the “main” centers of learning, and 
satellites schools were also established. The 1960s saw the establishment of teacher 
training centers at the regional level to improve the quality of human resources in charge 
of education. By 1992, the Regional Educational Councils were created as part of 
regionalization program of the Department of Education. In the beginning, only 
representatives of educational institutions of the region could be part of the Councils. Later, 
citizens were encouraged to participate, but this initiative never succeeded as expected. By 
1995, the Ministry began promoting the signing of memorandums of understanding with 
the governorships to promote decentralization. But, the roles of governors were kept vague 
along with details on financing. In the year 2000, with the launching of a national plan for 
the Redesign of Education Supervision, the Departmental Educational Councils (CDEs—
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reflecting Spanish terminology) were created (governorships needed to sign an MOU with 
the Ministry). Many other initiatives were launched to promote decentralization, though 
many are yet to be implemented (see Table 62 below) 
 
Table 62: Measures aimed at promoting education decentralization – Status (as of 
2010) 
Pedagogical units in each of the country’s 17 Departments Inactive 
Departmental Management Teams Mixed 
Teachers Selection Committees Inactive 
Association of Schools Cooperation (equivalent to US PTAs) Mixed 
Decentralization Commission Inactive 
Departmental General Directorate at the central level Inactive  
Qualifications and certification for regional supervision Mixed 
Departmental Statistics Unit Mixed 
Decentralization Secretariat Inactive 
Departmental Education Councils (at the Governorship level) Mixed  
Source: author based on interviews and review of documentation 
As shown above, the central government has retained control over the provision of 
educational services in the country, and very little has been done to promote 
decentralization of services, funds, or human resources related to this important area of 
government services.  
 The process of educational reform in Paraguay has experienced different phases 
(Villagra Carron et al., 2011), with a first phase occurring between 1990 and 1995, where 
the National Advisory Council for Educational Reform (CARE) was formed (1992). With 
the approval of the National Education Law in 1998, the CARE was replaced by the 
National Council on Education (CONEC).  The mission of the Council is to promote 
educational reforms.   
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 The objectives of CONEC include: 
1) Develop the nation’s culture and education, in coordination with the Ministry 
of Education; 
2) Cooperate with implementation in the short, medium, and long term; 
3) Assist in the coordination, among all education related stakeholders, and among 
different administrative levels, of education and culture related activities; 
4) Periodically evaluate and inform the Executive Branch and Legislative Branch 
about the status and progress of the national education system; 
5) Periodically evaluate the performance of public and private universities, as well 
as other higher learning centers, and present reports to the Congress for their 
consideration; 
6) Provide advice on education policy; 
7) Propose to the Ministry of Education reforms or adjustments to policy 
programs, as needed, to improve education; 
8) Advise national scientific and technological research in the country, in 
coordination with the respective government agencies126.		
  
In this first phase, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) became an 
important player supporting the reforms and providing financial and technical assistance, 
especially for elementary education; the World Bank played a similar role in the case of 
middle schools (Villagra Carron et al., 2012; Rivarola, 2000).  
																																																								126	http://www.conec.gov.py	
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 The main objectives of this first phase included universalizing access to education 
and promoting equity; prioritizing quality education; improving curricula and teaching 
(including Guarani as a language of instruction); improving human resources; and 
expanding and improving school infrastructure (Villagra Carron et al., 2011).  
 The second phase (1996-2000) saw the approval of the National Education Law in 
May of 1998 (Law 1264). The Presidency of Juan Carlos Wasmosy established universal 
and free pre-K schooling (with the technical assistance of the IDB). Evaluation 
mechanisms were considered and implemented from the central government, again with 
the support of the IDB.  
 The 2001-2005 phase had as a theme “education with quality and equity.” A 
National Literacy Plan was launched, oriented to adults with no education, especially in 
rural areas of the country.  
 A final phase, for the time period considered here, occurred from the year 2006 to 
2010 and includes the administration of President Fernando Lugo (2008-2010). In this time 
period, the administration of President Nicanor Duarte Frutos (2003-2008), himself a 
former education minister in the Wasmosy administration, devoted significant resources to 
public education, with special emphasis again on rural areas, improvement of human 
resources, and reducing absenteeism and dropout rates. 
Since 2008, with the administration of President Lugo, as in the case of the health 
sector, there was a strong political discourse in favor of ensuring that the benefits of free 
education were accessible to all. Education was defined then as a “public good” and a 
fundamental right of every Paraguayan citizen. The State assumed the role of guaranteeing 
that right (Uharte Pozas, 2012). Law 4088 of 2009 exemplifies this commitment, 
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establishing that middle school education would be free for all, in fact extending free public 
education (Uharte Pozas, 2012).  
 Throughout the process of reform in Paraguay, it is argued that the goal of 
educational decentralization reforms were directed more toward the deconcentration of the 
Ministry’s activities, and not toward full decentralization to subnational levels of 
government. The 1998 law called for the creation of Departmental Educational Councils, 
Commissions of Educational Reform and Management at the Departmental level (never 
implemented), and a National System for Teachers’ Training, among other proposed 
reforms. Other decentralization proposals included the creation of parent associations, 
which were supposed to co-manage and support the local schools attended by their children 
(very few of these have been created and/or are active) (Gaete, 2012).  
 A significant initiative regarding education decentralization was the creation of 
Departmental Educational Councils or CDEs (Consejos Departamentales de Educacion), 
with responsibilities such as the formulation, and support for the implementation, of 
educational plans for each Department in consultation with local communities. The 
Councils were to be composed of up to 11 different organizations including the 
governorship, the Departmental Junta (regional legislative body), municipalities, and 
regional educational centers, the Catholic Church, universities, training institutes, teachers 
and parents associations, and supervisory organizations, among others. The relationships 
among them were not clearly defined, and the CDEs have no authority to fire or evaluate 
teachers who continue to be responsive only to the national education ministry. In essence, 
CDEs do not have a management or administrative role in schools (Gaete, 2012).  
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The Education Law did not create a similar structure at the municipal level, and 
though some local governments—with the support of NGOs and cooperation agencies— 
tried to implement local education councils, based on the model of local health councils, 
the initiatives were not successful and/or sustainable in the long term (Gaete, 2012; 
interviews).  
 Departmental governments were given responsibility for the so called Nutritional 
Complement Program by which children attending school were given a glass of milk and 
enriched food to help alleviate malnutrition. Funding for this initiative was contentious up 
to the recent approval of the so called FONACIDE Law, by which specific funds were 
assigned for this nutritional program to regional governments. The implementation of this 
program is not without criticism, as interviews with some NGO representatives and senior 
officers from the Ministry of Education allege that funds were being misused.  
 In general, the Ministry of Education, and its bureaucracy, has not been very 
supportive of decentralization initiatives and the process remains very slow. The Ministry 
has delegated certain basic functions (especially in the area of maintenance and payment 
services), but all other key areas such as human resources management, curriculum 
reforms, evaluation, training, etc. remain firmly in control of the central government. 
By examining which level of government is in charge of the decision making 
process in public schools, the table below illustrates the limited role played by local and 
regional governments in the provision of education services (Table 63).  
As indicated, the Paraguayan legal framework provides a very limited role to 
governorships in the running of schools, and much less to municipal governments. And, in 
the case some responsibilities that have been assigned to them, compliance with the law is 
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limited. Local communities have no major role in the day-to-day management of schools, 
and their involvement has been limited to the Association of Schools Cooperation (or 
Asociaciones de Cooperativas Escolares—ACEs) where parents, teachers, and the 
leadership of the schools supposedly have voice in how some budgetary decisions are 
made.  
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Table 63: Education Decision Making by Level of Government/Authority in Public 
Schools, 2010 
 National Departmental Municipal Community School 
Hiring/Firing of 
teachers (1) X X    
Hiring/Firing of 
School directors X X    
Teachers’ 
promotion X     
Payment of 
Salaries X     
Budget/Use of 
resources X   X  
School calendar X     
School fees (2) X     
Maintenance of 
Schools X   X X 
Textbooks 
selection X     
Curricula 
designs X X    
Study Programs X X   X 
Class schedule X X   X 
Class 
organization     X 
Teachers 
supervision (3) X X X   
Teachers 
training  X     
Teachers 
evaluation (4) X X X  X Notes:	(1)	Technically	there	are	Selection	Commissions	at	the	Departmental	 level.	As	of	2010	there	were	no	cases	in	which	Governorships	have	made	those	decisions.		(2)	In	the	year	2008,	fees	for	middle	school	were	eliminated.	(3)	Each	district	should	have	a	pedagogical	and	administrative	evaluation	commission.	(4)	There	is	a	process	of	self-evaluation	and	evaluations	made	by	school	directors.	Their	purpose	are	for	diagnostic	and	training	reasons.		Source:	Translated	from	2013	Educational	Report	of	Paraguay.	Rodolfo	Elias	et	al.			
	 312 
Discussion of Reforms 	
Paraguayan educational reforms concentrated vastly on improving quality, equity, 
and access to education. Many plans and programs were drafted, and many strategic 
consultancy meetings were held, but, the reforms were always controlled by the Ministry 
of Education, and decentralization was not extensively discussed, nor was it included in 
the discussions and/or plans of the central authorities. If civil society organizations 
included decentralization in their proposals, they were not really taken into account. The 
fact that decentralization, in the form of the creation of Departmental Education Councils 
(CDEs), was included in the 1998 Law has been suggested as both a consequence of the 
momentum for decentralization that, at the time, the health decentralization law had 
created; and to the fact that the Governors Association was able to lobby for some more 
specific role for governorships that were otherwise not given much responsibilities by the 
Constitution and the subsequent laws.  
 Some factors might help explain this lack of progress in education decentralization 
services: 
1) Interviews with senior officials, in both Congress and the Ministry of 
Education, indicated that technocrats within the central administration 
have played a role in keeping decentralization initiatives alive—at least 
at the proposal level—but, there is no clear political commitment to 
actually implement them.  
2) There has not been a strong demand from citizens or civil society to push 
for education decentralization. Citizens do not trust local authorities in 
the provision of educational services.  
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3) There has not been a political figure(s) or civic leader(s) able to create 
coalitions or networks supporting education decentralization, or with the 
capacity to galvanize such momentum. There has not been a class of 
policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 2003) in this area.   
4) There has not been a strong commitment from Congress, as many 
legislators do not want to antagonize powerful education unions, or 
because they have used employment in the education sector as a 
patronage tool. 
5) It has also been suggested that governors themselves, when given the 
small opportunity to implement programs, did not live up to the 
challenge, and used it for political benefit.  
6) Lack of support from the Ministers of Education themselves.127 
7) Strong opposition from public sector unions and from education sector 
bureaucrats.  
 
Instead, deconcentration of education services has been the norm. Recent 
interviews with representatives from civil society organizations involved in improving 
Paraguayan public schools revealed a potential, emergent push for reform, as the private 
																																																								127	In fact, and as an example of the lack of political will from central authorities, in the mid-1990s, the 
Institute for Public Management & Community Service (IPMCS) of Florida International University (FIU) 
was implementing a USAID funded program in support of decentralization. IPMCS had a meeting with the 
then Minister of Education to propose a decentralization pilot program on education, much as it was been 
done on the health sector. The proposal was firmly rejected. None of the Education ministers of the 1990 – 
2010 period analyzed here have been known for supporting decentralization policies.  
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sector, realizing that the quality of education is not providing qualified human resources, 
and this might hinder economic development, is now pushing for educational reforms.  
Education decentralization has not been seen as a process by which governorships 
and municipalities obtain a significant role in the provision of education services. The few 
responsibilities that were decentralized (many of them not implemented as of 2010), 
involve “coordination” and support in the design of school curriculum to better reflect local 
or regional needs, or with infrastructure needs. But, in fact, very few of these initiatives 
have been implemented. The central government retains authority over every major 
decision that involves education, from human resource management and evaluation, to 
funding, to decisions over school calendar, opening and closing of schools, teachers 
training needs, and information and statistics systems. All remains under the firm control 
of the central authorities in Asuncion.  
 Though Article 75 of the Paraguayan Constitution states that education provision 
is the responsibility of the family, the municipalities, and the State, very little has been 
done to include local governments in the decentralization process.  
 As of 2015, interviews and reviews of local press indicated that the situation was 
not likely to change and that, in fact, no new developments regarding education 
decentralization were to be expected.  
 
Indicators of Success? 	
 If Paraguay has minimally decentralized education but has put emphasis on some 
deconcentration, can progress in education be measured? Most people interviewed for this 
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research agreed that little progress has been achieved, and the central authorities (regardless 
of the political party in power) have done little to implement reforms.  
The country has improved some of its education indicators with the reduction of 
illiteracy, increased school enrollment, and better infrastructure. The involvement of some 
civil society organizations has greatly contributed to these improvements, though regional 
and ethnic differences make the improvements relative.  
A 2009 United Nations (UN) report and a 2013 Partnership for Educational 
Revitalization in the Americas (PREAL—reflecting Spanish terminology)128 report on the 
progress of educational reform in Paraguay for the 1990-2010 period show that, though 
progress has been made, many challenges remain, including (Villagra Carron et al., 2011; 
PREAL report, 2013): 
1) High levels of grade retention at the elementary level (up to 30%); 
2) Very low levels of graduation at the middle school level (27%); 
3) High dropout rates among indigenous communities and in rural areas. The 
average school attendance for Paraguay was, for those older than 15 years of 
age, 8.2 years (2010). Only 3 of 10 students entering the first grade in 1999 had 
completed their formal education in 2010;  
4) Illiteracy rates among indigenous people over 15 years of age continues to be 
very high (40%); 
5) In terms of enrollment, school registration has increased but there is a large 
number of children between the ages of 13 and 17  that do not attend school; 
																																																								128	Programa de Promoción de la Reforma Educativa en América Latina y el Caribe (PREAL) 
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6) Paraguay continues to score very low on regional and international tests of 
students achievement; 
7) Place of residence, maternal language, and ethnic differences continue to be 
serious challenges to equity in the provision of education services;  
8) Teachers evaluation, training, and preparation is still weak;  
9) Though the budget of education as percentage of public spending has slightly 
increased over the period, as a percentage of GDP it continues to be low, thus 
investment in teachers training, infrastructure, or students has diminished;  
10) Decentralization of education management has been very challenging, and the 
Departmental Education Councils have had limited impact on policy decision 
and implementation129. Some parents associations (ACEs) have had a limited 
role in the budget decisions of their local schools130.	
 
By referring back to what Winkler (1989) and Naidoo (2007) considered necessary 
factors for a successful decentralization, and applying those factors to the Paraguayan 
experience between 1990 and 2010, the country’s initiative has failed to meet most of the 
proposed criteria (Table 64) 
																																																								129	A limited number of DECs are active in the country. Some as the one in the Department of Caacupe is 
quite active, but most are not or have been established but play no specific role.  
 130	The number of ACEs is hard to establish. Interviews indicate that if each school had one, there should be 
between 5,000 to 8,000 ACEs established. But, ACEs are not recognized as legal entities, thus their capacity 
to make decisions or influence the management of local schools is limited and is directly tied to the 
relationship that each one might have with their respective school directors.  
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Table 64: Factors for a Successful Decentralization 
 Yes No Mixed 
Presence of tradition of self-reliance at local level  X  
Subregional governments have access -and autonomy in the use 
of - to funding  
 X  
There is local demand for decentralization  X  
Key stakeholders are involved in the decision making process    
X 
Local administrative capacity exists   X 
Clear understanding of reform process   X 
Staggered implementation X   
Clear lines of monitoring and evaluations are shared by all 
stakeholders 
 X  
Central authorities support for decentralization  X  
Transparency in the delivery of resources and decision-making   X  
Source: author based on Winkler (1989) and Naidoo (2007) 
 
Overall then, the education reforms proposed in Paraguay, including some 
decentralization initiatives, have had a very limited impact on improving the quality and 
equity of education services in the country. The implementation of the proposed 
decentralization reforms were confronted with serious political and financial challenges 
from representatives of the central government and unions, as well as by other internal 
political tensions among governors, local mayors, and authorities of the national 
government themselves.   
The lack of clear legal framework, both in terms of responsibilities assigned to the 
different levels of government, and financially, hindered the process, made it more 
confusing, and held back reforms. Congress did not give impetus or guidance to the 
process, and did not enact the necessary legislation to move the process forward. Moreover, 
the Ministry of Education leadership was also not supportive of the process. Thus, the 
progress made has been very slow and the results not very encouraging.  
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Decentralization reforms proposed such as the creation of CONEC, the 
Departmental Education Councils, and the ACEs have not played an important role in 
promoting decentralization of education.  
It is possible that the approval of the Education Law in 1998, was done under the 
impetus of what was happening in the health sector, and at a time when some legislators in 
Congress were supportive of decentralization. But, the implementation confronted serious 
opposition from the Ministry’s bureaucracy, unions, and a political situation that made it 
very difficult to succeed. Funding to regional and local governments was never enough and 
their responsibilities were limited in scope.  
As in the case of the health sector, this chapter has shown that education 
decentralization, even more than in the health case, has been dependent on the political will 
of key stakeholders. Even more than in the health sector, there was no national discussion 
on educational decentralization reforms, and the degree of collaboration that was present 
at the time of enacting Law 1264 of 1998 quickly dissolved, and opposition to the process 
took the upper hand. Thus, hypothesis one and two are partially confirmed, but the impact 
on basic indicators could not be measured.  
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
 
EDUCATION DECENTRALIZATION IN COLOMBIA 1990 – 2010  
 
 
Introduction 
 
For most of its modern history, Colombia’s public education has been marked by a 
lack of clear rules, powerful unions, and poor results. The country’s public education has 
not been characterized as one that excels in preparing students for the labor market or one 
that provides a good education.  Over the years, formal education catered mainly to the 
middle and upper classes, emphasizing preparation for more prestigious careers such as 
law, was prioritized over the education of poor Colombians (Hudson, 2010).   
The 1991 Constitution established that basic education was free and compulsory 
for all children between 5 and 15 years of age; including kindergarten, five years of 
elementary school, and four years of secondary education. Access and quality continue to 
be a serious challenge, and most people who can afford it send their children to private 
schools. Inadequate resources and mismanagement continue to drive students to the private 
sector.  
Though indicators, such as coverage and literacy rates, have improved significantly 
with the implementation of decentralization policies, the statistics must be interpreted 
cautiously as serious regional and social differences remain (Hudson, 2010. Santa Maria et 
al., 2009; Iregui et al., 2006; Faguet & Sanchez, 2006). Major cities have mostly achieved 
universal coverage and literacy is also very high, but in rural areas, the situation is very 
different.  
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The national government oversees all public education policies in Colombia and 
provides most of the funding for public schools, whether directly through the Ministry of 
Education or through transfers to subnational governments. The decentralization reforms 
initiated in the 1980s, and accelerated after the 1991 Constitution, though, have given 
Departments and local governments a voice in the control of the schools. Thus, the Ministry 
has found itself sharing responsibilities with regional governments, which tend to be more 
responsive to political pressure, and whose record of performance varies widely (Hudson, 
2010; Santa Maria et al., 2009).  
A significant obstacle to education reform has been the Colombian Federation of 
Educators (FECODE), which is the largest union in the country. FECODE has strongly 
resisted decentralization initiatives that would give more control to subnational authorities 
over teachers’ evaluations and resources, preferring to maintain its grip on national politics 
by exerting pressure at the national level (Hudson, 2010; Santa Maria et al., 2009; Melo, 
2005; Lowden, 2004; Hanson, 1995).  
This section will examine education decentralization in Colombia, its background, 
and the decentralization reform process, including its implementation to test the validity of 
hypothesis one (H1)131. The section will conclude by analyzing the impact of reforms to 
test the validity of hypothesis two (H2)132 by using indicators of school coverage and 
enrollment. 
																																																								131	H1: If national, regional, and local political leaders participate and collaborate in the promotion of 
political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization, there is a greater probability for the passage, approval, 
and implementation of public service decentralization laws. 	132	H2: Once public service delivery decentralization has been enacted, the higher the degree of collaboration 
between national, regional, and local levels of government (in essence the type of intergovernmental relations 
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Background of the Reform: The Need for Reform 	
Public education in Colombia has been affected by poor allocation of resources, 
regional inequalities, teachers’ selection mechanisms, teachers’ salaries, socio-economic 
factors of each student, and the transitory aspects of many reforms (Iregui et al., 2006).  
 The Ministry of Education has historically lacked the capacity to execute national 
education policies in the country, as well as the capacity to enforce education standards.  
 In the 1950s, Colombia was lagging behind most Latin American countries in 
educational indicators. Illiteracy reached 44% of the population older than 7 years old, and 
elementary education only reached 46.3% of children between 7 and 11 years old. High 
school indicators were abysmal. Recommendations were made to increase coverage and to 
improve quality, especially of basic elementary education and vocational schools. The 
government of Rojas Pinilla sought to implement some of these reforms (Iregui et al., 
2006).  
 In the 1960s, there was a considerable increase in resources allocated to education, 
and special emphasis was placed on improving secondary education. A result of these 
efforts was the creation, in many parts of the country, of National Institutes of Diversified 
Education (or INEM—reflecting Spanish terminology)133, aimed at providing classes not 
only on the classical curriculum, but also vocational training in industrial, commercial, and 
agricultural areas. By the end of the decade, the Educational Regional Funds (FERs—
reflecting Spanish terminology)134 were created to centralize education administration, and 																																																								
established), stakeholders and citizens (other socio-political actors); the greater the probability of its success 
and effectiveness.  
 133	Institutos Nacionales de Educacion Media Diversificada 	
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the Situado Fiscal was established to provide Departments with resources to be spent on 
education.  
 The efforts made did not produce much results as the 1970s still saw serious 
problems with lack of infrastructure (classrooms and unfinished buildings), poorly trained 
teachers, absenteeism and high drop-out rates. Regional inequalities continued, as well as 
lack of curricular integration between the three levels of schooling (Iregui et al., 2006).  A 
series of policies were again designed to address these persistent problems, including the 
universalization of primary education, the creation of pre-K centers, and the adoption of a 
mechanism of automatic promotion in primary school, increased coverage in high school 
education, and the standardization of salaries for secondary education. A training program 
for teachers was designed, as well as an economic incentive one to attract better qualified 
teachers to the public sector.  
 Toward the end of this decade, some improvements in elementary education could 
be seen, but secondary education continued in critical condition, including tertiary 
education where only 9 out of 1,000 students had access to a public university. An 
important development was the adoption, in 1979, of the Teachers’ Statute (Estatuto 
Docente), oriented toward establishing the conditions by which teachers would be hired, 
promoted, and retired in the public schools system (Iregui et al., 2006; Lowden, 2004).  
The 1979 enactment of the teachers’ labor regime, the Estatuto Docente gave the 
teachers’ union (FECODE) great influence and bargaining power at the national level. The 
new rules were to have a great impact for future decentralization reforms, as many benefits 
																																																								
134 Fondos Regionales de Educacion  
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(such as automatic promotion based on years of service or attendance to 
trainings/publications, no performance evaluation criteria, tenure, and the near 
impossibility of being fired) were to be seen as threatened by the unions if decentralization 
advanced. As such, the power of FECODE was cemented. FECODE also sought to defend 
its bargaining power as a nationally representative organization, and feared that 
decentralization would impact their national-level bargaining power (Santa Maria et al., 
2009; Lowden, 2004; Melo, 2005; Hanson, 1995). 
 At the beginning of the 1980s, the Betancur administration tried again to boost 
public education and a national literacy campaign was launched, aimed especially at 
traditionally excluded communities (called CAMINA), and a National Program for Open 
and at Distance Universities with the objective of making higher education more accessible 
and with broader coverage.  
By 1989, a serious attempt to reform the Ministry of Education (MEN) was 
launched calling for a rational distribution of tasks through administrative decentralization. 
“The role of the reorganized MEN is to specialize in nationwide policy formation, planning, 
evaluation, and training” (Hanson, 1995; page 110). Within the guidelines and parameters 
established by MEN, local municipalities were to establish their own priorities on issues 
such as school construction and maintenance, budget expenditures, and personnel needs. 
Mayors and local councils were put in charge of educational leadership and coordination. 
In accordance with the stated goal of increasing participation in the education decision-
making-process, “large committees of appointed and elected members at the municipal, 
Departmental, and national levels” (Hanson, 1995) were established with the responsibility 
of approving decisions made by the mayors and their education secretaries. A process of 
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fiscal decentralization was also established to finance the administrative decentralization 
of education. 
 The Barco administration also sought to expand education at all levels, but no 
specific programs or plans were designed to advance quality of education. Universities still 
lacked research capacity, and though there was an expansion in the number of higher 
education institutions, they were besieged by administrative and financial problems (Iregui 
et al., 2006).  
 At the beginning of the 1990s, discussions about the need to reform public 
education were placed in the context of its importance for the development of human 
capital and economic development. At this time, access to secondary and tertiary education 
continued to be serious bottlenecks; simultaneously, improvements in the quality of 
educators started to be noticeable, but the quality of education results continued to be poor. 
A serious problem persisted: called the “politization of education,” governors used 
appointments and promotions in schools for political gain (Meade & Gershberg, 2008; 
Iregui et al., 2006).  
 The Constitution of 1991, and Law 60 of 1993, marked the beginning of education 
decentralization and the launching of new reforms, especially fiscal ones. Financial 
resources for education increased dramatically. Departmental and local governments began 
to have a much larger role in the administration and expenditure of financial resources.  
 In 1994, the General Education Law was enacted to regulate the provision of 
education services in accordance with the requirements of the new Constitution. By the 
end of the decade, with the exception of large cities, universal coverage was still not 
prevalent, access to education, by socio-economic categories and by regions, continued to 
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be highly unequal, and quality was still a serious problem (Hudson, 2010; Santa Maria et 
al., 2009; Iregui et al., 2006; Lowden, 2004).  
 The Pastrana administration, in an attempt to improve the sector, focused on 
reducing the teacher/student ratio, as well as on the need to better the socio-economic 
situation of families, seen as a major obstacle to students’ achievements. The proposed 
reforms of his administration included the transfer of teachers within municipalities or 
within the same Department, and also the revision of financial mechanisms including 
considering a voucher system, and greater collaboration with the private sector.  
 By 2001, of great concern were the fiscal implications of decentralization on the 
macroeconomic stability of the country. Thus, by way of Legislative Act 1 in the same 
year, the transfer system to regional governments was reformed and unified in one fund, 
creating the General Sharing System (SGP—reflecting Spanish terminology)135.   
 As discussed in other sections of this study, Law 715 in the same year (2001) 
modified the allocation of funds in the SGP, and defined the competences of Departmental 
and local governments in education and health.  
 Complementarily, Decree 1278 of 2002 issued a new Teachers Statute by which 
the criteria for hiring, promotion, and retirement of public education were redefined, and a 
new echelon of compensation was established based not only on years of service, but also 
on performance.  
No major developments have taken place since then, but the overall goal of 
continuing to expand coverage, increase access and quality, as well as to open more the 
																																																								135	Sistema General de Participaciones 
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tertiary sector have been kept as important objectives of the education decentralization 
process. 
Legal Framework, the 1991 Constitution and Education Decentralization 	
 Between 1975 and 1987, the public education system was greatly centralized. The 
Ministry of Education was the agency responsible for formulating policies and coordinated 
the activities in the area. The national government controlled the transfers to Departments. 
Each Department had a delegate of the central government charged with overseeing how 
expenditures were made, and making sure that contracting was done according to national 
guidelines (Iregui et al., 2006).  
 A first attempt at decentralization occurred in 1987 by giving local governments 
responsibility over local infrastructure. A 1989 law gave authority to the mayors to hire 
teachers with the national government in charge of paying salaries.  
Law 29 of 1989 turned over management of the majority of teachers to the 
municipalities. The law did not have the support of FECODE or the mayors, as they feared 
that resources would not be available and they would be held responsible for any failure. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, responsibilities were split between central, regional, 
and local levels without clear definitions; thus, duplication, confusion, and lack of 
accountability was common (Meade & Gershberg, 2008). 
 With the 1991 Constitution, the administration of elementary and secondary 
education was transferred to regional and local governments with the main objective of 
expanding coverage, especially for elementary and middle school.  
The drafting of the new constitution in 1991, and the critical political situation of 
the country, provided an opportunity to redefine the provision of services in the country, 
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and the need for educational reform was central to many delegates (Galilea et al., 2011; 
Meade & Gershberg, 2008; Lowden, 2004; Dillinger & Webb, 1999).  
 During the Constitutional Assembly, one of the most contentious issues was 
whether to orient decentralization toward a greater role for Departmental governments or 
toward municipalities. FECODE (represented at the Assembly by two of its former leaders) 
was strongly opposed to the municipalization of education. Lowden (2004) attributes the 
success of diluting education decentralization to the fact that many representatives to the 
Assembly feared the power of FECODE, and saw the number of governors (32) as more 
“manageable” than a thousand mayors136. But, President Gaviria and his teams highly 
preferred municipalization of education based on principles of subsidiarity and local public 
choice, including more autonomy to local schools (Lowden, 2004). In the end, a 
compromise was reached with regional and local governments sharing some 
responsibilities for education administration, though it was left for future legislation to 
clearly define the competences of each.  
 The voices of NGOs, church groups, and private school associations were also 
represented at the constitutional assembly but did not have much influence on the outcome. 
The Federation of Municipalities and the Governors Association did not have a major role 
either, as they were relatively new and had very different interests and lacked institutional 
capacity.  
Overall, the discussions regarding education decentralization in the Assembly had more to 
do with fiscal and administrative issues and not with pedagogical ones.  
																																																								136	This view was shared by people interviewed in Colombia (December 2015) 
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 The new Constitution made education a right and increased the number of years for 
obligatory attendance, but did not make it “free and mandatory for all,” something the 
national government opposed as it would have curtailed greater private participation in 
public education (Lowden, 2004; and interviews). The design and implementation of 
education reform was postponed for later discussion. 
 Laws 60 of 1993 and 115 of 1994 were the major legislative initiatives to regulate 
education after the enactment of the new Constitution (Bonet et al., 2014; Galilea et al., 
2011; Iregui et al., 2006; Melo, 2005; Dillinger & Webb, 1999). More autonomy was given 
to governors and mayors in terms of human and financial resources administration.  
Law 60, left in the hands of Departments and the special districts (Bogota, 
Cartagena, Santa Marta, and Barranquilla) the Situado Fiscal, which gave them a 
percentage of the current central government revenues—scheduled to increase from 22.1% 
in 1993 to 24.5% in 1996. A share totaling 60% of the Situado Fiscal was to be spent on 
education, with 20% for health, and the remaining 20% designated for discretionary 
purposes. The municipalities were to allocate 30% of their share to education, 25% to 
health, 20% basic infrastructure and sanitation, and 25% to other expenditures (Santa Maria 
et al., 2009; Lowden, 2004).  
 Administrative responsibilities were also redefined, with the Ministry of Education 
maintaining its regulatory and policy-setting role, Departments were to administer and pay 
teachers, and have a supervisory role over municipalities, which were put in charge of the 
administration and provision of infrastructure. In order for Departments, and municipalities 
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of over 100,000137 to take over the new functions, they needed to be “certified” by the 
Ministry based on meeting a series of criteria, which included having an institutional 
structure, development plan for education, and an information system (Bonet et al., 2014; 
Di Gropello, 2004; Lowden, 2004; Dillinger & Webb, 1999). 
The second major law of this period was introduced by FECODE, and became Law 
115 of 1994, which was supposed to ensure school autonomy with the creation of the 
Institutional Education Projects—allowing schools to present their own pedagogic 
projects. However, the law gave schools no financial or administrative authority. 
Moreover, the law increased the role of the newly created departmental education 
secretariats and also allowed the creation of secretariats at the local level. Their functions, 
though, remained vague. 
In particular, Law 115/94 sought to give more autonomy to local schools by 
allowing the creation of school governments to include teachers, parents, and students in 
charge of establishing the internal rules of the school, identifying needs, and evaluating its 
performance criteria. Institutional Educational Plans (or PEI—reflecting Spanish 
terminology)138 , defined the academic goals of each school according to the general 
guidelines provided by the Ministry of Education. In practice, neither one had real 
autonomy, neither in resource management nor in the decision-making process.  
By 2001, fiscal pressures and economic crisis paved the road for the Pastrana 
administration to annul Law 60, and enact Law 715, which substantially changed how 																																																								137	Some decentralization reformers had proposed that the threshold be 50,000 inhabitants, but they were 
defeated (Lowden, 2004).  
 138	Plan Educativo Institucional 
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subnational governments were to be financed139. The Situado Fiscal, and other sources of 
funding, were consolidated in the General Sharing System (Sistema General de 
Participaciones), which was delinked from increases or decreases of the central 
government revenues, and a ceiling to total transfers was established. Funds could be spent 
on infrastructure, food, and transportation (after paying for salaries); municipalities could 
also contract with private entities to provide services. 
 Law 715 created a new system by which central funds for education were to be 
allocated according to the number of students enrolled in public schools and no longer on 
the number of teachers employed in each jurisdiction. Departments and municipalities were 
also no longer able to create teaching posts (no doubt a good source of patronage and 
clientelism) unless they had the budget to pay for them. Reforms to the teaching career 
were also made, including increasing the number of years teachers needed to be in each 
category before they could move up on the career ladder (Lowden, 2004).  
 The Law also increased the power and control of the Education Ministry over 
teachers’ management, including elimination of posts and transfers, new reporting rules 
and regulations were put in place to ensure better oversight of Departments and 
municipalities by the central authorities (Lowden, 2004). The Law made certification easier 
for municipalities (assuming control of resources and administration from the 
Departments) by making possible for local governments with less than 100,000 inhabitants 
																																																								139	Interviews with former Pastrana administration senior officials also expressed the deep preoccupation 
at the time with the financial stability of the country and the perception that local and regional 
governments’ financial imbalances were threatening the country’s fiscal stability.  
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to apply for certification. School directors were given more autonomy in the selection and 
management of teachers and resources.  
 The main purpose of Law 715 from the central government’s perspective was to 
strengthen decentralization, but with greater central government enforcement capacity 
(Lowden, 2004). The Law was supported by many political actors and stakeholders as the 
fiscal situation of the country was increasingly difficult, governors and mayors claimed for 
clarification of their roles and responsibilities, and many felt that the power of FECODE 
needed to be curtailed. In this regard, in 2002 the Pastrana administration reformed the 
Estatuto Docente or Teacher Statute establishing clear requisites to enter the teaching 
profession, as well as for promotions and retirement, conditions for reallocation, and 
dismissal of teachers. Decree 230 established norms to evaluate students and school 
performance (Lowden, 2004). 
Table 65: Law 60/1993 – Responsibilities by Level of Government – Education 
National  
Government 
Departmental 
Governments 
Municipal  
Governments 
- sets the policies and 
general objectives of 
the education sector  
- establishes the 
technical, curricular, 
and pedagogical 
norms to be used by 
the Departments 
- designs and manages 
the national 
information system 
- administers and 
directs, jointly with 
the municipalities, the 
provision of 
elementary and 
secondary education 
- participates in the 
funding and co-
funding of the area, 
and on infrastructure 
- administers and 
transfers the Situado 
Fiscal (resources 
from the central 
government) 
- promotes and 
evaluates teacher 
training 
- administers pre-K, 
elementary and 
secondary education 
as designed by the 
Department 
- finances the 
necessary investment 
for infrastructure and 
maintenance of 
education facilities 
- examines and 
supervises the 
provision of 
education services 
Source: Author. Adapted from Melo (2005) 
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 Law 715/2001 redefined the role of Departments and of certified municipalities in 
human resources administration (hiring, establishing guidelines, promotions), and were 
allowed to transfer teachers within municipalities (Table 66 below summarizes 
competences by level of government). Non-certified municipalities could only transfer 
teachers within the educational institutions present in their territory, could invest their own 
resources in infrastructure or to improve educational outcomes (Bonet et al., 2014; Galilea, 
2011; Di Gropello, 2004).   
In the case of Departments, the requirements for education certification included 
having (Melo, 2005; Di Gropello, 2004): 
- a functional information system, 
- the approval of a development plan for the area, 
- the approval by the Departmental Junta of the rules and regulations by which 
resources were to be used,  
- the adoption of a plan to increase the number of enrolled students, 
- an agreement with the Ministry of Education.  
In the case of municipalities, certification has been slow, partly due to institutional 
challenges and lack of capacity at the local level, but also due to the opposition of 
Departmental government, which see their resources diminished. As of 2009, only 4% of 
municipalities were certified in education (48 of 1,120 municipalities). The requirements 
for education certification were established by the Ministry of Education by decree 2700 
of 2004 and include (Santa Maria et al., 2009): 
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- Presenting a municipal education development plan in accordance with national 
guidelines. The plan must include a description of programs, projects, goals and 
indicators for coverage, quality, and efficiency in the provision of services.  
- Human resources staff with the required proficiency, as established by national 
government guidelines. The municipality must elaborate a feasibility study that 
justifies the human resources and provide such study to the Departmental 
government with an analysis of the financial viability. Once certified, the 
Department will formally, and effectively, transfer the education human resources 
to the municipality.  
- Local governments must have the educational facilities needed to provide such 
services140.  
- Institutional capacity: in accordance with guidelines established and defined by the 
Ministry of Education, municipalities must have undergone a modernization plan 
that would allow them to have the technical capacity to take over their new roles.  
Municipalities that intend to be certified must submit a request to the governor of 
the Department, who will have a month to consider the petition. After that, the Department 
must assist in the certification process. The Ministry of Education will verify the level of 
support provided by the Department to the local government. Once all requirements are 
met, the municipality formally requests the certification from the Department. The 
governor would then make an official transfer of the education resources to the 
																																																								140	The law requires that educational institutions must be able to provide education from pre-K (one year 
of pre-K) to ninth grade.  
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municipality, with the municipality from then on receiving the financial transfers directly 
from the central government.  
By the end of 2001, only one municipality was certified in education (Armenia), 
and by 2007 the number had increased to 39141. Lowden (2004) attributes the reasons for 
this partly to political conflict and tensions between FECODE and the governors and 
between governors and mayors, and also to the reluctance of many municipalities to 
assume responsibilities without proper funding, especially in regard to the refusal by some 
Departments to cover the pension costs of teachers (Meade & Gershberg, 2008; Lowden, 
2004).  
																																																								141	http://www.portalterritorial.gov.co/preguntas.shtml?apc=r-caqueta;x;x;x1-&x=80241  	
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Table 66: Law 715/2001 Competences by Level of Government – Education 
National  
Government 
Departmental 
Governments 
Municipal  
Governments 
- formulate policies and 
objectives of the 
education sector, and 
provide the norms and 
rules for the 
organization and 
delivery of services; 
- regulate the provision 
of services for public 
and private institutions; 
- promote, fund, 
coordinate and evaluate 
investment programs; 
- evaluate the financial 
and administrative 
performance of regional 
governments; 
- transfer the education 
resources of the SGP; 
- annually define the per 
student allocation; 
- establish the 
requirements for 
municipalities’ 
certification, and decide 
about the certification 
of municipalities of less 
than 100,000 
inhabitants (in the case 
the Department refuses 
to do it).  
General Competences: 
- provide financial, 
administrative, and 
technical assistance on 
the provision of 
education services to 
the municipalities; 
- administer, and be 
responsible for, the 
education information 
of the Department 
(including its reliability 
and quality); 
- support and provide 
technical and 
administrative 
assistance to the 
municipalities wishing 
to be certified; 
- certify the 
municipalities that 
fulfill the requirements. 
Competences Regarding non-
certified municipalities: 
- direct, plan, and 
provide education 
services in the pre-K, 
elementary, and middle 
levels; 
- administer and 
distribute among 
municipalities the 
financial resources 
coming from the SGP; 
- administer the 
educational institutions, 
as well as teaching and 
administrative 
personnel; 
- distribute among 
municipalities the 
teaching and 
administrative staff in 
accordance to the needs 
of the system. 
For certified municipalities: 
- direct, plan, and 
provide education 
services in the pre-K, 
elementary, and middle 
levels; 
- administer and 
distribute among the 
educational institutions 
the financial resources 
coming from the SGP; 
- administer the 
educational institutions, 
as well as teaching and 
administrative 
personnel. 
 
For non-certified municipalities: 
- administer and 
distribute the SGP 
resources assigned to 
them for the 
maintenance and 
improvement of 
quality, the transfer of 
teachers and vacancies 
between their 
educational institutions; 
- provide the information 
required by the 
Department and the 
national government.  
Source: Author. Adapted from Santa Maria et al., 2009 & Galilea et al., 2011 
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Financing of Public Education 	
By 2009, only about 4% of municipalities were certified. Most of education 
decentralization has, in practice, been taken over by Departmental governments (Santa 
Maria el at, 2009).  
The principal source of funding for public education comes from transfers of the 
SGP. These transfers are distributed among Departments, certified municipalities, and 
special districts in accordance to the criteria established by Law 715/2001. Subnational 
governments can also allocate from their own budget, resources to education. A particular 
source of revenue in this regard are the funds from the Royalties Fund which are used to 
finance regional development plans to include education.  
Presently, Law 715 orders that 58.5% of the SGP must be spent in education. 
Criteria for the distribution of resources, as per Law 715, is based on population served 
(students enrolled). Each year the Ministry defines a per student allocation, per each level 
of education (pre-K, elementary, middle), and per area (rural and urban). Once resources 
are allocated by population served, the balance is distributed taking into account criteria of 
students to be served and by poverty index.  
About 90% of expenses are paid from transfers of the SGP, which shows the high 
dependence of Departments and certified municipalities on transfers from the central 
government (Santa Maria et al., 2009).  
Between 2002 and 2007, the Departments with the largest population dispersion, 
were the ones that received the most funds from the SGP per student enrolled (Guainia, 
Vaupes, Vichada, and Amazonas). Of the 32 Departments (plus the city of Bogota), 23, or 
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72%, received in average 1 and 1.3 million of pesos—the average spent per enrolled 
student (Santa Maria et al., 2009).  
Royalties also play a role in the financing of public education. Law 141 of 1994, 
established that Departments and municipalities could use the funds from royalties to 
increase coverage in health, education, and potable water. Law 756 of 2002 also established 
that, as long as subregional levels of government did not meet the basic coverage indicators 
in infant mortality rates, basic health and education coverage, potable water and sewage, 
Departmental governments must allocate no less than 60% of the total royalties transfer to 
these services. In the case of local governments, the percentage is 90% (Santa Maria et al., 
2009; Melo, 2005).  
The national government transfers the royalties through two mechanisms: direct 
royalties transferred to the producing Departments and municipalities, and to the port cities 
from where the products are exported to; and indirect royalties that benefit all Departments 
and municipalities of the country through the presentation, to the National Royalties Fund 
or FNR (reflecting Spanish terminology),142 of development programs and projects for its 
approval and funding. Those projects are evaluated and prioritized by the National 
Planning Department and its approval is dependent on the Royalties Advising Board, an 
advisory agency of the FNR. Overall, the amounts are low and their share of education 
financing too. According to Santa Maria et al. (2009), it represented less than 1%. 
Direct royalties have been characterized by uncertainty as the price of commodities 
have fluctuated, and economic crisis have impacted the transfers. The producing 
																																																								142	Fondo Nacional de Regalias 
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Departments of Casanare, Arauca, Meta, Guajira, Tolima, and Huila are the ones who have 
benefited the most from direct royalties, though they are subject to market fluctuations and 
commodity price slumps.  
A problem with the use of royalties is the heavy dependence on transfers from the 
central government. Moreover, though the law established that when basic indicators are 
not been met, 60% of royalties funds must be spent on health, education, and water and 
sanitation, there are no requirements or guidelines as to what percentage should be spent 
on what sector, leaving it to the discretion of governors and mayors—the resources are 
often misallocated, misspent, embezzled, or simply spent on projects of poor technical 
quality or with no sustainability (Santa Maria et al., 2009). 
 
Impact of Education Decentralization in Colombia 	
Analyzing the impact of education decentralization is not an easy task as many 
socio economic factors influence the possible results of the proposed policies.  
In terms of the legal framework established, Meade and Gershberg (2008) point to 
the fact that, during the 1980s-1990s in the intergovernmental system established in 
Colombia, responsibilities were split between central, regional, and local levels without 
clear definitions; thus, duplication, confusion, and lack of accountability was common.  
Impediments to reform included a lack of unity within the national ministry to 
facilitate reforms, clientelism, and opposition by unions, and a lack of capacity at the local 
level. The Education Ministry had little enforcing capacity, accountability was problematic 
(the ministry lacked a good information system to be able to know what was happening in 
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remote regions). Smaller cities had low capacity, poor infrastructure, and some were 
embedded in conflict.  
As central funding was tied to the number of teachers employed by Departments, 
this led to an extremely unequal distribution of funding (plus it also encouraged 
clientelism). The numbers of teachers hired continued to rise, as well as their salaries.  
Di Gropello (2004) and Melo (2005) also note that the dispersion of responsibilities 
across political actors, while it can make sense politically, greatly complicates 
accountability relationships because of the absence of a level that is clearly responsible for 
service delivery. This view was expressed by many people interviewed in Colombia who 
mentioned that with everybody being responsible for some part of the reforms, in the end, 
nobody is responsible for anything143.  
In an analysis of the impact of fiscal decentralization on public education (in 
essence how efficiently have regional and local governments spent the resources), Melo 
(2005) concludes that there are high levels of inefficiency. During the time that Law 60 
was in place, there was a positive impact on coverage, but a negative impact on the 
academic achievements of students. The transfer of more resources has not been 
accompanied by an increase in the quality of education.  
Universal coverage was one of the main goals of decentralization (Melo, 2005). 
Governors seem to have concentrated on expanding coverage but were not as concerned 
with the quality of the education provided. As a result of conflicting responsibilities, quality 
of education has not significantly improved. Public schools continue to be at the bottom of 
																																																								143	Representatives of the Governors and Mayors Federations during many interviews conducted for this 
research.  
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quality indexes, and the results of per-grade-proficiency level exams are, in general, very 
poor (Iregui et al., 2006). 
Public expenditure on education has increased. As percentage of GDP it grew from 
3.3% in 1993, to 4.9% in 1999, to 4.8% in 2010 (World Bank data. See Table 67 below). 
On average, the central government covers about 85% of education expenses, and 
Departments and municipalities, using their own resources, contribute the remaining 15%. 
The largest expense is by far salaries and pensions (see Tables 67 & 68) where up to 90% 
of public education expenditures is spent on education staff compensation.  
 
Table 67: Education Expenditures – Colombia 1998 – 2010	
 
Expenditure on 
education (1) 
Government expenditure on 
education (2) 
Per Capita 
Expenditure 
(Euros) 
1998 12.4 3.9 - 
1999 13.1 4.4 90 
2000 13.2 3.5 94 
2001 13.4 3.7 100 
2002 15.2 4.3 107 
2003 15.5 4.3 87 
2004 15.4 4.0 91 
2005 15.5 3.9 110 
2006 13.7 3.8 116 
2007 14.4 4.0 140 
2008 14.6 3.9 146 
2009 16.0 4.7 177 
2010 16.4 4.8 229 
(1) as % of total government expenditure (%) 
(2) as % of GDP (%) 
Source: Author based on World Bank Development Indicators. Accessed 1/14/2016 and 
http://www.datosmacro.com/estado/gasto/educacion/colombia 
 
 The increase on public expenditures in education can be seen in Table 68 below, 
which shows the education budgets per Department.  
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Table 68: Public Expenditure in Education per Department, 2002-2007 (millions of 
pesos, 2008)	
Department 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Antioquia 1,132,423 1,151,569 1,198,661 1,333,733 1,464,470 1,248,820 
Bogota 1,273,137 1,247,522 1,214,342 1,473,483 1,536,902 1,117,382 
Valle Cauca 680,339 698,111 756,990 804,120 822,387 883,567 
Santander 554,039 545,084 514,179 541,071 550,655 588,886 
Bolivar 399,747 444,949 497,398 530,674 535,466 566,331 
Cundinamarca 611,432 573,391 553,597 583,067 564,991 564,893 
Cordoba 382,959 385,757 442,677 472,368 476,174 531,038 
Tolima 365,930 371,071 364,983 381,283 368,531 493,493 
Nariño 422,486 453,825 571,062 441,574 468,868 482,751 
Boyaca 526,466 511,059 437,971 450,879 450,078 467,832 
N. Santander 346,936 340,320 343,788 345,768 392,739 398,067 
Cauca 320,886 329,523 343,952 343,437 357,759 390,085 
Atlantico 349,811 366,459 393,668 404,207 400,073 388,804 
Magdalena 273,220 285,484 403,668 354,681 374,004 376,645 
Huila 275,352 277,896 293,186 307,054 302,073 346,191 
Cesar 219,646 238,586 270,825 267,262 283,542 329,221 
Meta 184,949 189,943 214,061 228,102 258,603 305,127 
Guajira 128,621 153,827 215,111 173,493 253,383 265,338 
Caldas 290,047 284,525 255,901 255,448 262,531 262,437 
Sucre 204,778 245,092 259,005 262,346 261,609 260,927 
Casanare 116,957 120,085 132,193 125,692 137,039 218,156 
Risaralda 207,588 215,595 212,826 217,798 224,320 211,346 
Choco 173,546 183,368 195,266 184,885 185,307 183,440 
Putumayo 105,664 108,418 133,719 132,545 132,563 147,891 
Caqueta 121,483 123,382 249,930 132,994 136,864 140,400 
Quindio 143,641 148,059 135,080 131,834 158,384 138,851 
Arauca 97,504 100,534 82,868 89,822 101,139 136,291 
Guaviare 36,125 34,772 45,294 46,958 44,972 46,753 
Amazonas 29,086 29,813 38,600 38,703 41,019 38,287 
Vichada 32,965 32,084 36,796 36,151 34,912 35,687 
San Andres 23,047 21,552 21,603 20,972 23,890 23,328 
Guainia 24,367 25,044 21.224 21,225 28,688 20,486 
Vaupes 24,560 24,324 19,165 19,648 19,656 19,715 
Total 10,079,682 9,920,703 10,484,579 10,349,157 11,429,271 11,445,026 
Source: Santa Maria et al., 2009 
  
The Colombian government’s own ten year evaluation of education 
decentralization (1990-2001) finds that education “decentralization has favored an increase 
in coverage, reduction in the general illiteracy rate, greater availability of teachers and 
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higher schooling levels” (Rojas & Frank, 2004).  Faguet and Sanchez (2009), in analyzing 
the results of education decentralization in Colombia, also find that decentralization 
coincides with a 20% increase in total school enrollment, and increased literacy rates 
(93%). The authors also stress the finding that enrollment increased sharply in those 
districts that were the most financially decentralized and most free from central 
government influence. 
There is overall consensus that coverage has increased. The vast majority of 
students in Colombia attend public schools. Between 1985 and 2002, 75% of students were 
enrolled in public schools, and 70% of teachers worked for public schools. Elementary 
school coverage increased from 68.4% in 1989 to 83.7% in the year 2000, and secondary 
education coverage increased from 40.3% in 1989 to 62% in 1997 (Santa Maria et al., 
2009).  
  Coverage has increased nationwide, especially for elementary (6 to 10 years old), 
and secondary education (11 to 14 years old), with less success in expanding middle 
education (15 to 17 years old). Tables 69 and 70 below show national improvements in 
primary and secondary enrollment rates, as well as in completion rates for primary students. 
Completion and enrollment rates have improved significantly—since the implementation 
of decentralization and the 1994 education law—for secondary students (one of the main 
policy goals), with gross enrollment rates improving from 64% in 1994 to 71% by the year 
2000, to 82% in 2005, and 95% by 2010. Completion rates have also increased, from 45% 
in 1993 to 58% in 2001, reaching 91% in 2010 (see also Figure 3).  
Great regional variations remain. The newest Departments (Vichada, Guaviare, 
Vaupes) have the lowest coverage for elementary school and secondary school. Choco is 
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another Department that stands out for its low coverage at all levels (Santa Maria et al., 
2009). School drop-out rates continue to be a problem in many Departments. In 2007, the 
average dropout rate, at the Departmental level, was of 7.1%. For the 2002-2007 period, 
the Department of Caqueta had the most serious problem in this regard with 14.9% drop 
out rate, and the best was the city of Bogota with just 3.2% (Santa Maria et al., 2009).   
 
Table 69: Education Indicators (Selected) – Colombia 1990 – 2010	
 
(1) both sexes (number) 
(2) both sexes (number) 
(3)  both sexes (%) 
(4) both sexes (number) 
(5) both sexes (%) 
(6) both sexes (%) 
(7) both sexes (%) 
(8) (% of total expenditure in public institutions) 
(9) as % of government expenditure on education (%) 
(10) as % of GDP per capita (%) 
(11)  (% of total expenditure in primary public institutions) 
(12) (% of total expenditure in secondary public institutions) 
Source: Author based on World Bank Development Indicators. Accessed 1/14/2016  
Series&Name 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Enrolment&in&primary&education(1) 4246658 4310970 4525959 4599132 4648335 4692614 4916934 .. .. 5162260 5221018
OutBofBschool&children&of&primary&school&age(2) .. 1190651 875312 857424 840109 725269 532967 .. 270024 198353 159945
Gross&enrolment&ratio,&primary&(3) 105.4405 106.1356 110.4852 111.3202 111.5517 111.6661 116.09 .. 119.0579 118.5221 118.8807
Primary&completion&rate,&both&sexes&(%) 73.55794 72.94743 81.81144 82.92981 82.62786 86.39491 87.58864 .. 93.39546 94.86706 94.8574
Enrolment&in&secondary&education(4) .. 2377947 2686515 2829435 2935830 3025350 3252128 .. .. 3589425 3568889
Gross&enrolment&ratio,&secondary(5) .. 52.36373 58.23482 60.50289 62.07318 63.34929 67.57471 .. 72.42449 72.57739 71.51099
Lower&secondary&completion&rate(6) .. .. .. 45.66249 .. .. .. .. 69.17265 .. ..
Youth&literacy&rate,&population&15B24&years(7) .. .. .. 90.52465 .. .. 96.995 .. .. .. ..
Current&education&expenditure,&total(8) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Expenditure&on&primary(9) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 44.93812 45.16187 44.55692
Government&expenditure&per&primary&student(10)& .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 13.24931 15.24253 11.95551
All&education&staff&compensation,&primary(11) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
All&education&staff&compensation,&secondary(12) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
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Table 70: Education Indicators (Selected) – Colombia 2001 – 2010 	
	
(1) both sexes (number) 
(2) both sexes (number) 
(3)  both sexes (%) 
(4) both sexes (number) 
(5) both sexes (%) 
(6) both sexes (%) 
(7) both sexes (%) 
(8) (% of total expenditure in public institutions) 
(9) as % of government expenditure on education (%) 
(10) as % of GDP per capita (%) 
(11)  (% of total expenditure in primary public institutions) 
(12) (% of total expenditure in secondary public institutions) 
Source: Author based on World Bank Development Indicators. Accessed 1/14/2016  
 
  
Series&Name 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Enrolment&in&primary&education(1) 5131463 5193055 .. 5259033 5298257 5296190 5292476 5285523 5299258 5084972
OutBofBschool&children&of&primary&school&age(2) 234995 189015 .. 281828 178763 222685 272710 295334 319134 391648
Gross&enrolment&ratio,&primary&(3) 116.0434 116.9415 .. 118.4376 119.633 119.733 119.7376 119.5937 119.8435 114.9137
Primary&completion&rate,&both&sexes&(%) 92.17438 92.58965 .. 100.0221 103.5889 109.3641 110.8273 110.4283 114.623 113.3939
Enrolment&in&secondary&education(4) .. 3723348 .. 4050525 4297228 4509406 4684033 4772189 4992062 5079732
Gross&enrolment&ratio,&secondary(5) .. 73.2597 .. 78.1847 82.21493 85.76431 88.71023 90.15461 94.25033 95.96435
Lower&secondary&completion&rate(6) 58.6589 63.78273 .. 69.81939 75.2119 77.94411 80.1693 82.43913 88.81356 91.30218
Youth&literacy&rate,&population&15B24&years(7) .. .. .. 97.99131 97.9584 97.88317 97.96863 97.98927 97.93743 98.09842
Current&education&expenditure,&total(8) .. 96.83647 .. 93.31497 .. .. 100 100 .. 77.73353
Expenditure&on&primary(9) 44.57196 39.88195 .. 48.3245 47.43698 40.49725 36.62786 37.30254 38.40722 35.92155
Government&expenditure&per&primary&student(10)& 13.06542 13.51016 .. 15.94129 15.4463 13.05167 12.49926 12.45925 15.75964 15.83455
All&education&staff&compensation,&primary(11) .. .. .. 76.47044 .. .. 80.06557 75.26206 93.1597 89.70094
All&education&staff&compensation,&secondary(12) .. .. .. 76.47042 .. .. 80.06557 75.26207 93.1597 89.70095
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Figure 3: Evolution of Primary and Secondary Enrollment (1998 – 2010) 
Government Expenditure on Education (1998 – 2010) – Colombia  
 
 
In the case of municipalities, data has been very difficult to gather to compare their 
effectiveness in implementing education decentralization. But, Faguet and Sanchez (2006), 
using large-N and quantitative analysis of municipalities in Bolivia and Colombia (90% of 
Colombian municipalities), find evidence of the link between decentralization and 
increased number of school enrollment. Also, those municipalities that spend more of their 
own resources in education, as well as those that are certified, show higher enrollment rates 
than those which are not (Faguet & Sanchez, 2006).  
 In truth, since the law establishes that municipalities with over 100,000 inhabitants 
and Departments are certified, and the municipalities meeting that population threshold are 
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in the minority, most of education decentralization in Colombia has been implemented by 
the regional governments. The goal of increasing enrollment has been largely achieved, 
but serious quality gaps remain.  
 
Conclusions 	
The Colombian experience with education decentralization offers some important 
insights into a process that is often complicated, reversible, and filled with power struggles 
and intense politicking.  
As noted at the outset of this review of the Colombian experience, some key 
questions related to roles and responsibilities, fiscal impact, accountability, local capacity, 
and local participation in the decision-making process must be addressed and taken into 
account as decentralization processes are unfolding (Winkler, 1989; Naidoo, 2007; 
Hanson, 1997). In the case of Colombia, some of these issues were not properly addressed 
and problems appeared early in the process.  
By applying what Winkler (1989) and Naidoo (2007) consider necessary factors of 
successful decentralization, to the Colombian experience between 1990 and 2010, it is 
evident that the country’s initiative has met some of the proposed criteria (Table 71 below), 
resulting in an overall mixed success in the implementation of education decentralization 
policies.  
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Table 71: Factors for a Successful Decentralization	
 Yes No Mixed 
Presence of tradition of self-reliance at local level  X  
Subregional governments have access—and autonomy in the 
use of—to funding    
 
X 
There is local demand for decentralization   X 
Key stakeholders are involved in the decision making process  
X  
 
 
Local administrative capacity exists   X 
Clear understanding of reform process   X 
Staggered implementation X   
Clear lines of monitoring and evaluations are shared by all 
stakeholders   
 
X 
Central authorities support for decentralization X   
Transparency in the delivery of resources and decision-making     X 
Source: author based on Winkler (1989) and Naidoo (2007) 
 
 At the beginning of the process in Colombia, years of persistent political violence 
meant that local communities lacked a tradition of self-reliance, so it was necessary to 
ensure accountability at the local level and citizens’ involvement in the process. Some of 
the school reforms aimed at including parents and students in participatory school and 
curriculum management failed because of this. Key stakeholders also lacked clear 
information and understanding of what the process entailed, and what was expected from 
each level of government. Lack of information and communication has negatively 
impacted accountability at all levels. 
Some other obstacles to the reform included the lack of coordination among 
different stakeholders; lack of a shared vision of what the process entailed; confusion as 
there were no clear guidelines of what was expected from each level of government; the 
and opposition of national, regional, and local bureaucracies, as well as the powerful 
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teachers’ union (FECODE). Decentralization for the teachers’ union meant losing political 
power, which came from being able to negotiate national contracts (Berhman, Deolalikar, 
Soon, 2002). The unions scored some important victories as schools were not given 
autonomy to select, hire, and discipline staff, for example.  
At the Departmental and municipal levels, a main problems was the weakness of 
administrative institutions, and the lack of local capacity, in particular for smaller 
municipalities and Departments. As these concerns arose, much to its credit, the Colombian 
government and the Colombian Federation of Municipalities continued to implement 
training to local and regional governments on managing the new programs.  
Many local governments also felt that the central government was transferring 
responsibilities and challenges before a minimum standard was achieved. Thus, local 
governments would have to spend many resources to bring their local schools to the new 
standards and mayors would risk the political fallout in case reforms did not work out.  
 The lack of a shared vision of what education decentralization aimed to accomplish, 
and what level of government was to be in charge of what aspect of implementing the 
reforms, added to the misunderstandings and the setbacks in the Colombian process. 
Vested interests, in particular the teachers’ union, ministries’ bureaucracies, some political 
movements, and to some extent, the violent armed movements, made certain reforms very 
difficult to implement, whittling down the proposed changes. An “all-at-once,” “from-the-
top” imposed strategy did not help the government’s initiative. 
The Colombian case also demonstrates that regional differences and local diversity 
should be taken into account in the design and implementation of education 
decentralization policies. Wealthier and larger Departments, as well as local governments, 
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were reluctant to accept the new responsibilities as long as roles, funding, and 
accountability were not clearly defined and established. Necessary good will and political 
capital were lost in those first years of implementation. 
One of the main problems in the Colombian education decentralization experience 
was, and to some degree still is, with fiscal autonomy and local and regional governments’ 
lack of capacity to procure their own source of revenues, create them, or control spending. 
The Colombian central government still has tight control on how Departments and local 
governments can spend the funds that are transferred to them.  
 The case of education decentralization in Colombia shows just how complicated 
and difficult it is not only to design, but also to implement, decentralization. Setbacks have 
not been uncommon, but—to their credit—Colombia’s political leaders (especially at the 
regional and local level) have shown resilience and political will to continue demanding, 
and improving, the implementation of education decentralization. Decentralization of 
education services, as is the case for any other service, is not an easy task; the issue is 
finding the appropriate balance. Thus, hypothesis one (H1) tends to be positive. 
 In regard to the effectiveness of the policies implemented, the goal of extending 
coverage and increasing enrollment has largely been achieved. Coordination toward this 
goal has not been easy, and the central government has kept close control of the process, 
but, in general, there has been cooperation and collaboration. Thus, the proposed 
hypothesis 2 is also largely positive. The more collaboration between different 
stakeholders, including the three different levels of government, the more likely that public 
policy decentralization objectives would be achieved.  
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CHAPTER TEN 
 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS: INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: PARAGUAY AND COLOMBIA 		
 Colombia and Paraguay are unitary and decentralized countries, as defined in their 
political constitutions. The present research has explored the way inter-governmental 
relations were re-shaped in the 1990s as a consequence of significant reforms initiated in 
both countries, and we have examined the political factors that shaped the decentralization 
reforms in Colombia and Paraguay. These centralized countries were selected for analysis 
because of how reforms emerged from the historical circumstances unique to each country. 
Violence and a need to re-legitimize the State motivated many of Colombia’s reform, while 
departure from years of authoritarian rule and the imperative to strengthen institutions 
motivated Paraguay’s reform. Both countries owed their societies improved delivery of 
public services.  
The particular historical characteristics of each country and the evolution of their 
political and intergovernmental systems was described in Chapters 3 and 4 of this study. 
Colombia’s political system had been marked by years of violent conflict, civil wars, right 
and left wing extremism, and the infiltration of drug cartels in politics. Facing continuously 
weakening democratic institutions, the traditional parties (Conservative and Liberal) 
allowed for significant political reforms aimed at re-legitimizing the State. In the case of 
Paraguay, its political psyche had been scarred by two external wars, followed by years of 
political upheaval that ended in the longest dictatorship—by one man—in Latin American 
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history. Succession tensions and economic worries led to the replacement of the dictator 
and the transition to democracy. In Paraguay, too, there was a need to re-legitimize the 
State and its presence in the territory. Thus, both countries launched a series of reforms 
leading to new political constitutions (in 1991 in the case of Colombia, and in 1992 in the 
case of Paraguay).  
The present research has shown that external shocks provided reformers with both 
the opportunity, and the challenges, to move reforms forward and realize their policy goals. 
Critical junctures, and taking advantage during a window of opportunity, offered 
supporters of decentralization in both Colombia and Paraguay the momentum to push 
reforms forward. Domestic, international, and economic factors contributed to the impetus 
for change, and those same factors are at the heart of slowdown. The present research has 
also considered changes that occurred over time and that contributed to a gradual and 
incremental institutional change (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). 
We examined formal rules (political and judicial, economic, social), and their 
hierarchy (Constitutions, laws, decrees and bylaws), that might constrain institutional 
changes (North, 2009). The bargaining strength of different stakeholders was also taken 
into account in the analysis.  
In the end, it is essential to keep in mind that, as North (2009) posits, institutional 
change is “overwhelmingly incremental.” We have observed that Colombia’s and 
Paraguay’s decentralization reforms, with all their successes and setbacks, show a “gradual 
restructuring of a framework in which the interconnections between formal and informal 
constraints and enforcement characteristics evolved” over time (page 89). The limited 
success of Paraguay’s decentralization can be attributed to the limited degree of freedom 
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that politicians and stakeholders might have to bargain and still maintain the loyalty of their 
constituencies. 
If using Daughters and Harper’s (in Lora, 2007) proposed Decentralization Maturity 
Index to assess how appropriate or effective decentralization reforms have been in five 
fundamental policy areas (political decentralization, expenditures assignment, subnational 
taxation, intergovernmental transfers, and subnational debt management), a clearer picture 
of their similarities and differences can be attained: 
1) Local democratic representation: indicating whether subnational authorities are 
directly or indirectly elected; 
2) Effective assignment of roles and responsibilities at various levels of government: 
measuring the extent of responsibilities over a specific sectors’ delegation to 
subnational authorities; 
3) Strengthening of subnational taxation system: expanding subnational governments’ 
authority over local taxes; 
4) Reduced discretion in the intergovernmental transfer system: level of discretion 
over transfers by the central government, namely the extent to which transfers are 
automatic or freely allocated; 
5) Creation of hard credit culture for subnational borrowing: measuring the presence 
of borrowing restrictions.  
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Table 72: Decentralization Maturity Index – Colombia and Paraguay 
 
 Democratic representation Responsibilities 
Taxation 
System 
Discretion 
of transfers 
Borrowing 
capacity 
Colombia Yes 
Mixed – much 
confusion 
remains 
No 
Yes – but 
central 
government 
keeps 
control 
No 
Paraguay Yes 
Mixed – much 
confusion 
remains 
No 
Yes – but 
central 
government 
keeps 
control 
No 
Source: Author based on Daughters and Harper (in Lora, 2007) 
 
 
As indicated, the differences between the two countries are not significant, except 
in the level of expenditures made by subnational governments in Colombia (much higher 
than their Paraguayan counterparts), and the fact that, though responsibilities are in both 
cases not clearly defined, Colombia’s subnational governments do play a more important 
role in the implementation of health and education decentralization reforms than the 
Paraguayan regional and local authorities.  
Fiscal decentralization has been significant in Colombia but much less so in the 
case of Paraguay.  Fiscal decentralization has been a process principally involving public 
expenditure rather than revenue; and three major concerns remain regarding the 
movements toward fiscal decentralization and how the services decentralized are being 
financed: (a) generating own revenues which, in general, is very limited; (b) the heavy 
reliance on fiscal transfers from the central government; and (c) borrowing, which has also 
been seriously limited  (Gomez Sabaini, & Jimenez, 2006). Tax collection remains a 
problem for most local and regional governments in Colombia and Paraguay. 
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Treisman’s indicators of decentralization (2002) can be used to measure the level 
of decentralization achieved by these two countries: Vertical decentralization refers to the 
number of tiers for each country; decision making decentralization refers to the extent to 
which subnational levels of government have autonomy to make political decisions. In that 
regard, Treisman points to weak autonomy (constitution reserves exclusive right to legislate 
on at least one specific policy area to subnational legislatures), residual authority 
(constitution gives subnational legislature exclusive right to legislate on policy areas not 
specifically assigned in the constitution), and subnational veto (regionally-chosen upper 
house of parliament has constitutional right to block legislation). Appointment 
decentralization refers to the extent to which executive appointments are made by actors at 
same tier; electoral decentralization to the extent to which subnational authorities are 
directly elected; fiscal decentralization, the share of subnational governments in total 
public expenditures or share of tax revenue collection; and finally, personnel 
administration, the share of government employees at the subnational level (see table 73).  
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Table 73: Treisman’s Decentralization Indicators: Colombia and Paraguay 
 
 Vertical 
Decentral
ization 
Decision Making Decentralization 
Appoint
ment 
decentral
ization 
Electoral 
Decentral
ization 
Fiscal 
Decentral
ization 
Personne
l 
Decentral
ization 
 Number 
of Tiers 
Weak 
Auton
omy 
Resi
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house 
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non-
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bills 
    
Colo
mbia 3 No No No No Yes Yes 
18% of 
tax 
revenue 
collected 
by 
subnation
al level* 
subnation
al 
governm
ent 
expendit
ure 
32.3%* 
43% ** 
Parag
uay 3 No No 
Yes for 
Depart
ments 
No for 
municip
alities 
No Yes Yes 
subnation
al 
governm
ent 
expendit
ure 6% 
(2006)**
* 
8.6% 
(2006)**
* 
*OECD Territorial Reviews OECD Territorial Reviews: Colombia 2014 
** OECD Colombia: Implementing Good Governance, 2013 
*** UCGL Country Profiles: Paraguay (http://www.cities-
localgovernments.org/gold/Upload/country_profile/Country%20Profile%20Paraguay.pdf)  
 
 
The table above serves to visualize the stark differences between these two unitary 
countries. Though both have very similar legal frameworks in terms of political and 
administrative autonomy, Paraguay’s regional governments are more restricted fiscally as 
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their budgets are finally approved by Congress and are part of the nation’s budget. This 
contrasts the situation of Colombia’s Departments. Moreover, Colombian municipalities 
are not subject to central government intervention in cases of mismanagement or 
malpractice; while in Paraguay, the legislation allows it—although these instances are rare. 
The main difference between the two countries involves fiscal decentralization. 
Here again, both have limited the fiscal autonomy of subnational governments. They are 
not allowed to create new taxes, but can raise existing ones (in the case of local 
governments), or increase the fees that they already collect. In both Colombia and 
Paraguay, regional and local governments rely heavily on transfers from the central 
government, including royalties. But, the clearest indicator of how much more fiscally 
decentralized Colombia is lies in the share of public expenditures spent at the subnational 
level, which in the case of Colombia reaches 32%—the highest of any other unitary 
country. Paraguay lags behind at only 6%. What is not different between them is the little 
autonomy and/or discretion that regional governments have in the use of funds.  
If central governments only decentralize certain services and funds are earmarked 
to control what subnational governments can actually do, why do they only “partially 
decentralize”? (Lockwood, in Ahmad & Brossio, 2009). The present research has shown 
that this was partly because central governments feared being held responsible for the 
mistakes and mishaps of subnational authorities. In the case of Colombia, for example, the 
fiscal problems of the first wave of decentralization led to the 2001 Law 715 that pushed 
back some of the fiscal decentralization reforms already in place.  
The way decentralization has been designed in many countries, including Colombia 
and Paraguay, has made accountability in the use of funds and outcomes of subnational 
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governments by citizens very difficult (Devarajan et al., 2009). Central governments have 
incentives to deliberately withhold resources from local governments—a widespread 
practice by the Finance Ministry in the case of Paraguay. In both Colombia and Paraguay, 
the central government has put stringent conditions on the transfer of funds, earmarking 
them in such a way that little autonomy is left for subnational governments. Finally, 
transfers have been, in certain instances, selective—benefitting some political allies more 
than others, particularly in the case of Paraguay.  
This partial decentralization creates a governance trap (Devarajan et al., 2009), as 
local and regional governments, facing insufficient resources and lacking decision making 
autonomy, are thus not accountable to their citizens, and central governments blame 
subnational authorities for the lack of capacity they themselves help to perpetuate. As such, 
and as evident in the cases of Colombia and Paraguay, a perverse and self-reinforcing cycle 
is set in motion by which subnational authorities blame central authorities for a poorly 
designed and funded decentralization model, creating incentives at the local level for 
patronage and clientelism; central authorities blame local and regional governments of their 
lack of capacity and accountability. As long as subnational authorities do not have 
autonomy and control over resources (and thus are held accountable for their use and 
outcomes), the expected success of policy decentralization will never materialize.  
The section on political parties (Chapter 5), and their frequent lack of support for 
further decentralization reforms, could be partly explained by the structure of electoral 
incentives (Grofman, in Weingast & Wittman, 2006) —where incentives for voters (or 
their desires) do not always align with those of candidates and parties (aiming to be 
reelected) —and by the ambiguity that characterizes the approval of conflictive legislation 
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where, even when legislation is approved, details are left to be decided by future legislation 
in order to avoid conflict and further tensions.  
The chapter also offered an analysis of the role played by patronage and clientelism 
in defining the characteristics of both countries’ political system, and the influence these 
practices still have in the decision-making process. By analyzing how political 
decentralization, and the electoral reforms enacted in the 1990s, have contributed to the 
denationalization and fragmentation of political parties in both countries, the research 
shows that the practices of clientelism and patronage have been, in some instances, 
encouraged.  
It is argued here that the differences, and the internal divisions within the parties, 
have contributed to the Executive branch’s lack of support—in both countries—for 
decentralization, and to the central government’s ability to define the public policy 
decentralization agenda with an emphasis on fiscal issues, control over policy areas, and 
by restraining the authority of subnational governments.  
The remaining chapters of this research (Chapters 6 through 9) have analyzed the 
process by which public service delivery decentralization, in the areas of health and 
education, occurred. It offers an evaluation of the effectiveness (defined as the capacity to 
implement the policies formulated with the desired results), and efficacy (defined as the 
capacity to make decisions or formulate adequate policies) of the policies devised. Both 
Colombia and Paraguay can be considered good examples of efficacy (laws and programs 
were mostly approved), but they have not necessarily been effective—subnational 
governments’ capacity to implement programs has been curtailed by legal requirements, 
excessive reporting, and fiscal constraints.  
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By examining laws dealing with health and education decentralization in both 
Colombia and Paraguay, the present research has attempted to explain how the agenda 
setting for reform occurred and explain the role of key actors in such processes (Kingdon, 
2003; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996; Mintron & Norman, 2009). The role of policy 
entrepreneurs, such as Minister Vidovich Morales of Paraguay and Londoño in Colombia, 
in health decentralization was also discussed. Their ability to create coalitions and networks 
of support to further reforms were essential to the approval process. Education 
decentralization in both countries seemingly lacked key policy entrepreneurs to champion 
reform implementation.  
By analyzing how those reforms were approved and implemented, the present 
research has sought to understand the complex relationships between legislators, 
bureaucrats, voters, politicians, and members of civil society. In the end, uncertainty and 
risk aversion have played a significant role, especially in Paraguay, in slowing down the 
decentralization reforms initiated in the mid-1990s.  
Regulatory uncertainty, the role of large state bureaucracies in health and education, 
and labor unions, as well as informal rules of interparty consultation, have also been 
discussed in the chapters dealing with the particulars of health and education 
decentralization in these two cases. In general, these informal institutions have made 
decentralization implementation very difficult. 
The research presented here strengthens previous findings (Kaufman & Nelson, 
2004) that major social sector reforms, especially in health and education, are often moved 
to the backburner due to pressing concerns of the political agenda of the country’s political 
class. As a consequence, and even when the legal framework was enacted and put in place, 
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the path of reform implementation has been very slow in the case of Paraguay, and has 
slowed down in the case of Colombia.  
The present research describes the phases that Colombia and Paraguay have 
traversed during the reform process: from the point that decentralization was included in 
the policy agenda; to a second phase in which concrete proposals were designed, approved, 
and brought to the Executive for approval; to the formal authorization of the reforms; and 
finally, the implementation phase (Kaufman & Nelson, 2004).  
The final phase has proven to be a very difficult one, with the introduction of a host 
of new actors impacted by the consequences of the proposed reforms. In this case, labor 
unions played a significant role in either blocking reforms or modifying them in such a 
way as to either derail implementation or slow it down. This is particularly true, both in 
Colombia and Paraguay, in the case of education decentralization where labor unions had 
long had a very powerful influence on politicians, a long tradition of strong organization, 
and an ability to influence the process, mostly, in their favor. In the case of health, since so 
many different stakeholders were involved and/or impacted by the reforms, a cohesive 
front of opposition was not present in either case, and some part of state bureaucracies 
were, in fact, in favor of the reforms.  
As discussed above, many difficulties have hindered the effective and efficient 
implementation of public policy decentralization, ranging from vague legal frameworks, 
unclear mandates, lack of adequate human capital, competing political forces, and the 
fundamental fact that local and regional governments in both countries continue to be 
heavily dependent on the transfer of resources from central authorities. Central authorities 
have also, through excessive regulations and controls, found a way of exercising control of 
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subnational governments, hindering their ability to be innovative and creative in the 
implementation of health and education decentralization reforms.  
Today, the future of public service delivery may emerge from the small but 
nonetheless significant changes that can be implemented through ministerial decrees, local 
initiatives, or changes in administrative practices—leading to new ways of delivering 
services with greater autonomy for subnational levels of government. These small steps, as 
long as they remain uncontroversial, could, in the long term, contribute to incremental 
changes in the way services are delivered.  
Though Kaufman et al. (2004) only analyze the decentralization policy reforms in 
various Latin American countries, they do not attempt to evaluate the extent to which those 
policies have been successful. The present research has modestly tried to evaluate the 
impact of health and education reform in Colombia and Paraguay by examining infant 
mortality rates (children under one year old, live births) in the case of health, and school 
enrollment (coverage) in the case of education.  
The findings are mixed in both countries, as many other social factors influence 
these indicators, and because so much of the desired data were not available. Nevertheless, 
these preliminary findings seem to support the assumption that, as subnational levels of 
government are given increased fiscal and administrative autonomy, basic indicators tend 
to improve, though the quality of those services is still very much in doubt and very difficult 
to assess.  
The present research has shown that health and education decentralization reforms 
imply: a series of very complex, difficult to implement new structures; a redesign of 
policies and procedures; changes in the relations between stakeholders; and changes in 
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intergovernmental relations that are not always clearly defined, much less understood, by 
all participants, including local communities. Thus, implementation suffers and demands 
for “better reforms” increase resulting, in some instances, in the slowing down of the 
process as different strategies are put forward to improve decentralization and no 
agreements are reached.  
By analyzing the dynamics by which these reforms were approved, this research 
has also shown that the political will of some key political actors—from ministers, state 
bureaucracies, legislators, community organizations, unions and associations, to 
presidents—was essential for the approval and implementation of decentralization reforms.  
In the case of Paraguay’s health decentralization, the commitment to reform of then 
Minister Andres Vidovich Morales—and his ability to create consensus both within his 
Ministry, as well as with national legislators, the president of the country, and subnational 
authorities—was fundamental to achieving reforms. Implementation, though, was 
impacted by his departure as Minister, as well as by the difficult political upheavals that 
would characterize Paraguayan politics in subsequent administrations.  
The case of health decentralization in Colombia has also shown the important and 
similar role played by Minister Juan Luis Londoño. In the Colombian case, implementation 
has been more successful and reforms have profoundly changed how health services are 
provided in the country.  
Promoters of health decentralization in Colombia benefitted from a strong reform 
team in the Ministry, as well as social movement, interest groups such as the Colombian 
Federation of Mayors, and political parties willing to support the coalition for reform. In 
the case of Paraguay, the coalition consisted mostly of the then Minister of Health, some 
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legislators in Congress, and few civil society organizations, and though associations such 
as the mayors and governors once supported the initiatives, momentum was—through the 
passage of time and implementation problems—slowly lost. The Lugo administration’s 
(2008-2010) decision to make health provision free of charge for all Paraguayans, though 
a laudable initiative, greatly diminished the little autonomy local governments had 
achieved in implementing and funding small health programs at the local level. 
In the case of education, neither country has had a key figure promoting 
decentralization. In Paraguay, education decentralization implementation never occurred 
and has essentially failed. In the case of Colombia, even with the strong opposition of the 
Colombian Federation of Educators (FECODE), there had been a previous tradition of 
subnational governments’ involvement in providing education services; thus, with the 
arrival of political decentralization, mayors and governors were empowered and demanded 
a role in education decentralization.  
Finally, in applying Bjork’s propositions for effective decentralization144 (2006) to the 
Colombian and Paraguayan experience: 
1) The greater the accepted vision of decentralization between the distinct center of 
power, the greater the chance for successful change: in both countries this assertion 
holds true, with the qualifier that, in both cases—but especially in the case of 
Paraguay—the definition and implications of decentralization were not clear for all, 
and the consensus decentralization created did not hold for long.  
																																																								144	Though his proposals are specifically for education decentralization, they can easily be applied to other 
policy areas. 	
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2) Devolution rather than delegation of authority and responsibility has a greater 
chance of long-term success: Neither Colombia nor Paraguay devolved authority 
and resources to subnational levels of government.  
3) It is easier to initiate decentralization in times of political, economic, and social 
stress, than during times of relative stability: the research has shown that this 
assumption holds true for both Colombia and Paraguay. 
4) When decentralization initiatives die, it is usually for political rather than 
administrative/technical reasons: here the results are mixed. First, in neither case 
has decentralization “died.” Though both countries show signs of a slowdown in 
decentralization, which can be attributed to political reasons (especially for 
Paraguay), administrative obstacles have also proven to be a factor in the 
slowdown, especially in Colombia. In fact, it is argued here that central authority 
bureaucracies, through excessive regulations and reporting requirements, have 
managed to effectively slow down the implementation of reforms.  
5) The presence of a strong management infrastructure at the regional level creates 
greater opportunity for success: this assumption holds true for both countries. In 
the case of Colombia, the presence of a more established infrastructure and previous 
experience in implementing such programs (especially in education) was important 
for Departmental governments in their success with extending coverage and 
enrollment. Paraguay’s subnational governments have lacked experience and 
infrastructure. 
6) Readiness and an incremental approach are important factors when 
decentralizing: this research has shown that one of Colombia’s problems, 
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according to subnational authorities interviewed and previous research, was the fact 
that the immense differences in resources, capacity, and ability to manage and 
implement public policies of Colombia’s subnational governments was not taken 
into account. This has been a very important factor for the perceived failures in 
implementation. In the case of Paraguay, the incremental approach was applied in 
the health sector reforms with the signing of memorandums of understanding 
between the Ministry, Departments, and local governments that required a series of 
steps to be met before health decentralization could be initiated.  
7) People who have been part of an organizational culture that has managed a 
centralized system are not very effective in managing a decentralized system: 
Paraguay and Colombia have demonstrated that large bureaucracies are difficult 
and slow to change, and since decentralization involves relenting power, these 
authorities tend to combat any reforms.  
Colombia and Paraguay have shown that sufficient power is required to influence the 
process. In both cases, but particularly in Paraguay, mayors and governors have lacked it. 
In Colombia, mayors in particular, have been more successful in exercising their power to 
influence the process.  
In neither case do subnational levels of government have sufficient autonomy in the 
management of financial resources, however in both cases, the way fiscal decentralization 
has been designed and implemented with its heavy dependence on transfers from the 
central government, makes them very vulnerable to the political will of those central 
authorities.  
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Adequate capacity in both cases has already been noted as a problem, along with the 
lack of reliable accountability mechanisms. Accountability issues might be the result of a 
lack of a democratic tradition and widespread practices of clientelism and patronage that 
are hard to eliminate, but at least in the case of Paraguay, it is somehow counterbalanced 
by an emerging and vocal civil society. 
In conclusion, the cases of both Colombia and Paraguay are a combination of “classic 
deconcentration” and “coercive devolution” (Lowry, in Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007), 
where subnational levels of government have mixed administrative responsibilities in the 
implementation of public service delivery.  
In the case of Paraguay’s educational system deconcentration has been the norm as the 
few programs that exist are still implemented at the local level by local staff of national 
agencies. Primary implementation authority remains in the central government, and local 
authorities have minimal discretion in planning and implementation as noted in Chapter 8. 
Their planning and management capacity is also highly controlled by the central 
government, and accountability goes upward to the national ministry. In the case of health 
decentralization, in the initial stages of the reform and through the period between 1996 
and 2008, the goals included increasing subnational governments’ involvement in the 
decision-making process with more responsibilities and management capacity. But the 
situation has, with time, moved toward a classic deconcentration model (Chapter 6).  
In the case of Colombia’s education and health reforms, the model more closely 
resembles that of coercive devolution, as local officials implement local plans, but central 
government authorities review their actions for consistency with national priorities and 
guidelines. The system is frequently characterized by tension as national, regional, and 
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local officials argue about who is in charge. The central government reviews local and 
regional implementation plans and regulatory compliance with national guidelines. 
Subnational governments are expected to meet certain criteria for successful 
implementation, and non-compliance is punished (Chapters 7 and 9).  
Decentralization continues to struggle against a number of challenges in both countries 
due to the unique complexities of Paraguayan and Colombian societies, the administrative 
and political challenges the countries still face, residents’ demands for more services and 
improved services, the presence of political turmoil and conflicting values, economic 
problems, and the constant need for political leadership. Future research can further explore 
and analyze the role played by state bureaucracies in hindering or advancing 
decentralization implementation, the initiatives to strengthen local capacity, and under 
what conditions would further decentralization of service provision occur.  
The present research has shown that “getting the institutions right” (Ostrom, 1990) is a 
very difficult task. The reshaping and realignment of intergovernmental relations spawns 
tension and conflict; therefore, incrementalism is an important factor for success. 
Institutional change always carries tension as resource considerations, which have 
distributional consequences (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010), are thrust to the forefront of 
political considerations. In both Colombia and Paraguay, political and economic resources 
and control of those resources were, and are, at the center of discussions of decentralization 
reform.  	
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